Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

The War

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Pashtun taliban in south afg
    Hazara tajik northern alliance in north afg

    Getting people consensus is difficult in afghanistan.

    I think tribal warfare is perfectly common and natural in this part of the world and US needs to accept it.

    Comment


    • Obama Troop Surge Decision Ignored Pak-Taliban Ties

      Analysis by Gareth Porter*

      WASHINGTON, May 22, 2011 (IPS) - The unilateral U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden created a spike in mutual recriminations between U.S. and Pakistani politicians, but their fundamental conflict of interest over Afghanistan was already driving the two countries toward serious confrontation.

      The pivotal event in relations between the Barack Obama administration and Pakistan was the decision by Obama to escalate the war in Afghanistan in 2009, despite the knowledge that Pakistan was committed to supporting the Taliban insurgents as a strategic policy in its conflict with India.

      Obama launched a desperate, last-minute effort to get some kind of commitment from the Pakistanis to reduce their support for the Taliban before the decision to escalate the war. But he did not reconsider the decision after that effort had clearly failed.

      It was always understood within the Obama administration that any public recognition that Pakistan was committed to supporting the Taliban could be politically dangerous to the war effort. As a result, Obama's national security team decided early on to deny the complicity of Pakistani Chief of Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and director of the ISI intelligence agency Shuja Pasha, despite the knowledge that they were fully behind the policy.

      On Mar. 26, 2009, a story in the New York Times provided the most detailed news media account up to that date of Pakistani assistance to the Taliban. But the story quoted anonymous U.S. officials as blaming "mid-level ISI operatives" and expressing doubt that top Pakistani officials in Islamabad were directly coordinating the clandestine efforts by ISI operatives to assist the Taliban.

      That did not reflect the briefing Obama had gotten from George W. Bush's director of national intelligence, Mike McConnell, after his election. McConnell had learned from communications intercepts that Kayani considered the Haqqani network, which was being targeted as the most serious threat to U.S. troops n Afghanistan, as a "strategic asset".

      As Obama approached a decision on Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's request for another troop increase of as much as 40,000 troops, the Pakistani military's determination to use the Taliban and the Haqqani network to advance Pakistani interests in Afghanistan was a major issue in the policy debate.

      Opponents of the troop surge request, including Vice-President Joe Biden, deputy national security adviser Tom Donilon and Afghanistan War coordinator Douglas Lute, argued that the Pakistanis were not going to change their policy toward Afghanistan, according to Bob Woodward's account in "Obama's Wars".

      Biden argued in a meeting on Sep. 13, 2009 that Pakistan was determined to avoid an Afghan government "led by a Pashtun sympathetic to India" – i.e., Afghan President Hamid Karzai. The conclusion was that the Pakistanis would continue to aid the insurgency the U.S. was trying to defeat.

      Despite that argument, as the policymaking process was entering its final weeks, Obama tried to exert high-level pressure on Pakistan.

      In a Nov. 11, 2009 letter to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Obama said Pakistan's use of such "proxy groups" as Haqqani and the Taliban would no longer be tolerated, as Woodward recounts. National Security Adviser James Jones and Counterterrorism adviser John Brennan were sent to Islamabad to deliver the message.

      Obama wanted Pakistan to understand that he would take unilateral action against the Taliban and Haqqani safe havens in Pakistan, including accelerated drone strikes and commando raids, unless Pakistani forces attacked them.

      That message was clearly received. A Pakistani official told the New York Times, "Jones's message was if that Pakistani help wasn't forthcoming, the United States would have to do it themselves."

      The week of Nov. 17, CIA Director Leon Panetta met with Pasha and other top Pakistani officials, and complained about the presence of the Taliban leadership headquarters in Quetta, Baluchistan, according to Woodward's account. He cited intelligence that bombs were being made there, then "taken across the border and blowing up Americans".

      Panetta proposed joint U.S.-Pakistani operations on the ground aimed at the Quetta Shura, but Kayani refused.

      In a response to Obama's letter late in November, Zardari voiced the Pakistani military's rationale for Pakistan's use of Afghan insurgents to protect its interests in Pakistan. He charged that "neighbouring intelligence agencies" – meaning India – "are using Afghan soil to perpetuate violence in Pakistan."

