Page 1 of 12 12345678910 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 15 of 172

Thread: The War

  1. #1

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825

    The War

    It would be nice if we could collect all the pertinent posts regarding policy decisions made during this war by the past administration and this one. That, however, would be a monumental task as they're spread through a variety of related threads.

    I offer this-

    Bob Woodward's Book Portrays A Great Divide Over Afghanistan-WAPO Editorial Sept. 29, 2010

    I've been opposed to this war since the fall of 2007 when it became clear to me that this government, in sum, was incapable of reversing conditions in Afghanistan. I'm dismayed to read from Woodward that James Jones, in late May or so of this year, suggested we can't succeed so long as sanctuary exists in Pakistan.

    Really? Only now?

    The permutations of thought driving this administration's rationales for our current policies, despite the extended period of analysis last fall, were unsurprising in their conclusions and unsophisticated in their offerings. Half-measures to appease all sides without firm resolve to fall on one side or the other of the central issue.

    We've offered up our armed forces to dubious ends. I'm frankly very disturbed by the news of sport killings and dope in Afghanistan coupled with charges against the murder of two soldiers in an argument in Iraq. Not the first time we've heard or read of such in our armed forces of late and, perhaps, a trendline of decaying ethical standards and base talent among our troops while used as the instrument of our political indecision...again.

    This war needs to end. We've an enemy in the GoP that are called an ally. Maybe some among them but certainly not its army nor ISI. Their nat'l objectives diametrically opposed at the core to ours in Afghanistan. Their civil administration is even more vascillating and corrupt than ours. So too our Afghan partners. None of this will change.

    For the families of our soldiers killed this year and all the years prior in Afghanistan we must offer our abject apologies. Their deaths were functionally meaningless when measured against our true intent. For this, our past and present leadership should be deeply ashamed.

    There are no greater geo-political realities that aren't understood by the general public. Nothing here is beyond our comprehension. It is, simply, what it appears to be and has been for some interminable time. Our government's sole obligation is to secure the safety of this nation and do so in direct fashion. We've failed to do so while wandering in a forest of indecisiveness and policy confusion for nearly a decade. Last April's abortive attack in Times Square proves our vulnerability is as great as ever. Only good fortune saved the lives of many then.

    We may not prove so lucky the next time. None of that, however, is affected in the least by what we've failed to accomplish in Afghanistan.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  2. #2
    In Memoriam/Battleship Enthusiast Defense Professional USSWisconsin's Avatar
    Join Date
    05 Dec 08
    Location
    Wisconsin
    Posts
    5,434
    War is Hell, War in Afganistan is worse - the fairly recent involvement there by the USSR were something we could have considered more carefully, but mainly our own committment - and we know democratic countries historically don't tolerate long wars. The Korean and Vietnam war have familar connotations too, with the enemy able to withdraw to sanctuary.
    "If your plan is for one year, plant rice. If your plan is for ten years, plant trees.
    If your plan is for one hundred years, educate children."

  3. #3
    Contributor 1980s's Avatar
    Join Date
    19 Jul 08
    Posts
    697

    I believe this article fits in here:

    The other conflict in Afghanistan
    By Brian M Downing

    The ongoing insurgency in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan rightly commands attention, but it obscures a critical second conflict in the country. Long-standing antagonism between the non-Pashtun peoples of the north and the Pashtun people of the south are heading toward fissure. Paradoxically, settlement of the insurgency, through negotiation or force of arms, could exacerbate this divide.

    Ethnic politics
    Afghanistan comprises a dozen or more sizable ethnic groups, the precise numbers and proportions of which are unclear and contested. Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkic, Baloch, and

    other groups differ on demographic matters; and the country's geography and decades of conflict offer little prospect of a neutral, acceptable census.

    The center of the demographic dispute is the size of the Pashtun peoples of the south and east, who, on only sparing evidence, purport to be about 52% to 55% of the population and have so claimed since the 19th century.

