Turkey, Kurds, and the Re-Orientation of Politics
Turkey changing its' image and stance internally and externally with a more embracing pro-islamic image of their identity from a secular constitutionalists ideal imbued by the founders of the republic.
My feeling is to some degree there is a lot of posturing to project influence within Mid-East both economically and politically by participating in the game.
Turkey's Military Strikes Could Herald Closure For Kurdish Opening | EurasiaNet.org
There is some continuation of destabilization in border areas with Iraqi Kurdistan but that is not new.
1) [Syria]
2) [Kurds]
1)Syria seems like it is beginning to sway between Turkish and Iranian influence leveraging both to maximize benefits. This sort of occurred with Ukraine playing off Russia and Eu until eventually it more or less lost both partners.
The problem with Syria is at this point its' one of the only few countries where foreign (US/EU) influence has not meddled beyond political negotiation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38401&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=a78d45b9bc89b0445420bdeadcff950b
What is interesting in the article is not the Proselytizing of religions that is nothing new, the economics underpinning the current state of affairs with the drought rippled effect continuing is more interesting.
The reality is Syria in my opinion created its' own frozen conflict (with Israel and to a degree with Lebanon). It also to a degree created a frozen political conflict by not re-instituting citizenship that Kurds lost decades ago when it was stripped from them. Repercussions are such that the choice to negotiate(or do nothing) is slowly dissapearing.
Politically they could recognize borders with Israel and grant citizenship to Kurds to placate the West to a certain degree, but that kills Arab influence of detonates the authority of the government which is shaky already. Ergo the conservatives and religious whom are not yet out on the streets protesting the gov't might be compelled to do so.
Thus far their attempt to split Western Influence over Israel and Lebanon did not pan out, they(the gov't) probably thought the Lebanese pullout would split EU/US pressure and it did for a little while the problem is there was no resolution since meddling in Lebanon continued and posturing for negotiation with Israel and no actual negotiation occurred.
The pressure from Turkey over gov't crackdowns in Syria is sort of a dance in relation to, I pretend to listen to your advice and once the operation finishes you can claim that the pressure brought political resolution. We both can pat ourselves on the back for a job well done. The reality is Turkey controls a lot of water that goes through Iraq/Syria through dams present and planned and in some degree it could economically force the issue if it really wanted by simply using trade means.
(this is more or less what I got from the article below which goes into it far more eloquently than I do)
Turkey risks Syria's friendship in last-ditch effort to end violence - CSMonitor.com
This is more recent and more or less talks about things that give Syria stabilization.
Why many Syrians still support Assad - CSMonitor.com
I don't think this helps if every sixth person is in Agriculture and it is suffering due to drought, and the youthful unemployment and small business which provide some added services add up my guess is the majority are not happy.
Future thought: My guess is if foreign pressure increases on Syria the regime will actually negotiate and fix things internally/externally. This will weaken it longer term since it will not be able to have "external threat" mentality once Israel is peaced. They could become cosmopolitan and grant equal rights to all (Kurds etc) maintaining something similar to Soviet style despotism seen in quiet a few former republics. This may stabilize it longer term since there is no critical mass in any one minority which would push a region to secede. If the gov't overplays its' hand and the foreign pressure is actually strong enough the regime could destabilize and you get something similar to a land grab "Iraq 2" scenario except it would be to a degree far worse and more destabilizing longer term.
2) Kurdish question rests on a triangle more or less Turkey/Iran/Syria once one soften their stance and uses the emerging state for their gains there will be traction. It is more a question of when and not if. I used to think Syria would recognize its' own Kurds and more or less deal with and not protest their goals by maximizing its' benefit, ergo supplying arms while trying to get contracts etc... The odd thing is that thus far Turkey has been the one benefiting the most on the trade front. Iran seems quiet but in the future it could trade off Shiite Iraq against Kurdish Kurdistan the problem is nobody wants to pay with "something" because everyone has something to loose.
