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Invasion of East Timor (1975)

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  • Invasion of East Timor (1975)

    Indonesia's military involvement 1
    Geographically, East Timor is bordered to the south by the Timor Sea and to the north by the Savu and Banda seas. The island itself is about 482 kilometers long and up to 104 kilometers wide. Timor is traversed by parallel ranges of mountains that are slightly higher to the east, where the island's highest peak, Mount Ramelau, or Tata Mailau is located. It is a region situated between Australia, the Nusa Tenggara Islands and the Philippines and, as such, is an area of great strategic military importance. Foreign governments were therefore anxious to study East Timor very closely during the cold war as its future had the potential to effect the entire region.

    Evidence, in March 1975, came to light implicating the People's Republic of China in the distribution of arms and finances to FRETILIN which set alarm bells ringing in the corridors of power across the globe.
    If proved, Western governments were convinced that the region would further destabilize. It was therefore made clear to Indonesia by a number of Western nations they could not accept the development of a Chinese satellite state in the region. It was no mere coincidence then, that U.S. President Gerald Ford visited Jakarta only two days before Indonesian troops liberated Dili on December 7th 1975. Events in the region were fueling the hysteria felt amongst those who continued to put their faith in the domino theory.
    Nightmare scenarios were presented of another Cuba, of hostile armadas patrolling the region's waters and of missile bases with capabilities of striking Australia, New Zealand and US military bases in the area. It was feared that East Timorese independence would precipitate a rouge regime with the ability to cause a regional disaster. The rough polarity of international politics at the time seemed to allow only one viable option; East Timor's integration into Indonesia.
    Despite fears of Portuguese Timor developing into a communist stronghold, Indonesia had, since its announcement, supported Portugal's decolonization plan and a peaceful settlement to the East Timor conflict. It was, in many ways, within Indonesia's interests that the East Timorese be given the right to self-determination and that the decolonization process be carried out democratically. A forced integration would, of course, only hinder East Timor's economic development as well as damage Indonesia's international reputation and affect foreign aid. Indonesia also, had no wish to be labeled a modern day colonial power.
    In 1974 however, as inter-party violence in East Timor escalated, L.B. "Benny" Moerdani, head of the Strategic Intelligence Center at the Ministry of Defense (HANKAM), suggested that Indonesia offer its assistance in upholding the rights of the coalition parties. In his opinion, the best course of action was to infiltrate a small number of volunteers into East Timor to stimulate local resistance. On his own initiative, he summoned Colonel Dading Kalbuadi and outlined his plan to dispatch a team of volunteers to cross the border so as to assist those Timorese wishing to integrate with Indonesia.
    Amongst the initial pro-integration volunteers was 16-year-old Anno Gusmao, brother of Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, a FRETILIN leader and commander of a Tropaz battalion who later, was arrested on November 20th 1992.
    Dading fully appreciated that the risks of being a volunteer were far higher than those of a regular soldier. He also understood perfectly that clandestine volunteers were often regarded as saboteurs by hostile powers. Such powers would, it was assumed, be prepared to mete out extreme punishment to any volunteers captured. Once deployed then, the volunteers would be on their own.
    The operation, code named Operation Poinciana, involved Sandhi Yudha commandos (Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha, or Kopassandha), who were given the mission to occupy potential FRETILIN bases south of Dili. Meanwhile, a small number of Timorese volunteers were divided into three teams; Susi, Tuti and Umi, all common Indonesian female names, each led by Indonesian commanders.
    "Each team had around 60 Timorese volunteers. We did not speak Indonesian and mostly used sign language to communicate with our commanders. However, the language barrier did not cause problems," said First Lieutenant Carlos Reis Soares.
    Like many of the pro-integration fighters, Soares was initially ignorant of the political developments sweeping East Timor prior to the civil war, unaware of the policies each party fought to assert. However, when the civil war broke out he opted to fight alongside the UDT.
    "I decided to join Indonesia because I had family in Indonesia (West Timor)," said Soares, who later joined the 745th Infantry Battalion under Major Theo Syafei, whose members were all East Timorese.
    At the border, Dading and his men changed into civilian clothes and quietly infiltrated into East Timor. UDT and APODETI supporters, who had continually been attacked by FRETILIN, were now no longer fleeing to Indonesia for protection. With basic military training and the support of Indonesian volunteers, both UDT and APODETI members were finally able to uphold their beliefs in the face of persecution.
    In mid-September 1974, the Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories, Antonio d'Almeida Santos, met with President Soeharto, who assured him that the Indonesian government had no territorial ambitions whatsoever. Soeharto went on to say that in accordance with the Indonesian 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian government was opposed to all forms of colonialism. A follow up meeting, scheduled one month later was, however, to sour the cordial relationship enjoyed by the two governments.