    Other groups, however, disagree. They insist that the Pashtun are perhaps slightly more than 40% of the population, while disinterested assessments say Northerners constitute 45% to 50% of the population. The dispute is not merely a matter for demographers or even for the issue of moneys doled out from Kabul. It now centers on who will preside over Afghanistan - and indeed if there will be an Afghanistan as presently constituted.

    For a century or more the question of Pashtun majority could sit on the back-burner as most Afghans had far more interest in local government than in events in faraway Kabul where figures reigned but dared not rule. But decades of war and inept or intolerable central governments have brought the matter to the fore.

    Mohammed Daoud's reforms of the late 1970s led to violent opposition in most parts of the country and plunged the country into decades of intermittent warfare and foreign interventions from which the country has yet to recover. His successors fared little better and the various mujahideen groupings could not govern, which led to the Taliban government of the mid-1990s through 2001.

    There is wide agreement in the northern regions that Pashtun governments from Mohammed Daoud to Hamid Karzai have been incompetent, intrusive cabals that long misgoverned the country and are poised now to give it back to the Taliban in concert with foreigners from Pakistan and China. Northerners bitterly recall the Taliban as harsh southerners who slaughtered non-Pashtun people by the thousands.

    Post-Taliban government
    After fighting the Taliban to a standstill and ousting them in 2001, northerners felt their efforts guaranteed them predominance in the new government. They acceded to the accession of Karzai, the head of the (Pashtun) Popalzai tribe, to the presidency.

    This was done in part owing to US pressure and despite considerable support in the country for the Tajik statesman, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who also enjoyed support from regional powers that had supported the north well after the US washed its hands of the area.

    Over the past nine years, however, northerners have seen their politicians pushed out of key ministries, especially the Ministry of Defense, which was once administered by the Tajik leader Mohammed Fahim. That portfolio is now in the hands of Abdul Wardak, a Pashtun who has used his office to reassert his people's predominance in key military commands and simultaneously vitiated the militias of northern warlords. Northerners have been reduced to the rank-and-file of the Afghan National Army and ceremonial positions such as the country's two vice presidencies.

    Outsiders have criticized the presidential and parliamentary elections as fraudulent. Karzai is widely believed to have interfered with local polling stations and given himself and his supporters wide victory margins. Northerners certainly agree but insist that outsiders miss an important aspect of Karzai's fraudulence. He not only inflated the national support for himself and his supporters, he also suppressed evidence of non-Pashtun voters and their support for Tajik, Uzbek, and other peoples' candidates. Pashtun politicians counter by insisting that it is the northerners who are tampering with the ballot box to overstate their numbers.

    Today, northerners contend the nation is on the brink of another act of legerdemain that will ensure Pashtun predominance - and misgovernment. The loya jirgas, which are romanticized in the West as a protodemocratic institution in colorful local dress, are simply another Pashtun ploy to ensure their dominance.

    Karzai's peace council has been hand-selected to approve whatever settlement he presents them. Northerners sense that Karzai is about to betray them by settling with the Taliban, granting them large swathes of territory which northerners feel the Pashtun mullahs will one day use again to assert control across the country. Further, Karzai is seen as collaborating with Pakistan to exploit Afghan resources in conjunction with China.

    Warlords, army and the regional powers
    Over the past few years, Generals Fahim and Rashid Dostum, leaders of Tajik and Uzbek forces, respectively, are said to have demobilized their forces and turned over their armor and artillery to the Afghan National Army (ANA) - as noted, a force largely purged of non-Pashtun commanders. Turning over heavy weapons is credible; full demobilization is not. There can be little doubt that these wily northerners, and other smaller ones, have retained patronage networks and forces in-being - lightly-armed, yet trained and loyal and angered by events in the south.

    The position and reliability of the ANA are unclear. Though chiefly commanded by Pashtuns now, northerners constitute at least 55% of the ANA's officers and rank-and-file, with Tajiks greatly over-represented and judged to be the best fighters. Resentment toward Pashtun superiors - military and political - are almost certainly parts of soldierly conversations. The ANA's battle record thus far is sparse, unremarkable, and unlikely to have instilled a super-ethnic identity.

