Originally posted by Officer of Engineers
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PLAN force projection sans carriers?
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Originally posted by ace16807 View PostEarlier this year I wrote a paper in response to James Holmes' "China and Imperial Germany" article arguing that the PLAN in particular currently doesn't pose, nor will it pose in the future, as significant threat to the USN as the Kaiserliche Marine did to the RN during the turn of the 20th century up to WW1.
As part of my concluding remarks I speculated the purpose of their current carrier program and, in a larger sense, their aspirations of greater projection capabilities. However, that brought me to a question that I didn't quite answer in the paper. Why bother with a significant carrier program at the moment? Granted, a carrier is the epitome of naval power projection and the PLAN's carrier program is more or less the public poster child of their growing capabilities. But from a pragmatic stand point, how useful would a carrier or possibily in the near future a few carriers be? The PLAN would be at a significant disadvantage re carrier numbers for the near future when matched against the USN. Clearly, they've been working to narrow that gap by developing their infamous "carrier-killers", but no doubt their carriers are just as vulnerable as oursare, if not more so.
I suppose what I'm getting at is, is a legitimate carrier program for the PLAN necessary? I went on further in my paper speculating that the PLAN might be better off allocating resources to developing amphibious capabilities through more LPDs etc. The PRC would like to portray itself as being nowhere near as "imperialistic" as the US in their regional and international influence, but carriers are inherently a highly visible, offensive asset. On the other hand, if it enhanced its amphibious capabilities through LPDs, LHAs and the sort, they not only avoid the public exposure of wanting to build its offensive naval capabilities (although admittedly they lose the public appearance of building its naval capabilities) but they also assets more suited for MOOTW abroad as well as build a more credible threat in the Taiwan straits as a gambling chip.
This idea might be complete madness, but thoughts?“the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson
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Originally posted by Dreadnought View PostBrazil's Sao Paulo as well thought they still had her in limited services for pilot training. The site I found seems pretty up to date and listing her as in service.
Aircraft Carriers: List of aircraft carriers by country
I don't see the aversion to LHD's either. Juan Carlos is on trials as either a carrier or LHD.
Put the San Paulo along side Juan Carlos, capability wise with an F-100 in tow then the LHD is more influential.Ego Numquam
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Originally posted by ace16807 View PostThis idea might be complete madness, but thoughts?
A carrier is a political asset, considering that when the VARYAG sails, she would not be in any position to conduct combat operations, let alone air strike package operations. However, a Chinese carrier sailing through disputed EEC, say through Vietnamese waters, would send signals loud and clear to Hanoi.
The same, however, could not be said of Japanese waters since a wolf pack of LOS ANGELES would be waiting.
You have to imagine what the mere presence of a carrier in disputed waters mean and then you can understand its worth to the PRC.
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^^^^ The problem with that premise is that one of the countries may say, "**** the Chinese. I am gonna do what I want and see how the Chinese respond." In short, they may call China's bluff and when they do, they will lose more than what a military oriented force can do.
The job of a military-oriented force is to give the political side flexible options, not an end unto itself.
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Originally posted by Blademaster View Post^^^^ The problem with that premise is that one of the countries may say, "**** the Chinese. I am gonna do what I want and see how the Chinese respond." In short, they may call China's bluff and when they do, they will lose more than what a military oriented force can do.
The job of a military-oriented force is to give the political side flexible options, not an end unto itself.
In the case of the Vietnamese and the Philippines, they have to beg for political support from their allies, Moscow, and Washington. Can you imagine Moscow or Washington sending a submarine over fishing rights?
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Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View PostWith what?
In the case of the Vietnamese and the Philippines, they have to beg for political support from their allies, Moscow, and Washington. Can you imagine Moscow or Washington sending a submarine over fishing rights?
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