    President Soeharto sent Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo to Lisbon to discuss the future political status of East Timor. Upon leaving though, Moertopo was unaware of the changes taking place in the Portuguese government. General Spinola having been forced to resign was replaced by his former chief of staff, General Francisco da Costa Gomez, considered to be a political radical.
    Moertopo was therefore confronted with a new leader with a new policy regarding East Timor. A policy that accepted only two possibilities for the future of Portuguese Timor: full integration into Indonesia or self-government federated with Portugal.
    "Independence" according to Gomez at the time, "is totally unrealistic."
    In January 1975, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Security was therefore forced to consider both political and military involvement in East Timor as well as other possible outcomes should Indonesia refuse assistance. Operation Komodo (Operasi Komodo), created by General M. Panggabean, was directed by an intelligence unit whose principal task was to prepare for contingencies with regard to expected political changes in East Timor. Chief of the Intelligence Coordinating Body (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, or BAKIN), Lieutenant General Yoga Sugomo, led the operation which was to form the basis for Indonesia's battle plans to liberate the region. Initially however, the unit was tasked with directly observing all political developments in Portuguese Timor as well as initiating, developing, and maintaining contacts with local sympathizers.
    In the midst of this crisis, APODETI realizing the threat posed by FRETILIN, who could rely on the support by the Portuguese colonial government, prepared to defend itself.
    Fearing they would lose political momentum on August 10th 1975, the UDT also acted by mobilizing itself to pre-empt any FRETILIN military action. On the morning of Monday, August 11th 1975, Radio Dili announced that the whole city was under the control of the UDT. Joao Carascalao, the UDT military commander, explained to the Portuguese Governor of Timor that they were forced to act for the sake of unity, self-determination and ultimately to reject communism.
    On August 26th, Colonel Mario Lemos Pires fled to Atauro, effectively ending Portugal's control over its colony whose government then asked the U.N. Secretary General to complete the decolonization process. The Portuguese government had, it appeared, effectively washed its hands of the whole affair, unable to restore peace in the region due, in large part to the large weapons cache it had left to the FRETILIN militia. The killing spree that followed, between August and December 1975, left 3,000 UDT/ APODETI supporters dead and indirectly caused the deaths of some 60,000 East Timorese through hunger, malaria or dysentery.
    Hundreds of the UDT and APODETI victims were killed in Aileu after a mass round up by FRETILIN. A former Portuguese military training center, Aileu was used by FRETILIN as the main detention center for political prisoners and was to become a jail notorious for torture, murder and ill treatment.
    "The FRETILIN rounded up over 1,000 prisoners from 12 regencies at a potato store that served as our prison. There were no bathrooms or toilets, and we had to defecate in oil drums placed in the room. Many died of hunger and torture during months of detention," remembered Francisco Pereira, one of Aileu's former inmates.
    Pereira was detained for seven months when Indonesian troops and East Timorese partisans attacked Dili. The FRETILIN troops then began taking out the prisoners in small groups who would then disappear. Pereira later learned from relatives who brought him food however, that those prisoners thought to have been relocated had in fact been killed and dumped into a nearby river, their bodies mutilated, many beyond recognition.
    Later, the bodies of 135 victims of a FRETILIN massacre were found in four mass graves in Aileu so it was therefore not surprising that when more FRETILIN troops entered Aileu, nearly all of the town's 36,000 population fled into the forest. Only 15 elderly people remained. Most people never returned.
    Pereira and a group of 70 prisoners were however, taken to Maubisse where they stayed for a month before they were once again moved.
    "We were ordered to walk in twos," said Pereira. "The FRETILIN troops who guarded us threatened to kill all of us if any of us tried to escape."
    Despite the threats, Pereira managed to detach himself from the line and escape his captors. "I pretended to pee, and then ran as fast as I could."
    Another survivor of a FRETILIN massacre at another detention center, Januario de Caralho, recalled how many prisoners were crammed into secret cells, so crowded that they could not even sit down4. He recounted that with no toilet the prisoners were forced to defecate on the floor. Amongst the many held in these inhumane conditions were Jose Fernando Osorio Soares, Apodeti secretary general, his brother and his cousin Arcindo Osorio and Domingos Osorio. All were executed in Hat-Nipa. Only Januario de Carvalho escaped.
    Armindo Soares, a Timorese regional politician, remembered a meeting with Ramos Horta in Austria during the Third All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialog where Horta, Soares claimed, "admitted to FRETILIN's brutal treatment of their prisoners."
    Amnesty International also confirmed of receiving reports of human rights violations by FRETILIN, including the killing and serious ill-treatment of prisoners held in Dili and Aileu. It also received a statement issued by FRETILIN itself, announcing the execution, in December 1983 of a number of alleged collaborators, as well as complaints about FRETILIN brutality made by Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Bishop of Dili, in interviews given in 1984.