Syria in this regard had the least to loose and most to gain by getting a neighbor as a buffer vis a vis Turkey and Iran to a certain degree.
catalysts:
1) economy
I am basically looking at this from the point of view of Russia in the 90s when it collapsed. However my knowledge is limited in regard to the housing bubble in Turkey, agricultural problems(if any), bankruptcy effects if someone defaults on their loans, and the state of trade/gdp growth buffeted by these effects and on their own.
2) military
If the military gets softened up by a lull in activity and far more likely by a soft purge of hard core nationalists political opponents of the current party in the future once catalyst 1) falls into place there might be a reduction in forces scenario for the military presence and replacement of able commanders by cronies which my guess is happening now as we speak to a degree.
Top AKP official calls for drastic military overhaul - Hurriyet Daily News
Kurds establishing a state prior to funding increased insurgency within Turkey seems not necessary. What is necessary is money and unity. Unity seems to be lacking lately but there does seem a gradual amalgamation of forces into larger more unified entities (politic & military wise). I get a feeling that there is an opinion of waiting for the most opportune moment to have an effort ergo catalysts 1&2 come together and there is some success by the PKK of continued mayhem the other two political entities in Northern Iraq will align themselves to capitalize on expanding influence. This will most likely occur fairly quickly the question is will they be successful and how Turkey deal with it prior to occurrence.
Iran kills Kurdish rebel deputy military chief - Yahoo! News
sort of curious article in regard to happenings.
found this a bit odd but hey probably a grain of truth in there.
I actually think Turkey is going to experience a cluster**** post economic collapse and army reorganization. (similar to what happened in Russia in the Caucasus during the 90s) [the differences of course are the scope and size]
Turkey changing its' image and stance internally and externally with a more embracing pro-islamic image of their identity from a secular constitutionalists ideal imbued by the founders of the republic.
My feeling is to some degree there is a lot of posturing to project influence within Mid-East both economically and politically by participating in the game.
Turkey's Military Strikes Could Herald Closure For Kurdish Opening | EurasiaNet.org
There is some continuation of destabilization in border areas with Iraqi Kurdistan but that is not new.
1) [Syria]
2) [Kurds]
1)Syria seems like it is beginning to sway between Turkish and Iranian influence leveraging both to maximize benefits. This sort of occurred with Ukraine playing off Russia and Eu until eventually it more or less lost both partners.
The problem with Syria is at this point its' one of the only few countries where foreign (US/EU) influence has not meddled beyond political negotiation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38401&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=a78d45b9bc89b0445420bdeadcff950b
What is interesting in the article is not the Proselytizing of religions that is nothing new, the economics underpinning the current state of affairs with the drought rippled effect continuing is more interesting.
The reality is Syria in my opinion created its' own frozen conflict (with Israel and to a degree with Lebanon). It also to a degree created a frozen political conflict by not re-instituting citizenship that Kurds lost decades ago when it was stripped from them. Repercussions are such that the choice to negotiate(or do nothing) is slowly dissapearing.
Politically they could recognize borders with Israel and grant citizenship to Kurds to placate the West to a certain degree, but that kills Arab influence of detonates the authority of the government which is shaky already. Ergo the conservatives and religious whom are not yet out on the streets protesting the gov't might be compelled to do so.
Thus far their attempt to split Western Influence over Israel and Lebanon did not pan out, they(the gov't) probably thought the Lebanese pullout would split EU/US pressure and it did for a little while the problem is there was no resolution since meddling in Lebanon continued and posturing for negotiation with Israel and no actual negotiation occurred.
The pressure from Turkey over gov't crackdowns in Syria is sort of a dance in relation to, I pretend to listen to your advice and once the operation finishes you can claim that the pressure brought political resolution. We both can pat ourselves on the back for a job well done. The reality is Turkey controls a lot of water that goes through Iraq/Syria through dams present and planned and in some degree it could economically force the issue if it really wanted by simply using trade means.
