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  • Originally posted by jlvfr View Post
    This right here was the main problem of the soviet problem: logistics. They could charge fast and hard, but then would run out of everything...
    I don't know... From what I've read, the Red Army regularly had large detachments operating ahead of the main force up to 100 miles behind the breach. I understand that cannot be sustained for long, but still pretty impressive feat of logistics.
    "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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    • Originally posted by jlvfr View Post
      This right here was the main problem of the soviet problem: logistics. They could charge fast and hard, but then would run out of everything...
      Same with the Wehrmacht; I don't think anybody on the General Staff and, especially, Hitler had any idea what a vast and hostile territory they were trying to conquer in 1941. It probably looked doable on a map, but trying to sustain an army on the march for literally hundreds and hundreds of miles was impossible for the Wehrmacht in 1941, let alone any other time; even if the Wehrmacht could've conquered all of that territory, there was no way they were going to hold it.
      "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

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      • Originally posted by gunnut View Post
        I don't know... From what I've read, the Red Army regularly had large detachments operating ahead of the main force up to 100 miles behind the breach. I understand that cannot be sustained for long, but still pretty impressive feat of logistics.
        Detachments, yes. Full-scale armies, no.

        Originally posted by Stitch View Post
        Same with the Wehrmacht; I don't think anybody on the General Staff and, especially, Hitler had any idea what a vast and hostile territory they were trying to conquer in 1941. It probably looked doable on a map, but trying to sustain an army on the march for literally hundreds and hundreds of miles was impossible for the Wehrmacht in 1941, let alone any other time; even if the Wehrmacht could've conquered all of that territory, there was no way they were going to hold it.
        Yeah, talk about massive underestimation of needs. The Wehrmacht was so ill prepared, it even used british trucks captured in France!

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        • Originally posted by Triple C View Post
          I was reading a very dense academic history of the British colonial intelligence unit of the Indian Army (circa 1880s to 1920s), titled The Imperial Security State by professor Hevia. The text discusses in great detail how the composition of a genre of military literature called "route books" by the intelligence officers of the Indian Army was a top priority and consumed a great deal of time and energy of intelligence operatives.

          The route books are pocket-sized pamphlets or manuals that advice military commanders on possible lines of march between strategically important points. The presentation takes the form of an annotated time table, which describes the army's march beginning at 10 am along prescribed routes organized in tabulated form. Running from top to bottom and broken into estimated time required to complete each stage of the march, a route book's columns also list longitude and altitude coordinates, azimuth, topographical descriptions of terrain features, as well as commentary on conditions of the soil, availability of wells, forage and pack animals and the attitude of the inhabitants. The route book "compress space into military time" and is designed to help an army commander to have relevant knowledge on what to expect from the the physical and human geography.

          This is a genre of military literature with which I am unfamiliar. My questions are: Are "route books" a common genre of "military statistics" in Western armies during this period? And are they still in use? What functional equivalents replaced them in modern armies? I have the suspicion that the rigid format would not be appreciated by modern units that are much more mobile than foot bound Indian Army troops.
          We did route march tables...i.e., it takes a mechanized infantry battalion to take Route X in Y time based on terrain, classification of roads, etc. As part of any staff planning of contingency operations you look at terrain and make the estimates based on topography and any info on roads, weather, etc. Those usually ended up classified.

          Also today, we have numerous software programs which the transportation corps uses to plan unit moves (different than how long it takes to attack from point x to point y.)

          Hope that helps.
          “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
          Mark Twain

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          • Originally posted by gunnut View Post
            I don't know... From what I've read, the Red Army regularly had large detachments operating ahead of the main force up to 100 miles behind the breach. I understand that cannot be sustained for long, but still pretty impressive feat of logistics.
            I wish there was a yawn emoji.

            Wow...a 100 mile sustainment effort!

            Pardon me if I am underwhelmed.

            The US projected and sustained combat forces globally in World War 2...and sustained several members of our alliance to boot as well.

            All modern armies had some sort of organic logistics infrastructure.

            Units have the ammunition, food, fuel, medical supplies on the vehicles (tanks, artillery pieces) as well as an additional immediate repair & resupply available at the battalion level. In a lot of Wehrmacht Infantry and artillery company/battery support was horse drawn for much of the war.

            Every division of all armies had the ability to provide food, fuel, ammo, spare parts, medical support and transport to maintain the division for a further 2 days. As armies moved forward railroads became critical to sustaining the combat forces and feeding the monster of modern combat. The Western Allies in World War 2 (and we continue today) also laid pipeline to move POL.

            If you ever heard the story of it takes 10 men to keep 1 in combat, well, now you know why.
            “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
            Mark Twain

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            • Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
              I wish there was a yawn emoji.

              Wow...a 100 mile sustainment effort!

              Pardon me if I am underwhelmed.

              The US projected and sustained combat forces globally in World War 2...and sustained several members of our alliance to boot as well.

              All modern armies had some sort of organic logistics infrastructure.

              Units have the ammunition, food, fuel, medical supplies on the vehicles (tanks, artillery pieces) as well as an additional immediate repair & resupply available at the battalion level. In a lot of Wehrmacht Infantry and artillery company/battery support was horse drawn for much of the war.

              Every division of all armies had the ability to provide food, fuel, ammo, spare parts, medical support and transport to maintain the division for a further 2 days. As armies moved forward railroads became critical to sustaining the combat forces and feeding the monster of modern combat. The Western Allies in World War 2 (and we continue today) also laid pipeline to move POL.

              If you ever heard the story of it takes 10 men to keep 1 in combat, well, now you know why.
              Yes sir, I understand what an enormous effort it is to sustain a combat force in the field, let alone half way around the world. However, the Red Army effort I read about was a division sized task force operating up to 100 miles behind the breach created by the shock armies in the initial operation. I thought that was pretty impressive back in 1940s with the equipment available to the Red Army at the time. It was pretty much a division sized raiding party meant to create havoc rather than to hold ground. The rifle armies were the ones to hold and enlarge the breach.

              I was reading about the concept the deep operations and it seemed that it was a tactic which required humongous man power across a very wide front. I remember OOE mentioned somewhere that the Red Army liked to have a 6 to 1 advantage in numbers in the offensive. How would one defend against that without the numbers, assuming technological parity? Better yet, how would one attack it? Can deep operation work without the numbers? If not, then it seemed to be a unique tactic developed for the Soviet Union of the 1930s only. It would not work for everyone, or even Soviet Union/Russia of a different time period.
              "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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              • 1. If you are asking how NATO would handle that size of an attack...the answer is simple. We planned to defend by aggressive local counterattacks and striking the attacking Warsaw Pact forces along the entire length of the forces. That is what the MLRS, ATACMs, AH-64 and F-16s were about. They would hit every CP and bridge from the IGB back into Russia. The plan was to hold in Center and South for the REFORGER units to arrive....who would then counterattack from SW to the north east on a deep attack aimed for Eastern Poland. Red Storm Rising got that part correct...as did the final chapters of Team Yankee.

                2. In WW 2, the Soviets would have pulled resources from all along the front to accomplish the plan you discuss regarding a division size raiding force. Were they horse mounted or vehicle mounted? I know the Soviets still depended on Cossack units. Again, in 1944, the very concept you discuss was used...by the 3rd US Army in its romp across France.
                “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                Mark Twain

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
                  1. If you are asking how NATO would handle that size of an attack...the answer is simple. We planned to defend by aggressive local counterattacks and striking the attacking Warsaw Pact forces along the entire length of the forces. That is what the MLRS, ATACMs, AH-64 and F-16s were about. They would hit every CP and bridge from the IGB back into Russia. The plan was to hold in Center and South for the REFORGER units to arrive....who would then counterattack from SW to the north east on a deep attack aimed for Eastern Poland. Red Storm Rising got that part correct...as did the final chapters of Team Yankee.
                  Thank you sir. That answers a lot of my questions. Basically it sounds like a holding action with overwhelming firepower (to make up for the lack of manpower) in a very short amount of time to stall the offense, then wait for reinforcement to drive them back. I was thinking along that line after reading about how deep operation works. My first reaction was what if the opposition bent, but did not break, and the offensive punched itself out?

