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  • Decoding Obama's Bahrain puzzle

    By M K Bhadrakumar

    The address by United States President Barack Obama on Thursday regarding the Middle East situation was a mixed bag of certainties and ambiguities, although Obama did bring US regional policy frankly and squarely behind the Arab Spring.

    On the other hand, the speech was a last-ditch attempt to define a new narrative and a desperate gamble to regain the initiative. There is indeed a fundamental contradiction insofar as any political order that is born out of the Arab Spring, which is representative or sensitive to popular Arab opinion will, by definition, find it difficult to forge strategic cooperation with America.

    Cairo has opted for normalization of relations with Iran; begun whittling down security cooperation with Israel; and in a stunning move reconciled the Palestinian groups and is probably encouraging them to seek United Nations recognition for Palestinian statehood. Washington is barely coping.

    Unsurprisingly, Obama was highly selective when he contemplated changes in the Middle East; he just couldn't bring himself to mention Saudi Arabia. He didn't know what to say. The great puzzle is Bahrain. Obama said with certainty:
    Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law.

    Nevertheless, we have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute forced are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and we will - and such steps will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can't have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. [Applause] The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.

    This can be viewed almost as a reprimand of King Hamad Khalifa, a close ally, and a rejection of the violent crackdown on Bahraini protesters. Obama would know that changes in Bahrain would inevitably affect Saudi Arabia. Yet, he never mentioned Saudi Arabia and the US is also "quietly expanding on a vast scale" the US's defense ties with Saudi Arabia.

    An Associated Press analysis with a Washington dateline on the same day as Obama spoke reported a "historic expansion of a 66-year-old relationship that is built on America's oil appetite, sustained by Saudi reliance on US military reach".

    Apart from the recent US$60 billion Saudi-US arms deal, AP reports on a top-secret US project to develop an elite 35,000-strong Saudi force trained and equipped by the US under the supervision of Central Command specifically geared to protect Saudi oil infrastructure and other sensitive establishments.

    Equally, something appears very odd in what Obama said about Bahrain since he continued in the same breath to draw a parallel with Iraq, of all places: "Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process."

    Najaf versus Qom

    Obama's Bahrain puzzle needs decoding. On second thoughts, Bahrain and Iraq have similarities. In both places, democracy is all about Shi'ite empowerment. Clearly, the US pins hopes on the "reformist" crown prince of Bahrain to accommodate the demands of the Shi'ite opposition, while the prime minister, who is apparently a hardliner, is setting the pace for repression - and he is supported by the Saudis.

    The US sees the alchemy of Shi'ite empowerment in Bahrain very differently from the Saudis. For one thing, Bahraini Shi'ite protesters aren't (so far) "anti-American" and the continuance of the US base for its Fifth Fleet is not in jeopardy. Again, Sheikh Issa Qassem, the spiritual leader of Bahraini Shi'ites, is prepared to settle for a constitutional monarchy and is not demanding an overthrow of the Sunni monarchy.

    What Bahraini Shi'ites are demanding is power-sharing rather than a capture of power.

    More important, the US doesn't subscribe to the conspiracy theory that the Iranians are going to be the "winners" if the Shi'ite majority gets a share of power in Manama. Iran, too, seems to realize its limitations. On the other hand, Bahraini Shi'ites do not want an Iran-type clerical regime - Velayat e-Faqih.

    From the religious perspective, too, they draw inspiration from Najaf in Iraq rather than Qom in Iran. This last point becomes extremely important for comprehending the thinking behind Obama's remarks on Bahrain.

    It is often overlooked that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'ites based in Najaf, has consistently avoided supporting strict conceptual interpretation of Velayat-e Faqih. He is neither openly dismissive of some of the underlying doctrinal ideas nor does he explicitly offer any substantive affirmation of the Faqih framework. In short, Sistani remains reluctant about getting involved in politics, although as prominent US scholar and academic Vali Nasr (who, incidentally, advises Obama on the Muslim Middle East) points out, he "never tried to promote rivalry" between his doctrinal ideas and those of the Iranian clerics in Qom.

    What it all adds up to is that a friendly Bahraini Shi'ite nation could turn out to be a strategic asset for the US to build bridges to Najaf - and that holds immense significance for the overall configuration of American influence in Iraqi politics, which today Iran (vainly) tries to dominate.

