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  • #46
    Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
    Actually, I credit Marshal's crowning achievement with the Marshall Plan. That Plan was more than responsible for halting the progress of a rival superpower and sown the seeds and path for its downfall, all done without firing a shot against that superpower. Remember that line from Sun Tzu? Hence his close second ranking.
    S-2 makes the point I would have. We're discussing achievements of generals while in uniform. But I agree with you that the Marshall Plan was his single greatest life achievement, so much so a product of his thinking that Truman insisted on calling it the Marshall plan. We'll never know his thoughts on it and the rest of his life's work because he never kept a diary and refused to write an autobiography even when offered $1M by a publisher. He commented that he had already been amply compensated for his service. We could sorely use a few Marshalls about now, don't you think.
    To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato

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    • #47
      Why do you have to be in uniform to be considered as a strategist? Some great strategists of our time never wore uniforms but were largely responsible for their country's victories over their archrivals or enemies.

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      • #48
        Originally posted by Shek View Post
        Grant's strategy and Scott's Anaconda Plan are two different strategies. Different ends, ways, and means. Only the lines of operation have some things in common.
        It seems to me that Grant's strategy evolved within the Anaconda plan and, although it bears his distinctive mark, it was not apart from it. He certainly proved it in the Western campaign which "strangled" the South's ability to obtain supplies along routes west of the Mississippi and to move men and material north and south.
        To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato

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        • #49
          Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
          Why do you have to be in uniform to be considered as a strategist? Some great strategists of our time never wore uniforms but were largely responsible for their country's victories over their archrivals or enemies.
          Point well taken. However, we are but simple posters trying to be true to the question, which unmistakeably refers to generals, not civilians. If we judge Grant by his presidency, he would be a disaster.
          To be Truly ignorant, Man requires an Education - Plato

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          • #50
            Originally posted by Shek View Post
            Grant's strategy and Scott's Anaconda Plan are two different strategies. Different ends, ways, and means. Only the lines of operation have some things in common.
            Which why I picked Grant, Scott identified the battlefeild dimensions, Grant actually worked in them to win.

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            • #51
              Originally posted by JAD_333 View Post
              It seems to me that Grant's strategy evolved within the Anaconda plan and, although it bears his distinctive mark, it was not apart from it. He certainly proved it in the Western campaign which "strangled" the South's ability to obtain supplies along routes west of the Mississippi and to move men and material north and south.
              John,

              Scott's Anaconda was designed within a conciliatory policy, intended to isolate the South economically to provide a boost to Unionists to overthrow the secessionists. The lines of operations were down the Mississippi and at Southern ports. It was never envisioned to move to the Southern interior or take on Southern military forces (other than to secure ports and the Mississippi).

              http://bigthink.com/ideas/21190


              On the other hand, Grant's 1864-5 strategy was designed within the hard war policy, intended to take the war directly to the South by destroying its armies and resources to make war. Part of this was taking the remaining ports along the seaboard, but those were supporting operations, with the decisive efforts being the moves against the ANV and AoT. Destroy the forces of the rebellion, the rebellion goes away.



              These are very different strategies that if anything, are very distant cousins.
              Last edited by Shek; 28 Dec 10,, 19:49.
              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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              • #52
                it seems that grant's strategy was built as a corollary to the anaconda plan; ie by the time he executed his plan most of the elements of the anaconda plan had already -taken place-, ie seizing new orleans/mississippi/vicksburg, combined with a blockade and seizure of key islands on the periphery.

                that alone failing to defeat the south, the next logical order would be to destroy the southern armies and advance inland to destroy the resources of making war. i'm not sure how successful sherman's march to the sea would have been had the mississippi not been successfully cut, making one flank secure.
                There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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                • #53
                  I don't know if you would call it a corollary to it, since the Anaconda plan had failed by the time Grant took over. Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana were isolated but this was not the heart of the South by any means. The only real success of Scott's plan was the rapid seizure of Missouri, Maryland and Kentucky which kept them out of the confederacy. The only unionist rising if it can be called that is what is now West Virginia. The Unionist movement in Arkansas died when fighting broke out at Ft Sumter.