    A break between northerners and Karzai would lead to serious conflicts within the ANA, including large-scale desertions and mutinies, particularly if called on to do so by Fahim and Dostum and the family of the late legendary mujahideen chieftain, Mohammed Ahmad Shah Massoud.

    Regional powers are more aware of growing north-south tensions than the US. They have had ties with northern forces going back to the war in the 1980s and the standoff with the Taliban in the 1990s. India, Iran and Russia have aid programs and intelligence officers in the country, chiefly in the north. They, along with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and other Islamic former Soviet Socialist Republics, are concerned with the insurgency in the south and prepared to take extraordinary steps to prevent Islamist militancy and terrorism from spreading north. (Uzbekistan knows well that its militants fled south in the 1990s and today serve with al-Qaeda.)

    Naturally, geopolitics and economics are at work as well. India seeks to counter growing Pakistani and Chinese influence in Afghanistan. Russia, too, is worried of growing Chinese influence in a region close to tsarist, Soviet and Russian interests.

    Iran plays a double game. It gives small amounts of arms to insurgents and trains them at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps base in southeastern Iran. But this is a warning to the US should it, or Israel, attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Support to insurgents can go up markedly, perhaps to include Stinger-like missiles, and Quds Force guerrillas could be deployed against US troops to make supply lines even more parlous than they are today.

    Despite its limited support for the insurgency, Iran is deeply hostile to the Taliban, whom they recall as merciless Sunnis who slaughtered tens of thousands of Shi'ite Hazaras and who invaded an Iranian consulate and killed several diplomats. The three powerful regional powers also wish to share in the exploitation of Afghan resources and have a say in any pipeline that might be built there.

    India, Iran and Russia are pressing Karzai on neglected northern interests. Bagfuls of money have been known to bring nettlesome matters to a politician's attention. They would support the north in the event of a break with the Pashtuns and are at least preparing to help rebuild separate military forces there. Each regional power has its intelligence people operating in the country, especially in the north.

    The US position
    Northern concerns are being articulated to US officials by Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other disgruntled non-Pashtuns who have been able to retain positions in the military and diplomatic service and also by those peoples. But US attention is mainly directed on counter-insurgency operations in the south and east and in seeking to begin a negotiated settlement.

    Despite its maladroitness over the past nine years, the US can join the regional powers in pressing Karzai on restoring positions in the army and state to northerners and in seating them prominently at any peace conference that might convene one day.

    Failure to do so may leave Karzai with a Taliban south and a secessionist north, leaving him with palaces in Kabul and restaurants abroad. A break between north and south could force the US to withdraw from the insurgent-wracked south and concentrate, politically and militarily, in the north.

    This would not be uniformly adverse: the US would find political development and military support far easier among the northerners than it is with the disparate and increasingly hostile Pashtun tribes in the south. In this regard, Washington and Kabul alike should pay greater attention to the ominous conflict with the north.

    Brian M Downing is the author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.

  4. #4

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825
    Downing's characterization of Afghan demographics is generally reasonable. However, whether an absolute majority or not, he does ignore the Pashtun plurality which appears uniformly uncontested.

    In posturing our "maladroitness", I sense that Downing downplays the comparatively tranquil state of matters in the north which permits American forces and money to be focused further south.

    It's fair, however, to suggest the north offers greater bang for the buck. In fact, I confess to seeing some rough parallels to a similar political environment WRT Kurdistan. Obviously, northern Afghanistan lacks the homogeneity rendered by a singular Kurdish ethnicity. Still, I can't help but be intrigued by the possibilities of autonomy or a separate state accomodating northern alliance aspirations.

    I've no reason to doubt civil war will again come upon our departure. I find an alliance between the N.A., India, Russia and Iran largely congruent. Interjecting America might, however, make strange bedfellows with at least the Iranians. Who between America and Iran benefits more or, conversely, reduces their vulnerabilities from such is speculative but peripheral to the central objective of developing an anti-taliban/pashtun resistance within Afghanistan.