      And Zardari did not give a clear response to Obama's invitation to plan joint operations against those forces.

      When Obama met with his national security team for the final time on Nov. 29, he knew that the pressure tactic had failed. Lute, Obama's Afghanistan coordinator, warned that Pakistani policy was one of four major, interacting risks of a troop surge policy.

      But Obama approved a plan for 30,000 additional troops anyway, suggesting that the decision was driven by the political-bureaucratic momentum of the war rather than by a rational assessment of cost, risk and benefit.

      Throughout 2010, the Pakistani military continued to make clear its refusal to compromise on its interests in Afghanistan. In late January, U.S. and Pakistani authorities picked up Mullah Ghani Baradar, the second-ranking official in the Taliban Quetta Shura, in a raid in Karchi – apparently without realising in advance that Baradar was present.

      But when the United States sought to extradite Baradar to Afghanistan, the Pakistanis refused. And Baradar and several other members of the Quetta Shura who had been detained by the Pakistanis were reported in October 2010 to have been released.

      In a January 2011 interview with Public Broadcasting System's "Frontline", Gen. David Petraeus, by then the commander in Afghanistan, was asked about Pakistan's release of top Taliban leaders. "We've actually had a conversation on this very recently," said Petraeus blandly, "and in fact there has been a request for information…."

      Two National Intelligence Estimates on Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 2010 pointed once again to the centrality of Pakistani policy to the outcome of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan.

      The NIE on Afghanistan concluded that the United States was unlikely to succeed in Afghanistan unless Pakistan changed its policy to take military action against insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. But the estimate on Pakistan made it clear that no such change in Pakistani policy could be expected.

      In mid-December, the Obama administration issued a five-page summary of its December 2010 review of the Afghanistan War, which concluded that the "gains" were "fragile and reversible" and that consolidating those gains "will require that we make more progress with Pakistan to eliminate sanctuaries for violent extremist networks."

      Immediately after that review, the New York Times reported a military proposal for cross-border raids into Pakistan aimed at capturing Taliban commanders for interrogation back in Afghanistan.

      Beginning in late 2010, moreover, the U.S. infiltrated hundreds of unilateral intelligence agents into Pakistan, suggesting an intention to carry out further cross-border raids.

      Those moves had already alarmed Pakistan's military leaders well before the U.S. raid against bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad.

      And in a classified report sent to Congress in early April, the Obama administration strongly criticised Pakistan's failure to attack insurgent safe havens in Mohmand in northwest Pakistan for three straight years, as reported by the New York Times Apr. 5.

      Moeed Yusuf, director of the South Asia programme at the U.S. Institute of Peace, who has been leading a study of Pakistani elite opinion on relations with the United States, believes the crisis in U.S.-Pakistan relations can be blamed on a failure of both governments to acknowledge explicitly the existence of a fundamental conflict of interests.

      "If there is a strategic divergence of interests, I think Pakistan needs to put it on the table," said Yusuf. Pakistani leaders "need to be very candid about why it's not in their interests" to do what Washington wants, he said.

      If the interests at stake are not brought into the open, Yusuf suggested, "A rupture is possible."

      Obama Troop Surge Decision Ignored Pak-Taliban Ties - IPS ipsnews.net

      Comment


      • Afghanistan: Drawdown or drawback?

        By Brian M Downing

        Following the announcement on Wednesday by United States President Barack Obama, the US will have 10,000 fewer troops in Afghanistan by the end of the year, from a total of over 100,000, with another 23,000 to depart by the middle of 2012.

        With the reduction, the US and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will concentrate on several districts where insurgents have been largely driven out or where Pashtun tribes have long opposed the Taliban and are reasonably supportive of the ISAF.

        This will entail leaving parts of the south and east - discordant in America's unyielding victory culture. But withdrawal has been underway for over a year now, most notably from the Korengal Valley in April 2010.

        Within these limited "enclaves" in the south and east, the ISAF can better allocate resources to building roads and schools, providing medical and veterinary services and completing irrigation and electrification programs. The ISAF will also be able to concentrate on training local militia forces and establishing intelligence networks. Counter-insurgency programs may well work out better in more limited areas of the contested south and east.