                  Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
                  2. In WW 2, the Soviets would have pulled resources from all along the front to accomplish the plan you discuss regarding a division size raiding force. Were they horse mounted or vehicle mounted? I know the Soviets still depended on Cossack units. Again, in 1944, the very concept you discuss was used...by the 3rd US Army in its romp across France.
                  From what I have read, I believe the type of raiding forces in 1944 and 1945 were tank corps. They would charge ahead of the tank army and run around up to 100 miles behind the lines for a few days and then link up with the follow on forces, or else they run out of supplies. Wehrmacht ran out of reserves to stop these actions.

                  I will have to read up more on Patton's Own.
                  "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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                  • Havn't the Germans done the very same in 1940?
                    No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

                    To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

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                    • Originally posted by Doktor View Post
                      Havn't the Germans done the very same in 1940?
                      On a smaller scale, with much shorter supply lines, and having the advantage of their enemy being caugh completely unprepared for this kind of warfare.

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                      • Originally posted by Doktor View Post
                        Havn't the Germans done the very same in 1940?
                        Also keep in mind that what became the Third Army conducted this breakout while staving off a 3 panzer/panzergrenadier division counterattack right at the breakthrough point. And once they Breakout was rolling Third Army also pushed the Sustainment units forward as well to keep the fight rolling. The Red Ball Express may not have been the most efficient but it kept the points of multiple spears into the fight.
                        “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                        Mark Twain

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
                          Red Storm Rising got that part correct . . .
                          IMHO, probably the best book Clancy wrote (with the possible exception of The Hunt for Red October); I really liked the fact that he gave you kind of a macro view of the conflict, as opposed to his later books that tended to concentrate on a single protagonists POV.
                          "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

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                          • Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
                            Also keep in mind that what became the Third Army conducted this breakout while staving off a 3 panzer/panzergrenadier division counterattack right at the breakthrough point. And once they Breakout was rolling Third Army also pushed the Sustainment units forward as well to keep the fight rolling. The Red Ball Express may not have been the most efficient but it kept the points of multiple spears into the fight.
                            Are you talking about Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein? I know the Third Army was on the southern end of the FEBA, I didn't know they were able to counterattack so effectively (though the fact that Patton was in charge explains it).
                            "There is never enough time to do or say all the things that we would wish. The thing is to try to do as much as you can in the time that you have. Remember Scrooge, time is short, and suddenly, you're not there any more." -Ghost of Christmas Present, Scrooge

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Stitch View Post
                              Are you talking about Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein? I know the Third Army was on the southern end of the FEBA, I didn't know they were able to counterattack so effectively (though the fact that Patton was in charge explains it).
                              I believe he was talking about Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy. The First Army punched a hole through the German lines (shock army) then the Third Army went through the gap and made a dash toward German's rear (tank army).

                              The major difference I see (from my totally untrained amateur point of view) is the Red Army didn't carry their support with them at division, or even corps level. Soviet Union simply could not afford to lavish their troops with thousands of trucks and jeeps like the Americans did. Support was concentrated at corps level or higher. Soviet tank corps (division size) were able to operate away from their support during a breakout for a few days. Then they would need to link up with the army for supplies. American armor divisions could sustain themselves much longer.
                              "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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                              • I will do one better, Patton's relief of Bastogne. Never mind if Patton did actually lift the seige or not but his manouver. An entire army swung 90% while both refusing the flank and direct all traffic down to the troop level over unexpected terrain in less than 36 hours. All this while preventing a German counter-attack into our rears. Rommel was kids league by comparison.
                                Chimo

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