    Any redefining of Shi'ite empowerment away from the traditional stranglehold of the clerical establishment (and the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih) and the shepherding of Bahraini Shi'ites toward a genuinely democratic, "secular" way of life holds interesting geopolitical possibilities for US regional policies, as such a progression would be completely antithetical to what the Iranian regime (or Hezbollah in Lebanon) represents.

    That is to say, the cumulative impact of "democratic" Shi'ite empowerment in Iraq and Bahrain could at some point come to a "fusion" that poses an ideological headache for the Islamic regime in Iran. Thus, reform in Bahrain holds the potential to kick-start an engrossing shadow play within the world of Shi'ism in the Muslim Middle East. If Bahrain can be finessed to follow the "secular" democratic route of Shi'ite empowerment and be conjoined with Iraq politically, it may hasten the demand for democratic change within Iran itself.

    A schism erupts ...

    Iran's clerics, who have their political antennae out, may be sensing trouble and that may partly explain the grim power struggle that has erupted between the religious establishment and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (who is incidentally the first non-cleric to occupy the position of head of state since the 1979 revolution). Conventional wisdom so far has been that Supreme Leader Ali Khameini solidly backed Ahmadinejad and that the president himself was the representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

    The thesis has been, finally, blown away by the past few weeks of dramatic happenings in Tehran. We are witnessing instead the Iranian religious establishment circling its wagons. The Majlis (parliament), top IRGC commanders, Friday Prayer speakers and even the Guardian Council - important organs of the religious establishment - are queuing up to criticize or put down Ahmadinejad.

    They are taunting the president - inflicting scores of cuts on him that are bound to bleed at some point. The political stakes are high. It was none other than Khamenei who gave the green signal for the assault on Ahmadinejad when he took the decision last month to reinstate Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi (a senior cleric who was previously the supreme leader's adviser to the Basij, Iran's equivalent of a "people's liberation army"), who was sacked by the president.

    Interestingly, this was preceded by a smear campaign for months in Tehran that Ahmadinejad was systematically promoting "non-clerical" figures into positions of power and was pushing a secret plan to have another non-cleric succeed him as president in the next election in 2013. Furthermore, that he was working on a master plan to marginalize the religious establishment.

    Ahmadinejad is a staunch follower of Ali Shariati, the brilliant non-cleric Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who propagated "red Shi'ism" in the tumultuous years leading up to the revolution in 1979 - a curious amalgam of Marxism, Third Worldism and Islamic puritanism - which opposed the unrevolutionary "black Shi'ism" or Savafid Shi'ism of the Iranian religious establishment. Shariati was trained in Sorbonne in France and was a friend of philosopher and author Jean-Paul Sartre; he was murdered in 1975 and in the event the clerics hijacked the revolution from its Marxian moorings.

    The latest political controversy in Tehran over control of the Oil Ministry is also related to the broader power struggle, as powerful elites within the corrupt and decadent religious establishment have traditionally controlled and enjoyed this milk cow of the Iranian economy in league with the bazaar, and they cannot brook Ahmadinejad's move to assume direct charge of the portfolio.

    The Guardian Council, the constitutional watchdog dominated by the religious establishment, stepped in last week to censure Ahmadinejad's executive decision to take charge of the Oil Ministry.

    Again, Iran's administrative court, which is under the thumb of the religious establishment, has come up with a case against the head of the presidential administration, Hamid Baqaei, who is the right-hand man of Ahmadinejad and has the rank of vice president, banning him from working in state bodies for the next four years.

    On Sunday, in a dramatic development, Ahmadinejad's key aide Kazem Kiapasha, who was touted in recent months as the president's favorite candidate for the 2013 election, was arrested.

    Unshuttered balcony

    According to the Tehran grapevine, many people loyal to Ahmadinejad, including his close confidant Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also the president's chief of staff), have been taken in for questioning and websites allied to them have been blocked.

    Mashaei and Baqaei have been summoned for questioning by Iran's intelligence services. Hardliners and conservative clergy have been campaigning in recent months that Ahmadinejad has a master plan to weaken the Velayat-e Faqih system. Evidently, the hydra-headed Iranian religious establishment is imposing itself on an assertive non-clerical head of state.