        In time - a commodity admittedly not well stockpiled in Western publics - the enclaves will contrast sharply with the areas left to insurgent forces. Afghans will come to see where their children receive better schooling and health care, where their crops and herds fare better, and where jobs are more plentiful. Insurgents may lose their popular appeal as bringers of liberation and prosperity.

        Insurgent forces will almost certainly face desertions from their ranks. Most insurgents are uninterested in the lofty goals of insurgent groups; they seek mainly to rid their valley of foreigners. With the latter chiefly in enclaves, many fighters will see their goal accomplished and return to their villages.

        This was the case in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, province by province. Mujahideen commanders found their rank and file leaving their units by the thousand. Many commanders began fighting each other and some allied with the Kabul government for protection.

        Reform in Kabul

        The withdrawal of US and other troops will put a great deal of pressure on the Kabul government to reform itself. Indeed, Obama made that point rather forcefully on Wednesday. Kabul must build a fair and effective government or face an inevitable victory by insurgent forces.

        Further, it must build an effective army and police force to take the place of departing ISAF troops. Few in Afghanistan are unaware of the hideous fate that befell president Mohammad Najibullah and other officials when the Taliban took Kabul in the mid-1990s. Even fewer will be confidant that a US helicopter will take them to safety after a decade of corruption, intransigence, and misrule and so many US casualties.

        Vietnam might provide a useful case history of withdrawal and reform. South Vietnamese presidents stubbornly resisted US pressure to reform the land tenure system, army, and state. The governmental officials, safe in their Saigon villas, persisted in their ways as American troops fought the war. Landlords retained the best land; generals were promoted due to connections rather than performance; and officialdom took its percentages.

        When president Richard Nixon began to withdraw troops in 1969, however, South Vietnam adopted widespread if belated reforms. Land was redistributed to the tillers and professionalization of army and state finally took place. It was too little, too late. South Vietnam fell just two years after the last GIs departed from Tan Son Nhut air base.

        While this should be instructive to Kabul officialdom, it might also advise them to continue grabbing while they can - and to keep a jet fueled at Bagram.

        Regional powers

        Reduced Western forces will also encourage regional powers to assume a larger role in Afghanistan. India, Iran, Russia and China have all been involved in development and training programs, but they must be more forceful with the government in Kabul and the ones in Islamabad and Rawalpindi as well.

        Regional powers have far more to lose from a Taliban Afghanistan than does the literally distant and figuratively receding US. They face the spread of insurgent movements into other parts of Central Asia, including into their own lands.

        The regional powers must reinforce Western pressure on Karzai to build a fair and competent government, though another option might be more promising - allying with leaders of the non-Pashtun north. They oppose the Taliban but also oppose Karzai as just another grasping and blundering Pashtun ruler. The prospect of a restored Northern Alliance would serve the dual purposes of warning Karzai and preparing the north for civil war in the event of a Taliban victory.

        It is increasingly clear that the problem of terrorism and militancy in the region lies not with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, but with Pakistan - more precisely, with the Pakistani army and its intelligence service. It is they who built training bases in Afghanistan for the Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Jaish-i-Mohammed and a slew of other militant groups operating along the AfPak line and in Kashmir. It is they who give sanctuary to Taliban fighters and leaders. And it was near one of their compounds where Osama bin Laden was found to be operating and then killed by US special forces.

        If there is a solution to the region's insurgency and terrorism problems, it will come through concerted diplomatic and economic pressure on Pakistan to become a responsible member of the world community or degenerate into the North Korea of the region, if not the largest failed state in history.

        The importance of regional powers in solving international crises may well be the United States' emerging strategy as its public is finding the global mission it eagerly assumed in the heady days after World War II as far too costly. US assistance in world affairs will be there, but at levels that are reduced - perhaps greatly so. North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers must take up more of the burden of European security. Libya is to be solved by powers just to the north. Chinese navalism is a matter for the nations of East and Southeast Asia. And so it is with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

        Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.

        Asia Times Online :: Drawdown or drawback?

