The greatest operational commanders of the last 200 years.

[Blue]

I'm kinda with the Col and S-2 here. I find several faves up there, but they are separated by tech as the Col pointed out. I can't pick just one.

[Mihais]

Pick Lee,to ease your conscience

[Blue]

Pick Lee,to ease your conscience

And fyi, I don't have a conscience.

[Triple C]

You are an armed extremist and a terrible, terrible man!

[S2]

Zraver Reply

"That may have been true in the past, but the increasing range and leathlity of modern weapons means a brigade sized unit fights a much deeper battle than any lower unit."

Then haven't you simply extended the definition of tactical capability? Regardless of the speed with which it can march or the greater range and lethality of its enhanced weaponry, it still can project the fight no further than the limit of those assets. To reach beyond that requires the assistance of another (usually higher) command.

IMO 1MARDIV fought a tactical battle at Guadalcanal. They fought the enemy before them and in no way shaped or influenced the operational picture around themselves until victory was achieved. Only at that point could Marine and Army air project power from the captured asset of Henderson.

I harken to the debunked definition from AIRLAND battle regarding a commander's area of influence and his area of interest. Area of influence was defined by the greatest range at which the enemy fell under his guns-organic or attached. Area of interest was defined by the area where the enemy's march speed was such that they'd be within range of those assets within 12-24 hours.

To shape the battle before the tactical commander was the responsibility of the operational commander either by attrition of logistical assets and approaching units or delay/blocking of retreating units from a friendly commander's zone of advance.

[Blue]

You are an armed extremist and a terrible, terrible man!

According to most democrats, yes I am. You forgot bigot too.;)

[Officer of Engineers]

That may have been true in the past, but the increasing range and leathlity of modern weapons means a brigade sized unit fights a much deeper battle than any lower unit. In 91 the RCT's were very much an operational unit even if the fight locally was tactical. In Iraq today, BCT's are now doing missions as indepedent units operating over wide areas.

I have to agree with Steve here ... and you are historically speaking wrong, and in fact modern operationally wrong. Captains and Majors were the defacto campaign commanders in a hell of a lot of Colonial Wars and during UN Peacekeeping missions. Those garrisons were commanded by Majors and Captains and represented the policies of the national governments involved.

Case in point, Custer was a LCol at Little Big Horn.

[S2]

"Case in point, Custer was a LCol at Little Big Horn."

And tried to achieve an operational victory through a tactical asset instead of waiting for Gen. Terry to arrive.

[Officer of Engineers]

"Case in point, Custer was a LCol at Little Big Horn."

And tried to achieve an operational victory through a tactical asset instead of waiting for Gen. Terry to arrive.

By the British/Canadian POV, he was trying to the Brigade Commander when he was actually the re-enforced company commander.

[zraver]

Then haven't you simply extended the definition of tactical capability? Regardless of the speed with which it can march or the greater range and lethality of its enhanced weaponry, it still can project the fight no further than the limit of those assets. To reach beyond that requires the assistance of another (usually higher) command.

The brigade sized unit is the first command that can create that through the use of organic and attached units that are not typical battalion assets. Brigade sized units are also the first units to have non-line unit organic logisitics assets. A typical ground combat unit cannot reach deeper than about 10km with organic assets. Brigade units add tube artillery (30+km) possibly rocket artillery (40-100+ m) and possibly aviation assets. The Brigade also brings in the the JTAC and cross service asset use as well.

IMO 1MARDIV fought a tactical battle at Guadalcanal. They fought the enemy before them and in no way shaped or influenced the operational picture around themselves until victory was achieved. Only at that point could Marine and Army air project power from the captured asset of Henderson.

As soon as the Marines landed the Japanese drive in New Guinea was doomed and it drew in the IJN for a series of battles not to mention the first allied ground based victory with the morale boost it provided. These are all operational missions.

I harken to the debunked definition from AIRLAND battle regarding a commander's area of influence and his area of interest. Area of influence was defined by the greatest range at which the enemy fell under his guns-organic or attached. Area of interest was defined by the area where the enemy's march speed was such that they'd be within range of those assets within 12-24 hours.

To shape the battle before the tactical commander was the responsibility of the operational commander either by attrition of logistical assets and approaching units or delay/blocking of retreating units from a friendly commander's zone of advance.

This applies to the brigade commander. he has deep fires, attached assets, reserves and scouts to shape the battle for his manuever battalions. He also controls the logistics.

OoE,

Sir,

I have to agree with Steve here ... and you are historically speaking wrong, and in fact modern operationally wrong. Captains and Majors were the defacto campaign commanders in a hell of a lot of Colonial Wars and during UN Peacekeeping missions. Those garrisons were commanded by Majors and Captains and represented the policies of the national governments involved.[/quote]

Sir I was not counting OTW operations. Unless things go sideways they are generally lacking in combined arms, density or intensity.

