Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Henry Kissinger on the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Henry Kissinger on the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.

    While most of the folks in academic have a different view on the war (they tend to be on Henry's side), popular view of the war is also changing

    Amazon.com: On China (9781594202711): Henry Kissinger: Books

    Henry writes "On China" page 3701 "touching the tiger's buttocks"

    China achieved this objective in part by its military daring, in part by drawing the United States into unprecedentedly close cooperation. China's leader had navigated the third Vietnam war (1979) by meticulous analysis of their strategic choices, daring execution and skillful diplomacy (normalize relations with Japan, visit to Singapore) and skillful diplomacy, with all those qualities, they would not have been able to "touch the buttocks of the tigers" but for the cooperation of the United States.

    The third Vietnam war ushered in the closest collaboration between China and the United States for the period of the Cold War. Tow trips to China by American emissaries established an extraordinary degree of joint action. Vice President Walter "Fritz" Mondale visited China in August 1979 to devise a diplomacy for the aftermath of the Deng visit, especially with respect to Indochina. it was a complex problem in which strategic and moral considerations were in severe conflict. The United States and China greed that it was in each country's national interest to prevent the emergence of an Indochinese Federation under Hanoi's control
    .
    .
    .
    page 373

    Beijing did impose heavy costs on Vietnam. Chinese diplomacy in SE Asia before, during, and after the war worked with great determination and skill to isolate Hanoi. China maintained a heavy military presence along the border, retained several disputed pieces of territory, and continued to hold out the threat of a 'second lesson' to Hanoi. For years afterword, Vietnam was forced to support considerable force on its northern border to defend against another possible Chinese attack. As Deng has told Mondale in August 1979.

    page 374
    "for a country of that size to keep a standing force of more than one million, where will you find enough work force? A standard force of one million needs a lot of logistical support. Now they depend on the Soviet Union. Some estimate say they are getting $2 million a day from the Soviet Union, some estimate say $2 1/2 million....[I]t will increase difficulties and this burden on the Soviet Union will grow heavier and heavier. Things will become more difficult. In time the Vietnamese will come to realize that not all their requests to the Soviet Union can be met. In those circumstance perhaps a new situation will emerge.
    That situation did, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support brought above a retrenchment in Vietnamese deployment in Cambodia. Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democratic societies, China achieved a considerable part of its strategic objectives in SE Asia. Deng achieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Soviet domination of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait.

    ..
    In retrospect, Moscow's relatives passivity in the third Vietnam war can be seen as the first symptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.

    Page 375

    The third Vietnam war may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen successed in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam-- both of whole militaries were better trained and equipped than China.

    Page 376

    Singapore's Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew has summed up the ultimate result of the war: "The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.
    Last edited by xinhui; 15 Jun 11,, 07:17.
    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

  • #2
    Ah, you beat me to it xinhui. Wanted to start a thread in the book section about 'On China'. How to go about it is the challenge though.

    So i looked for reviews in various newspapers. Lots of arguments pro & con. Some even against Kissinger himself because he was such a polarising figure and the left absolutely hates him. One needs to be aware of this bias and discount it to get at the essence of what he is saying.

    What do you suggest ?

    Maybe looking at small sections in narrow areas might be a better idea as you've done here. Better to have seperate threads on various parts of the book rather than one BIG thread on it ?

    The main question to answer for me is how important is this book to non-americans or chinese in gaining an understanding of China. That would be the present day China rather than of the 70s where Kissinger made his mark.
    Last edited by Double Edge; 15 Jun 11,, 09:56.

    Comment


    • #3
      Henry has his bias that is for sure -- love to see how he kept referring how the Uber statesmen save the day, I can see that he is not talk about Deng or Zhou, but himself rather.

      Some of the stuff in the first chapters are echoed by many historians, seriously students of history will gain little. That said, it is a ready enjoyable and easy read. he writes well. One thing for sure, he has a better understanding of Chinese strategic culture than most.
      “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

      Comment


      • #4
        So, do you want to keep this thread strictly about 1979-soviet vietnam war or is it ok to introduce here other ideas from his book ?

        Intend to get the book when its out in paperback.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by xinhui View Post
          That situation did, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support brought above a retrenchment in Vietnamese deployment in Cambodia. Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democratic societies, China achieved a considerable part of its strategic objectives in SE Asia. Deng achieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Soviet domination of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait.

          ..
          In retrospect, Moscow's relatives passivity in the third Vietnam war can be seen as the first symptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.

          Page 375

          The third Vietnam war may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen successed in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam-- both of whole militaries were better trained and equipped than China.

