A fictional dogfight over the Himalayas

[phoggy]

The powerful Suchoi Su-27 and its two-seat more advanced development, the indian Su-30 MKI, are for many aviation enthusiasts the epitome of a highly agile fighter aicraft.

Due to an invitation of the Indian Air Force (IAF) Lt. Col. Frank Simon of the German Air Force´s Fighter Wing 73 (Jagdgeschwader - JG 73 « Steinhoff ») had got a chance to get an idea how good the flight performance of this Flanker-C (NATO-Code) in comparison with the newest modern Eurofighter/Typhoon.


Lt. Col. Frank Simon, an Eurofighter-pilot of the German Air Force (GAF),
in front of an Indian Suchoi Su-30 MKI

Simon is the right man for such a task. He flew already the Mig-29 in the Air Force of the NVA (Nationale Volksarmee of ex East German)and now for the Fighter Wing 73 « Steinhoff » (JG 73 S). He is a very experienced pilot and is therefore completely qualified to fly the most modern Eurofighter of the German Air Force.

The powerful Suchoi Su-30 MKI (Multirole Export India) is a two-seat advanced variant of the Russian interceptor Suchoi Su-27 Flanker, which is equipped with the latest avionics, what come from different nations (Russia, Israel, France and India). It was produced in cooperation with the Indian aviation industry. Its thrust vector control allows the Suchoi being able to fly special maneuvers beyond the purely aerodynamic possibilities, the so-called post-stall area. The unimaginable Pugachev´s Cobra maneuvers have thoroughly impressed the audience on most major international air shows.
« In this respect, this flight with Su-30 MKI of IAF was a special for me and I was looking forward with great anticipation to this event », said Frank Simon, who was accompanied on the trip to India by Lt. Col. Frank Neurath of the German Air Force Test Center Manching (WTD-61).

When wearing the flying suit, Simon had got his first Déjà-Vue:
"The Indian Flanker pilots use the same Russian anti-G trousers that we had on the Mig-29. ".
Frank Simon got then the preparation briefing for the flight as a backseater from his Indian Suchoi-Pilot such as :
How to operate the ejection seat in emergency falls; a short presentation of the Flanker, the cockpit and the planned flight maneuvers and procedures.

Cobras over the Himalayas


Suchoi Su-30 MKI of the Indian Air Force (IAF)


Tornado F-3, Eurofighter and Suchoi Su-30 MKI

« In the air space for dogfight training with the breathtaking scenery of the Himalayas, my Indian pilot demonstrated to me how close and hard the Su-30 can fly and lets me then try for myself. We flew a variety of maneuvers with and without thrust vectoring, Immelmann, looping, and finally the famous cobra maneuver, too.».



And although the jets were still below the Himalayan peaks, the air was probably quite thin for the engines of the Suchoi, because the Indian pilot wanted « the cobra » only with the nose slanted downward and not upward. He maybe fear that the incoming air insufficient to carry the aircraft during the combustion of mixture of fuel and air.

« In the end we still practice how to fly the Flanker by using of the thrust vector control to out-maneuver and be able to shoot down a bandit, who attacked you from six. For this maneuver, you pull the aircraft sharply upward after a hard curve – it looks like a cobra.
At this steep attitude you get into a low speed range,in which the thrust vector control should be automatically activated to take countermeasures. So we now turn the thrust vector control - and the elegant nose of the Suchoi drops down to aim straight to the maybe-stunned opponent :
quick aiming with the helmet visor, and then firing an infrared air-to-air-missile on the opposite fighter - and that´s it. ». So much for theory.

Eurofighter would have an easy game !


Eurofighter / Typhoon of the brish RAF (Royal Air Force)


Spanish Eurofighter / Typhoon fighter at the Airshow Royal International Air Tattoo on 15.07.2007

« Then I ask the pilot, he should do this maneuver again and quickly put the nose back over the horizon in order to follow the enemy, if our opponent could recognize our intention and tries to climb over us for countermeasure. But that's what he failed to do it. The nose of the Flanker - despite thrust vector control – is too heavy for the planned maneuvers ! An Eurofighter should have then an easy time, because the Flanker is now sluggish in the air without speed !
We have tried the same maneuver once again at the end of the flight – with the same result. ».