(this is more or less what I got from the article below which goes into it far more eloquently than I do)
Turkey risks Syria's friendship in last-ditch effort to end violence - CSMonitor.com
This is more recent and more or less talks about things that give Syria stabilization.
Why many Syrians still support Assad - CSMonitor.com
I don't think this helps if every sixth person is in Agriculture and it is suffering due to drought, and the youthful unemployment and small business which provide some added services add up my guess is the majority are not happy.
Future thought: My guess is if foreign pressure increases on Syria the regime will actually negotiate and fix things internally/externally. This will weaken it longer term since it will not be able to have "external threat" mentality once Israel is peaced. They could become cosmopolitan and grant equal rights to all (Kurds etc) maintaining something similar to Soviet style despotism seen in quiet a few former republics. This may stabilize it longer term since there is no critical mass in any one minority which would push a region to secede. If the gov't overplays its' hand and the foreign pressure is actually strong enough the regime could destabilize and you get something similar to a land grab "Iraq 2" scenario except it would be to a degree far worse and more destabilizing longer term.
2) Kurdish question rests on a triangle more or less Turkey/Iran/Syria once one soften their stance and uses the emerging state for their gains there will be traction. It is more a question of when and not if. I used to think Syria would recognize its' own Kurds and more or less deal with and not protest their goals by maximizing its' benefit, ergo supplying arms while trying to get contracts etc... The odd thing is that thus far Turkey has been the one benefiting the most on the trade front. Iran seems quiet but in the future it could trade off Shiite Iraq against Kurdish Kurdistan the problem is nobody wants to pay with "something" because everyone has something to loose.
Syria in this regard had the least to loose and most to gain by getting a neighbor as a buffer vis a vis Turkey and Iran to a certain degree.
catalysts:
1) economy
I am basically looking at this from the point of view of Russia in the 90s when it collapsed. However my knowledge is limited in regard to the housing bubble in Turkey, agricultural problems(if any), bankruptcy effects if someone defaults on their loans, and the state of trade/gdp growth buffeted by these effects and on their own.
2) military
If the military gets softened up by a lull in activity and far more likely by a soft purge of hard core nationalists political opponents of the current party in the future once catalyst 1) falls into place there might be a reduction in forces scenario for the military presence and replacement of able commanders by cronies which my guess is happening now as we speak to a degree.
Top AKP official calls for drastic military overhaul - Hurriyet Daily News
Kurds establishing a state prior to funding increased insurgency within Turkey seems not necessary. What is necessary is money and unity. Unity seems to be lacking lately but there does seem a gradual amalgamation of forces into larger more unified entities (politic & military wise). I get a feeling that there is an opinion of waiting for the most opportune moment to have an effort ergo catalysts 1&2 come together and there is some success by the PKK of continued mayhem the other two political entities in Northern Iraq will align themselves to capitalize on expanding influence. This will most likely occur fairly quickly the question is will they be successful and how Turkey deal with it prior to occurrence.
Iran kills Kurdish rebel deputy military chief - Yahoo! News
sort of curious article in regard to happenings.
On Tuesday, the president of Iraq's Kurdistan region, Massud Barzani, called on Kurdish fighters seek their goals through diplomacy.
"We are in a difficult situation because there are two countries (Iran and Turkey) telling us to control our borders so there will be no problems," Barzani said in Arbil.
But "we are afraid to send forces to the borders for fear of a Kurdish-Kurdish war," he said.
"We are in a difficult situation because there are two countries (Iran and Turkey) telling us to control our borders so there will be no problems," Barzani said in Arbil.
But "we are afraid to send forces to the borders for fear of a Kurdish-Kurdish war," he said.
I actually think Turkey is going to experience a cluster**** post economic collapse and army reorganization. (similar to what happened in Russia in the Caucasus during the 90s) [the differences of course are the scope and size]
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