Debunking The 10:1 Ratio of Forces in COIN

[Officer of Engineers]

The resource taps need to be shut/ destroyed.

Captain, please educate me. What are the Chechen's resource taps? I am trying to follow your reasoning and am asking for your eval.

[lemontree]

This was the supposed goal in Vietnam but, obviously, China & Russia could not be destroyed; lines of communication/supply could be destroyed, but that was only temporary. Interdiction of resources was our only option, but that was only partially effective.

In Vietnam, the Vietcong was following something known as cyclic-guerilla warfare. Simply put, the north was won from the French in 1955/56, then operations were shifted to the south, using the north as a base.

During the American phase of the war, the VC bases were in North Vietnam not in China & Russia.

[lemontree]

Captain, please educate me. What are the Chechen's resource taps? I am trying to follow your reasoning and am asking for your eval.

(b) In a civilian insurgency - the aim is to protest against real or percieved injustices by own or foreign government.

Sir, the Chechen insurgency is a home grown insurgency, due to historical differences with the Russian state. The Chechens want to separate.
There is no foreign influence here.

Their funding is through:-
- Drug trade from Asia to Europe and through Argentina.
- Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia, through the influence of Arab militants.

These are their resource taps.

The Chechen insurgency is doomed to failure, as they do not have a foreign base that will accept them.

[Mihais]

Not only is doomed.It did fail.However the counter-insurgent did not played by the ''rules''.

[zraver]

Not only is doomed.It did fail.However the counter-insurgent did not played by the ''rules''.

Yes it did- Russia's rules long standing and never updated to reflect modern times.

Russia's rules for COIN

1. Think about rebelling and get exiled or go to prison and die
2. Rebel and die
3. rebel and start to succeed and your family dies
4. Keep rebelling and your village dies
5. Make peace and die in strange autoaccident a few months later

Its been a pretty effectuive program... Russia relies on making war to painful to continue which was thier failure in Afghanistan they never really brought the pain. Pain and expulsion are the others way to stop an insurgecy.

Pain- make the peace of the vanquished prefferable to continued conflict. German Nazi's kept a low grade insurgecy going after WWII but they never targeted the allies. However the vast majority of Germans were so shell shocked that the thought of taking up arms was terrifying to them. Yet thats not what the Nazi's wanted. They had planned on a guerilla war and then Ike issued an order than any German civilian caught under arms would be shot on sight. That order combined with the self evident willingness of the allies to reduce entire cities to cinders stopped the planned guerilla war dead in its tracks.


the other option is expulsion. From the times of Sargon the Great to the Greek-Turkish population swap most effective COIN ops involved some sort of population expulsion. However after the 1920's these moves were deemed illegal although they still happen. The eviction of Germans from Pomerania, Prussia and Sudetenland as examples quietly allowed, with the Palestinians being one the world rejects. However in both cases it works. The former German areas do not have an insurgency and most of the attacks inside Israel by Palestinians come via border jumpers not Israeli Arabs.

For the US since the death of Geronimo and the end of the Philippine Insurrection we have not been willing to either inflict enough pain or engage in mass deportations. Instead we look for ways to create virtual expulsions, and virtual pain through more targeted actions. Such as targeting militants with drone strikes, co-opting tribal leaders etc. How much success this has had is a matter of debate. But these approaches run counter to our own military history of simply locking on to an enemy population and shaking them like a dog mauling its prey.

Cpt Lemontree seems to argue that shutting off the suppy tap is the key. I disagree, no nation has ever been able to seal its borders. the LTTE was defeated not becuase it lost supplies- though that hurt. But because the Sri Lankin Government said enough is enough and simply jumped up and down on the Tamil areas with both feet until the cries of uncle were reduced to death rattles- human rights abuses be dammed. More bullets, more bombs, more anything would not have saved the LTTE.

For further proof I will point to the Taliban.... noawdays it seems like the taliban is every where with influence across the various tries in Afghanistan. Yet why didn't the Pashtun Taliban face that same situation from other Afghan groups prior to 2001? Prior to 9-11 the Afghan Civil war was remarkable conventional it was not an insurgency... why? Because the Taliban was willing to slaughter to enforce its rule, and the people believed the same.

[Mihais]

Yes it did- Russia's rules long standing and never updated to reflect modern times.