In this case the result was not so amazing :
When the Suchoi has completed successfully the cobra maneuver and the opposite pilot should have not recognize in time this maneuver, then the Flanker was probably the winner of this fictional dogfight.

However, the Cobra maneuver – not depending on the type of the fighter or on the experiences of the pilot – can be quite guessed in advance by opposite experienced fighter pilots. The rest is done by the inertia of the mass : a heavy combat aircraft like the Flanker is disadvantaged by its high mass, when it flies a maneuver only based on its exceptional aerodynamics and by using of powerful engines with thrust vector control, which is normally impossible for the most other fighters.

Alone the fuel load of the Suchoi is over 9 tons, almost reaches the mass of an Eurofighter itself !
Flanker-C is clearly a heavy weight fighter, a Goliath : and even with its powerful engines it cannot overcome the limit of natural physical laws !

Strong opponent

Because the Flanker was originally designed as a heavy interceptor and went already into the army service, they cannot compete to the much smaller and lighter Eurofighter in the fictional, above described dogfight. Together with a better thrust to weight ratio, Eurofighter could be the winner of this fictional dogfight exercise over the Himalayas…

However, one must take into account when comparing all weapon systems that the presentation of such maneuvers is only a part of the whole picture. In reality, the dogfight would take place mostly in a BVR (Beyond Visual Range)-combat between two pilots who try to shoot down his opponent at distances outside the range of human eye.

And of course, the Suchoi Su-30 MKI – within or without the Cobra maneuver – is always a very agile fighter, which should not be underestimated. Experienced Indian pilots can now concentrate on flying new exceptional flying maneuvers with the thrust vector control.
Such exchanging projects of both Air Forces (IAF and GAF) are always benefit for all involved parties.

Norbert Thomas / Piz
German Air Force (Bundesluftwaffe)

Source :

Norbert Thomas/Piz – German Air Force / FLIEGER REVUE, Nr. 02-2011

[Phoenix10]

Here is an aviation week article about Red Flag, during which Su-30s went to post stall maneuvering, lost too much energy, and paid the price. I'm sure that many on this forum have seen this before. I mention it here again because it is related to the first post.

Key points (not that this is news to anyone):
- AESA radar is very important
- IFF is very important
- Having a super-maneuverable aircraft alone means little, pilot training and experience are huge

USAF Pilot Critiques Red Flag Action | AVIATION WEEK

"Indian pilots flying Su-30MKIs are extremely professional, but they're still learning how to best fight with their new aircraft.

That opinion comes from an unidentified, senior F-15 pilot taped while briefing senior retired U.S. Air Force officers about the most recent Red Flag exercise. The video was made available online at YouTube.com.

The French pilots flying the new Dassault Rafale appeared to be there to collect electronic intelligence on the Indian aircraft, contends the USAF pilot, who wears an Air Force Weapons School graduate patch.

The French were originally going to bring the older Mirage 2000-5 until they discovered the Indians were bringing their new Su-30MKIs, the pilot says. They then switched and brought their Rafales with more sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment.

Once at Red Flag, "90 percent of the time they followed the Indians so when they took a shot or got shot" they would take a quick shot of their own and then leave," he said. "They never came to any merges," which starts the dogfighting portion of any air-to-air combat. He asserts that French pilots followed the same procedure during Desert Storm and Peace Keeping exercises. When U.S. aircrews were flying operations, the French would fly local sorties while "sucking up all the trons" to see how U.S. electronics, like radars, worked, according to the pilot.

He praised the Indians as extremely professional and said they had no training rule violations. However, they "killed a lot of friendlies" because they were tied to a Russian-made data link system that didn't allow them to see the picture of the battlefield available to everyone else. The lack of combat identification of the other aircraft caused confusion.

But the U.S. apparently isn't ignorant of the Su-30MKI's radar either.

The Su-30 electronically scanned radar is not as accurate as the U.S.-built active electronically scanned radar carried by the F-22 and some F-15s. Also, "it paints less, sees less" and is not as discriminating.

He praised the F-22 as the next great dogfighter. But he faulted the fact that it carries too few missiles and contends that the on-board cannon could be a life-saver, particularly against aircraft like the MiG-21 Bison flown by the Indians. It has a small radar cross section, as well as an Israeli-made F-16 radar and jammer. The latter makes them "almost invisible to legacy F-15C and F-16 radars" until the aerial merge or until it fires one of its Archer, active radar missiles, the U.S. pilot says.

