Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Dutch researchers create air-transmissible H5N1, keeping it in research hospital

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • #31
    Originally posted by zraver View Post
    H1N1 has a lethality rate of 2% if 4 billion people got infected in say an 18 month super pandemic that is 80 million dead. If an airborne version also increases just one scale in lethality that is 800 million dead....
    There have been about 530 cases of H5N1 among humans this year; 280 odd died... (I heard this on BBC World Service). That means roughly 50% death rate. Compare this to the 'Spanish flu' pandemic of early 20th century where the death rate was roughly 10%. Sure it's good research in that we now know exactly what mutations are needed for it to become transmissable between humans and so in theory are a stage further along a vaccine path but as for posting the precise details of how they did this for public reading... I think not.

    Comment


    • #32
      Originally posted by snapper View Post
      There have been about 530 cases of H5N1 among humans this year; 280 odd died... (I heard this on BBC World Service). That means roughly 50% death rate. Compare this to the 'Spanish flu' pandemic of early 20th century where the death rate was roughly 10%. Sure it's good research in that we now know exactly what mutations are needed for it to become transmissable between humans and so in theory are a stage further along a vaccine path but as for posting the precise details of how they did this for public reading... I think not.
      A Spanish flu sized pandemic with H5N1 could lead to a billion people dead in 2 years and the possible collapse of society. Short of a full scale nuclear war, a meteor strike, or a super volcanic eruption, this is the worst conceivable disaster that could hit human civilization. It boggles the mind that two viruses that might be able to do this have been already created by two small academic labs with a couple year's effort. It's even more alarming that the lab in the Netherlands went and outlined how to do it at a public conference. That cat is out of the bag. It doesn't matter now that they will or will not publish their methods, pretty much any competent virologist or microbiologist can do it with a few million to tens of millions dollars of capital, and do it in a way that's nearly undetectable.

      Unlike in 1918, this time around we can produce flu vaccines, and that could save us. However, it will have to be produced against the correct variant of the strain, which is a moving target due to constant evolution. Current H5N1 vaccines require 2x or more the normal dose to elicit a lasting immune response. This means that we do NOT currently have the production capacity to counter an epidemic once it starts, and we certainly do not have the capacity to rectify our mistake if we guess the wrong variant to inoculate against. In my mind this now needs to be rectified, pronto.
      Last edited by citanon; 22 Dec 11,, 22:41.

      Comment


      • #33
        Originally posted by snapper View Post
        There have been about 530 cases of H5N1 among humans this year; 280 odd died... (I heard this on BBC World Service). That means roughly 50% death rate. Compare this to the 'Spanish flu' pandemic of early 20th century where the death rate was roughly 10%. Sure it's good research in that we now know exactly what mutations are needed for it to become transmissable between humans and so in theory are a stage further along a vaccine path but as for posting the precise details of how they did this for public reading... I think not.
        I'll just note that death rates for something like flu are not easy to pin down, because the symptoms are so generic, and the reaction to flu so variable. There are innumerable pathogens that can cause flu-like symptoms. The only way I know of to reliably diagnose flu is a blood test, preferably PCR, and that's expensive and time consuming. Thus the death rate depends on the diagnosis rate, which is very likely highly inaccurate, and worse, unreliably inaccurate; depending on the hysteria and publicity and what not, there could be a high false positive rate or false negative rate.

        An example from swine flu:

        Abstract

        Background

        During the April-July 2009 outbreak of H1N1/2009 in scotland the West of Scotland Specialist Virology Centre (WoSSVC) in Glasgow tested > 16 000 clinical samples for H1N1/2009. Most were from patients clinically diagnosed with H1N1/2009. Out of these, 9% were positive. This study sought to determine what respiratory pathogens were misdiagnosed as cases of H1N1/2009 during this time.