    Some 150 prisoners though, escaped execution in Manatuto, thanks to the help of a local priest who opened the prison doors there allowing the prisoners to flee into the forest. FRETILIN's cruelty was however to be its downfall, unifying all opposition against it. As coalition support grew, so to did the resistance movement united in the common cause to restore peace in East Timor.
    Four days after arriving at Atauro, Colonel Pires urged international intervention, as the killings continued and the East Timorese faced serious food shortages. Dili was divided into three sectors: UDT, FRETILIN, and the Portuguese military, which controlled the area around the harbor. Six days later, the U.N. Secretary General requested Australia and Indonesia to;
    "..provide assistance for the ever-increasing number of refugees from East Timor."
    On October 7th 1975, after a bitter battle, Batugade, on East Timor's Western border, was liberated from FRETILIN control by a joint force of Timorese freedom fighters and Indonesian volunteers, with few casualties. Dading estimated that only about 50 volunteers from special forces units were involved in fighting alongside UDT and APODETI liberation fighters when Batugade was captured. Once liberated, nine coalition leaders were able to meet and, following discussions, reached an agreement later known as the Batugade Petition.
    That month, Indonesian volunteers, supported by 1,500 APODETI and UDT partisans, also attacked and captured Balibo and Maliana, but were forced back at Lebo due to the enemy's sheer numbers. The enemy also had the tactical advantage of defending from high ground, pinning down the young Indonesian volunteers, many of whom had no prior combat experience.
    "When radio contact with them was cut off, the Army sent a helicopter to find the troops but upon hearing the approaching helicopter, the troops went into hiding thinking it to be an enemy helicopter. They couldn't even identify their own helicopters, let alone combat techniques to maneuver in such a terrain," Artillery Colonel Soebijakto Prawirasoebrata said in 1976.
    The next target, Atabai, was taken on November 28th, three weeks behind schedule. From that point onwards, the border conflict became static, as Indonesian volunteers and FRETILIN fighters dug in and fired randomly at each other. The front had become a training ground for both sides. The engagements with each other were to be a blessing in disguise as the Indonesian volunteers were able to improve their fighting skills.
    In Dili, the situation became increasingly uncertain. On November 29th, Portugal, after having abandoned the territory for three months, declared itself administrator of East Timor but at the same time refused to send in representatives to restore security and order to the region. Widespread unrest began to develop as APODETI, KOTA and Trabalhista members became targets of increasing FRETILIN intimidation that was seen to be becoming more radical as conditions worsened.
    In the following ten days, the security situation in Dili collapsed completely with any semblance of law or order disappearing. FRETILIN mobs, supported by a number of Portuguese military and colonial troops and Tropaz forces, attacked Dili from the surrounding hills. To protect themselves from reprisal attacks by FRETILIN, thousands of UDT and APODETI supporters fled the city, trying to head westwards to obtain sanctuary in Indonesia. Those who were unable to escape suffered terribly in Taibesse prison, imprisoned by FRETILIN supporters.
    Convinced that they had won the battle and controlled all of Dili, FRETILIN, on November 28th 1975, unilaterally proclaimed the formation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, appointing Xavier dos Amaral as president. FRETILIN's opponents, both those who were pro-integrationist and those who wished to retain some union with Portugal, were eradicated. The only option open to non-FRETILIN groups was armed resistance. FRETILIN's declaration of independence was challenged by a counter proclamation that stated that FRETILIN, by their actions, had effectively closed the option of a peaceful settlement. The counter statement urged the government and people of Indonesia to come to the aid of their brothers in Timor who were being indiscriminately slaughtered.
    The Balibo Declaration of integration and FRETILIN's proclamation of independence placed Indonesia in a difficult situation. Despite the rapid growth of the pro-integration movement thousands of refugees poured into Indonesian West Timor to escape the FRETILIN militia. Indonesia faced the large task of accommodating and sheltering the mass exodus. Despite majority support for integration in East Timor, the conflict was now forcing Indonesia to bear part of the burden in caring for its victims.
    Though more than willing to protect any innocents suffering persecution, the Indonesian government was fully aware that the establishment of refugee camps was in no way a solution to East Timor' problems. The refugees themselves, also placed a considerable strain on government resources that needed to provide food, medicine, accommodation and other daily necessities also badly needed in other parts of the country.
    In addition to these concerns, Portugal's inability to handle the East Timorese situation had left a void in the region which permitted, under international law, outside intervention to restore order as an 'act of dereliction'. The legal justification, under international law however, was a secondary concern. The fate of the people of Timor was, at the time a far more pressing from Indonesia's standpoint.