          Page 376

          Singapore's Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew has summed up the ultimate result of the war: "The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.
          A lot of revisionism here. I remember that there were general low level panic on just how far behind the PLA was and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, just how far ahead the Soviet Army was. The natural barriers the PLA was counting on were no match for Soviet engineers.

          For 15 years, China let both USSR and Vietnam to have their way. It was only in 1984 that the PLA achieved some sort of military superiority over their Vietnamese foe but not enough to deny them their say in SE Asia.

          Come 1990s, China was in no shape to dictate anything, having just suffer Tianamen and the resulting economic collapse. While both China and Afghanistan took their toll on the Soviet budget, there can be no denying that it was Reagan who posted the challenge that collapse them, not China.

          Comment


          • #6
            But Col, that won't fit into Henry's narrative, wouldn't it? Again, he is looking at this from the POV of a Uber statesman. That said, he idea that the Chinese strategic culture is not "event based" but rather long-term planned is on the mark.
            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

            Comment


            • #7
              Sirs,I'm a bit in the dark here.I heard this idea from the Colonel about the fright the Soviet Army caused the PLA after '79 a few times.But was it justified considering the different context?
              The Soviets had~50 divisions in the Far East.The Chinese had terrain ,the PLA and the People's War doctrine.The 40th Army had only terrain to conquer during initial stages.It was no mean feat,but still,nobody shot at them.
              Those who know don't speak
              He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

              Comment


              • #8
                The initial PLA defence lines were 100 miles into China. In other words, they were relying on that 100 miles to stretch and to delay the Soviet Army. Afghanistan showed that 100 miles might as well be 100 feet.

                Also compared to their own advances in Vietnam, the Soviets not only managed to hide their axis of advance but did not suffer the delays the Chinese encountered.

                The Chinese relied heavily on saturation fire which was not the case with the Soviets who had no qualms about human recce forces and thus enjoyed a superiority of accurate fire the Chinese had no clue on how to achieve.

                The Soviets planned their operations so well that they never allowed the enemy to set up even a hasty defence. This in contrast that the Chinese were meeting ambushes left, right, and centred.

                Soviet tanks drove right through the heart of Afghanistan. Chinese tanks were stung to death by RPG traps.

                Comment


                • #9
                  I remember watching the '79 invasion unfold while at Cal. One of the researchers in the Center for Chinese Studies was a serving military officer working on his PhD. He knew I was interested in military biographies and factions, so one day he asks me who I would have put in charge of the invasion.

                  I couldn't answer him.

                  So, he says, Who was the last guy to have huge success as an officer in combat?

                  I couldn't answer him.

                  Ever heard of General Xu Shiyou?

                  Ah. The penny dropped. The best fighting general available was last in combat in the Korean War !
                  Trust me?
                  I'm an economist!

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Soviet tanks drove right through the heart of Afghanistan. Chinese tanks were stung to death by RPG traps.
                    I never knew Afghan had any force as one-tenth effective as Vietnamese army

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by drhuy View Post
                      I never knew Afghan had any force as one-tenth effective as Vietnamese army
                      The point was the Soviet Army read their enemy. The Chinese did not ... or rather, don't know how to read their enemy. Even with warning, the Afghans could not put up a fight. The Chinese gave months of warning to the Vietnamese.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        The Chinese gave months of warning to the Vietnamese.
                        Exactly opposite. The Vietnamese was totally surprised.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          You could have fooled me. Those were not hasty defences that bled the first Chinese advance to a halt. The kill zones were too well defined for a surprised attack.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                            You could have fooled me. Those were not hasty defences that bled the first Chinese advance to a halt. The kill zones were too well defined for a surprised attack.
                            Events interpretation could be wrong. The first waves of Chinese were countered only by local defense forces. The fact that one side sucked doesn't mean the other side was well-prepared, it's simply because they sucked. Period.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by drhuy View Post
                              Events interpretation could be wrong. The first waves of Chinese were countered only by local defense forces. The fact that one side sucked doesn't mean the other side was well-prepared, it's simply because they sucked. Period.
                              Hardly. The AARs defined well established positions at the platoon and company level requiring superior weaponry to dislodge. These positions were well dug in and withstood army level indirect fire and required special weapons platoons to dislodge.

                              The failure of the Chinese was not the lack of determination, 30,000 casualties states just how determined they were. Given the lack of counter-battery operations by the Vietnamese, these casualties were suffered at the close quarters environment. This could only have had happened if the Vietnamese were just as determined (whether you accept the Chinese claims of 50,000 casualties or not) but it definitely meant superior Chinese fire could not dislodge the Vietnamese defenders and that could only have happened if they were dug in.

                              Comment

                              Working...
                              X