    Equally, how afghan pashtuns might react would be at least as interesting. While fair to say all taliban are pashtun, not all pashtun are taliban. That anti-taliban pashtun tribes could be co-opted to such an alliance, however, would seem dubious. Instead, such an alliance might force their hand into the taliban camp.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  5. #5
    Staff Emeritus
    Military Professional
    Defense Professional Shek's Avatar
    Join Date
    23 Feb 05
    Location
    Krblachistan
    Posts
    11,636
    Quote Originally Posted by S-2 View Post
    We've offered up our armed forces to dubious ends. I'm frankly very disturbed by the news of sport killings and dope in Afghanistan coupled with charges against the murder of two soldiers in an argument in Iraq. Not the first time we've heard or read of such in our armed forces of late and, perhaps, a trendline of decaying ethical standards and base talent among our troops while used as the instrument of our political indecision...again.
    Steve,
    I too am appalled by the behavior, and would offer up that Afghanistan is a much more decentralized fight than Iraq, and when coupled with the impacts of a force deployed more often than is healthy and the occasional bad commander (e.g., 5/2 ID (SBCT), who should have been relieved before even being deployed), you end up with incidents like these at a higher rate than would be "acceptable."
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  6. #6

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825

    Shek Reply

    ...Afghanistan is a much more decentralized fight than Iraq..."

    Yes. Circumstances have required us placing junior officers and their company-level NCOs in situations on battlefields requiring a high degree of autonomous judgement. I've no doubt that the professional development of many small-unit leaders has been accelerated by these requirements. With it, however, come risks.

    "...when coupled with the impacts of a force deployed more often than is healthy and the occasional bad commander (e.g., 5/2 ID (SBCT), who should have been relieved before even being deployed), you end up with incidents like these at a higher rate than would be 'acceptable.'"

    We're seeing some spillover into our general population. Other factors like the economy, domestic relations and the availability of post-combat psychiatric care enter into the picture but it's fair to say there are problems emerging within our armed forces.

    Civilian Soldiers' Suicide Rate Alarming-USA Today Nov. 26, 2010
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  7. #7
    Global Moderator
    Military Professional
    Defense Professional
    Albany Rifles's Avatar
    Join Date
    27 Apr 07
    Location
    Prince George, VA
    Posts
    8,318
    Mental Health Care at Fort Carson : NPR

    Mental health issues also plagued the 4th ID at FT Carson. A very good friend of mine did 2 roatations from there and said the command climate was appalling in regards to PTSD and soldeirs getting help. I am sure you guys heard these reports...but Shek it goes to your comments about the commander of 5/2 ID and Steve's comments about mental health care for our soldiers.
    “We had been hopelessly labouring to plough waste lands; to make nationality grow in a place full of the certainty of God… Among the tribes our creed could be only like the desert grass – a beautiful swift seeming of spring; which, after a day’s heat, fell dusty.”
    ― T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph

  8. #8
    Staff Emeritus
    Military Professional
    Defense Professional Shek's Avatar
    Join Date
    23 Feb 05
    Location
    Krblachistan
    Posts
    11,636
    Quote Originally Posted by Albany Rifles View Post
    Mental Health Care at Fort Carson : NPR

    Mental health issues also plagued the 4th ID at FT Carson. A very good friend of mine did 2 roatations from there and said the command climate was appalling in regards to PTSD and soldeirs getting help. I am sure you guys heard these reports...but Shek it goes to your comments about the commander of 5/2 ID and Steve's comments about mental health care for our soldiers.
    Another thing to consider specific to Ft. Carson is that the one brigade that had the most issues involved 2/2 ID that rotated off the Korean peninsula in to (I believe) a 15 month tour in Iraq and then redployed to Ft. Carson and reflagged as a 4 ID brigade. For some soldiers, they were "deployed" away from family for 2+ years and then returned to an unfamiliar place after an extremely difficult OIF rotation - a recipe for things to go bad.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  9. #9
    Contributor 1980s's Avatar
    Join Date
    19 Jul 08
    Posts
    697
    Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami is an alternative to the Taliban for Pashtun tribes that may feel threatened by a revival of the N.A. There have been reports of several clashes and turf-war situations between the two over the past year, altho it isnt clear how large (or small) the gap between Hezb-e Islami and the two main Afghan Taliban networks are.