        Methods

        We examined the results from 3247 samples which were sent to the laboratory during April-July 2009. All were from patients clinically diagnosed as having H1N1/2009 (based on accepted criteria) and all were given a full respiratory screen using real time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rtRT-PCR) assays.

        Results

        In total, respiratory pathogens were detected in 27.9% (95% confidence interval, 26.3-29.5%) of the samples submitted. Numerous pathogens were detected, the most common of which were rhinovirus (8.9% (95% confidence interval, 7.9-9.9%)), parainfluenza 1 (1.9% (95% confidence interval, 1.4-2.4%)) and 3 (4.1% (95% confidence interval, 3.3-4.9%)), and adenovirus ((3.5% (95% confidence interval, 2.9-4.2%)).

        Conclusions

        This study highlights the problems of using a clinical algorithm to detect H1N1/2009. Clinicians frequently misdiagnosed common respiratory pathogens as H1N1/2009 during the spring/summer outbreak in Scotland. Many undesirable consequences would have resulted, relating to treatment, infection control, and public health surveillance.

        During the summer 2009 outbreak of "swine flu" in Scotland what respiratory pathogens were diagnosed as H1N1/2009?
        I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

        Comment


        • #34
          Originally posted by ArmchairGeneral View Post
          I'll just note that death rates for something like flu are not easy to pin down, because the symptoms are so generic, and the reaction to flu so variable. There are innumerable pathogens that can cause flu-like symptoms. The only way I know of to reliably diagnose flu is a blood test, preferably PCR, and that's expensive and time consuming. Thus the death rate depends on the diagnosis rate, which is very likely highly inaccurate, and worse, unreliably inaccurate; depending on the hysteria and publicity and what not, there could be a high false positive rate or false negative rate.

          An example from swine flu:




          During the summer 2009 outbreak of "swine flu" in Scotland what respiratory pathogens were diagnosed as H1N1/2009?
          AG, I would think that the diagnosis for the H5N1 cases that have been detected is fairly reliable, as there is close attention from public health authorities, whom, I assume, would carefully confirm the diagnosis. On the other hand, I suppose there could be under-reporting of mild cases, which could skew the lethality rate to make the flu look much more lethal than it is. I wonder if this issue has been looked into for H5N1.

          Comment


          • #35
            Originally posted by citanon View Post
            AG, I would think that the diagnosis for the H5N1 cases that have been detected is fairly reliable, as there is close attention from public health authorities, whom, I assume, would carefully confirm the diagnosis. On the other hand, I suppose there could be under-reporting of mild cases, which could skew the lethality rate to make the flu look much more lethal than it is.
            Exactly.
            I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

            Comment


            • #36
              Mankind never ceases to amaze. We have a utopian planet and the means/resources to last hundreds of millions of years, but instead of truly bettering ourselves and striving for all that is good we focus on ways to annihilate ourselves with a touch of a button.
              We know two things without question. As a species we are capable of making a biological weapon such as this and in time using it as a weapon against each other, possibly even against ourselves. Secondly, despite our full resources, best intentions, vigilance, and knowledge we are prone to lapses and mistakes. The fact that pathogens such as this even exists creates a probability that in time something will get accidentally released. Make no mistake, we are playing with fire. If you remember one thing remember this. We don't need a "zombie apocalypse". We have viruses that are frighteningly efficient at doing the same thing we fear zombies can do.
              Removing a single turd from the cesspool doesn't make any difference.

              Comment


              • #37
                Originally posted by ArmchairGeneral View Post
                Exactly.
                On the other hand, the engineered virus apparently killed a great number of the infected ferrets.