    FRETILIN's proclamation of independence posed a serious threat to Indonesia as enemy border crossings into West Timor started to increase in 1975. By September 1975, with over 40,000 East Timorese refugees sheltering in West Timor, Indonesia not only needed to provide shelter but also stem the tide of armed infiltration into it's territory. FRETILIN's border violations, mortar attacks and robberies were causing such disruption amongst Indonesian villagers, and East Timorese refugees, that on September 26th some 5,000 people held a mass gathering to declare their determination to fight FRETILIN. They further demanded that the Indonesian government take firm action against any FRETILIN troops who ventured into Indonesia.
    This new development motivated ABRI into creating a new military operational plan, code named Operation Lotus (Operasi Seroja), involving various ABRI units. Under this new plan, volunteers would no longer be deployed, but a massive joint operation of brigade size would be mobilized, consisting of elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The ABRI leadership appointed Air Marshal Sudarmono as chief of operations staff, and Brigadier General Bambang Triantoro, was appointed his operational assistant. Brigadier General Soeweno, commander of the Sandhi Yudha, was appointed commander of Operasi Seroja's joint task force. Finally, Navy Colonel Rudolf Kasenda was appointed commander of the joint force staff.
    Joint forces, supported by Timorese fighters, took Dili on December 7th 1975, forcing FRETILIN forces to withdraw to Aileu but when that also fell, they withdrew to Ainaro in the mountains. Three days later, the coalition forces attacked Baucau and one by one they seized the other towns in East Timor. However, Operasi Seroja failed to completely quell FRETILIN resistance and the war dragged on. The Indonesian forces were slow to consolidate their positions outside of the main towns against an opponent that had built a strong defensive system that included the mobilization of civilians. They had already divided the province into nine military sectors:
    1. The military sector in Dili, Tibar, Remexio and Metinaro commanded by the Chief of Staff of the FRETILIN's Armed Forces, Guido Diamntino Da Kagneicao Soares;
    2. The military sector in Aileu that covered Ermera, Ainaro and Same, under Jose Da Silva;
    3. The military sector in Atabai that covered Atabai, Balibo and areas along the border, from Nunura in the South to Batugade, under Aguilis Freitas Soares;
    4. The military sector in Liquissa that covered Liquissa, Majibara and Bazartere, under Atonia Pines;
    5. The military sector in Bobonaro that covered Maliana, Cailoco, Atsabe, Bobonaro, Suai and all the areas along the southern border up to Sumalai, under Soares;
    6. The military sector in Manatuto that covered Manatuto, Laclo, Laclubar, Laleia and Sotbada, under Joao Pedro Soares;
    7. The military sector in Viqueque that covered Viqueque and Barique, under Anibal Araujo;
    8. The military sector in Baucau that covered Baucau, Vemase, Laga, Quelicai, Baguia and Venilale, under Jose Cirilonuses;
    9. The military sector in Lautem that covered Lautem, Lospalos, Iliomar, Luro and Tutuala, under Adau Amaral.
    The FRETILIN troops were fully aware that the only effective way of dealing with the coalition troops was by engaging in guerrilla warfare and so set about building a defense around the local geography. They used light weapons for coastal defense but had a stronger defense in the areas that bordered the mountains. The FRETILIN fighters were also highly mobile moving in small groups and using civilians as human shields against the coalition forces.
    "Many of the civilians fought alongside the FRETILIN out of fear. The FRETILIN troops and their supporters terrorized the people, making arbitrary arrests, torturing victims in public and effectively instilling great deal of fear among the people," said Lautem Regent Edmundo.
    A series of localized campaigns from September 1977 until early 1979 led to the capture and surrender of many thousands of East Timorese, who were driven out of the bush by hunger.
    "FRETILIN forces herded people from four regencies to the mountains at Matabean complex where they concentrated their final resistance. Life in the mountains was the worst I had ever experienced. There was no food, water was scarce and many died of starvation. Yet, despite the hardship, the people refused to return to their home villages due to the uncertainty of the situation. Like me, they were victims of the political situation. Nothing could compare to the situation," said Sera Malik, a former FRETILIN platoon commander who surrendered in 1982 and later joined Kopassus as an honorary member. At Matabean, FRETILIN's numbered 15,000 men armed with the bulk of the weapons left by the Portuguese.
    Despite continuous air and ground attacks from Indonesian troops, FRETILIN managed to defend the Matabean complex for a long time, thanks to their good fighting spirit and their intimate knowledge of the terrain.
    "They fought in small units and were capable of conducting both short and long-range engagements. They also had better techniques and tactics compared to the Indonesian troops," Carlos Reis Soares explained. Matabean therefore became a killing zone.
    "In 1977, the marines were almost completely wiped out there and the 328th Infantry Battalion/Siliwangi suffered a similar fate," said Sera Malik.
    It was at the Matabean complex that both the coalition forces and the FRETILIN troops suffered the highest number of casualties in the whole conflict.
    "Between 1,000 and 2,000 FRETILIN troops died at Matabean. The number included those who died of starvation and illnesses," said Sera Malik, who dismissed claims that the war had caused the death of 200,000 East Timorese.
