WWII Bomber comparison I Flying Fortress vs Lancaster

[bolo121]

I have read this elsewhere, but was it really worth it?
What was easier to replace, some more ships and infantry or vast numbers of elite aircrew and their extremely expensive aircraft? Not to mention the immense support infrastructure behind them.
I've heard it said that the allies could have avoided their infantry shortage if they had reduced the number of people diverted to the strategic bombing effort.

[zraver]

I have read this elsewhere, but was it really worth it?
What was easier to replace, some more ships and infantry or vast numbers of elite aircrew and their extremely expensive aircraft? Not to mention the immense support infrastructure behind them.
I've heard it said that the allies could have avoided their infantry shortage if they had reduced the number of people diverted to the strategic bombing effort.

There wasn't really an infantry shortage not for the US anyway. The US had a messed up replacement system that created a bottleneck and seriously depleted trained infantrymen. The British had a shortage but bomber command was not the cause.

However if you think about it, the men devoted to the strategic air campaign diverted massive German resources. Planes instead of tanks, redirection of 88mm guns to AA instead of AT roles, 1 million Germans involved in air defense, fuel diverted to the fighters instead of the panzers... That is all tactical applications. Then there is the drain on production from dispersal, the destruction of the Luftwaffe and the influence all of this had on the Eastern Front etc. That is strategic impact. Finally there is the utter and complete destruction of the transport net, first in France and then in Germany. This was a bone crushing war winning over match. It did not matter how many men and tanks the Germans had- they could not get to the fight where they were needed, when they were needed.

For the number of men who gave their lives compared to the impact on the war the strategic bombing campaign was bloody but incredibly cost effective.

[gunnut]

I have read this elsewhere, but was it really worth it?
What was easier to replace, some more ships and infantry or vast numbers of elite aircrew and their extremely expensive aircraft? Not to mention the immense support infrastructure behind them.
I've heard it said that the allies could have avoided their infantry shortage if they had reduced the number of people diverted to the strategic bombing effort.

Also look at it this way, we can only saturate front line with so many men. Allies had a huge pool of man power to draw from. Is it more effective to spread them on the ground and in the air? Or is it more effective to saturate the ground with more men who just might get in each other's way?

[gunnut]

You guys are missing a much larger point.

The strategic bombing campaign forced the Germans to have to fight to defend their country and industries. As a result the Luftwaffe was shredded in the winter-spring 1944. This so depleted the ranks of the fighter groups on the Western Front that the Luftwaffe pulled all resources east to defend the Fatherland....thus leaving the Normandy beaches open to invasion. Only 2 aircraft sorties attacked the Allies coming ashore on 6 June. And teh Allies operated under an aluminum umbrella from then onward.

Yes, the disruption of POL facilities had an impact as did the TOTAL disruption of the transportation networks (rail, canal and road).

But the greatest effect was the strategic bombing campaign ripped over the sky above German forces which allowed the Allies to pummel the German combat forces in the West.

We're not saying there shouldn't have been a bombing offensive. We're just debating what to bomb. Would it be more effective to bomb energy production? Transportation nodes? Or factories for planes and tanks?

There would be disruption to Germany's war effort regardless. We just want to know which would cause the most disruption.:)

[astralis]

gunnut,

Well, in the 1930s, when strategic bombing doctrine was developed, they really believed air power on industrial centers could destroy a nation's ability to wage war. They followed what they believed. It was the first time the doctrine was put to the test.

By tac-air, do you mean using heavy bombers on troop concentrations, depots, barracks...etc? Or do you mean using fighters and fighter-bombers on individual targets?

both, although instead of a focus on depots and barracks, it should have been a focus on the transportation net. wrecking trucks and railroads paralyzed the german war effort, and wasted resources doubly: not only did german industry have to spend time and money and resources to produce the stuff, having the truck or railroad that was transporting it blown up would make all that useless. it was also harder to camoflage and protect, as well. it would have been great if the bombers forced each train to start carrying AA, further wasting the german resources.

the accuracy of strategic bombing wasn't effective for the resources spent. it did much better in combustible japan.

and note that doing so would have forced the luftwaffe to fight, so we would have gotten that out of the deal.