                Comment


                • #38
                  If I read this right then basically they have made a biological WMD, and are keeping it in a civilian research hospital. Is it just me or is this absolute insanity? Oh, and the NIH funded the work and approved its publication
                  No. it isn't just you - this is very scary - inventing airborne versions of a dangerous pathogen - then storing it in a dubious setting. Sounds more like a rouge nation or terrorist group's actions than a federally funded agency supporting public health.:insane::scared:

                  This kind of information should be available to vetted scientists on a need to know basis - not publicly available for rouge nation's or terrorist group's consumption.
                  I would consider this to be akin to me telling the board how to build a nuclear weapon - and giving out details that weren't in the public domain. Add to that, telling everyone where the materials required are stored under limited security.
                  Last edited by USSWisconsin; 30 Dec 11,, 17:37.
                  sigpic"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
                  If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by bonehead View Post
                    Mankind never ceases to amaze. We have a utopian planet and the means/resources to last hundreds of millions of years, but instead of truly bettering ourselves and striving for all that is good we focus on ways to annihilate ourselves with a touch of a button.
                    We know two things without question. As a species we are capable of making a biological weapon such as this and in time using it as a weapon against each other, possibly even against ourselves. Secondly, despite our full resources, best intentions, vigilance, and knowledge we are prone to lapses and mistakes. The fact that pathogens such as this even exists creates a probability that in time something will get accidentally released. Make no mistake, we are playing with fire. If you remember one thing remember this. We don't need a "zombie apocalypse". We have viruses that are frighteningly efficient at doing the same thing we fear zombies can do.
                    And we know Zombies are fictional - invented to entertain us - pathogens are not entertaining - being deathly ill or watching a loved die of an illness is not fun. After watching a Zombie movie - we can go to sleep knowing it isn't really going to happen. Does anyone doubt that this virus can kill?
                    sigpic"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
                    If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      Originally posted by citanon View Post
                      On the other hand, the engineered virus apparently killed a great number of the infected ferrets.
                      A good point, though the reports I've read don't mention whether ferrets are considered a good model for lethality in humans, just transmission. But still, it's safer to assume high lethality, given what we know.
                      I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        An interesting post from Vincent Racaniello, a noted virologist and science writer, from his blog:

                        Originally posted by Vincent Racaniello
                        A bad day for science
                        20 DECEMBER 2011
                        The virologists who carried out the contentious experiments on influenza H5N1 transmission in ferrets have agreed to remove certain details from their manuscript, according to ScienceInsider:

                        Two groups of scientists who carried out highly controversial studies with the avian influenza virus H5N1 have reluctantly agreed to strike certain details from manuscripts describing their work after having been asked to do so by a U.S. biosecurity council. The as-yet unpublished papers, which are under review at Nature and Science, will be changed to minimize the risks that they could be misused by would-be bioterrorists.

                        Apparently a second manuscript on similarly sensitive material, submitted to Nature, has been studied by the NASBB and its details will also be redacted. Members of both scientific groups disagree with the decision.

                        The article hints that details of the experiments may be made available to influenza virologists ‘with a legitimate interest in knowing them’. Who will decide what constitutes a legitimate interest? And what if a virologist, or another scientist who does not work on influenza virus, has an idea for an experiment and would like the details? Will they be denied because they are not card-carrying influenza virologists? Science often works in unusual ways, and one of them is that difficult problems are often solved by individuals from different areas of research.

                        I agree with Albert Osterhaus, who noted that this debate could have been held in 2005 when the complete genome sequence of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus strain was released. That H1N1 strain is known to be lethal and transmitted efficiently among humans. In contrast, it is not known if the ferret-passaged influenza H5N1 virus would be transmitted in people and cause disease.

                        This is a bad day for virology, and for science in general. The decision by the NSABB sets a precedent for censoring future experimental results whose wide dissemination would benefit, not harm, humanity.

                        Update: A member of the NSABB has written about the committee’s thoughts on this issue. See comments below.
                        And a response in the comments to the post from Mike Imperiale, a member of the NSABB:

                        Originally posted by Mike Imperiale
                        As a virologist and a member of NSABB, I would like to make a few comments mainly to clear up some misconceptions that have crept into this discussion.