    Meanwhile, the number of East Timorese who surrendered or joined the coalition forces continued to grow as more and more people grew wary of both the futility of their struggle and FRETILIN'S communist manifesto.
    "Almost all of the people in Aileu were FRETILIN supporters. When Aileu fell to the coalition forces, I withdrew to the forest with 30 men armed with G-3 rifles and stayed there until 1978. There were only 15 of us left", said Tomas Yesidonsa, a former Tropaz member who is now a member of the Aileu regional parliament.
    "In 1977, the FRETILIN forces burned our chapel and threatened to execute those who surrendered. We could not accept the fact that the FRETILIN forces had done this and so we decided to return to the city, relying on a guarantee from the (Indonesian) troops that they would not shoot us when we surrendered,"
    In early 1976, efforts to involve more East Timorese in the war against the FRETILIN forces intensified.
    "I managed to gather some 200 former Tropaz members to help ABRI. We joined the Umi, Susi and Tuti teams and helped secure Dili, during which we seized 150 weapons. I wanted to help ABRI end the conflict and offered to help, but my proposal was turned down," said Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares, a former Tropaz member.
    Fortunately, Abilio met Captain Hendro Prijono and Second Lieutenant Prabowo Subianto, commanders of Kopassandha's Nanggala 10 and Nanggala 28 Companies. The three of them discussed ways to involve more native East Timorese in the campaigns against the FRETILIN forces. Hendro and Prabowo then wrote a letter to ABRI leadership, informing them of the large number of people in Dili who wanted to fight alongside the coalition forces. Considering their recommendations, the Army formed the 744th and 745th Infantry Battalions, under the command of Major Yunus Yosfiah (whose members included former Tuti, Umi and Susi teams), and which contributed significantly to efforts to eliminate FRETILIN resistance.
    Operasi Seroja continued until 1979, when the government announced plans to place East Timor under full civilian administration. This was in line with the third phase of a original four-phase plan which followed the situation before Operasi Seroja, and the actual operation itself. The third phase of the plan represented the stabilization period which, in time, would be followed by a rehabilitation phase. According to early estimates though, the first and second phases would be completed without difficulty allowing the government to stabilize and rehabilitate the province in very little time. However, continued attacks on military outposts by the remaining FRETILIN forces disrupted efforts to stabilize and rebuild the province forcing the government to launch continued series of attacks against FRETILIN resistance.
    A cease fire between the government and the FRETILIN was agreed upon in March 1983 but later broke down motivating the government, in August 1983, to launch operation, Operation Clean-Sweep (Operasi Sapu Bersih). The operation commenced at a time when East Timor, as an issue, shifted from being a military to a political concern jeopardizing efforts to stabilize and rehabilitate the province.
    East Timor remains a politically charged issue with the remaining FRETILIN rebels continuing to feed on the region's notoriety generated by the world press to gain public support. Aware of these changes, the Army began to pay more attention to political aspects of the issue.
    In 1984, Korem 164/Wira Dharma issued manuals amongst troops stationed in East Timor on how to better win the hearts and minds of the people which strongly promoted a better respect for human rights. Since 1989, combat operations have been pushed to the side as territorial operations have gained a greater momentum to help the civilian administration develop the province.
    Operation Seroja
    The December 7th 1975 offensive on Dili was, according to General Benny Moerdani (retired), "an embarrassment".
    It was firstly a long way behind the initial schedule of February, which allowed the enemy time to relocate their forces, train a militia and occupy important positions prepared by a Portuguese administration which had anticipated an Indonesian invasion. Secondly, the plan was too ambitious, given financial limitations, shortages in ammunition, transport and logistics, and most of all, the inexperience of the troops deployed.
    "They simply could not fight," Lieutenant General M. Sanif (retired) said of the troops deployed in the operation.
    "Many of the young soldiers simply refused to fire at the enemy. They just could not do it, even though they knew that the FRETILIN troops might kill them. I had to literally show them," said Colonel Suprapto Tarman, a former chief of staff of Korem 164/Wira Dharma in Dili.
    Poor intelligence was another drawback in the operation, providing the operational commands with false intelligence that affected planning that would later proved disastrous.
    "Intelligence reports indicated that the Comoro River was full of crocodiles so the original plan to parachute troops there had to be canceled. It later transpired that there was not a single crocodile there. Had we dropped troops there, the attack on Dili would have been more successful and our casualties would have been smaller," an infantry officer lamented.
    Benny Moerdani claimed that given the chance to do it all over again, all he would have asked for was better intelligence.