    This schism within the Iranian regime and the enveloping revolutionary fervor imparted by the Arab Spring could stir up the moribund democratic movement within Iran. The Iranian religious establishment is not a pushover and it will fight tooth and nail to defend its untrammeled political power. But then, the Iranian religious establishment is also lately a divided house.

    This is where democratic reforms in Bahrain leading to Shi'ite empowerment could act as a catalyst for an "implosion" within Iran.

    Actually, Obama has been surprisingly mild in his rhetoric on Iran - as if he were keenly following events there. Such an approach makes sense, as any manifest attempt to muddy the waters of the power struggle in Iran could be counter-productive.

    The growing disarray within the Iranian regime and contradictions in Iran's political economy are best exploited if Bahrain emerges at this juncture as another democratic society (like Iraq) where Shi'ites are empowered but have opted for a modern, forward-looking society seeking integration with the West in the present era of globalization.

    Obama's approach is diametrically opposite the Manichean vision of the Saudi establishment, which is frantically rallying the Sunni Arab world. Obama distanced himself more than once from the Saudi tirade against Iran stoking the fires of Sunni sectarian passions.

    He would rather prise open the 30-year-old house that Iran's Shi'ite clerics built by climbing through an unshuttered balcony window that Bahraini Shi'ites could hold open for him in the dead of the night.

    Will it work? The hope is audacious since there is the real risk that persecuted Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia will also clamor for the empowerment that the Bahraini Shi'ites may secure under Obama's watch. If that happens, a reluctant Obama may come face to face with the imperative of reforms in Saudi Arabia, which would be the mother of all reforms.

    Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs

  • #2
    Interesting read 1980s. Thanks.
    Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

    Comment


    • #3
      This is quite an in-depth & perceptive article from the Indian ambassador. How he teases out more meaning from disparate sentences from Obama's speech, giving an insight into american thinking and how they plan on dealing with Iran.

      Some thoughts...

      More important, the US doesn't subscribe to the conspiracy theory that the Iranians are going to be the "winners" if the Shi'ite majority gets a share of power in Manama. Iran, too, seems to realize its limitations. On the other hand, Bahraini Shi'ites do not want an Iran-type clerical regime - Velayat e-Faqih.
      So that conspiracy theory would be the Saudi narrative to maintain the minority Sunni power in Bahrain.

      What it all adds up to is that a friendly Bahraini Shi'ite nation could turn out to be a strategic asset for the US to build bridges to Najaf - and that holds immense significance for the overall configuration of American influence in Iraqi politics, which today Iran (vainly) tries to dominate.
      The sequence mentioned here is counter-intuitive. He mentions that Bahrain would be an asset to build bridges to Najaf. I'd have thought it would be the other way around given the US already has a presence in Iraq but a rather marginal one in Bahrain.

      So in theory it should be easier for the US to influence Shia affairs in Iraq and the result then radiates outwards possibly influencing Bahrain and ultimately Iran. That Iraq is supposed to be the poster child of Sunni-Shia cooperation within a secular framework.

      Is Iran the winner in Iraq ? Iran seems to think so but that isn't the whole picture yet or the end of the story, apparently.

      Any redefining of Shi'ite empowerment away from the traditional stranglehold of the clerical establishment (and the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih) and the shepherding of Bahraini Shi'ites toward a genuinely democratic, "secular" way of life holds interesting geopolitical possibilities for US regional policies, as such a progression would be completely antithetical to what the Iranian regime (or Hezbollah in Lebanon) represents.
      Right, because it creates another alternative and leaves the choice upto the ppl to decide rather than having it foisted over them as the only working Shia solution. It breaks the existing choice of model, either Saudi Sunni or Iranian Shia, offering a compromise or third way.

      But are the Saudi's buying it ? one thinks they would prefer the present entrenched positions as that makes it easier for them to maintain their status quo. Simply because they do not want to cede power to Shia in their own country. Therefore they are going to oppose this idea in the buffer state that Bahrain is for them.

      The same could be said of the clerics in Iran as well. So there are already two powerful enemies obstructing this 'third way' and not just the Iranians alone in opposition as mentioned by the author.

      Which is a pity because a third way offers a chance of cooling off if not defusing the rivalries between the Saudi's & Iranians.