Case in point, Custer was a LCol at Little Big Horn.

Custer was acting as tactical commander. The operational control for the Summer Campaign was entrusted to two generals (Cook and Terry) who were leading a multi-pronged operation.

[S2]

Zraver Reply

"Brigade units add tube artillery (30+km) possibly rocket artillery (40-100+ m) and possibly aviation assets. The Brigade also brings in the the JTAC and cross service asset use as well"

Well my operational hat is sufficiently rusty that I'd defer to Red7 or shek in determining how often these attachments along with the TA assets are made available permitting the Brigade TOC to independantly target deep fires into the operational zone while also controlling the close fight. As to JTACs, that's fine they're located in brigades (battalions actually) but this is nothing more than an extension of ALOs and S-3 (Air) in that they support the close battle with CAS.

Again, I may not be privy to their typical employment.

"As soon as the Marines landed the Japanese drive in New Guinea was doomed..."

I disagree. There was a small matter of a contested battle to determine that outcome. As I indicated, winning the ground created the conditions for an operational victory but until that tactical victory was achieved 1MARDIV was only part of a greater mosaic.

"...and it drew in the IJN for a series of battles not to mention the first allied ground based victory with the morale boost it provided."

Those IJN battles were part of the operational mosaic to which I referred. I'm unaware that Gen. Vandegrift believed his division possessed an operational mission. Clearly it was incapable of sustained operations in the absence of secure SLOCs.

"This applies to the brigade commander. he has deep fires, attached assets, reserves and scouts to shape the battle for his manuever battalions. He also controls the logistics."

Yes, his battalion manuever commanders look to him as their operational commander and hope he'll attrite enemy forces within their area of inerest. That doesn't mean that a typical manuever brigade is typically an operational asset.

[zraver]

Yes, his battalion manuever commanders look to him as their operational commander and hope he'll attrite enemy forces within their area of inerest. That doesn't mean that a typical manuever brigade is typically an operational asset.

I think we crossed lines. I went back and grabbed my original statements

Finally the operational level of command has the widest net. A platoon leader through regimental commander is a tactical leader. Thats 4 levels of command- platoon, company/troop, battalion/squadron, regiment*. Operational commanders go 6 levels from brigade to as high as theaters- brigade**, division, corps, army, armygroup/front and theater.

**- as either a fully auotonomous unit like an Ameican RCT or fully or mostly self contained divsional unit that can operate on its own.

I am not arguing brigades are always operational units, only that the typical American Brigade is the lowest normal unit that can undertake operational missions.

I disagree. There was a small matter of a contested battle to determine that outcome. As I indicated, winning the ground created the conditions for an operational victory but until that tactical victory was achieved 1MARDIV was only part of a greater mosaic.

That greater mosaic is stategy. Once the marines were ashore, the IJN which was low on troops had to divert precious units and assets away from New Guinea. Japan was left with too little to contest the Americans and Aussies in either location.

[S2]

Zraver Reply

"...the typical American Brigade is the lowest normal unit that can undertake operational missions."

I can probably agree with that. "...normal..." being the operative term. A Ranger Battalion seizing a SASP, for instance, might be considered an operational task but the executing unit wouldn't be considered normal.

"Once the marines were ashore, the IJN which was low on troops had to divert precious units and assets away from New Guinea. Japan was left with too little to contest the Americans and Aussies in either location."

Are you sure? The first attacks at Tenaru were led by the Ichiki detachment out of Guam. The second attack at Bloody (Edson's) Ridge was conducted by remnants of Ichiki's forces and the Kawaguichi's 35th Bde. of the IJA 18th Division from Cebu, Phillippines. The third major assault was led by the 17th Army H.Q. (Hyakutake) which transferred itself along with the entire 2nd Division out of Rabaul. The last assault, to be conducted by the 38th Division, was sunk offshore and never arrived with any coherancy. It had previously been committed to the Dutch East Indies.

Perhaps you're suggesting that these units were originally destined for New Guinea but were diverted? If so, that may be correct but forces already committed in New Guinea don't seem to have been used for the Guadalcanal operations.

[Shek]

Z,
By doctrine and practice, brigades and divisions in the US Army undertake tactical missions in support of major operations and campaigns that define the operational level of war. By exception and through augmentation, a division can become a JTF capable of C2ing at the operational level of war.

[Albany Rifles]

Z,
By doctrine and practice, brigades and divisions in the US Army undertake tactical missions in support of major operations and campaigns that define the operational level of war. By exception and through augmentation, a division can become a JTF capable of C2ing at the operational level of war.

By a lot of augmentation....and then it
ceases to be a division and is now a joint task force....and that is a very recent additional function of the division HQ.

And 1 MARDIV was not operating in a vacuum....it was the land component of an area command under Halsey...who was the operational commander.