    The sun had not risen on the morning of December 7th 1975, when the combined UDT, APODETI, Indonesian volunteer, and ABRI forces, attacked East Timor's northern coastline. From the darkness of the early morning, the Indonesian Navy bombarded the outer suburbs around Dili. Then, at 5.45 a.m., eight Hercules transport aircraft of the Air Force's 31st squadron disgorged hundreds of paratroopers from the 502nd Airborne Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Matrodji, and the airborne-commando (Para Komando, or Parako) Detachment of the Sandi Yudha, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Soegito. The each plane carried 62 troops either from Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base in Jakarta or Iswahyudi Air Force Base in Madiun, East Java. The reception from the Tropaz they would receive even before they reached the ground, though, was to be hostile. The incessant anti-aircraft fire that rose up from the city resulted in five of the eight aircraft being hit forcing all of the pilots to cut short the dropping time, leaving 29 troops in each plane.
    The second sortie commenced at 7.45 a.m. with another five Hercules aircraft parachuting more troops into Comoro resulting in further errors as the descending troops fired upon the advancing Indonesian marines confusing them for FRETILIN fighters. The marines fired back at the descending paratroopers inflicting high casualties in their ranks and causing the Commander of the Joint Forces Colonel R. Kasenda to cancel the third airdrop.
    The naval bombardment of Dili also created problems as it only helped to alert the sleeping FRETILIN forces who promptly readied their defenses. An hour after the bombardment, which was hoped to have silenced the FRETILIN artillery on the western and eastern flanks of the city, Kostrad paratroopers jumped into Dili. The bombardment though, had failed to eliminate any of its targets and instead gave FRETILIN an opportunity to regroup and counterattack the invaders.
    Poor coordination made matters worse. In the fighting that raged in the center of the town, the marines, who had landed from the north on the beach, shot at Kostrad troops. Field commanders had apparently not all been given operational briefings creating chaos within the ranks fighting for control of the city. Relentless enemy fire prevented logistical support from reaching the beach and, in turn, many Indonesian troops immediately felt the dangerous effects of ammunition shortages in the battle in the town center. They were never told that several months earlier the Portuguese garrison in Dili had been re-supplied with new weapons provided because of Portugal's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
    The Indonesian troops were also unaware that a large ammunition store had intentionally been made available to FRETILIN by the Portuguese colonial government once it had fled East Timor. In the store were over 15,000 modern weapons that were promptly distributed en-mass to all FRETILIN supporters in the region. FRETILIN troops also had the advantage of almost five month's battle training by elements of the Portuguese military, from the time the political crisis erupted at the end of August, to early December 1975.
    It now appears that even in the initial plan to seize Dili, several basic military premises supporting an operation like this were overlooked. Any military operation, according to military theory, must clearly determine whether it is going to focus in a land, air or sea theater. What gravely affected the operation's success in Dili on the first day, was poor planning. The planners had failed to see that not all of the soldiers had been involved in any form of joint operational training. Consequently, confusion arose. It was reported that an aircraft was shot at by friendly troops on the ground and that paratroopers were dropped although their aircraft was off course and out at sea. Worst of all, since logistical supply came via the Navy, the troops who had been ordered to capture the city had no access to re-supplies of ammunition or food.
    In the original plan, Dili was to be attacked by Parako troops at 8 p.m. while a marine amphibious unit would land at the port. Later, in the morning, an airborne unit would land at the airport, while the seaborne troops (Pasukan Pendarat, or Pasrat), would land on the coast west of Dili (Comoro).
    However, to ensure the secrecy of the attack, the Parako raid was canceled and instead, they were parachuted together with other airborne units. The Pasrat troops were also dropped closer to Dili than originally planned so as to enable a quick link-up with the marines. From the military point of view, the plan would create problems because the airborne troops would fall into scattered areas that would overlap with the Pasrat troops. Also, due to shortages of transport aircraft and ships, the attack on Baucau would not be launched simultaneously with the Dili offensive because the necessary transport was not available.
    In the actual operation, the original airborne attack on Dili was canceled and instead the troops would land from both the sea and the air. An airborne operation would only be launched during the attack on Baucau, which had a good operational airport. However, the airborne operation in Baucau would commence after a simultaneous airborne and seaborne attack involving the 401st Airborne Infantry Battalion and a team of the Kopassandha special forces.
    The forces available for the attack on Dili were the 501st Airborne Infantry Battalion, a company of the 502nd Airborne Infantry Battalion from the 18th Airborne Infantry Brigade, one Parako detachment, the Tuti and Umi special teams, Pasrat troops, a mechanized Pasrat detachment, a 130 mm rocket unit, and a 105 mm howitzer unit.
    The forces that would take Baucau were the 17th Airborne Infantry Brigade (not at full brigade strength), the 401st Airborne Infantry Battalion from the 18th Airborne Infantry Battalion, a Pasrat detachment and the Tuti special team.