                        First and foremost, there is absolutely no doubt that this research had a very legitimate goal, to understand how the avian H5N1 virus might become transmissible among humans, using the well-established ferret model system as a surrogate. This has very important implications for the public health community worldwide. One should remember that until this work, it was unclear whether H5N1 even could be transmitted among mammals. These papers show that it can happen.

                        Second, this is not the same as the debate over the reconstruction of the 1918 virus in 2005. That virus was much less lethal in man. Moreover, there is some immunity against H1N1 in the population and medical care has improved greatly since 1918. Despite these advances, however, the current H5N1 mortality rate is in the 60% range. Might that rate drop and the virus become less virulent as a whole if it does indeed begin to exhibit human-to-human spread? It's possible, but we have no way of knowing that. I, for one, am not anxious to see that human experiment take place.

                        Third, I object to the use of the term "censorship." This is not censorship, but rather our responsibility as a scientific community. If H5N1 were to start spreading from human to human, be it by natural or man-made means, we are not prepared to handle it. There is NO pre-existing immunity and a reliable vaccine is not available, nor are the quantities of antiviral drugs that would be required to deal with a pandemic that would take only a few short months to establish itself. In this context, I agree that it is key that people with a legitimate need to know this information must be given access to it. And this is not limited to the influenza virology community. I know that both Nature and Science are insisting that this be the case if they are to agree to witholding some of the work from publication.

                        Finally, let me comment on the argument that terrorists would not use an agent whose spread cannot be controlled. One needs to look no further than suicide bombers to know that many modern day terrorists do not care about collateral damage or even their own lives. Moreover, it is well known, in public sources, that terrorist groups have expressed an interest in developing biological weapons.

                        At the end if the day, the possible consequences of this virus getting loose have to be balanced against the benefits of publication the papers "as is." Given the current state of the science, public health preparedness, and the world, my colleagues at NSABB and I believed that the prudent approach was to use caution. We (the scientific community) owe it to the public, who both fund our work and benefit from it, to demonstrate that we are acting responsibly. I would hasten to add that, if these papers are published with no editing and there is a terrorist event with this virus, one can only imagine what the response of the U.S. Congress and other international legislatures might be in terms of putting Draconian restrictions on research.
                        A question that just occurred to me, have no idea what the answer might be: the scientists in question seem to have accepted the judgement of the journals and the NSABB, but if one of them disagreed, there's nothing that could stop them just posting the omitted details online. I wonder if they would face legal repercussions from doing that...
                        I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          I suppose the Manhattan project was a bad thing for nuclear scientists too - information was restricted, Oppenhiemers career was wrecked - but we also didn't have a nuclear armagedon - yet.

                          I wonder if they would face legal repercussions from doing that...
                          or worse "repercussions " the movie "The Eiger Sanction" comes to mind. Or John Bull's fate. If they were to pubish them on the net, and a bioterrorist mounted an attack using the materials - then what?

                          There are many such situations where the choice is between bad and worse. 1000 lives vs a million... "Numbers add up to nothing" (Neil Young; Powderfinger) - each death is tragic, and large numbers of deaths hide this very well.
                          Last edited by USSWisconsin; 30 Dec 11,, 18:27.
                          sigpic"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
                          If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

                          Comment


                          • #43
                            Originally posted by ArmchairGeneral View Post
                            A question that just occurred to me, have no idea what the answer might be: the scientists in question seem to have accepted the judgement of the journals and the NSABB, but if one of them disagreed, there's nothing that could stop them just posting the omitted details online. I wonder if they would face legal repercussions from doing that...
                            Of course he'd face legal consequences. If they could put Martha Stewart in prison, they could get him.