I do agree with you that there was a political motive to conduct strategic bombing just to show Stalin that the west was not sitting on its thumb. But if so, they still could have gone after energy production and rail yards rather than factories.

yeah, the bomber boys hated doing it. they were ahead of their time, and not in a good way.

[gunnut]

gunnut,

both, although instead of a focus on depots and barracks, it should have been a focus on the transportation net. wrecking trucks and railroads paralyzed the german war effort, and wasted resources doubly: not only did german industry have to spend time and money and resources to produce the stuff, having the truck or railroad that was transporting it blown up would make all that useless. it was also harder to camoflage and protect, as well. it would have been great if the bombers forced each train to start carrying AA, further wasting the german resources.

the accuracy of strategic bombing wasn't effective for the resources spent. it did much better in combustible japan.

and note that doing so would have forced the luftwaffe to fight, so we would have gotten that out of the deal.

Railroads and roads are easy to fix. Rail yards are not. Energy production less so (in my opinion).

Heavy bombers in WW2 did not have the accuracy to bomb a single road in an efficient manner. Even if they could, a single cut railway can be easily repaired compared to the effort expended to bomb it.

Rail yards and depot include maintenance facilities and transfer stations for different rail lines. Those would take a lot more time to fix, and were much bigger targets than a single rail line.

Tac air hitting individual rail cars and locomotives did far more damage than bombing factories or transportation nodes. Basically nothing moved during daylight in western Europe. Tanks couldn't move because their support couldn't move. People didn't want to move without their heavy equipment. Tactical interdiction at its finest.

[astralis]

gunnut,

Railroads and roads are easy to fix. Rail yards are not. Energy production less so (in my opinion).

Heavy bombers in WW2 did not have the accuracy to bomb a single road in an efficient manner. Even if they could, a single cut railway can be easily repaired compared to the effort expended to bomb it.

Rail yards and depot include maintenance facilities and transfer stations for different rail lines. Those would take a lot more time to fix, and were much bigger targets than a single rail line.

Tac air hitting individual rail cars and locomotives did far more damage than bombing factories or transportation nodes. Basically nothing moved during daylight in western Europe. Tanks couldn't move because their support couldn't move. People didn't want to move without their heavy equipment. Tactical interdiction at its finest.

yeah, locomotives were the big limiting factor for the germans.

see the way allied airpower paralyzed the germans in the 30 days prior/after the normandy campaign.

[Stitch]

gunnut,



yeah, locomotives were the big limiting factor for the germans.







see the way allied airpower paralyzed the germans in the 30 days prior/after the normandy campaign.

There's a reason Germany started producing armored locomotives, especially toward the end of the War.

[zraver]

Railroads and roads are easy to fix. Rail yards are not. Energy production less so (in my opinion).

Heavy bombers in WW2 did not have the accuracy to bomb a single road in an efficient manner. Even if they could, a single cut railway can be easily repaired compared to the effort expended to bomb it.

Rail yards and depot include maintenance facilities and transfer stations for different rail lines. Those would take a lot more time to fix, and were much bigger targets than a single rail line.

Tac air hitting individual rail cars and locomotives did far more damage than bombing factories or transportation nodes. Basically nothing moved during daylight in western Europe. Tanks couldn't move because their support couldn't move. People didn't want to move without their heavy equipment. Tactical interdiction at its finest.

And when the escort fighters started strafing on the way home you got strategic interdiction that collapsed the German economy in about 3 months.

[Albany Rifles]

Gunnut,

I am not tracking you....are you saying we did not go after railyards, etc?

Because we knocked the hell out of them....that is what the B-25s and B-26s of the 9 Air Force went after, quite succesfully. And the 8th joined in during the lead up to D Day as well as during the Battle of the Bulge.

[gunnut]

Gunnut,

I am not tracking you....are you saying we did not go after railyards, etc?

Because we knocked the hell out of them....that is what the B-25s and B-26s of the 9 Air Force went after, quite succesfully. And the 8th joined in during the lead up to D Day as well as during the Battle of the Bulge.