        Comment


        • 1980s, et al,

          While I agree that there is an alternative solution, I don't believe that the US State Department (DoS) has the knowledge, skills, and abilities, to achieve any advantageous results. After all, Ambassador Crocker (as an example) was the the lead after the initial intervention in Afghanistan, and we're still recycling that vary same leadership that was instrumental in creating the problem.
          "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."
          Albert Einstein
          Originally posted by 1980s View Post
          By Brian M Downing

          ... ... ... It is increasingly clear that the problem of terrorism and militancy in the region lies not with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, but with Pakistan - more precisely, with the Pakistani army and its intelligence service. It is they who built training bases in Afghanistan for the Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Jaish-i-Mohammed and a slew of other militant groups operating along the AfPak line and in Kashmir. It is they who give sanctuary to Taliban fighters and leaders. And it was near one of their compounds where Osama bin Laden was found to be operating and then killed by US special forces.

          If there is a solution to the region's insurgency and terrorism problems, it will come through concerted diplomatic and economic pressure on Pakistan to become a responsible member of the world community or degenerate into the North Korea of the region, if not the largest failed state in history. ... ... ...
          (COMMENT)

          US interference and intervention is the last thing that will solve the problem. The US doesn't add stability, it has proven to be a destabilizing factor in the region.

          There is this thought within the DoS by the Foreign Service guru's and within the Intelligence Community (IC) that the US must intervene for two reasons:
          • It must remain engaged in order to show that the US is still relevant. This must be done at all cost, even unto the complete negligence and destruction of the US infrastructure and economy. It is to maintain the appearance of a "Super Power."
          • The other is the "national security interest" relative to the threat posed by terrorism. The theory runs parallel to the old "Domino Theory." If we abandon the Region, various countries will turn towards terrorism.

          In both cases, the national security decision making process is extremely flawed. The US attempt to remain internationally relevant is futile. Each time it gets involved it turns into a decade long endeavor that never reaches a desired conclusion; whether it is Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen. We never achieve the desired outcome; militarily or diplomatically; and we've certainly invested many more dollars (hundreds of billions) then we will ever get in return.

          The "national security interest," particularly the performance of the IC, in recent decades, has proven anything but effective. While everyone points to the hunt for Osama bin Laden as a success, it took many Billions of Dollars and a decade of time and resources at the expense of the economy and development of America. And in the end, America didn't build new bridges in the Middle East and Gulf States, it has degraded its reputation to the point that the potential for terrorism against America has expanded; not receded.

          Most Respectfully,
          R

          Comment


          • Roccor,you have a point,particularly about the costs for killing Osama.But we're not talking terrorists here.We're talking power and more specifically relative power(which is all that matter in the international arena).So the question is if US standing in hierarchy of powers is better controlling ME through its proxies(or directly ) or not?
            Those who know don't speak
            He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

            Comment


            • RoccoR

              I dont follow US domestic politics too closely altho if im not mistaken much of the failure of American policy in Afghanistan lies with the attitude Donald Rumsfeld took towards operations there (basically that the war was 'won' before it even really started). From what i see often stated in hindsight is that the Bush admin actually had no real plan for Afghanistan and that Rumsfeld really did not care what shape Afghanistan took post-Taliban, provided that it would not act as a safe-haven for 'international terrorists'.

              For the first few years ISAF concentrated solely on securing Kabul. The rest of the country was pretty much neglected and so it is little wonder that by 2005/6 the Taliban started to re-emerge in Qandahar and had little to nothing standing in their way of spreading further into Afghanistan. This alongside all the warnings and intelligence the Bush admin ignored from the Afghans, foreign diplomats and their own agencies that Pakistan was not only sheltering the Taliban but that serving members of the Pakistani military were actively supporting them, even inside Afghanistan itself. Bruce Riedel has commented as much on a number of occasions.

              But i dont know if these kinds of 'failures' are something inherent to US policies abroad, or whether you could (and maybe should) treat the mess in Afghanistan as a failure of the Bush admin - which Obama has little choice but to try and fix. Altho you're probably right about recycling the same leadership..

              In anycase, i think that whole 'Blackwell plan' to withdraw US forces out of the Pashtun regions and station them in the north and west of Afghanistan is a much better option than trying to win a counter-insurgency operation in places like Helmand and Qandahar (securing the non-Pashtun regions and carrying out counter-terrorism in the south and east when needed is basically his proposal). I think few people are seriously convinced that the Taliban is going to negotiate or would ever honor any kind of settlement with the Karzai regime, let alone with the US. They have proven their dishonorable nature more than enough and as for their Pakistani backers, well, little else needs to be said about how credible they are (ie, not trustworthy at all).