Against the much larger RCS Su-30MKI, the F-16s and F-15s won consistently during the first three days of air-to-air combat, he continues. However, that was the result of trying to immediately go into a post-stall, thrust-vectored turn when attacked. The turn then creates massive drag and the aircraft starts sinking and losing altitude. "It starts dropping so fast you don't have to go vertical [first]. The low-speed tail slide allowed the U.S. aircraft to dive from above and "get one chance to come down to shoot," the pilot says. "You go to guns and drill his brains out." The Su-30 is jamming your missiles so...you go to guns and drill his brains out."

U.S. pilots conclude that the Su-30MKI is "not [an F-22] Raptor," he further says. "That was good for us to find out." But when the Indian pilots really learn to fight their new aircraft - "they were too anxious to go to the post-stall maneuver," he says-- the USAF pilot predicts that they would regularly defeat the F-16C Block 50 and the F-15C with conventional radar.

A final weakness in the Su-30MKI was its engine's vulnerability to foreign object damage which required them to space takeoffs a minute apart and slowed mission launches."

[phoggy]

Thank you for the article, Sir.
It´s very interesting to know a little bit about the Achilles´weak spot at Pugachev´s Cobra maneuver of Suchoi Flanker at dogfights in post-stall area.

Lt. Col Frank Simon was also one of Mig-29-Pilots of the German Air Force (Bundesluftwaffe), who had participated in joint Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) exercises in 1997 with F-16s of the USAF´s 457th squadron at Forth Worth. In those simulated dogfights the GAF´s pilots had firstly advantages by using of the HMS (Helmet Mounted Weapons Sight). The HMS was a great help, allowing the Germans to achieve a lock on any target the pilot could see within the missile field of view, including those almost 45 degrees off boresight. In contrast, the USAF´s F-16s were only able to lock onto targets in a narrow window directly in front of the aircraft’s nose.
It was not until late 2003 that the USAF and US Navy achieved Initial Operational Capability of the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS).

[Chogy]

I've always enjoyed that Red Flag briefing YouTube because it is both straightforward (blunt), and it helps defeat the media and airshow generated myth of the "unconquerable" extreme AOA fighter.

[Stitch]

I've always enjoyed that Red Flag briefing YouTube because it is both straightforward (blunt), and it helps defeat the media and airshow generated myth of the "unconquerable" extreme AOA fighter.

Chogy - Without violating OPSEC, what was your strategy for defeating AOA fighters? Lock 'em up early on, before the merge?

[Jimmy]

With that bigass radar up front, that's ALWAYS the gameplan for F-15s.

[Chogy]

Shoot 'em with a sidewinder from 5 miles?

If a thrust-vectoring super-fighter intentionally enters an extreme AOA regime, he has given up almost all of his options, has handed you the vertical on a platter, and has made himself enormously vulnerable to IR missiles, the gun, pretty much any weapon. And real combat is not a sterile 1 V 1.

Assuming he survived the search-sort-shoot regime and a merge is inevitable, mutual support is what makes such maneuvering so dangerous to the high AOA guy. He might be able to temporarily stiff-arm one fighter, but not the others that will invariably be in the neighborhood.

Lead: "Engaged neutral with a guy doing a cobra."
Two: "Tally ho, Pitch right."
8 seconds later...
Two: "Fox two kill the guy fluttering about at 15,000 feet.
Lead: "Bug out East, push it up."
Two: "Toop."

About like that. ;)

[jineshjk]

Here is an aviation week article about Red Flag, during which Su-30s went to post stall maneuvering, lost too much energy, and paid the price. I'm sure that many on this forum have seen this before. I mention it here again because it is related to the first post.

Key points (not that this is news to anyone):
- AESA radar is very important
- IFF is very important
- Having a super-maneuverable aircraft alone means little, pilot training and experience are huge

USAF Pilot Critiques Red Flag Action | AVIATION WEEK

"Indian pilots flying Su-30MKIs are extremely professional, but they're still learning how to best fight with their new aircraft.

That opinion comes from an unidentified, senior F-15 pilot taped while briefing senior retired U.S. Air Force officers about the most recent Red Flag exercise. The video was made available online at YouTube.com.

The French pilots flying the new Dassault Rafale appeared to be there to collect electronic intelligence on the Indian aircraft, contends the USAF pilot, who wears an Air Force Weapons School graduate patch.

The French were originally going to bring the older Mirage 2000-5 until they discovered the Indians were bringing their new Su-30MKIs, the pilot says. They then switched and brought their Rafales with more sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment.

Once at Red Flag, "90 percent of the time they followed the Indians so when they took a shot or got shot" they would take a quick shot of their own and then leave," he said. "They never came to any merges," which starts the dogfighting portion of any air-to-air combat. He asserts that French pilots followed the same procedure during Desert Storm and Peace Keeping exercises. When U.S. aircrews were flying operations, the French would fly local sorties while "sucking up all the trons" to see how U.S. electronics, like radars, worked, according to the pilot.

He praised the Indians as extremely professional and said they had no training rule violations. However, they "killed a lot of friendlies" because they were tied to a Russian-made data link system that didn't allow them to see the picture of the battlefield available to everyone else. The lack of combat identification of the other aircraft caused confusion.

But the U.S. apparently isn't ignorant of the Su-30MKI's radar either.

The Su-30 electronically scanned radar is not as accurate as the U.S.-built active electronically scanned radar carried by the F-22 and some F-15s. Also, "it paints less, sees less" and is not as discriminating.

He praised the F-22 as the next great dogfighter. But he faulted the fact that it carries too few missiles and contends that the on-board cannon could be a life-saver, particularly against aircraft like the MiG-21 Bison flown by the Indians. It has a small radar cross section, as well as an Israeli-made F-16 radar and jammer. The latter makes them "almost invisible to legacy F-15C and F-16 radars" until the aerial merge or until it fires one of its Archer, active radar missiles, the U.S. pilot says.

Against the much larger RCS Su-30MKI, the F-16s and F-15s won consistently during the first three days of air-to-air combat, he continues. However, that was the result of trying to immediately go into a post-stall, thrust-vectored turn when attacked. The turn then creates massive drag and the aircraft starts sinking and losing altitude. "It starts dropping so fast you don't have to go vertical [first]. The low-speed tail slide allowed the U.S. aircraft to dive from above and "get one chance to come down to shoot," the pilot says. "You go to guns and drill his brains out." The Su-30 is jamming your missiles so...you go to guns and drill his brains out."

U.S. pilots conclude that the Su-30MKI is "not [an F-22] Raptor," he further says. "That was good for us to find out." But when the Indian pilots really learn to fight their new aircraft - "they were too anxious to go to the post-stall maneuver," he says-- the USAF pilot predicts that they would regularly defeat the F-16C Block 50 and the F-15C with conventional radar.

A final weakness in the Su-30MKI was its engine's vulnerability to foreign object damage which required them to space takeoffs a minute apart and slowed mission launches."

Here is the truth instead Fernof's bluff.

A final word, from India, on 'YouTube Terry' - The DEW Line

Pushpindar Singh
(Vayu Aerospace Review Editor)

YouTube rebuttal:

Being aware of the IAF's views on the subject, and while fully respecting the IAF Vice Chief's statement that the 'leaked' video and its content was 'too demeaning for reaction', I have decided to share the facts with readers, not those fancily conjured up by Colonel Terrence Fornof, an F-15 fighter jockey and now Director of the Requirements and Testing Office at the USAF Air Warfare Centre at Nellis AFB. The USAF later issued a statement to say that Fornof's was a private briefing to the 'Daedalians', a group of retired military pilots. "Colonel Fornof did not mean to offend any U.S. allied forces, as he knows firsthand the importance of training with allied forces and the awesome firepower they bring to the fight. His comments during this briefing were his personal opinions and not those of USAF Warfare Centre or of the Air Force".
Still, to get the record straight, the facts are :
Ø The IAF did not undertake any IvIs at Nellis during Red Flag, nor did they engage thrust vectoring during the Exercise. IvIs were flown only at Mountain Home AFB. In none of the IvIs were the Su-30MKIs ever vulnerable, let alone shot down. As all exercises were flown with ACMI, the situations are recorded and available to substantiate this aspect. Additionally, the MKI's behaviour with thrust vectoring is dramatically different from that described by the Colonel. F-15 and F-16 aircrew were well appreciative of IAF manoeuvres with thrust vectoring.
Ø Colonel Fornof's statement on Su-30MKI rates of turn with thrust vectoring (20o/ sec) is grossly 'out' but apparently gives away actual F-22 performance (28o/sec) Pitch of the talk seemed as to whether thrust vectoring was important or not. As all sorties were with ACMI, entire profiles are recorded, can be analysed and surely would have been replayed to drive the point home and make the 'chest thumping' sound more real. Apparently this was not done. Perhaps, as the Colonel is aware of F-22 data, he has tried to down play the Su-30MKI in comparison. Surprisingly, while there was no systems / avionics / comparison between the two types or with any other type of 'legacy' aircraft, the speaker does admit that radar of the MKI is 'superior' to that of the F-15 and F-16, however 'inferior' to AESA of the F-22 (a correct assessment). However, the IAF used the Su-30's radar in the training mode, with downgraded performance vis-à-vis operational mo! de, as they could hardly participate without this primary sensor
Ø The 'Bison' radar : the USAF should be aware that the 'Bison' does not have an Israeli radar, it is Russian. Nor does the Su-30MKI have Tumansky engines (but the NPO-Saturn). Surprisingly the Colonel seems oblivious of such facts, yet tries to convey that he is an authority on the matter.
Ø Fratricide by IAF fighters : this is correct, the IAF did 'shoot down' some 'friendlies' and that was assessed and attributed to the IAF not being networked. However, what the Colonel did not bring out were the two essential reasons for this. Firstly, this occurred mainly when the AWACS was not available (unserviceable) and controlling was done by GCI. More significantly it happened during extremely poor controlling by their operators, this fact being acknowledged during debriefs and the controllers being admonished accordingly. 'Accents' were perhaps the main culprit here, which very often led to American controllers not being able to understand Indian calls.
Ø Now hear this : the F-15C and other USAF fighters had the same number of fratricides as the IAF ! Considering they are well networked, yet their pilots shot down the same number of 'friendlies'. This was not only a major concern but also turned out to be a major source of embarrassment as the USAF had everything -- Link 16, IFF Mode 4 etc and the IAF had nothing. Under the Rules of Engagement, they did not even permit the IAF to use data link within themselves. All cases of USAF fratricide were covered in the next day's mass briefing as lessons learnt by concerned aircrew. In the IAF, the incidents were covered by concerned controllers, and attributed to lack of adequate integration, excessive R/T congestion and poor controlling. Gloating on cases of IAF fratricide is frivolous and unprofessional.
Ø However, Colonel Fornof did appreciate IAF 'professionalism' and that the IAF were able to dovetail with USAF procedures within short time. There was not a single training rule / airspace violation. This is a most important aspect.
Ø Since the Colonel could hardly tell his audience that the IAF had given the USAF good run for their money, they downplayed the Su-30's capability. It is correct that the IAF aircrew included some very young pilots -- nearly 70 percent - but they adapted rapidly to the environment (totally alien), training rules (significantly different), airspace regulations etc but to say that they were unable to handle the Su-30 in its envelope (something that they have been practicing to do for four to five years) is just not credible ! If young pilots can adapt to new rules and environment within a short span of two weeks, it is because they are extremely comfortable and confident of their aircraft.
Ø The IAF's all round performance was publicly acknowledged during, and at end of the Exercise, specifically by those involved. Not a single TR / airspace violation was acknowledged. Mission achievement rate was in excess of 90%. The drop out / mission success rates of all others, inclusive of USAF, were significantly lower. This is of major significance considering the fact that IAF was sustaining operations 20,000 km away from home base while the USAF were at home base. (The 8 Su-30s flew some 850 hrs during the deployment, which is equivalent to four months of flying task in India over 75 days). IAF's performance at Mountain Home AFB was even better that that at Nellis AFB.
Ø FOD : At Mountain Home, IAF had reduced departure intervals from the very beginning (30" seconds) considering that operating surfaces were very clean. However, a few minor nicks were encountered and it was decided to revert to 60 seconds rather than undertake engine changes. This was communicated by the IAF at the very start (IPC itself).
Ø There is no need to go in for 'kill ratios' as that would be demeaning. However, the IAF had significant edge throughout and retained it. In fact the true lesson for the USAF should be : 'do not field low value legacy equipment against the Su-30MKI' !.
(demeaning or otherwise, it is understood that the kill ratio (at Mountain Home AFB) was 21 : 1, in favour of the Su-30MKIs)

[Jimmy]

That was written by someone unfamiliar with Red Flag and USAF training.

The training at Mountain Home was DESIGNED for them to get kills. It was a spin-up exercise to get them up to speed...the adversaries' (USAF) role is not to fight all-out, it's to present specific situations for the IAF to deal with and punish their mistakes. It makes absolute sense that their performance at Mountain Home was better than at Nellis...Red Flag adversaries are a lot more dynamic.

Red Flag debriefs are not the next day. A lot of those pilots will be flying again. And without a clearance, that ACMI data is NOT available.

I'm curious about the frat incidents...it can happen, I guess, but I've done probably 10 exercises at Nellis and I've never actually seen one. There was ONE case where an F-15 declared a contact hostile because the aircraft in question had a bad IFF...I was the controller and knew it was a friendly and got him targeted where he needed to be, which was brought up several times in the debrief. I can only imagine how big a deal it would've been if he'd actually done it. I have a very hard time imagining that they would've let it go through several frats. I'm inclined to say that part of the story is bogus.

[jineshjk]

That was written by someone unfamiliar with Red Flag and USAF training.

The training at Mountain Home was DESIGNED for them to get kills. It was a spin-up exercise to get them up to speed...the adversaries' (USAF) role is not to fight all-out, it's to present specific situations for the IAF to deal with and punish their mistakes. It makes absolute sense that their performance at Mountain Home was better than at Nellis...Red Flag adversaries are a lot more dynamic.

Red Flag debriefs are not the next day. A lot of those pilots will be flying again. And without a clearance, that ACMI data is NOT available.

I'm curious about the frat incidents...it can happen, I guess, but I've done probably 10 exercises at Nellis and I've never actually seen one. There was ONE case where an F-15 declared a contact hostile because the aircraft in question had a bad IFF...I was the controller and knew it was a friendly and got him targeted where he needed to be, which was brought up several times in the debrief. I can only imagine how big a deal it would've been if he'd actually done it. I have a very hard time imagining that they would've let it go through several frats. I'm inclined to say that part of the story is bogus.

Also that USAF F-15pilot, didnt participated in RedFlag08, ACMI data itself is not available for outsiders sure, but analysis by pilots and experts.... available, at least for aerospace community. Really I also dont have any clear idea about ACMI data availability but I am sure that post is genuine.

Vayuaerospace Email-
[email protected]
[email protected]

[Jimmy]

Also that USAF F-15pilot, didnt participated in RedFlag08, ACMI data itself is not available for outsiders sure, but analysis by pilots and experts.... available, at least for aerospace community. Really I also dont have any clear idea about ACMI data availability but I am sure that post is genuine.

The ACMI data is classified. It's not available to anyone who wants to watch it. As commander of the Air Warfare Center, Col Fornoff would've definitely had access.

Edit: At least, it's classified at Nellis, Tyndall, and Yuma. I assume everywhere that uses it.

[Gun Grape]

Thank you for the article, Sir.
It´s very interesting to know a little bit about the Achilles´weak spot at Pugachev´s Cobra maneuver of Suchoi Flanker at dogfights in post-stall area.

Lt. Col Frank Simon was also one of Mig-29-Pilots of the German Air Force (Bundesluftwaffe), who had participated in joint Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) exercises in 1997 with F-16s of the USAF´s 457th squadron at Forth Worth. In those simulated dogfights the GAF´s pilots had firstly advantages by using of the HMS (Helmet Mounted Weapons Sight). The HMS was a great help, allowing the Germans to achieve a lock on any target the pilot could see within the missile field of view, including those almost 45 degrees off boresight. In contrast, the USAF´s F-16s were only able to lock onto targets in a narrow window directly in front of the aircraft’s nose.
It was not until late 2003 that the USAF and US Navy achieved Initial Operational Capability of the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS).

Since we reopened this thread, I always wondered why the USAF/USN did not pursue development/fielding of the VTAS beyond equipping F-4Js with them in the mid 1970s?

[Chogy]

I wish I could somehow more greatly emphasize how little "kills" mean in training. They are not tracked, not bragged upon. because everyone involved knows how artificial the setups are. There are no squadron boards with some "kills" tally updated weekly in grease pencil.

In any scenario, there are going to be intentionally included factors that often greatly skew the results. Especially when one of the teams is involved in a form of primary or upgrade training, the supporting assets are considered training aids, programmable biological autopilots, that will do whatever they are told. For example, when I was at Holloman AFB in the AT-38B, the F-15 wing would regularly call on us for dissimilar ACT. If one pilot on the F-15 side was in MQT, getting qualified to be a full-up asset to his squadron, then the training was for him; our job that day was to be punching bags, and we took no offense at that.

If told "We want you to fly to the merge, then turn in a 3G circle until we tell you to stop", then that is exactly what we do. That is where the infamous "T-38 KILLLZ F-22 LOL" video on YouTube came from. An artificial scenario.

My point with all this is that we treasure far more the overall team performance we'd exhibit at major exercises, not some number of "kills". We might have a guy with zero kills in a large engagement, but because of his superior mutual support and radar work, he may have helped the unit achieve an overall success, and for THAT, he is praised.

Indian AF pilots in major exercises in the USA take home with them a tremendous experience and are better pilots for it, as do those they work with and against.

[avon1944]

Re: A fictional dogfight over the Himalayas

After Cope India/Red Flag 2008, and the big sukois doing so well again the F-16s the head of the Sukoi Aviation firm, explained why the Su-30MKI was so superior to the American fighter. He even showed a diagram of the Su-30 doing the cobra in combat. The diagram showed the fighter on the Su-30s tail was 600m behind. American fighters do not follow so close giving the US fighters more time in order to defeat the opponent ahead of them.
It was in the third Cope India/Red Flag in which the F-15s and F-16s had practiced with F-22s which could do the cobra better than the Su-30! So when the Su-30s arrived, the F-15s handled them very effectively.

"We want you to fly to the merge, then turn in a 3G circle until we tell you to stop", then that is exactly what we do. That is where the infamous "T-38 KILLLZ F-22 LOL" video on YouTube came from. An artificial scenario.

I haven't seen the video but I have seen a picture from the HUD of the T-38 or F-5. The F-5 was a little high on the F-22's tail, about 10° off the tail. If one takes the time to read the HUD you would see.... the altitude was ≈15,000ft, at approximately 400mph and pulling only 3½Gs! The first thing I asked myself, "what were the ROEs?"

[Chogy]

After Cope India/Red Flag 2008, and the big sukois doing so well again the F-16s the head of the Sukoi Aviation firm, explained why the Su-30MKI was so superior to the American fighter. He even showed a diagram of the Su-30 doing the cobra in combat. The diagram showed the fighter on the Su-30s tail was 600m behind.

His job is to sell Sukhois to governments perhaps not well acquainted with air-air combat. There is no "behind" any more, no vulnerable cone being dragged behind a jet from 5 to 7 o'clock. What is an F-16 doing 600m behind a Sukhoi? He would have fired long ago, and probably from the beam (side) or front aspect.

I haven't seen the video but I have seen a picture from the HUD of the T-38 or F-5. The F-5 was a little high on the F-22's tail, about 10° off the tail. If one takes the time to read the HUD you would see.... the altitude was ≈15,000ft, at approximately 400mph and pulling only 3½Gs! The first thing I asked myself, "what were the ROEs?"

I have pretty much stopped trying to explain or debate things like that. A person either understands, or doesn't.

I had a training flight once where my lead was saddled with a female ROTC cadet in his back seat. These are normally a drag, because little real training can be done... the cadets generally get too sick. But this gal was doing OK. Lead says "Swede, enter a 3 to 4 G turn. I want to demonstrate some maneuvers to the cadet." I dutifully enter a sustained turn, no maneuvering. Over my shoulder, I can see lead lining up for a tracking gun shot.

Over the radio I hear the cadet's squeaky female voice - "Tracking kill on Swede!" The resulting tape became something of a joke. "Swede got gunned by a chick!" This was some years before there were females in fighter cockpits, and the notion of being gunned by a female was similar to getting beat up by Twiggy or some other skinny little girl.