The problem ain't the rules.The problem is with modern times.The only consequence of that is someone,sometime will bring the full wrath of Achilles on idiotic chew toys that think they're civilized,evolved etc...and that will be a day when the rivers will be red. As for the rest,don't waste your time preaching to the choir.
As for expulsions and brutality in general in modern US COIN,you're only partially right.The Iraqi Sunnis were scared to the death by the prospect of Shia death squads,which for many weren't prospect but harsh reality.Thus you had a good chunk of refugees in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.While it wasn't US wielding the club,it was to a point a perfect case of good cop-bad cop. The bad cop is sorely missing in A-stan and that's the main difference between the two theaters.It may not be PC to say it in public,but here are only the 2 of us.

Cpt Lemontree is right in a certain context.Just because one practices irregular warfare(of any sort) doesn't mean all irregular wars are the same,just as conventional wars aren't the same.Cutting supply works if the center of gravity of the guerilla IS NOT the population.Just because Mao said the guerilla is like a fish in the water among people doesn't mean all guerillas need to be among the population.We practiced guerilla warfare against all sorts of invaders for centuries.None of them saw too many civilians because all of them were in sanctuaries.In an American context,the Plain Indians practiced irregular warfare for centuries,first against the Spanish,then against Mexicans and Americans.It was killing the supplies,the buffalo herds ,that led them to the reservations.Without finding and cutting the Comanchero trails,the US cavalry would have hunted the Comanches years more.

[lemontree]

Cpt Lemontree seems to argue that shutting off the suppy tap is the key. I disagree, no nation has ever been able to seal its borders. the LTTE was defeated not becuase it lost supplies- though that hurt. But because the Sri Lankin Government said enough is enough and simply jumped up and down on the Tamil areas with both feet until the cries of uncle were reduced to death rattles- human rights abuses be dammed. More bullets, more bombs, more anything would not have saved the LTTE.

The loss of supplies not just hurt - they ran out of small arms and light arty ammo - so they could not hit back.
They had lost their base in Tamil Nadu, India, so there was no strategic depth.

The LTTE could flatten areas with their arty just as the Sri Lankan Army could. The slogging match would go on and on.

For further proof I will point to the Taliban.... noawdays it seems like the taliban is every where with influence across the various tries in Afghanistan. Yet why didn't the Pashtun Taliban face that same situation from other Afghan groups prior to 2001? Prior to 9-11 the Afghan Civil war was remarkable conventional it was not an insurgency... why? Because the Taliban was willing to slaughter to enforce its rule, and the people believed the same.

The Taliban has their strategic depth in Pakistan, that is their support/supply base.
They are a militia of the Pak Army.

[Officer of Engineers]

The Taliban has their strategic depth in Pakistan, that is their support/supply base.
They are a militia of the Pak Army.

Captain,

What is the difference? It seems that the Taliban can do no better against a 40,000 man NATO force than the Mujahadeen did to a 120,000 man Soviet force. Numbers wise, the Taliban is not that much different than the Mujahadeen, and yet, they're achieving no better success against a much smaller force.

By the same token, our 30,000 man NATO force cannot achieve an answer when 120,000 man Soviet force cannot.

What is your eval?

[lemontree]

Captain,

What is the difference? It seems that the Taliban can do no better against a 40,000 man NATO force than the Mujahadeen did to a 120,000 man Soviet force. Numbers wise, the Taliban is not that much different than the Mujahadeen, and yet, they're achieving no better success against a much smaller force.

By the same token, our 30,000 man NATO force cannot achieve an answer when 120,000 man Soviet force cannot.

What is your eval?

Sir,

Pak Objectives
The objective of the Pak Army is to use the Taliban and keep the region in termoil:-
(a) To obtain US military and economic aid to "fight" terror (as long as it can).
(b) To ensure the region remains unstable and frustrate the US/NATO long enough so that they leave the area.

Gains for Pakistan
- The Pak army wants to ensure that its 500,000 strong military is focused towards India and units are not bled away towards a pro-India Afghanistan.
- A strong Afghanistan will eventually raise the issue of the ligitimacy of the Durand line.

The Pakistanis' dont really care, as they banking on China. They are giving China access to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea through Gwadar port.
They have also been conducting military exercises with the PLA in desert warfare. Which make India's nightmare a reality - a two front war with China.

Likely Future
PLA may plan to hold/tie-up Indian formations in the north and plan a blitz with Pak Army on the west. With the likely aim of:-
- over-running Indian units and capturing maximum terrain in the west.
- to bring India to the negotiating table to swap Chinese claimed regions in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir vale for Pakistan.
- Humiliation of India and ensure unchallenged Chinese supramacy in Asia.

BTW, no side will be stupid enough to use go nuclear.