              Whatever little commitment is left to be made to Afghanistan on the timetable put forward (if it is even stuck to) is better spent on those areas and communities where people actually resent the Taliban and not the foreign forces. Blackwell's 'plan' for a de-facto partition along north-south lines i think is the way to go since that seems to be the natural course of affairs if left to the people of Afghanistan anyway.. At least the World knows which side of the divide does not support international terrorism or 'jihad' against foreign nations and other religions/sects etc

              Comment


              • Mihais, et al,

                It is a fair question; and one that needs to be discussed.
                Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                Roccor,you have a point,particularly about the costs for killing Osama.But we're not talking terrorists here.We're talking power and more specifically relative power(which is all that matter in the international arena).So the question is if US standing in hierarchy of powers is better controlling ME through its proxies (or directly ) or not.
                (COMMENT)

                First, is the question of "control" and "relative power."
                • No one in the Middle East (ME) or the Gulf States (GS) wants the US to be "in control." The exercise of (by the US) of "control" through conventional force, military action and diplomatic pressures (economic and commercial trade) smacks of "imperialism" for which the indigenous governments and people equate to a great evil. The western powers have been exercising such dominance over the regions (ME/GS) since the creation of the Suez Canal, and in particular, since the conclusion of WWI. Many of the troubled ME/GS states that exist today owe their origins to the lines drawn by the western powers and the subsequent support provided by the US. And the creation of these states often happened without regard to the tribal and ethnic cultural divisions that existed long before the western powers started establishing these states.


                Is it a question of establishing "power?" -- OR -- Is it more important to win the "influence" (and what that brings) from the culture and people of the region (ME/GS)?
                • The US foreign policy is such that America believes that it must act as a Super Power with dominance (military and diplomatic) over its allies. (Persuasive in Peace - Invincible in War ---- as both a concept and mantra.) And the ME/GS Regions see this as a veiled hegemony, with no regard for the impact it has on the stability region; merely as a utilitarian tool working in the best interest of America.


                If "proxy" power is obvious, then the question becomes, does this really change the overall impression it makes on the indigenous populations within the region (ME/GS)?
                • The outcomes change only if the "proxies" are covert or clandestine. That is, if the indigenous populations are totally unaware of the fact that the US is the "puppet master." But if the effort is common knowledge, then again, the regional population will see the US as an imperialistic hegemony enforced by US military might; done because we can --- and not --- because it is in the best interest of the people. And the people of the region are well aware of how regional quasi-dictators act in their own best interests. And they are well aware of the relationships the US establishes with these dictators, for the sole benefit of the US, but lining the pockets of the dictators. They do not see America holding the high moral ground; but as facilitators of dicatorial regimes.


                These two perspectives, individually, can be over come through concerted political-military efforts that reduce the footprint of the hegemony. However, left unchecked, will amplify the growing distrust of America that is damaging the reputation of America and the influence it might have in terms of good will.

                Most Respectfully,
                R

                Comment


                • 1980s, et al,

                  Again, we are more in agreement, than disagreement.
                  Originally posted by 1980s View Post
                  I dont follow US domestic politics too closely altho if im not mistaken much of the failure of American policy in Afghanistan lies with the attitude Donald Rumsfeld took towards operations there (basically that the war was 'won' before it even really started). From what i see often stated in hindsight is that the Bush admin actually had no real plan for Afghanistan and that Rumsfeld really did not care what shape Afghanistan took post-Taliban, provided that it would not act as a safe-haven for 'international terrorists'.
                  (COMMENT)

                  From a conventional military standpoint, the "war" (if we can call it that) was "won" (if we define its objectives that way), long before the military build-up. But the military build-up, post-destabilization of the Taliban Regime, was without focus, clear objectives and goals.
                  Originally posted by 1980s View Post
                  For the first few years ISAF concentrated solely on securing Kabul. The rest of the country was pretty much neglected and so it is little wonder that by 2005/6 the Taliban started to re-emerge in Qandahar and had little to nothing standing in their way of spreading further into Afghanistan. ... ... ...
                  But i dont know if these kinds of 'failures' are something inherent to US policies abroad, or whether you could (and maybe should) treat the mess in Afghanistan as a failure of the Bush admin - which Obama has little choice but to try and fix. Altho you're probably right about recycling the same leadership..
                  (COMMENT)

                  The stabilization of Kabul, was based on one military objective, and one diplomatic objective.