      Interestingly, this was preceded by a smear campaign for months in Tehran that Ahmadinejad was systematically promoting "non-clerical" figures into positions of power and was pushing a secret plan to have another non-cleric succeed him as president in the next election in 2013. Furthermore, that he was working on a master plan to marginalize the religious establishment.
      So this is a confirmation of sorts of an earlier thread here titled 'have we got ahmadinejad wrong'. He appears to be more secular than we thought, prefers non-clerics to clerics in certain circumstances.

      Question is do ppl on the Iranian street matter or figure here at all. One would think not but why then would Ahmadinejad make these moves but to win the next election. He learnt form the last one and is muddying the waters here and treading on Moussavi's turf. It's proving to be a costly gamble.

      What is confusing is during the 2009 election we were told his electorate were mostly religious, of conservative background and poor working classes. The well heeled & liberal middle classes chose Moussavi. So the present fight in Tehran is over shades of conservative, clerical vs non-clerical. It's a start. Sign of the times. Secular enfranchisement is the underground hot trend, more desirable & fashionable today in the ME.

      This is where democratic reforms in Bahrain leading to Shi'ite empowerment could act as a catalyst for an "implosion" within Iran.
      Still sceptical how tiny Bahrain can be a catalyst for big Iran. Surely, it has to be Iraq.

      The growing disarray within the Iranian regime and contradictions in Iran's political economy are best exploited if Bahrain emerges at this juncture as another democratic society (like Iraq) where Shi'ites are empowered but have opted for a modern, forward-looking society seeking integration with the West in the present era of globalization.
      So the author is talking about numbers here and not size, the more regimes there are that have a successful mix of Shias & Sunni's the more pressure there will be on Iran to reform. Or another way of putting it is this will empower reformers inside Iran without foreign interference or meddling. Can't be painted an american stooge when the Iraqi's, Bahranis, Syrians (?) are at it too.

      He would rather prise open the 30-year-old house that Iran's Shi'ite clerics built by climbing through an unshuttered balcony window that Bahraini Shi'ites could hold open for him in the dead of the night.
      Sceptical of this.

      Will it work? The hope is audacious since there is the real risk that persecuted Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia will also clamor for the empowerment that the Bahraini Shi'ites may secure under Obama's watch. If that happens, a reluctant Obama may come face to face with the imperative of reforms in Saudi Arabia, which would be the mother of all reforms.
      And he will balk at that or be known as the president that brought $250/barrel oil to America.
      Last edited by Double Edge; 23 May 11,, 19:55.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
        The sequence mentioned here is counter-intuitive. He mentions that Bahrain would be an asset to build bridges to Najaf. I'd have thought it would be the other way around given the US already has a presence in Iraq but a rather marginal one in Bahrain.

        So in theory it should be easier for the US to influence Shia affairs in Iraq and the result then radiates outwards possibly influencing Bahrain and ultimately Iran.
        Politically Shi'as in Iraq are a divided house, and the Americans have no influence over Iraqi Shi'a affairs. You must be confusing Shi'a affairs with Iraqi national ones, which are not exclusively Shi'a and so you have missed the point of the article as it relates to the theological battle between Qom and Najaf for influence and pre-eminence over Shi'a Islam as a whole. The less influence Iranian clerics schooled on the velayat-e faghih of the Islamic Republic have over Shi'a Islam in other countries, the weaker Iranian clerics and the Iranian regime will be politically both inside and outside of Iran. That is the presupposition the author is making. By the US steering Bahraini Shi'a towards Iraq rather than Iran, he is implying such an outcome would help strengthen the clerics from the more passive Najaf school of thought and so weaken the influence of Iran's politicized post-revolution brand of Shi'a Islam.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          Politically Shi'as in Iraq are a divided house, and the Americans have no influence over Iraqi Shi'a affairs.
          ok, and Iran no doubt is contributing to that division.

          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          You must be confusing Shi'a affairs with Iraqi national ones, which are not exclusively Shi'a
          Americans have more influence over Iraq than over Bahrain don't they ?

          Does it not follow then that they have more control over Shia affairs in Iraq than in Bahrain.

          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          and so you have missed the point of the article as it relates to the theological battle between Qom and Najaf for influence and pre-eminence over Shi'a Islam as a whole.
          I got that. So will the Saudi's support this idea then ? Najaf has to be beter than Qom. If they are not willing to share power then even that point will not matter.

