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BBC News - UN nuclear agency IAEA: Iran 'studying nuclear weapons'
Excerpts :
C. Enrichment Related Activities
C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities
The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:
C.10. Conducting a test
The UN's nuclear watchdog says it has information indicating Iran has carried out tests "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device".
In its latest report on Iran, the IAEA says the research includes computer models that could only be used to develop a nuclear bomb trigger. Correspondents say this is the International Atomic Energy Agency's toughest report on Iran to date. Iran says its nuclear programme is solely to generate civilian power.
The BBC's Bethany Bell, in Vienna, has examined the IAEA's latest quarterly report on Iran's nuclear programme. She says the report gives detailed information - some of it new - suggesting that Iran conducted computer modelling of a kind that would only be relevant to a nuclear weapon.
The report, published on the Institute for Science and International Security website, notes that some of this research, conducted in 2008-09, is of "particular concern", our correspondent says. "The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the agency," the report says.
'Credible evidence'
The report highlights:
The report continues: "The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing."
The report stops short, our correspondent adds, of saying explicitly that Iran is developing a nuclear bomb. It says the information is "credible", and comes from some of the IAEA's 35 member states, from its own research and from Iran itself.
The report urges Iran "to engage substantively with the agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications."
'No serious proof'
Ahead of the report's release, there had been speculation in Israeli media about potential strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official said Washington would look at applying more pressure on Iran if it did not supply answers to the questions raised in the report, Reuters news agency said. "That could include additional sanctions by the United States. It could also include steps that we take together with other nations," the unnamed official said.
The UN Security Council has already passed four rounds of sanctions against Iran for refusing to halt uranium enrichment. Heavily-enriched uranium can be processed into nuclear weapons. China and Russia are unlikely to support further sanctions against Iran, the BBC's Kim Ghattas says in Washington. Russia said the IAEA report had caused rising tension and more time was needed to determine whether it contained new, reliable evidence of a military element to Iran's nuclear programme.
Experts say Iran is at least one year away, perhaps several, from being able to produce a nuclear bomb. Some believe Iran's leadership wants to be in a position to able to produce such a weapon on short notice.Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said there was "no serious proof" that Iran was going to create an atomic warhead."We have repeatedly stated that we are not going to create nuclear weapons," he said. "Our position has always been that we will never use our nuclear programme for purposes other than peaceful ones."
In its latest report on Iran, the IAEA says the research includes computer models that could only be used to develop a nuclear bomb trigger. Correspondents say this is the International Atomic Energy Agency's toughest report on Iran to date. Iran says its nuclear programme is solely to generate civilian power.
The BBC's Bethany Bell, in Vienna, has examined the IAEA's latest quarterly report on Iran's nuclear programme. She says the report gives detailed information - some of it new - suggesting that Iran conducted computer modelling of a kind that would only be relevant to a nuclear weapon.
The report, published on the Institute for Science and International Security website, notes that some of this research, conducted in 2008-09, is of "particular concern", our correspondent says. "The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the agency," the report says.
'Credible evidence'
The report highlights:
- Work on fast-acting detonators that have "possible application in a nuclear explosive device, and... limited civilian and conventional military applications".
- Tests of the detonators consistent with simulating the explosion of a nuclear device
- "The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network."
- "Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components."
The report continues: "The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing."
The report stops short, our correspondent adds, of saying explicitly that Iran is developing a nuclear bomb. It says the information is "credible", and comes from some of the IAEA's 35 member states, from its own research and from Iran itself.
The report urges Iran "to engage substantively with the agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications."
'No serious proof'
Ahead of the report's release, there had been speculation in Israeli media about potential strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official said Washington would look at applying more pressure on Iran if it did not supply answers to the questions raised in the report, Reuters news agency said. "That could include additional sanctions by the United States. It could also include steps that we take together with other nations," the unnamed official said.
The UN Security Council has already passed four rounds of sanctions against Iran for refusing to halt uranium enrichment. Heavily-enriched uranium can be processed into nuclear weapons. China and Russia are unlikely to support further sanctions against Iran, the BBC's Kim Ghattas says in Washington. Russia said the IAEA report had caused rising tension and more time was needed to determine whether it contained new, reliable evidence of a military element to Iran's nuclear programme.
Experts say Iran is at least one year away, perhaps several, from being able to produce a nuclear bomb. Some believe Iran's leadership wants to be in a position to able to produce such a weapon on short notice.Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said there was "no serious proof" that Iran was going to create an atomic warhead."We have repeatedly stated that we are not going to create nuclear weapons," he said. "Our position has always been that we will never use our nuclear programme for purposes other than peaceful ones."
The Full IAEA report
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/im...rt.on.iran.pdf
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/im...rt.on.iran.pdf
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
Excerpts :
C. Enrichment Related Activities
C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of low enriched UF6, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UF6 since production began in February 2007
As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF6.8 Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.
Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 200712 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).
As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF6.8 Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.
Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 200712 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).
In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).13,14 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF6 into
two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.15
Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF6 had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF6 enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%
U-235 were produced.
Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP18 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the DIQ.
In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).13,14 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF6 into
two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.15
Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF6 had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF6 enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20%
U-235 were produced.
Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP18 and other
verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the DIQ.
C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.19
As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at Natanz.20
During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.
The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.22
As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at Natanz.20
During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.
The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.22
The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year. In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build new enrichment facilities during the next two years. Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology. As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.
D. Reprocessing Activities
Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.27 In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.28 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.
E. Heavy Water Related Projects
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject to Agency safeguards.
On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.
Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.
On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.
Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.
F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication
Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under Agency safeguards.
Uranium Conversion Facility: On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not involve the use of nuclear material.
As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF6 had been processed and that Iran had produced 113 g of uranium in the form of UO2 that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO2 has been sent to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO2. During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO2 would also be sent to FMP to produce
fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.
In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of natural UF6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO2. During the DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC31 and
produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, and further indicated that some of the product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO2 to the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research activities and pellet fabrication”.
Uranium Conversion Facility: On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not involve the use of nuclear material.
As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO2. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF6 had been processed and that Iran had produced 113 g of uranium in the form of UO2 that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO2 has been sent to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO2. During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO2 would also be sent to FMP to produce
fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.
In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of natural UF6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO2. During the DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC31 and
produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO2, and further indicated that some of the product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO2 to the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research activities and pellet fabrication”.
Fuel Manufacturing Plant:
As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a rototype fuel rod containing natural UO2 that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR. 37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.32 During the inspection, the Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP for testing purposes.
- Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by
military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2); - Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex,
Section C.3); - The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a
clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and - Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components
C.8. Modelling and calculations
Information provided to the Agency by two Member States relating to modelling studies alleged to have been conducted in 2008 and 2009 by Iran is of particular concern to the Agency. According to that information, the studies involved the modelling of spherical geometries, consisting of components of the core of an HEU nuclear device subjected to shock compression, for their neutronic behaviour at high density, and a determination of the subsequent nuclear explosive yield. The information also identifies models said to have been used in those studies and the results of these calculations, which the Agency has seen. The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the Agency.It is therefore essential that Iran engage with the Agency and provide an explanation.
53. The Agency obtained information in 2005 from a Member State indicating that, in 1997,
representatives from Iran had met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon State to request training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes employing Monte Carlo methodology, and shock wave interactions with metals. In a letter dated 14 May 2008, Iran advised the Agency that there was nothing to support this information. The Agency has also been provided with information by a Member State indicating that, in 2005, arrangements were made in Iran for setting up projects within SADAT centres (see Section C.1 and Attachment 1), inter alia, to establish a databank for “equation of state” information42 and a hydrodynamics calculation centre. The Agency has also been provided with information from a different Member State that, in 2005, a senior official in SADAT solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.
53. The Agency obtained information in 2005 from a Member State indicating that, in 1997,
representatives from Iran had met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon State to request training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes employing Monte Carlo methodology, and shock wave interactions with metals. In a letter dated 14 May 2008, Iran advised the Agency that there was nothing to support this information. The Agency has also been provided with information by a Member State indicating that, in 2005, arrangements were made in Iran for setting up projects within SADAT centres (see Section C.1 and Attachment 1), inter alia, to establish a databank for “equation of state” information42 and a hydrodynamics calculation centre. The Agency has also been provided with information from a different Member State that, in 2005, a senior official in SADAT solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.
Neutron initiator
The Agency has information from a Member State that Iran has undertaken work to manufacture small capsules suitable for use as containers of a component containing nuclear material. The Agency was also informed by a different Member State that Iran may also have experimented with such components in order to assess their performance in generating neutrons. Such components, if placed in the centre of a nuclear core of an implosion type nuclear device and compressed, could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction. The location where the experiments were conducted was said to have been cleaned of contamination after the experiments had taken place. The design of the
capsule, and the material associated with it, are consistent with the device design information which the clandestine nuclear supply network allegedly provided to Iran.
56. The Agency also has information from a Member State that work in this technical area may have continued in Iran after 2004, and that Iran embarked on a four year programme, from around 2006 onwards, on the further validation of the design of this neutron source, including through the use of a nonnuclear material to avoid contamination.
57. Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field.
capsule, and the material associated with it, are consistent with the device design information which the clandestine nuclear supply network allegedly provided to Iran.
56. The Agency also has information from a Member State that work in this technical area may have continued in Iran after 2004, and that Iran embarked on a four year programme, from around 2006 onwards, on the further validation of the design of this neutron source, including through the use of a nonnuclear material to avoid contamination.
57. Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field.
58. The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has
been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.
been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.
C.11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle
The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.
The alleged studies documentation also shows that, as part of the activities undertaken within Project 111, consideration was being given to subjecting the prototype payload and its chamber to engineering stress tests to see how well they would stand up in practice to simulated launch and flight stresses (so-called “environmental testing”). This work would have complemented the engineering modelling simulation studies referred to in paragraph 60 above. According to the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation, within Project 111, some, albeit limited, preparations were also being undertaken to enable the assembly of manufactured components.
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