                  To create a stable cantonment area for the establishment of a secure military headquarters.

                  To create a viable working environment to establish a western style central government as a basics template for the Department of State to establish a puppet government. Who could forget Senator Kerry standing next to President Harmid Karzai, the most recognized criminal in the country, on his re-election as President.

                  The support and recognition of Karzai, by the US did not go unnoticed by the average Afghan. A Super Power is judged by the people they help install. And the US backed a known corrupt politician. (Not good if you're trying to win the support and trust of the people.)
                  Originally posted by 1980s View Post
                  Whatever little commitment is left to be made to Afghanistan on the timetable put forward (if it is even stuck to) is better spent on those areas and communities where people actually resent the Taliban and not the foreign forces. Blackwell's 'plan' for a de-facto partition along north-south lines i think is the way to go since that seems to be the natural course of affairs if left to the people of Afghanistan anyway.. At least the World knows which side of the divide does not support international terrorism or 'jihad' against foreign nations and other religions/sects etc
                  (COMMENT)

                  The USplays "checkers" very well, but not "chess." It cannot think two - three - and four steps ahead of the opponent; a necessary skill set to "winning" the game.

                  The divisions of which you speak will bend, expand and fold, as the political and military landscape changes over time as the influence of the US recedes. We cannot predict with any accuracy what will happen; other than that our footprint was not viewed as advantageous by the Afghan people. Our military adventure will be recorded as just one invasion by a succession of military invaders that came and went.

                  Most Respectfully,
                  R

                  Comment


                  • People...And PEOPLE

                    I'm reading here about how U.S. policy is seen disadvantageous to the GS and ME people. Nice. Which people though? Am I to presume that the Iraqi Kurdish people saw U.S. policy post DESERT STORM through 2004 as disadvantageous? How about those of the northern alliance in Afghanistan? Do the Sunni bedouins of KSA find their elevation from the sands particularly disadvantageous?

                    So the idea that all peoples of the the GS and ME find U.S. policy as serving only an elite few at the expense of many everywhere and all the time may be flawed.

                    "...In anycase, i think that whole 'Blackwell plan' to withdraw US forces out of the Pashtun regions and station them in the north and west of Afghanistan is a much better option than trying to win a counter-insurgency operation in places like Helmand and Qandahar (securing the non-Pashtun regions and carrying out counter-terrorism in the south and east when needed is basically his proposal)..."

                    I'd tend to agree. The tajiks and uzbeks have shown, generally, to be more modernistic in their vision. Pashtuns likely will never be coaxed into the future without clear indication that doing otherwise is the pathway to failure. The best opportunity to achieve such is building an alternative vision to Afghanistan in those regions pre-disposed to such and let pashtuns draw their own conclusions.

                    Sadly, many afghan pashtuns might attempt acquiring by violence what they can't culturally. In so doing they'll only destroy that which they covet without understanding why such is unattainable within their culture.

                    "...I think few people are seriously convinced that the Taliban is going to negotiate or would ever honor any kind of settlement with the Karzai regime, let alone with the US..."

                    This is correct. For all the complaints I've read of the ABC/BBC/ARD polls, they've nonetheless consistently indicated a taliban preference amounting to less than 10% of the population. If pashtuns make up exclusively that support and constitute about 40% of the overall population then we can assume that even among pashtuns the taliban only garner about a 25% favorable rating. The taliban consequently understand that they'll fail, and do so abysmally, in any election.

                    Can you imagine Mullah Omar on the campaign trail?

                    "...They have proven their dishonorable nature more than enough..."

                    And shall again. They generate no political power reaching beyond the end of a gun barrel.

                    "...Blackwell's 'plan' for a de-facto partition along north-south lines i think is the way to go since that seems to be the natural course of affairs if left to the people of Afghanistan anyway..."

                    It will occur in any case. Civil war looms. I anticipate very active regional support for the anti-taliban elements. These likely will morph along classic pashtun-northern alliance lines but don't necessarily must.
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment


                    • S2, et al,

                      You have every right to be skeptical.
                      Originally posted by S2 View Post
                      So the idea that all peoples of the the GS and ME find U.S. policy as serving only an elite few at the expense of many everywhere and all the time may be flawed.
                      (COMMENT)

                      I am seldom exclusive in terms. That is, I seldom use or attempt to imply all inclusive terms. I certainly could not say that every member of the indigenous population falls in one category or another.