    Also, Rabbani was in Iran last week, apparently his first trip abroad since becoming the head of the Afghan Peace Council (the body that was set-up to engage in dialogue with the Taliban). Perhaps the Iranian regime has recognized the widening gulf between the north and south - that or maybe Rabbani is already moving to secure old alliances. In anycase, all other pending US-Iran disputes really should not be allowed to undermine the development of an anti-Taliban alliance of the non-Pashtuns if things are indeed moving in that direction.

    Quote Originally Posted by S-2 View Post
    Downing's characterization of Afghan demographics is generally reasonable. However, whether an absolute majority or not, he does ignore the Pashtun plurality which appears uniformly uncontested.

    In posturing our "maladroitness", I sense that Downing downplays the comparatively tranquil state of matters in the north which permits American forces and money to be focused further south.

    It's fair, however, to suggest the north offers greater bang for the buck. In fact, I confess to seeing some rough parallels to a similar political environment WRT Kurdistan. Obviously, northern Afghanistan lacks the homogeneity rendered by a singular Kurdish ethnicity. Still, I can't help but be intrigued by the possibilities of autonomy or a separate state accomodating northern alliance aspirations.

    I've no reason to doubt civil war will again come upon our departure. I find an alliance between the N.A., India, Russia and Iran largely congruent. Interjecting America might, however, make strange bedfellows with at least the Iranians. Who between America and Iran benefits more or, conversely, reduces their vulnerabilities from such is speculative but peripheral to the central objective of developing an anti-taliban/pashtun resistance within Afghanistan.

    Equally, how afghan pashtuns might react would be at least as interesting. While fair to say all taliban are pashtun, not all pashtun are taliban. That anti-taliban pashtun tribes could be co-opted to such an alliance, however, would seem dubious. Instead, such an alliance might force their hand into the taliban camp.

  10. #10
    Senior Contributor Senior Contributor
    Join Date
    01 Aug 07
    Posts
    818
    Quote Originally Posted by S-2 View Post
    I believe my solution allows America to attack Al Qaeda just as effectively with far less exposure and cost. I don't believe that building Achmed the opium grower a fresh well should be a nat'l priority.
    x2

    And if we are to be really thorough about it, let us rip apart Abdali's creation and feed them off to Tajiks, Uzbeks and Paks. Let us fulfill the Paks' dearest wishes: Give them their "strategic depth" and 12 million more Pathans. Then there will be fun!
    Last edited by Cactus; 09 Dec 10, at 13:37. Reason: Pathan population corrected from 28M to 12M in Afg.

  11. #11

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825

    Cactus Reply

    I think you're replying to a quote from the Ahmed Wali Karzai thread.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  12. #12
    Senior Contributor Senior Contributor
    Join Date
    01 Aug 07
    Posts
    818
    Quote Originally Posted by S-2 View Post
    I think you're replying to a quote from the Ahmed Wali Karzai thread.
    It was semi-intentional; I forgot to quote the larger part of your proposal that I was seconding and which I wanted posted here:

    Quote Originally Posted by S-2 View Post
    "How will you respond to Bluesman's assertions that you will be giving up?"

    He'd know better than I but I'd assert that for every target he chases in Afghanistan with his very deadly model airplanes he probably chases five in Pakistan.

    Secondly, leaving Afghanistan with our NGOs, contractors, various civilian governmental agencies and the vast bulk of our ground forces 1.) reduces our direct vulnerability to the taliban and others and, 2.) reduces the need to rely so heavily on a most dubious ally-Pakistan.

    Third, nothing constrains us from attacking targets throughout Afghanistan and elsewhere as our intelligence identifies them. This can be facilitated by bluesman's friends or by off-shore SOF units or some combination of the two. Then, of course, there's always the good ol' U.S.A.F.