    The actual attack on Dili was launched early at dawn though the defenders soon caused difficulties for the invading force. Because of the relentless anti-aircraft fire, the Air Force pilots transporting the airborne troops to their drop zones were anxious to avoid anti-aircraft flak. However, by doing so, the paratroopers were taken off course. Many of the Parako troops were dropped off course, some even into the sea. Some were also dropped straight into the enemy's barracks and were killed instantly. It was only on day two that the troops could start to regroup.
    The naval gunners all missed their targets, though the Navy later claimed though that had not been due to lack of practice. The reason, it was claimed, was because the gyro-stabilizers were not working properly, tipping the artillery guns preventing any accuracy. One naval artillery round even landed in front of the joint forces command headquarters at the port where Colonel M. Sanif, chief of operational staff, was briefing his staff. There were no maps or coordinates to guide the ground troops armed with random assortment of weapons which they were expected to use against the well armed FRETILIN fighters.
    The Army and Pasrat tanks were equally ineffective none of which could hit the FRETILIN's LCVPs. This though, may have been to their advantage as Indonesian troops later managed to seize one LCVP though the other FRETILIN LCVPs managed to escape.
    During the first two days, the Indonesian troops fought in assorted groups made up of various units due to the confusion of the situation. Only the Pasrat troops remained completely intact because they landed from the sea and were generally better organized. The Parako Detachment also fared well because it was dropped at the airport which fell to very little resistance.
    The unit that suffered the most was the 401st Airborne Infantry Battalion of the 17th Airborne Infantry Brigade, which was dropped in Baucau on December 10th. It took two days for the battalion to regroup because 80 of its 400 troops had broken their legs in the jump. According to the airborne combat commander, the troops did not have enough training and in two years they had only made one jump due to limited funds. In addition to these problems, Baucau's hostile terrain, covered in rugged coral and rocky ground, later raised concerns as to whether the unit's mission was doomed from its initial conception. At the time though, all the paratroopers could think about was how to reach the ground.
    Due to shortages in equipment and transport, the airborne troops could not even defend and maintain the areas they occupied. Some of the towns they had taken, including Vemase, therefore had to be abandoned allowing the Tropaz and FRETILIN's fighters to regroup.
    While the operations in Dili continued, another attack was launched on Aileu, the FRETILIN headquarters, 20 kilometers from Dili. However, the road leading to the town was so hilly that the actual distance by road stretched to 45 kilometers. The attack scheduled for December 22nd and was carried out by the 4th Brigade, Brigif Linud 18 (a Parako detachment), the Tuti and Umi special teams, a Pasrat detachment, a 130 mm rocket unit, a 105 mm howitzer unit, East Timorese partisans, and an Army Land Combat Unit (Kesatuan Tempur Darat Angkatan Darat, or KTDAD) at full strength. This consisted of the 405th, 406th and 407th Infantry Battalions.
    The joint forces were given one week to take Aileu, with the deadline of January 1st, before a U.N. representative, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, arrived in Dili on January 3rd. The Indonesian government would be at a political disadvantage if fighting was still raging during the talks.
    On December 18th, the 4th Brigade opened an attack to clean the baseline to Aileu during which they were confronted by FRETILIN forces who counterattacked to drive off the Indonesian troops. It therefore took the brigade three days to sweep the baseline clean of resistance.
    The FRETILIN forces proved stubborn adversaries who fought in small groups of fives and sixes and defended their territory well. Their fighters were armed with automatic weapons and fought from elevated positions causing many Indonesian casualties. With no air support for the Indonesian ground troops, artillery and tanks were used to protect the advance which for many of the Indonesian troops was their first combat experience. Because of ammunition shortages in the past they had no marksmanship training.
    By December 21st, the baseline was secured and, on the following day, the attack to the south began. It had taken the joint forces seven days to cover the 32 kilometers to Aileu but, by the time they finally arrived, they were so exhausted that they were in no shape to take Maubisse and Ermera. By then, FRETILIN had changed its strategy and started using guerrilla techniques to hinder the Indonesian offensive specifically targeting logistics support for attack, causing further casualties. Only on the Eastern front did FRETILIN continue fighting conventionally. The 328th Infantry Battalion therefore operated around the clock to try and break the enemy resistance resulting in the capture of Manatuto on December 26th.
    In Baucau, members of the 330th Infantry Battalion were air-dropped with the mission to retake the town that had fallen into FRETILIN hands. Though being experienced and well trained they faced a strong enemy defense prepared, in part, by the Japanese during World War II. It took them ten days to break it. Some ten days before the airborne attack, the 310th Infantry Battalion had arrived there who, supported by an artillery unit, launched an attack on the town. Facing a strong enemy defense, equipment shortages and a lack of experience it was unable to make significant progress.
    The 403rd Infantry Battalion was charged with taking Bobonaro. However, enemy resistance once again proved to be too formidable for the Indonesian soldiers who again suffered from equipment shortages and a lack of combat experience.