                      I'm not even sure, that in all cases US foreign policy always support the Ruling Elite. But it happens more often than not.

                      But clearly, if the majority of Afghans, Northern, Southern, Eastern or Western, are in favor of the US/UN/ISAF model government established, then there will be no problem in withdrawal. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, or whoever, do not live in isolation of some kind of support from the indigenous population.

                      In Iraq, there would be no need for the continuation of a military footprint if the vast majority of the indigenous population found the American way to be the right way. And Ambassador Jeffery would not need to nearly double the size of the Diplomatic mission if there was a stabilized environment conducive to US positions.

                      I Pakistan, there would be no need to triple the size of the US contingent if a vast majority of the people supported the US role in their country.
                      "...In anycase, i think that whole 'Blackwell plan' to withdraw US forces out of the Pashtun regions and station them in the north and west of Afghanistan is a much better option than trying to win a counter-insurgency operation in places like Helmand and Qandahar (securing the non-Pashtun regions and carrying out counter-terrorism in the south and east when needed is basically his proposal)..."
                      (COMMENT)

                      While I agree that we should forfeit the Pashtun Region, I am not sure that we should not make an immediate withdrawal and see how successful the last decade of intervention has been.
                      I'd tend to agree. The tajiks and uzbeks have shown, generally, to be more modernistic in their vision. Pashtuns likely will never be coaxed into the future without clear indication that doing otherwise is the pathway to failure. The best opportunity to achieve such is building an alternative vision to Afghanistan in those regions pre-disposed to such and let pashtuns draw their own conclusions.
                      (COMMENT)

                      I am not sure that the US effort to build anything for the Tajiks and Uzbeks accomplishes anything but give the appearance of US intervention. They have to make the choice as well.
                      Sadly, many afghan pashtuns might attempt acquiring by violence what they can't culturally. In so doing they'll only destroy that which they covet without understanding why such is unattainable within their culture.
                      (COMMENT)

                      And if this is the case (not saying it will be), what do we gain by getting involved. The nations and the overall region must make a decision, and choose their own destiny.
                      "...I think few people are seriously convinced that the Taliban is going to negotiate or would ever honor any kind of settlement with the Karzai regime, let alone with the US..."
                      (COMMENT)

                      The "Taliban" see themselves as a government in forced exile, through the efforts of a force power. They are not likely to accept a corrupt puppet regime as a legitimate government. And they have the ability to outlast the US and NATO forces.

                      The taliban consequently understand that they'll fail, and do so abysmally, in any election.
                      (COMMENT)

                      If the "Taliban" reconstitute themselves, they will not engage in a democratic process.

                      Can you imagine Mullah Omar on the campaign trail?
                      (COMMENT)

                      Yeah! I see that as humorous!

                      Most Respectfully,
                      R

                      Comment


                      • RoccoR Reply

                        "...I'm not even sure, that in all cases US foreign policy always support the Ruling Elite. But it happens more often than not."

                        I think the fact is that our Dept. of State will engage with any prevailing power. Doing so with the amount of gravitas our status garners tends to act as an unofficial endorsement when not necessarily the case.

                        "...if the majority of Afghans, Northern, Southern, Eastern or Western, are in favor of the US/UN/ISAF model government established, then there will be no problem in withdrawal..."

                        We'd have serious issues with pashtuns whether an afghan taliban existed or otherwise. As for withdrawal, don't tempt me. I'm all in favor of such-immediate and en toto. Civil and military aid too along with cutting all aid to Pakistan.

                        I don't wish to see the Karzai regime survive. I'm hopeful for civil war. It's the only pathway to a long-term resolution of Afghanistan which I can see. It will mean the de-stabilization of Pakistan but I'm in favor of that too. Nukes? I envision a target-rich environment should the Pakistanis fail to wake up to the blow-back they're brewing for themselves.

                        "...The Taliban, al-Qaeda, or whoever, do not live in isolation of some kind of support from the indigenous population..."