                  Rather than acting in support of Scott's plan, Grant moved forward from its failures.

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                  • #54
                    Here's what the OR has on the Anaconda Plan.

                    eHistory at OSU | Online Books | The Official Records of the Civil War

                    HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
                    Washington, May 3, 1861.

                    Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,
                    Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:

                    SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.

                    First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.

                    Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.

                    Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan--the great danger now pressing upon us--the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences--that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.

                    With great respect, yours, truly,
                    WINFIELD SCOTT
                    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                    • #55
                      Tempted to choose Grant, but in the end plumped for Marshall. Others have enumerated the reasons.

                      I have long thought him among the greatest Americans of the C20th. Perhaps someone else could have achieved what he did in building the great weapon used by the nation in WW2 or with the Marshall Plan, but he was the one who did manage it. He misjudged things in China, though he would hardly have been the first foreigner guilty of that. For mine, one of his finest moments was when Truman sought his advice on a rampant MacArthur - it came back 'sack the bastard'. His dignity when attacked by Macarthyites (funny how their apologists always overlook that) & his great humility speak volumes for the character of the man. Few could achieve as much in multiple lives.
                      sigpic

                      Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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                      • #56
                        A couple other contenders are Curtiss LeMay, Matthew Ridgway and William T Sherman not as popular as the ones listed but even less popular with their enemies.
                        sigpic"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
                        If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

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                        • #57
                          Curtis Lemay did not win the war with bombing. The claimed strategic utility and benefits of massive bombardment has been proven to be overstated. Matthew Ridgeway was confined to a front, not the entire theater. Same thing with William T. Sherman although I would say he was one of the greatest battlefield general one could have. A true dog of war.

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                          • #58
                            Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
                            Curtis Lemay did not win the war with bombing. The claimed strategic utility and benefits of massive bombardment has been proven to be overstated. Matthew Ridgeway was confined to a front, not the entire theater. Same thing with William T. Sherman although I would say he was one of the greatest battlefield general one could have. A true dog of war.
                            All three overwhelmed their enemies with violence and the threat of worse violence, in LeMay's case the Japanese were just the beginning, his cold war strategies scared the crap out of everyone. Ridgeway made the war too costly for the NK to pursue it, and and Sherman was very brutal for his time, his enemies were crushed. All three were strategic generals IMO, and very effective dogs of war.
                            Last edited by USSWisconsin; 29 Dec 10,, 08:28.
                            sigpic"If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
                            If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

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                            • #59
                              Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
                              Curtis Lemay did not win the war with bombing. The claimed strategic utility and benefits of massive bombardment has been proven to be overstated.
                              Have they? Could Operation Overlord have succeeded without the 8th AF grinding the Luftwaffe to dust and forcing its remnants into the Reich? Even inside of the technology of the time, post war ananylsis says the problem with strategic bombing was poor target selection. We went after indsutry instead of power generation. If we had gone after the power grid with a systematic approach, Hitler's Germany would have crumbled. As it was the escort fighters wrecked the German transport grid.

                              In the Pacific the B-29 was reducing Japan to ash even without the A-bomb.


                              Matthew Ridgeway was confined to a front, not the entire theater. Same thing with William T. Sherman although I would say he was one of the greatest battlefield general one could have. A true dog of war.[/QUOTE]

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                              • #60
                                I had to go with Washington.

                                Every other General had the infrastructure of an existing United States, and associated resources, to draw upon to some degree. Washington forged an army out of rabble, with the outstanding help of some colorful foreigners, and kept that army intact by sheer force of will through some very, very bleak periods. On a tactical level I believe he was solid but not spectacular; it was his ability to create victory and ultimately a Nation that made him great. I also admire the fact that he did not seek political power afterwards. It was thrust upon him more than anything.

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