    On the Central front at this time, joint forces reached Maubisse and had started a final attack on Ermera to the west. Meanwhile, FRETILIN troops in Manatuto began to regroup in an attempt to stem the powerful Indonesian military advance. Though some had surrendered, many remained to defend themselves against almost impossible odds. The FRETILIN defense of Viqueque was crumbling and the final Indonesian offensive was ready to be launched. Though new forces were deployed, equipped with poor weapons, it was now just a matter of time. What the Indonesian troops lacked in experience, they more than made up for in numbers.
    Inexperience, participants recalled, caused unnecessary fear among the Indonesian troops. They were told that the G3 assault rifles, used by the Tropaz and FRETILIN troops, had a range of up to 900 meters, though in reality they were only effective up to 500 meters. As a result, Indonesian troops were afraid of getting anywhere near the enemy for fear of getting shot before being able to fire back. Veterans recounted incidents where Indonesian troops would crawl into foxholes at the sound of gunfire, no matter how far away it was.
    A lack of transport also limited the Army's capabilities of whom most seriously affected where the airborne units. Often dropped 60 to 70 kilometers away from their targets it regularly took a number of days before they even reached their objectives, let alone seizing them. This was most clearly illustrated when Manatuto, in the western sector, fell to an airborne unit dropped nine days earlier; the southern sector remained in enemy hands for over a month after the landing day.
    The timing of the operation caused further problems. The offensive, originally planned between March and April, did not start until December when the rainy season was at its height. The rainy season created conditions that worked in Tropaz and FRETILIN's favor hampering the Indonesian offensive and limiting the effectiveness of tactical aircraft. Tropaz and FRETILIN fighters could therefore wage a guerrilla campaign and had no difficulties in securing food and water.
    * * *
    On a whole then, the first Operasi Seroja was a costly lesson for the Indonesian military prompting reforms in training and organization.
    General M. Yusuf, ABRI commander-in-chief, adopted a new policy that called for an increased level of professionalism in ABRI that included a program to improve the quality of the existing 100 battalions. Under Yusuf, all infantrymen had to qualify as raiders which he himself personally supervised by making visits to battalion headquarters across the country to ensure that the training given met the new standards. In addition, Yusuf modernized equipment and weapons and improved welfare.
    When General Benny Moerdani replaced Yusuf, as ABRI commander in chief, he embarked on a reorganization program to trim down ABRI's organization, improve efficiency, and increase professionalism shortening chains of command in each service.
    The high death toll during Operasi Seroja showed that the attack on Dili was not well prepared. It was a decision hurriedly made after the situation became uncontrollable, as tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees flooded into Indonesia, threatening West Timorese stability. Indonesian troops were not prepared. ABRI, recognizing these mistakes, has learnt well.
    ________________________________________
    Further reading:
    1. Amnesti International. East Timor Violations of Human Rights. London, Amnesty International Publications, 1985.
    2. Freitas, Jose Maria Costa. FRETILIN Massacres: The Survivors. Singapore, Usaha Quality Printers, 1976.
    3. Lowry, Robert. The Armed Forces of Indonesia. Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1996.
    4. Neonbasu, P. Gregor. Peta Politik dan Dinamika Pembangunan Timor Timur. Jakarta, Penerbit Yanense Mitra Sejati, 1997.
    5. Pour, Julius. Benny Moerdani: Profile of A Soldier Statesman. Jakarta, Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993.
    6. Saldanha, Joao Mariano De Sousa. The Political Economy of East Timor Development. Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994.
    7. Suryohadiprojo, Sayidiman. Kepemimpinan ABRI Dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya. Jakarta, Penerbit Intermasa, 1996.
    8. Taylor, John G. Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor. London, Zed Books Ltd., 1991.
    9. Tomodok, E.M. Hari-Hari Akhir Timor Portugis. Jakarta, PT Dunia Pustaka Jaya, 1994.
    10. Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change. London, Routledge, 1993.
    ________________________________________
    1 From Infantry of the Indonesian National Army by Lela E. Madjiah (in print). Bandung-based Infantry Armed Center in cooperation with The Jakarta Post. Copy right Pusat Kesenjataan Infanteri, Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Darat 1999. back
    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

  • #2
    28 views and no comments...
    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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    • #3
      Well theres nothing positive 2 say about it. Was another sad screw up by indonesia's armed forces that went on for 25 years until it ended with the final disaster.


      Any news on them handing over officers guilty of war crimes yet? ..i doubt it.

      .... just another region where the Javanese are not wanted.

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      • #4
        Was another sad screw up by indonesia's armed forces that went on for 25 years until it ended with the final disaster
        A "screw up" that America and Australia wanted them to do to make sure East Timor didn't go communist...

        And I had been wondering if anyone had any comments on the military side...
        To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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