                            This isn't Julian Assange posting government secrets to Wikileaks. This is something the public and both sides of the political spectrum are scared off. In the US he'd be f***ed by the cost of defense against litigation alone. He would also probably face subpoenaed by Congress and his lab would be "investigated" to the ground. If they cannot then get him on charges, they will get him anyways by charging him with lying about something, anything, to federal, state or local authorities. In addition to pretty much ending his career, the greater damage will be to the virology research community, and the whole chain of people who funded the work, as there's a not insignificant chance that this type of research will move into all together different regime of control (ie, classified and placed under DoD or similar agency's stewardship). I think the virology community realizes this could happen, and is moving to get ahead of events before they spin out of their control.
                            Last edited by citanon; 30 Dec 11,, 19:45.

                            Comment


                            • #44
                              Originally posted by citanon View Post
                              Of course he'd face legal consequences. If they could put Martha Stewart in prison, they could get him.

                              This isn't Julian Assange posting government secrets to Wikileaks. This is something the public and both sides of the political spectrum are scared off. In the US he'd be f***ed by the cost of defense against litigation alone. He would also probably face subpoenaed by Congress and his lab would be "investigated" to the ground. If they cannot then get him on charges, they will get him anyways by charging him with lying about something, anything, to federal, state or local authorities. In addition to pretty much ending his career, the greater damage will be to the virology research community, and the whole chain of people who funded the work, as there's a not insignificant chance that this type of research will move into all together different regime of control (ie, classified and placed under DoD or similar agency's stewardship). I think the virology community realizes this could happen, and is moving to get ahead of events before they spin out of their control.
                              There's two questions here- 1) Could the authorities go after them, and 2) Would the authorities go after them. Neither are clear to me. There is this thing called 'freedom of speech' we have here, you know...and it's not like this falls under the Espionage Act. Now, this is probably a moot point, as legal repercussions are not nearly as scary to a scientist as losing funding. Of course a grad student or someone could release info, but then they'd be risking their job prospects in the future.

                              As far as litigation, can't really sue someone unless harm is done, so that won't be an issue unless someone actually goes and tries to kill people.
                              I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

                              Comment


                              • #45
                                Originally posted by ArmchairGeneral View Post
                                There's two questions here- 1) Could the authorities go after them, and 2) Would the authorities go after them. Neither are clear to me. There is this thing called 'freedom of speech' we have here, you know...and it's not like this falls under the Espionage Act. Now, this is probably a moot point, as legal repercussions are not nearly as scary to a scientist as losing funding. Of course a grad student or someone could release info, but then they'd be risking their job prospects in the future.
                                I'm almost certain the authorities would go after him.

                                I think it's highly debatable whether disclosing information on a potential biological weapon would fall within freedom of speech protection. There has been, for example, legislation designed to prevent the publication of bomb making information on the internet. In this case, if the researcher publishes such information before such legislation is passed, the law would not apply to him ex post facto (but it's unclear whether this would violate other federal laws). However, even if he did not break the law, this does not grant him immunity from being investigated for terrorist connections, or subpoenaed for a Congressional investigation (indeed, if no crime was committed, he could not even claim 5th amendment protection), or red flagged for administrative action by grant agencies, or from the grant agencies themselves coming under intense political scrutiny and legislative action. If the researcher was to lie to investigators during any part of this investigation, he could be prosecuted and jailed, even if no other crime was committed (as happened in the case of Martha Stewart).

                                As far as litigation, can't really sue someone unless harm is done, so that won't be an issue unless someone actually goes and tries to kill people.
                                Whether harm is done by the mere disclosure of such information is debatable, and would be debated in court. A state government, or private individuals could claim, for example, that disclosure of the information necessitated heightened security and prevention measures at cost to the state. I'm sure in 5 min a competent lawyer could dig up better argument than I can muster. There would certainly be a lot of money being thrown around to motivate them. What would be crushing for the researcher would not necessarily be losing the judgement, but the cost of the litigation itself, and it is not clear that the researcher's institution would rise to his defense, after the NSABB action. Indeed the institution would consider itself lucky not to be included within the law suits.

                                At any rate, in the US, the guy would be f***ed six ways from Sunday. Not sure what would happen in Europe.

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X