No, I'm saying maybe we should have gone after them earlier than 1944. Bomb transportation nodes and energy production rather than factories. We were bombing aircraft factories and tank factories in 1943. German production went UP every year from 42 to 44.

But as Astralis said, the strategic bombing campaign was partially political in nature. It was to appease the Soviets who did most of the dying on the eastern front.

[Albany Rifles]

Okay, now I see what you guys are saying...a little slow.

But I go back to my post awhile ago.

One of the missions of the strategic bombing campaign was to engage and destroy the Luftwaffe to help pave the way for the Second Front. In order to invade Festung Europa the Allies planners said they would need air supremacy over the beaches and fleet and air superiority over the theater. To do that they had to

a) Bomb the heartland to force the fighters to come up and take losses, and,

b) Cause losses of fighter pilots (not just aircraft) to force the Luftwaffe to withdraw units from the periphery to man the drenses of the Fatherland.

The bloodletting of Fall 43 into Winter 44 did just that. And remember that the Luftwaffe was doing that to the RAF when they shifted from attacking RAF facilities to The Blitz, allowing the RAF time to expand their fighter pilot force.

And as Z pointed out the release of the fighter escorts from close escort allowed them to roam freely and destroy a LOT of the Luftwaffe on the ground.

Attacking transportation networks was not going to cause the Luftwaffe to react in a manner which would achieve the goal stated above. You had to go after essential industries and energy. And Ploesti, which was hit time and again but never put fully out of operation, proved just how hard it was to destroy a refinery....taking out a refinery was as difficult if not more difficult as taking out the sub pens.

[zraver]

Attacking transportation networks was not going to cause the Luftwaffe to react in a manner which would achieve the goal stated above. You had to go after essential industries and energy. And Ploesti, which was hit time and again but never put fully out of operation, proved just how hard it was to destroy a refinery....taking out a refinery was as difficult if not more difficult as taking out the sub pens.

Sir, disagree that going after the transportation net as a primary target of the escort fighters [ and bombers] would not have forced the Luftwaffe to fight. Once the escort fighters were released to free hunt the roads and rail on their way home the German economy collapsed and German troop movements in the west became almost impossible when skies were clear. This threat had to be countered or Germany would be defeated. It wasn't countered and Germany was defeated. Had the fighters and bombers gone after German transport exclusively I think the war may well have ended earlier.

Diverting the heavies to the big name targets made a contribution but not as much as it could have been. Attacks on the production of finished goods suffered perhaps a loss of 20% of theoretical potential (10% from direct loss to bomb damage and 10% loss due to dispersal), but Speer, natural slack in the German economy and the legions of slave labor available limited the damage the heavies could do. Throughout 1944 German production finally hit war winning levels (if it had them in 42). In some areas production rates in 1945 were on pace to exceed 1944's record levels. Under the peak of allied strategic air power, German production increased.

Attacks on oil also tended to fall far short of expectations. The Soviets ended the Romanian oil supplies, not allied bombers. Though Polesti was never able to operate at peak levels due to bomb damage and falling well pressure it was never knocked out either. Inside Germany the number of refineries and synthetic plants was IIRC more numerous (62 total) and robust than the transportation net of switching yards and canal locks (47). Rail and boat accounted for 90% of German transportation capacity. The Germans proved quite adept at moving factories around, you can move canals or rail nearly as fast.

Plus, attacks on the transportation net are by default attacks on energy and finished product production. if the user can't get them, they don't exist.

[Triple C]

Z,

I believe that Ploesti was producing at 1/5 capacity whilst being bombed. The problem was periods of poor weather that put it back online intermittently.

[1979]

Z,

I believe that Ploesti was producing at 1/5 capacity whilst being bombed. The problem was periods of poor weather that put it back online intermittently.

Ploesti never produced at 100% capacity in the 40's , capacity of refining oil was 8.9 million tons while internal production was only 5-6 million .
In addition germany also faced the same problem , existing refining capacity but insufficient crude.

wrt weather that might be true for april and may but it was not in june , july or august when attacks stepped up .