          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          The less influence Iranian clerics schooled on the velayat-e faghih of the Islamic Republic have over Shi'a Islam in other countries, the weaker Iranian clerics and the Iranian regime will be politically both inside and outside of Iran. That is the presupposition the author is making.
          ok, its the number of countries with sizeable shia populations outside Iran that follow Najaf over Qom that matters.

          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          By the US steering Bahraini Shi'a towards Iraq rather than Iran, he is implying such an outcome would help strengthen the clerics from the more passive Najaf school of thought and so weaken the influence of Iran's politicized post-revolution brand of Shi'a Islam.
          It will strengthen the clerics in Najaf but do you agree it will weaken the control the clerics have over Iran ?

          Its the numbers they command that matters isn't it. Iran has 70 million people, would Iraq+Bahrain shias amount to much even if they do follow Najaf.

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
            Americans have more influence over Iraq than over Bahrain don't they ?
            No, Iraq is fractured and heavily armed along religious and tribal lines. US influence in Iraq varies depending on what group and what issue. In Bahrian there are only two groups that matter Sunni and Shia. The massive pot pori of tribes, traditions and creeds is missing. Bahrian is also small enough that the US presence is both visibly profitiable and light handed.

            Does it not follow then that they have more control over Shia affairs in Iraq than in Bahrain.
            see above.

            I got that. So will the Saudi's support this idea then ? Najaf has to be beter than Qom. If they are not willing to share power then even that point will not matter.
            The Suadis are doomed every bit as much as the Iranian clerics. They won't fall soon but they will fall. Expanding access to technology means expanding access to ideas and the vision of both is increasingly rejected.


            ok, its the number of countries with sizeable shia populations outside Iran that follow Najaf over Qom that matters.
            if I understand the author right....

            Not so much countries as local and regional religious leaders. Sunni Islam is almost devoid of central authority, leaders derive followers in a neve rending ppularity contest. Shia Islam on the other hand is much more heirarchail like Christinanity where senority matters, and where a senior "management team" exists like Christian Patriarchs. Iran for all its flaws has been able to advance the idea of Shia exceptionalism. A very powerful and siren call for Shia given that sects historic oppression by Sunnis in so much of the Islamic world. Countering Iran's leaderships religious authority means advancing other Shia as capable of achieving the same prominence without the same confrontation.

            Its the numbers they command that matters isn't it. Iran has 70 million people, would Iraq+Bahrain shias amount to much even if they do follow Najaf.
            The Iran clerics may control 70 million, but they command far less. In a battle of voice its not about who starts with the biggest audience, but who ends with the biggest audience. Think of it as a battle between resturant chains. McDonalds dominates the global fast food business. Is it becuase the food is so good? Of course not but they do provide a meal with a value and a connection to a wider community ideal about moderninity. McDonalds advertising works because it taps into already present desires. In 1979 the Clerics in iran did not create the desire for change, they tapped into it. Now however what they desire and what those they control desire is less closely aligned. A competing voice more closely aligned to what the shia population desires will only force that gap wider.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              No, Iraq is fractured and heavily armed along religious and tribal lines. US influence in Iraq varies depending on what group and what issue.'
              But you broke the minority Sunni strangehold on power when you invaded Iraq. Maliki is a shia and would not be in power today otherwise. You mean to tell me this does not buy you any influence with Iraqi Shias. I can believe you would not have much purchase with Iraqi Sunni's because you upset their applecart.

              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              In Bahrian there are only two groups that matter Sunni and Shia. The massive pot pori of tribes, traditions and creeds is missing. Bahrian is also small enough that the US presence is both visibly profitiable and light handed.
              Yes but its the Saudi's you need to get convince here isn't it. Bahrain is caught between a rock & a hard place. Listening to you means the Sunni's lose their share over power there just like in Iraq. Putting it that way makes it a win-lose proposition, and might be unfair. An equitable sharing of power is desirable but its difficult to make the one presently in power see that.

              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              The Suadis are doomed every bit as much as the Iranian clerics. They won't fall soon but they will fall. Expanding access to technology means expanding access to ideas and the vision of both is increasingly rejected.
              Agree, there is only so far monetary sops will go to buy the ppl's acquiesence.

              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              if I understand the author right....

