S-2, et al,
First, let me say to all, that "S-2" is correct, this is well worth the read. But I would add this caution: the CNAS is similar to the Democratic Administration as the PNAC was to the Republican Administration; with a couple added twists.
I point this out, not to politicize it, but to express the promo-agenda and context in which the suggestions are framed.
Also, keep in mind the timeline. The US was engaged in regional anti-occupation support well before the official War in Afghanistan began on 7 October, 2001, with the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
(COMMENT)
The outline is worth considering; but I have some concerns.
This is (practically) a universal observation supported by nearly every outside observer. However, no one has taken the necessary steps to bring it under control and manage it properly.
It is such an effective means of causing chaos, that even the Iranians are helping further corruption and confusion by making contributions of their own.
This is a mute point. Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN Petraeus could stop it overnight. But for whatever reason, they haven't. Any CGFM (Certified Government Financial Manager) could do it with the staff they have. The problem is that within the funding streams, each of the high rollers has convinced the party givers (Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN Petraeus) that their program is absolutely essential, and the war is not winable without it.
This is (IMO) proposing absurd restriction. You don't make trade-offs with forces structures. If you need a particular force infrastructure, you build it and deploy it, or stay at home.
This is something that we should consider very closely. One has to look at anD evaluate what the outcome of the Team Ryan Crocker & David Petraeus has been in the past, and the expectation of what it would be in the future. Has the outcomes in Iraq met expectations? Do we want a set of similar outcomes in Afghanistan? Are we saying that this team is the best we can do?
If it is the best possible team, then we might be in more trouble than we think.
Yes, now this is the "exit plan" for most of the Afghan players. At least they have an "Exit Plan." The question is why? Is it because they expect the US intervention to fail; and based on that probability they need an "exit plan."
This is the meat. Yes - the wheel has turned 180 degrees. Now we are beginning to consider coming back to a "Low Intensity" - "Asymmetric" - "Third & Fourth Generation" warfare strategy. But, in this suggestion, we include resetting the clock to zero. That in effect, US Involvement would extend for another decade.
It also brings into the discussion the actual relationship between the US Force commander and the (now US Legitimized) Afghan Government; as well as the Durand Line Governments (AFPAK) and the sovereignty issues. Currently, there is a huge discussion on the necessity to engage the PAK Government and what relationship the Pakistan Government will have in the conduct of military affairs/operations in targeting safe havens inside their jurisdiction.
Most Respectfully,
R
First, let me say to all, that "S-2" is correct, this is well worth the read. But I would add this caution: the CNAS is similar to the Democratic Administration as the PNAC was to the Republican Administration; with a couple added twists.
I point this out, not to politicize it, but to express the promo-agenda and context in which the suggestions are framed.
Also, keep in mind the timeline. The US was engaged in regional anti-occupation support well before the official War in Afghanistan began on 7 October, 2001, with the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
Originally posted by EXCERPT > S-2
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The outline is worth considering; but I have some concerns.
Originally posted by 1. Cut Funding for the War
This is (practically) a universal observation supported by nearly every outside observer. However, no one has taken the necessary steps to bring it under control and manage it properly.
It is such an effective means of causing chaos, that even the Iranians are helping further corruption and confusion by making contributions of their own.
This is a mute point. Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN Petraeus could stop it overnight. But for whatever reason, they haven't. Any CGFM (Certified Government Financial Manager) could do it with the staff they have. The problem is that within the funding streams, each of the high rollers has convinced the party givers (Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN Petraeus) that their program is absolutely essential, and the war is not winable without it.
Originally posted by 2. Compromise on Combat Enablers
This is (IMO) proposing absurd restriction. You don't make trade-offs with forces structures. If you need a particular force infrastructure, you build it and deploy it, or stay at home.
- If you need more helicopters, then we should send them. We don't send the transport and pull the troops out. That is absurd. On the other hand, you don't keep troops on the ground simply as bargaining material. If a Ground Commander needs the boots, he keeps them. If he needs transport, he gets it.
- We always need more intelligence for our commanders. That is a given. In my 40+ years in the business, I've never heard a commander say he has enough intelligence.
- Finally, the idea of a local security apparatus is a move right out of the Vietnam Playbook. We know how to do this. We've done this before. It dovetails into Suggestion #5 BELOW.
Originally posted by 3. Reinvent, Don't Replace, the Special Envoy
This is something that we should consider very closely. One has to look at anD evaluate what the outcome of the Team Ryan Crocker & David Petraeus has been in the past, and the expectation of what it would be in the future. Has the outcomes in Iraq met expectations? Do we want a set of similar outcomes in Afghanistan? Are we saying that this team is the best we can do?
If it is the best possible team, then we might be in more trouble than we think.
Originally posted by 4. Find and Pressure Dual Citizens
Yes, now this is the "exit plan" for most of the Afghan players. At least they have an "Exit Plan." The question is why? Is it because they expect the US intervention to fail; and based on that probability they need an "exit plan."
Originally posted by 5. Go Long
This is the meat. Yes - the wheel has turned 180 degrees. Now we are beginning to consider coming back to a "Low Intensity" - "Asymmetric" - "Third & Fourth Generation" warfare strategy. But, in this suggestion, we include resetting the clock to zero. That in effect, US Involvement would extend for another decade.
It also brings into the discussion the actual relationship between the US Force commander and the (now US Legitimized) Afghan Government; as well as the Durand Line Governments (AFPAK) and the sovereignty issues. Currently, there is a huge discussion on the necessity to engage the PAK Government and what relationship the Pakistan Government will have in the conduct of military affairs/operations in targeting safe havens inside their jurisdiction.
Most Respectfully,
R
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