    Fourth, we've numerous allies in the region with a more direct interest in Afghan affairs. Let them fill the gap should they desire and/or see a compelling need and may the great game continue.

  13. #13

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825

    Cactus Reply

    "Give them their "strategic depth" and 28 million more Pathans."

    Maybe their "depth" but not 28 million more pathans. CIA says 42% of 29,121,286. Certainly subject to dispute but nowhere near the hordes you envision screaming down onto the punjab plains east of the Indus.

    I'm fully prepared to acknowledge a Pakistani "victory" in Afghanistan. Such shouldn't come without penalty though.

    For starters, we should suspend permanently our aid, end diplomatic relations and withdraw our embassy/consulate staffs and all ancillary services. Fini. If prepared to do that, you can only imagine all else we might do short of war. Pakistan should be thrust firmly and wholly into the PRC's camp without choice. It is a near and long-term net gain for our nation.

    They can't control the taliban. That's proven once already and, further, the taliban can't control Afghanistan. All that can be achieved without direct American involvement. All it really takes is our disengagement.

    There lies the problem. Too many in Washington still too accustomed to doing business as usual. The definition of insanity where doing over and over the same thing but expecting different results fully applies here.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  14. #14
    Senior Contributor Senior Contributor
    Join Date
    01 Aug 07
    Posts
    818
    You are right, the Paks already have 28M Pathans... well, give them 12M more.

    No, I was not envisioning them screaming down to the Plains to settle scores. That is another archaic imagery akin to the Paks' pursuit of "strategic depth", but let's leave it be. I was thinking more along the lines of the fun that will ensue in the voting lines, food+fuel rationing lines, recruiting lines etc.

    But I don't understand why you want the US to squander away the enormous political and diplomatic capital gained by fulfilling the Paks' long cherished dream of adding the first "A" (Afghania) to their acronym of "Pakistan"? By all means cut off every penny of aid, beneficial trade and useful academic/military/commercial exchanges. But keep the diplomatic relations open.

    The Paks' relations with the PRC is of no direct problem to anybody except the Indians (and India can/should learn to handle that by itself), except if they host PLAN in a manner that may threaten the SLOCs in the Arabian Sea. The price of Afghania is self-evident at this point - it cannot be gifted away for free.

  15. #15

    Military Professional
    Military Professional S2's Avatar
    Join Date
    11 Sep 06
    Location
    Portland, Oregon
    Posts
    10,825

    Cactus Reply

    "But I don't understand why you want the US to squander away the enormous political and diplomatic capital gained by fulfilling the Paks' long cherished dream of adding the first "A" (Afghania) to their acronym of "Pakistan"?"

    Because our ostensible "ally" is an enemy. Simply put, if one disengages from another because of irreconcilable differences, then do so fully. Allow the next act of this divorce to be re-engagement by other means. Lines of communication are freely available everywhere we look. Should messages need passing, there's a plethora of intermediaries able to act in that capacity. Breaking the typical channels, however, reinforces that only messages of dire importance will even be considered. There simply is no other cause for normal discourse because matters AREN'T normal.

    Pakistan has numerous lessons provided on what's necessary to be a functioning modern state in this global society. They've been enabled to do otherwise because of temporizing political expediency. That hasn't worked well, has it? Nobody yet has shown me a model or pathway to corrective behavior except self-actualizing. It's their tunnel of progress to light one lamp at a time. We can't throw the switch or light the wicks lying along that path. Self-evident.

    PLAN and Gwadar will be or not as the future holds. If worse comes to worse, it won't be the first major modern naval engagement for U.S. Navy forces. That can't be said for PLAN. Such a possibility, in the interim, is remote. Meanwhile, allow the PRC to mollify and coddle the irascible sensibilities of Pakistan. Last I recall, Zardari retreated from Beijing empty-handed. WE bailed him out via the IMF. Did Beijing understand this beforehand? If so, kudos to them for reading the tea leaves correctly.

    That should stop.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

Thread Information

Users Browsing this Thread

There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)

Share this thread with friends:

Share this thread with friends:

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •