Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Ahmed Wali Karzai builds private army to protect his clan in post-NATO vacuum

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Ahmed Wali Karzai builds private army to protect his clan in post-NATO vacuum

    Ahmed Wali Karzai builds private army to protect his clan in post-NATO vacuum

    * December 5th, 2010 12:21 am ET

    Ahmed Wali Karzai builds private army to protect his clan in post-NATO vacuum - National Afghanistan Headlines | Examiner.com

    One of the more interesting WikiLeaks tidbits this week was the disclosure of how Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK), the half-brother of Afghanistan’s president, is apparently building up a personal private army to protect the Karzai clan in preparation for the violent struggle for power likely to ensue once the U.S.-led coalition finally withdraws.

    AWK has consolidated power in Kandahar to such an extent that the Karzai family now has dominance over most provincial economic and security activities. U.S. diplomats have indicated, according to The Guardian, that the Karzais might be leveraging this powerful nexus to create a private regional army to protect themselves from rivals.

    U.S. officials have stressed how AWK has been trying to get the interior ministry to authorize him to license all contractors and their weapons through the Kandahar provincial council of which AWK sits atop, which "has the potential to arm the Karzai clan with a non-state entity that can insure against whoever should come to power in Afghanistan".

    In other words, the Karzai clan might be stocked with the corrupt and the insane, but certainly not the stupid - they see the writing on the wall. Hamid and AWK realize that once NATO exits Kabul will be up-for-grabs and they know they have much less political support than former Afghan President Najibullah had when the Soviets left him behind. And who knows how many times Karzai has cringed at the mental image of Najibullah’s blood-soaked body hanging like an ornament in Aryana Square courtesy of the Taliban.

    Beyond this, the cables confirm much of the same old about AWK – that he is an extorting, embezzling war profiteer and drug-trafficker extraordinaire. One cable in particular worthy of mention is entitled, "Kandahar politics complicate US objectives in Afghanistan" which characterizes Karzai’s pernicious half-brother as the equivalent of a mob boss:

    As the kingpin of Kandahar, Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources, patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a network of political clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises.

    The cable describes him as an "unrivaled strongman" whose purpose as chairman of the Kandahar provincial council is the “enrichment, extension and perpetuation of the Karzai clan, and along with it their branch of the Popalzai tribe.”

    However, unlike other strongmen who have public support because they fund useful projects and deliver services, AWK is widely unpopular in Kandahar because he rules exclusively rather than inclusively, is not perceived as caring about the population and is simply using his power to “feed his tribe”.

    This mafioso narrative is quite familiar considering what I wrote back in May about the alarming magnitude of the Karzai family’s corruption. One senior NATO official had calculated that the “Karzai cartel” was making more than a billion dollars a year off the Afghanistan war via lucrative contracts and sub-contracting spin-offs in convoy protection, construction, fuel, food and security.

    Ann Marlowe has been on the ground in Afghanistan through six “embeds” and seems to have a solid grasp of the Karzai character, going so far as to accuse them of complicity with the enemy. Marlowe once poetically scribed:

    We are supporting a criminal state in Kabul that is likely involved with the insurgency itself. There is almost nothing to distinguish the Taliban from the Karzai mafias, whose tentacles reach down to the most obscure rural districts. The Afghan state is being hollowed out from the inside and becoming a branch of a lucrative criminal enterprise. Why would the Karzais have any interest in defeating the insurgency? They are profiting from it.

    Marlowe concluded that “effectively, we are in Afghanistan so that the Karzai cartel can steal even more money. Is that worth losing our soldiers for?” To Marlowe’s point - the Karzai’s are a mafia in the most literal sense. Members of rival tribes who happen to speak out against the Karzais beg for anonymity, because as one tribal elder told the New York Times last year: “Local officials who don’t obey him (AWK) are killed. He has his own militias and elements of the Taliban. He can kill whenever he wants.”

    There is sufficient evidence to nail AWK for his narcotics activities and other Karzai family members for other assorted crimes but they’ve all gone untouched. And the cables reveal some very sad reasons why this is the case:

    "Initiatives that rely on the Afghan government to take the lead in bringing to justice major corrupt figures or negative influences in Kandahar contain a serious dilemma: they would include some of Karzai's closest relatives and allies and require the prosecution of people on whom we often rely for assistance and/or support. Second, any efforts to bring these individuals to justice could compromise the informal governing networks to which Kandaharis have become accustomed, without necessarily replacing them with effective government officials or improving the delivery of services."

    In February the US finally began to consider what measures to take "against criminal and corrupt Afghan officials in an effort to change their behavior … and end tacit American support for corrupt Afghan officials". There were even suggestions of possible law enforcement actions against three prominent maligned actors in southern Afghanistan: Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, and Asadullah Sherzad.

    Yet, so far, no prosecution of AWK has taken place as he continues to denounce these accusations as defamatory and baseless. AWK even had the gall to tell a U.S. official he was willing to take a lie detector test to prove his innocence. The same official commented about AWK afterwards in a cable: “He [AWK] appears not to understand the level of our knowledge of his activities…”

    I am not so convinced. I am willing to bet AWK is well aware of what the U.S. knows because he has friends in high places, the most cherished of which are the intimate relationships he’s developed within the CIA based on a mutual interest in the international opium market. According to Douglas Wissing in The Huffington Post:

    Reports by The New York Times, ABC News, The Washington Timesand The Times of Londonon Ahmad Wali Karzai paint a picture of a corrupt kingpin in the opium-soaked Kandahar heartland of the Taliban. The recent WikiLeaks disclosures show AWK's extensive connections to the CIA, long involved in the drug trade in the Golden Triangle, Latin America and Afghanistan, as historian Alfred W. McCoy has documented in his magisterial The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade.

    And the fact that AWK, according to the New York Times, was on the CIA payroll for eight years best explains his untouchable status. As Robert Baer wrote in a Time magazine piece last year:

    According to the New York Times, the brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is a CIA source, providing bases for the CIA as well as the U.S. military and serving as a go-between with parts of the Taliban. If it sounds a lot like Vietnam when Vietnam started to really come apart, it is — President Diem's grotesquely corrupt brother was a CIA source and a noxious agent of influence.

    Defense Intelligence chief Gen. Michael T. Flynn during this same period voiced concern that the U.S. purported “population-centric” strategy was being undermined by the perception (and reality) that the U.S. was aligned with thugs. The spy chief then delivered his recommendation on the AWK situation loosely ensconced in an overt yet devilishly befitting analogy:

    "The only way to clean up Chicago," Flynn declared, "is to get rid of Capone."
    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

  • #2
    Let's leave Khandahar.

    Comment


    • #3
      OoE Reply

      "Let's leave Khandahar."

      I'll do you one better, sir. Let's leave Afghanistan.

      Now.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by S-2 View Post
        "Let's leave Khandahar."

        I'll do you one better, sir. Let's leave Afghanistan.

        Now.
        Steve,

        I am not of that opinion. I am of the opinion you think you're a monster, let me show you a monster!

        Comment


        • #5
          OoE Reply

          "I am of the opinion you think you're a monster, let me show you a monster!"

          Colonel,

          Moi? Kittycat all the way sir. I've not a war-like bone left in my body. That's why I want the hell out of that country. We've proved perfectly incapable at great cost and human expense of effecting any worthwhile change there.

          Time to go.
          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

          Comment


          • #6
            How will you respond to Bluesman's assertions that you will be giving up?

            Comment


            • #7
              I have my doubts but ...
              Canadian colonel says Taliban defeated, will run in to a 'brick wall' on return | National News | St. Albert Gazette

              Friday, Nov 26, 2010 06:15 pm | Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press

              KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - The outgoing commander of Canada's mentoring team in Kandahar says the Taliban have been routed and won't present a significant threat in the future.

              Col. Ian Creighton, who was in charge of the operational mentor liaison team _ or OMLT _ says the lull in violence across southern Afghanistan over the last few weeks has nothing to do with onset of colder weather, as in previous years.

              "This is not just a winter thing where some guys have gone back to Pakistan. They have been defeated on the battlefield," he said Friday shortly after handing command to his replacement, Col. Hercule Gosselin.

              The blatantly upbeat assessment is at odds with American officers at NATO's southern Afghan command, who said last week it will be the spring before they can be sure the recent offensive through the Taliban heartland was successful.

              Still, Creighton wasn't reluctant to use an unambiguous word not often spoken here: "Victory."

              Soldiers of the Royal Canadian Regiment battle group, who are shaking the dust off their clothes following months in field, have lamented that NATO's restrictive rules on the use of aircraft and artillery have allowed insurgents to "just walk away." Some have predicted that the Taliban will be back in force next spring.

              Creighton said militants who managed to flee will find NATO and Afghan forces holding their ground if and when they return.

              "Anybody who comes back into this country — a Taliban — is going to hit that wall," Creighton predicted. "They'll have minimum effect if they do try to come back in. The security is tight, that's for sure."

              His boss, Brig.-Gen. Dean Milner, said it was a tough summer of fighting but he also believes things have turned around.

              "We weren't really sure how things were going back April-May," he said. "The insurgents had a lot of the momentum. They had freedom of movement, but the excellent efforts of the OMLT in concert with the rest of the task force, and our Afghan partners, we've been able to turn the tide."

              The soldiers of the OMLT have a reputation for being cowboys. Throughout their tour, they ranged all over Kandahar province, running into fights in Arghandab, Panjwaii, Zhari and most recently Dand districts.

              Their operations support NATO troops dug in with other Afghan soldiers at tiny outposts in each districts.

              A recent study by Canada's Foreign Affairs Department and the U.S. Institute for Peace found that the Taliban have been successful raising mercenaries within Afghan villages because they prey upon the perception that western troops are occupiers and have committed atrocities.

              But from Creighton's vantage point, the young fighting-age males who make up the bulk of insurgent cannon fodder have gladly put down their weapons and likely won't pick them up again.

              Skeptics of the Canadian government's plan to switch from combat to classroom training of the Afghan Army have suggested that Canadian soldiers must accompany their trainees into the field, as they do now, in order to be effective.

              Creighton said he expects the Americans will continue mentoring the Afghans in the field, but didn't entirely dismiss the criticism.

              "I will say an OMLT fighting side-by-side with the Afghan soldiers is something that really works to improve quicker than a group that's just partnering by itself," he said.

              "You need to bring that mentoring and partnership together to have that holistic approach to being successful."

              Regardless, he said Canadian troops will "do a remarkable job, no matter where they are in Afghanistan." But he warned that it will take a generation to properly train a professional Afghan Army.

              The commander of the 1st Brigade of the Afghan Army's 205 Corps said he is sorry to see the Canadians leaving Kandahar, and appealed to decision-makers in Ottawa to reconsider the scope of the training mission.

              "We need the help of Canada and we would ask Canada to continue their help with us in their mentorship with the financial and all other help they can do, with the logistics," Brig.-Gen. Ahmad Habibi said through an interpreter.

              Gosselin, Creighton's replacement, said it's too soon to know who will take over for his team in July when the Canadian combat mission ends.

              Comment


              • #8
                Blademaster Reply

                "How will you respond to Bluesman's assertions that you will be giving up?"

                He'd know better than I but I'd assert that for every target he chases in Afghanistan with his very deadly model airplanes he probably chases five in Pakistan.

                Secondly, leaving Afghanistan with our NGOs, contractors, various civilian governmental agencies and the vast bulk of our ground forces 1.) reduces our direct vulnerability to the taliban and others and, 2.) reduces the need to rely so heavily on a most dubious ally-Pakistan.

                Third, nothing constrains us from attacking targets throughout Afghanistan and elsewhere as our intelligence identifies them. This can be facilitated by bluesman's friends or by off-shore SOF units or some combination of the two. Then, of course, there's always the good ol' U.S.A.F.

                Fourth, we've numerous allies in the region with a more direct interest in Afghan affairs. Let them fill the gap should they desire and/or see a compelling need and may the great game continue.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                  "How will you respond to Bluesman's assertions that you will be giving up?"

                  He'd know better than I but I'd assert that for every target he chases in Afghanistan with his very deadly model airplanes he probably chases five in Pakistan.

                  Secondly, leaving Afghanistan with our NGOs, contractors, various civilian governmental agencies and the vast bulk of our ground forces 1.) reduces our direct vulnerability to the taliban and others and, 2.) reduces the need to rely so heavily on a most dubious ally-Pakistan.

                  Third, nothing constrains us from attacking targets throughout Afghanistan and elsewhere as our intelligence identifies them. This can be facilitated by bluesman's friends or by off-shore SOF units or some combination of the two. Then, of course, there's always the good ol' U.S.A.F.

                  Fourth, we've numerous allies in the region with a more direct interest in Afghan affairs. Let them fill the gap should they desire and/or see a compelling need and may the great game continue.
                  Then essentially, you have given a very important propaganda victory to Al Queda and to all muslim terrorists worldwide. First the British, then the Soviets, and now the Americans. I think the problem is that this is a war we cannot afford to lose. We have to win even it means a high economic and political cost.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Blademaster Reply

                    "Then essentially, you have given a very important propaganda victory to Al Queda and to all muslim terrorists worldwide."



                    "I think the problem is that this is a war we cannot afford to lose. We have to win even it means a high economic and political cost"

                    If you're an American citizen, I disagree. If you're an Indian citizen then promote this argument to your government. For myself, my government has proven thoroughly incapable over nine years and two presidents of displaying to me that they've a clue about what they're doing.

                    I believe my solution allows America to attack Al Qaeda just as effectively with far less exposure and cost. I don't believe that building Achmed the opium grower a fresh well should be a nat'l priority.
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      It is not that the coalition troops cannot win, but as it stands now, there seems to be three insurmountable obstacles.

                      1) The ludicrous ROE crafted for our own troops
                      2) The situation with the Pakistani border and sovereignty; thou shalt not cross
                      3) No way for economic assistance to actually make it to the targeted project intact, due to endemic corruption.

                      I'd love to believe the Canadian Colonel's statements, but I think the ANA will melt without coalition assistance.

                      As for international perception (victory? shameful loss?), I think that is secondary. A simple statement: "Any efforts to export jihadi violence outside Afghanistan will be met with punishing retaliatory strikes from the air. They will not be of equivalent force. They will be overwhelming. We will be watching. Behave yourselves."

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        chogy,

                        good points. the most serious, by far, of the obstacles is 3). more specifically, the lack of a serious host national government. the US is using a second-order solution by concentrating on effective local/regional governance, while developing a national army, in the hopes that when we're out the ANA can hold things together.

                        in fact, the ANA is now the lynchpin of our strategy. the operations around kandahar, helmand, etc etc is all meant to break taliban momentum and buy the ANA time to be able to face them down when we're out.

                        I'd love to believe the Canadian Colonel's statements, but I think the ANA will melt without coalition assistance.
                        right now, i'd agree. in two years, i think they'll be okay. roughly speaking the ANA is approximately equivalent to where the Iraqi Army was in early 2006. recall that one of the first independent IA operations was Operation "Charge of the Knights" in Mar 08.

                        as for the rest of the points, thankfully 1) has improved considerably under petraeus and 2) while still bad, is definitely not as bad as it was in 07 and 08.
                        Last edited by astralis; 08 Dec 10,, 19:01.
                        There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Chogy & Astralis Reply

                          I'm wondering if you two aren't discussing ROIs at cross-purposes?

                          Astralis, what's fundamentally improved WRT Pakistani sanctuary? S. Waziristan and Swat were sources of taliban resistance to the GoP-and were attacked. Balochistan (Omar/Quetta Shura) and N. Waziristan (Haqqani network and Hezb-i-Gulbuddin) are centers of the anti-afghan taliban-notably untouched to date.

                          "...in fact, the ANA is now the lynchpin of our strategy. the operations around kandahar, helmand, etc etc is all meant to break taliban momentum and buy the ANA time to be able to face them down when we're out."

                          Why are you so sanguine WRT ANA development or do I misread your perspective? Even were they to become an immensely professional, logistically assured force, wouldn't they face the same intractable problem presented by Pakistani sanctuary? I mean...we do, correct? What changes that? That's, of course, assuming they evolved to such a postulated state of professionalism.

                          Btw, if they did, wouldn't the ANA be the first wholly afghan organization under our mentorship to do so-civil or military? What signposts have you observed that indicate such an evolution?

                          Chogy, corruption IS endemic.

                          "Endemic, in a broad sense, can mean "belonging" or "native to", "characteristic of", or "prevalent in" a particular geography, group, field, area, or environment; native to an area or scope.

                          It also has specific meanings:

                          Endemism, an organism being "endemic" means exclusively native to a place or biota. For example, the platypus is endemic to Australia.
                          Endemic (epidemiology), an infection is said to be "endemic" in a human population when that infection is maintained in the population without the need for external inputs.
                          "

                          Occasionally, we lose sight of a word's particular power. Here we can see that Afghanistan qualifies in both the general and two specific definitions of endemic. Further, the nature of this endemism is generally shared by Afghanistan's surrounding neighbors. Thus also mutually reinforcing. I've no hope of its changing but I do suspect it's capable of changing those of us in long contact with it. If nothing else, it becomes an accepted and invisible component of the local milieu by sage and wizened outsiders. To that end, those conditioned to such begin developing workarounds accomodating this endemic corruption. We become enablers.

                          We see it in the manner that we turn a blind eye to opium production. For every moral standard, we've developed local exceptions. Try growing opium here in America. All hell shall rightfully break loose upon you. There? We might buy it or turn a blind eye. Either way the taliban and guys like Ahmed Wali Karzai equally benefit.

                          Karzai? Isn't he an ally and the president's brother?

                          Chogy, I'm not soapboxing YOU. It's just that a term like "endemic" finds its way into our lexicon and then insidiously asserts it's subtle power. We ACCEPT that condition as part of our operating framework.

                          I don't. I don't propose we change it by reshaping it. We can't. It's, afterall, endemic. We could DESTROY it. Doing so might mean destroying many of those we enable. If so, somebody might haul out the tired Powell aphorism where "if you break it, you own it".

                          Maybe. Likely even. Worse, we'd buy off on it. That's why I want out.

                          We can't get there from here.
                          Last edited by S2; 09 Dec 10,, 13:57.
                          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            S-2,

                            Astralis, what's fundamentally improved WRT Pakistani sanctuary?
                            i would argue half a loaf is better than no loaf at all; resources expended against the pakistani government means one less possible resource that might be used against us.

                            also, as we increase the size of the killboxes and the number/accuracy of the drone strikes on pakistani territory this represents a tactical improvement. the pakistanis might not touch the HQN but we're sure trying.

                            Why are you so sanguine WRT ANA development or do I misread your perspective?
                            it's not a case of being sanguine-- although given gen caldwell's efforts on the ANA's behalf i think i have more reason to be than several years ago. he's done more in the last two years than what occurred in the previous four or five. but anyway, it's clear that we've reduced/"re-focused" our strategic goals re: afghanistan-- we're no longer trying to turn it into a prosperous democracy-- but instead we're looking at a considerably smaller, much more viable goal of creating a national army.

                            Even were they to become an immensely professional, logistically assured force, wouldn't they face the same intractable problem presented by Pakistani sanctuary? I mean...we do, correct? What changes that? That's, of course, assuming they evolved to such a postulated state of professionalism.
                            they need not be immensely professional or logistically assured by -our- standards...they just need to be better than their taliban "brethren". in fact, we can lower the bar some more: they just need to be able to keep the taliban stalemated and be self-sustaining.

                            the goal is to make the pakistani sanctuary at worst an irritant, not something that will lead to taliban tanks crashing down the gates of the presidential palace...although i admit it's a tempting sight sometimes.

                            Btw, if they did, wouldn't the ANA be the first wholly afghan organization under our mentorship to do so-civil or military? What signposts have you observed that indicate such an evolution?
                            http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/da...ell_slide1.jpg

                            i think developing an ANA with basic competency is fully possible; hell, we pretty much stood up the iraqi army from scratch. it's a harder task given the illiteracy rates within the ANA but then again, their enemies from what i hear aren't on the same level as the insurgents the IA fought in iraq, for precisely the same reason.

                            put things in perspective: afghanistan now is not near as bad as iraq in 2006, not in terms of military or civilians killed or number of attacks.
                            There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Astralis Reply

                              "...resources expended against the pakistani government means one less possible resource that might be used against us..."

                              Apples and oranges. The P.A. have never scoured the hills looking for HQN. Their cantonments in Miran Shah are mere blocks away. So too with the Quetta Shura. It never existed from the GoP's perspective until, VOILA, one day Ahmed Mukhtar is telling all of us it's been dealt with. Finally, the afghan taliban know on which side their bread's buttered. They've never threatened the P.A. nor lended active support to those who've done so. Omar tried to end the feuding between Hafez Gul Bahadar, Maulvi Nazir and Baitullah Mehsud for the sole purpose of redirecting their enmity outward on Afghanistan. This was done with the P.A.'s fervant hopes and blessing.

                              "the pakistanis might not touch the HQN but we're sure trying..."

                              No we're not. PREDATOR is a discrete, precise, minimalist approach to preserving our right to self-defense. Its tactical efficacy doesn't absolve the strategic failure which underpins its need and use.

                              "...instead we're looking at a considerably smaller, much more viable goal of creating a national army."

                              Doesn't a nat'l army have to have a nation to defend? Putting aside whatever gains you might presume for an ANA, the civilian leadership must show at least commensurate growth to avoid doing anything but creating well-armed (if modestly skilled) future warlords. You might read the words of ministers but I sense no unifying ethos that's determined to bind a country.

                              "they just need to be better than their taliban "brethren."

                              Then they'd best show some acumen fighting the information war. Having their hands deep in the pockets of each passing merchant and citizen won't be a pathway to such. Chogy said "endemic" corruption. Pervasive is endemic's fellow traveller.

                              "...in fact, we can lower the bar some more: they just need to be able to keep the taliban stalemated and be self-sustaining."

                              Self-sustaining is something not afforded to even the Pakistani army. As to keeping the taliban stale-mated, we've barely done such since 2006. Do you suggest an ANA largely on its own will do so?

                              "...hell, we pretty much stood up the iraqi army from scratch"

                              I'm not sure I'm buying nor that there's a valid lesson here. Parallels to Iraq are something even Petraeus eschews. I'm sure he'd do the same with raising forth a nat'l armed force in Afghanistan.

                              "their enemies from what i hear aren't on the same level as the insurgents the IA fought in iraq..."

                              Again, I don't recall the IA laying the foundation to any success nor that AQI et al carry the same cachet as the taliban and their historical forebearers, the anti-Soviet mujahideen. There were 150,000 plus U.S. combat troops in a nation that's the same population and two-thirds the size of Afghanistan. I'm not counting the coalition of the willing there but their numbers weren't inconsiderable.

                              With all the advantages Iraq hold the jury remains very much out on its enduring success. I don't see anything similar in Afghanistan and hold that reliance on a resilient and capable ANA is akin to a thirsty man in a desert.
                              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                              Comment

                              Working...
                              X