              Not so much countries as local and regional religious leaders. Sunni Islam is almost devoid of central authority, leaders derive followers in a neve rending ppularity contest. Shia Islam on the other hand is much more heirarchail like Christinanity where senority matters, and where a senior "management team" exists like Christian Patriarchs. Iran for all its flaws has been able to advance the idea of Shia exceptionalism. A very powerful and siren call for Shia given that sects historic oppression by Sunnis in so much of the Islamic world. Countering Iran's leaderships religious authority means advancing other Shia as capable of achieving the same prominence without the same confrontation.
              Now that you make the parallel with christianity, was thinking about Henry VIII and him striving with the pope in Rome. Started his own brand of christianity and the rest is history. Not sure but the numbers Henry commanded were not enough to be a threat to Rome so they did not do anything about it.

              So who's to say this will have the desired effect in Iran :)

              However it would make the Shia's in Bahrain & Iraq more amenable to peaceful co-existence and thats certainly a good outcome.

              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              The Iran clerics may control 70 million, but they command far less. In a battle of voice its not about who starts with the biggest audience, but who ends with the biggest audience. Think of it as a battle between resturant chains. McDonalds dominates the global fast food business. Is it becuase the food is so good? Of course not but they do provide a meal with a value and a connection to a wider community ideal about moderninity. McDonalds advertising works because it taps into already present desires. In 1979 the Clerics in iran did not create the desire for change, they tapped into it. Now however what they desire and what those they control desire is less closely aligned. A competing voice more closely aligned to what the shia population desires will only force that gap wider.
              ok, its creating an alternative option. Now its upto the ppl to decide. Let's go with it. So what should the desired outcome in Bahrain be. What development can we point to in the near future to say the plan is on track.

              Would an agreement of power sharing in Bahrain be it ?

              I think so but its going to be tricky to get. For one there would have to be certainty that the bahrain shias are folowing najaf rather than qom. How does one determine this. I'm still seeing catch-22's here.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by 1980s View Post
                Politically Shi'as in Iraq are a divided house, and the Americans have no influence over Iraqi Shi'a affairs. You must be confusing Shi'a affairs with Iraqi national ones, which are not exclusively Shi'a and so you have missed the point of the article as it relates to the theological battle between Qom and Najaf for influence and pre-eminence over Shi'a Islam as a whole. The less influence Iranian clerics schooled on the velayat-e faghih of the Islamic Republic have over Shi'a Islam in other countries, the weaker Iranian clerics and the Iranian regime will be politically both inside and outside of Iran. That is the presupposition the author is making. By the US steering Bahraini Shi'a towards Iraq rather than Iran, he is implying such an outcome would help strengthen the clerics from the more passive Najaf school of thought and so weaken the influence of Iran's politicized post-revolution brand of Shi'a Islam.
                ok, so this is one US move on Iran.

                Here is how things are shaping up presently, in Iran's favour to counter US interests in the ME.

                Middle East: Regional Power Play Becomes More Complex | SAAG | 25-July-2011

                The three pillars of US policy in the ME: Egypt, Turkey & Saudi Arabia

                There are two new axes forming of late..

                Turkey-Syria-Iran
                Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran

                What response do the Saudi's have to counter the first axis ?

                Egypt lost its pro-Us president and Turkey is trying to become more regional. Saudi's are looking at hedging options with Russia & China.

                So thats all three pillars of the US ME policy in flux presently.

                If China joins the second axis, it also reaches out to Turkey via the first axis.

                Iran is the pivot here.

                The author concludes..
                The Turkey-Iran-Syria politico-strategic alignment and the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangular configuration are not any earth-shaking game changers in the Middle East. The former is definitely a Middle East grouping and the latter lies at the periphery of the Middle East.

                These presently should be viewed only as political moves even though if fully crystallized they could be of strategic significance.

                In terms of significance both need to be considered as aimed at shaking of the stranglehold of the United States yoke on Middle East affairs and creating more elbow space for the participants within the region.

                Noteworthy is the fact that in both these politico-strategic regional configurations, Iran emerges as the strategic magnet to which other participant nations have been drawn to.

                Noteworthy is also the fact that in case of the six nations involved in this strategic realignment in the Middle East, five nations are non-Arab states with only Syria as the Arab participant.

                Does the above spell the end of Arab dominance of Middle East strategic architecture led by Saudi Arabia? In terms of intra-regional power tussle do the present configurations indicate that Iran has prevailed over Saudi Arabia? The latter does suggest so and that carries implications for the United States and Israel.

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