[Officer of Engineers]

Sir,

Pak Objectives
The objective of the Pak Army is to use the Taliban and keep the region in termoil:-
(a) To obtain US military and economic aid to "fight" terror (as long as it can).
(b) To ensure the region remains unstable and frustrate the US/NATO long enough so that they leave the area.

Gains for Pakistan
- The Pak army wants to ensure that its 500,000 strong military is focused towards India and units are not bled away towards a pro-India Afghanistan.
- A strong Afghanistan will eventually raise the issue of the ligitimacy of the Durand line.

The Pakistanis' dont really care, as they banking on China. They are giving China access to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea through Gwadar port.
They have also been conducting military exercises with the PLA in desert warfare. Which make India's nightmare a reality - a two front war with China.

Likely Future
PLA may plan to hold/tie-up Indian formations in the north and plan a blitz with Pak Army on the west. With the likely aim of:-
- over-running Indian units and capturing maximum terrain in the west.
- to bring India to the negotiating table to swap Chinese claimed regions in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir vale for Pakistan.
- Humiliation of India and ensure unchallenged Chinese supramacy in Asia.

BTW, no side will be stupid enough to use go nuclear.

Captain,

Please do forgive me. It's been a while since our last conversation. Since then, a lot has surfaced vis-a-vi Chinese military doctrine, and in fact, Indian nuclear weapons doctrine, and some very facinating thinking that I only started realizing about three years ago.

It was your own General Sundarji who introduced me to the concept and one to this day, I found an absolute brilliant piece of strategic thinking on par with Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Machiavelli.

To be fair, I don't know who came up with it first, your General Sundarji or Chinese Field Marshall Rie but in a sentence

Deterrence is not warfighting.

Be that as it may and as facinating as this is (and it totally deserved threads of its own) and I think I started a few when I discovered this

Edit: here's one

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/eas...uestion-8.html

However, sticking to this thread, I failed to see any superiority when the same strategy against a weaker force did no better when it was claimed successful against a superior Soviet force ... unless that success was a lie.

[lemontree]

However, sticking to this thread, I failed to see any superiority when the same strategy against a weaker force did no better when it was claimed successful against a superior Soviet force ... unless that success was a lie.

Sir, Pak Army, through the Taliban is ensuring that Afghanistan remians a war-torn mess. They don't have to win. The US and NATO will get fedup one day and pull out, after handing over the reigns to the new Afghan Army.

[Officer of Engineers]

I doubt China would allow Pakistan to interfere with her $4.2bil investment.

[Mihais]

However, sticking to this thread, I failed to see any superiority when the same strategy against a weaker force did no better when it was claimed successful against a superior Soviet force ... unless that success was a lie.

Sir,with respect, I disagree.The Taliban may try to use the same strategy,but the circumstances aren't similar.
-First,there are the numbers.We have over 100000 NATO +300000 Afghans vs. ~40000 Talibs.At any point since 2006 we had more troops than the Soviets(max 150000) and the Afghan commies(40-50000) had.Prior to 2006,the Talibs were busy in Pakistan.
-Second,there is quality.
-Third there is space.Taliban only tried to expand from the south since late 2009 and their efforts met limited success.Whole Afghanistan was a theater of ops back in the 80's.Our combat power is much more concentrated in hot areas than it was possible for the Soviets.
- Fourth there is logistics.This is our center of gravity and this is where the Taliban failed and keeps failing to have a say.We have clear skies and roads.The Soviets had to move between OP's with tanks and air cover and often they couldn't do it.
The Mujaheddins were a force in the field.The Talibs aren't.So their strategy isn't similar.In the 80's they planned to attrit the Soviets and they did that.In our time they initially tried to do that and failed so they changed the plan:they hope to bore us enough to go home,than play the old Afghan game of civil war(which they have good chances of winning).The boredom part so far is working good for them.

[lemontree]

I doubt China would allow Pakistan to interfere with her $4.2bil investment.

Investment in Afghanistan?

[Doktor]

Investment in Afghanistan?

Could be more ;)

here is only 1 investment:

China Metallurgical Group Corporation, a Chinese state-owned conglomerate, bid $3.4 billion — $1 billion more than any of its competitors from Canada, Europe, Russia, the United States and Kazakhstan — for the rights to mine deposits near the village of Aynak. Over the next 25 years, it plans to extract about 11 million tons of copper — an amount equal to one-third of all the known copper reserves in China.

Source: Uneasy Engagement - China, Willing to Spend, Wins a Trove of Afghan Copper - Series - NYTimes.com