                        Attaining support and attaining goodwill aren't necessarily the same thing. The afghan peasantry appear to be masters at rolling with the punches. Again, however, WHICH indigenous population? They won't and don't live long on Hazara land. This, despite the fact that Hazara-dominated areas abut against Helmand, Kandahar and Oruzgan.
                        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                        Comment


                        • S-2, et al,

                          We are not that far apart. You, maybe, a bit more optimistic than I with the outcomes.
                          Originally posted by S2 View Post
                          I think the fact is that our Dept. of State will engage with any prevailing power. Doing so with the amount of gravitas our status garners tends to act as an unofficial endorsement when not necessarily the case.
                          (COMMENT)

                          Remember that DoS is an evangelistic mouth piece. It wants others to engage democracy, by only its brand. When the Palestinians openly voted for Hamas, the US turned their back on the Palestinians.

                          But in general, I believe you are more right then not.

                          I have little faith in the Foreign Service and their abilities to develop and conduct a coherent foreign policy that any American can understand.

                          Most Respectfully,
                          R

                          Comment


                          • RoccoR Reply

                            "...When the Palestinians openly voted for Hamas, the US turned their back on the Palestinians..."

                            Aren't you glad we did so? The will of the Palestinian people was expressed. Hooray! So too the will of the American people in rejecting a political entity whose manifesto calls for the elimination of Israel.

                            I fully endorse the rights of Palestinian people to elect this terrorist monstrosity. I fully require they do so with the full understanding of the penalties/implications for such rashness. Self-determination carries heavy responsibilities.
                            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                            Comment


                            • S-2, et al,

                              In some measure, you are right.
                              Originally posted by S2 View Post
                              Aren't you glad we did so? The will of the Palestinian people was expressed. Hooray! So too the will of the American people in rejecting a political entity whose manifesto calls for the elimination of Israel.

                              I fully endorse the rights of Palestinian people to elect this terrorist monstrosity. I fully require they do so with the full understanding of the penalties/implications for such rashness. Self-determination carries heavy responsibilities.
                              (COMMENT)

                              As usual, there is truth in what you say. Each decision and conscience action has a set of consequences and outcomes that must be faced.
                              • But, it is also the case that there will be many, within the region, and many factions that simply will view our action as a double standard. During the pre-1948 struggle for independence, the Stern Gang, the Jewish Agency, the Haganah, and the Irgun were Israeli Resistance Groups. They conducted operations against Western forces (espionage, sedition, assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage) during the period from 1920 to 1948. Menahem Begin, a former Commander of the Irgun, was responsible for the bombing of the King David Hotel. Together, men like David Ben Gurion, Menahem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon were all classified as terrorists. They were the original 20th Century Terrorists of Palestine. They all had outstanding wanted posters out for them. The various Palestinian movements were all merely emulating them.
                              • The leadership of Hamas, emerged as the legitimate government in the same way that the as the Israeli Resistance Groups (or Pro-Israeli terrorist groups) merged to become the legitimate government of Israel.

                              The Western View is not the only view of history and the development of regional terrorism, as a legitimate means of establishing a government.

                              If we are to maintain credibility within the region, we cannot rewrite history too much. There are still people alive, like myself, who understand that Western History of these events are not representative of the truth; but written politically palatable for the convenience of the Powers that be.

                              Most Respectfully,
                              R
                              Last edited by RoccoR; 25 Jun 11,, 19:56.

                              Comment


                              • RoccoR Reply

                                "...There are still people alive, like myself, who understand that Western History of these events are not representative of the truth; but written politically palatable for the convenience of the Powers that be."

                                Perhaps. I'd ask that you express ALL the truth. Did the results of those actions leave us with a viable democracy? I find Israeli democracy rather thriving.

                                "...They conducted operations against Western forces (espionage, sedition, assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage) during the period from 1920 to 1948..."

                                Western? Occupying forces. Military troops? A legitimate series of targets to those seeking to oust their oppressors.

                                I'd say the same of HAMAS were they to restrict their targeting to Israeli military forces WHILE conducting democratic principles of rule within the Gaza strip and also renouncing their manifesto.

                                They don't in each case. Civilian targets, one-party domination of Gaza and no renunciation. There's no basis for peace with Israel and no basis for a formalized relationship with America.
                                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X