The War

[astralis]

what needs to happen at this step is an annoucement of negative reciprocity on the US side. ie, if pakistan tries to limit ground strikes, we raise the number and draw a line in the sand. if they stop cooperating with us intelligence wise, then we strike where we want with no concern for pakistani desires.

the US needs not be completely unengaged, we just need to demonstrate a more effective carrot and stick policy. thus far it's all carrot and no stick.

[S2]

Nothing needs to happen. Mullen's comments are pointless unless the "stick" is already swinging at the Pakistanis. Not a threat but an actual repercussion to making war upon America.

As this is quite unlikely he should simply STFU. We look impotent when complaining to an enemy that they attack us.

[1980s]

Source: U.S. departs Pakistan base

By Nick Paton Walsh and Nasir Habib, CNN
April 22, 2011 -- Updated 2248 GMT (0648 HKT)

Islamabad, Pakistan (CNN) -- A senior Pakistani intelligence official told CNN Friday that U.S. military personnel have left a southern base said to be a key hub for American drone operations in the country's northwestern tribal areas.

It is the Shamsi Air Base in Pakistan's Balochistan Province, from which drones are said to take off and where they are refueled for operations against Islamic militants.

The development comes amid a public furor over American drone attacks, which have killed civilians.

A suspected U.S. drone strike Friday in the Pakistani tribal region killed 25 people, including eight civilians and 17 militants, a Pakistani intelligence source said. This came after another strike on March 17 killed 44 people, most of them civilians.

Yet a U.S. official disputed the Pakistani contention that civilians died in Friday's drone strike.

"There is no evidence to support that claim whatsoever," the U.S. official said.

Another senior Pakistani intelligence official, who did not want to be identified discussing a sensitive issue, confirmed that the Americans had been using the base as a center of operations for launching drone strikes. He was not able to confirm the Americans had left.

While the first official was able to confirm that American personnel were no longer operating out of the base, he could not say whether they had left voluntarily or at the request of the Pakistani government.

The operation of the base -- not publicly acknowledged by the American government -- has always been presumed to have occurred with tacit Pakistani military consent.

It was not clear from the Pakistani officials when the presence there began or when it ended.

A U.S. military official who did not want to be identified told CNN: "There are no U.S. forces at Shamsi Air Base in Balochistan." He did not respond at the time or in writing to queries as to whether U.S. personnel had been based there in the past.

The departure of American personnel -- if confirmed -- would be significant because of increasing strain between Islamabad and Washington sparked by the continuing drone attacks and by the Raymond Davis affair, in which a CIA contractor fatally shot two Pakistani men in a Lahore neighborhood.

It has always been unclear how many drone bases the United States operates in or near Pakistan. But the Friday attack in North Waziristan that killed 25 people would indicate the United States maintains the capability to strike tribal areas with drones.

Carl Forsberg, research analyst at the Institute for the Study of War think tank, said he doesn't think the alleged move will affect the effort using drones to target the Haqqani Network and other militant groups holed up in the tribal region.

That's because many strikes have been conducted from closer bases, such as those across the Pakistani border in eastern Afghan provinces. He said the Pakistanis could be making the alleged move to appease a populace angry at the United States.

The southern air base, he said, doesn't appear to be integral to the tribal area fight and is probably a supporting base.

"It's not like the Pakistanis shut down the program," he said. "It's possible they want to do this as a means of pre-empting drone strikes in Balochistan," where there is a Taliban presence.

"The United States has an interest in going after the Taliban in Balochistan" he said, and in an ideal world the United States would like to target Taliban sanctuaries in that region with drones.

Also, he said, it's possible the Pakistanis are using pressure on the United States to offset any U.S. pressure on them.

He said it's no coincidence that the development emerged after Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Islamabad.

In an interview that aired Wednesday on Pakistan's Geo TV, Mullen spoke forcefully about the Haqqani Network, which he said "very specifically facilitates and supports the Taliban who move in Afghanistan, and they're killing Americans."

"I can't accept that and I will do everything I possibly can to prevent that specifically," he said.

Then Mullen said Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence "has a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani Network. That doesn't mean everybody in the ISI, but it's there."

"I also have an understanding that the ISI and the (Pakistani military) exist to protect their own citizens, and there's a way they have done that for a long period of time," Mullen said. "I believe that over time, that's got to change."

A senior Pakistani intelligence official responded by saying, "We do have a relationship: that of an adversary."

"We have made our resolve very clear that (the Haqqani Network) is an enemy we need to fight together," said the official, who did not want to be identified discussing intelligence matters.

The Pakistani intelligence official told CNN that "we have our hands full" fighting other Islamist militant groups along the border with Afghanistan, notably those under the umbrella of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, "and once we are through with them we can turn on the other (the Haqqanis). We do not have the capacity to undertake simultaneous operations."

The official said the "onus of providing proof of this" relationship was on the Americans and it was not up to the ISI "to start providing clarification."

Asked if offense was taken from Mullen's remarks, the intelligence official said: "Not personally, no."

In Friday's attack, a drone fired five missiles on a hideout in Mir Ali of North Waziristan, one of the seven districts of Pakistan's volatile tribal region bordering Afghanistan, two intelligence officials said.

The officials said the militants, who were staying in the hideout, were planning to move into Afghanistan for an attack against coalition forces.

The militants were local Taliban members from Orakzai agency, another district of Pakistan's tribal region, who were trained for war, the officials said. The intelligence officials asked not to be named because they were not authorized to speak to the media.

But the attack also killed at least three women when one of the missiles hit a house next to the targeted compound, officials said. The Pakistani intelligence source identified the civilians killed as five women and three children.

Friday's drone strike was the 20th this year compared with 111 in all of 2010, based on a CNN tally.

The strike comes two days after Pakistan issued a strongly worded statement condemning deadly suspected U.S. drone strikes in the country's tribal region.

"Drone attacks have become a core irritant in the counterterror campaign," a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Wednesday. "We have repeatedly said that such attacks are counterproductive and only contribute to strengthen the hands of the terrorists."

CNN's Joe Sterling and Pam Benson contributed to this report.

Source: U.S. departs Pakistan base - CNN.com

[S2]

When you look at Shamsi and then the target area for PREDATOR it becomes evident that the base has no relationship to those strikes. Purpose? Probably reconnaissance of the Iranian border areas, baloch separatists and the southern Afghanistan infiltration routes out of Pakistan used by the taliban. My guess is that virtually every armed strike inside FATAville is being flown from Jalalabad or Asadabad.

"Why" is more interesting and my speculation isn't fully developed there but did it serve the ISI to have the Pakistani public believe there was a nod and a wink between them and the C.I.A. on armed strikes? Did we ever place that technology where they could have actually seized it or even see it?

What will be interesting is the subsequent hullaballoo that may arise when PREDATOR strikes continue despite our departure from certain locales in Pakistan.

[1980s]

Found it mildly interesting that Adm. Mullen finally pulled his nose out of Kiyani's azz and called out the ISI publically for their involvement with Haqqani et al while (again) in Pakistan recently.

Let's be clear- our CJCS has just accused an ally of long supporting a proxy war upon our own troops. Well overdue given the litany of accrued facts. GROSSLY overdue to the point of cowardice.

Here's another: Timing mean anything?

Guantánamo Bay files: Pakistan's ISI spy service listed as terrorist group | World news | guardian.co.uk

Anyone linked to Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate should be treated like al-Qaida or Taliban, interrogators told

Jason Burke
guardian.co.uk, Monday 25 April 2011 10.46 BST

US authorities describe the main Pakistani intelligence service as a terrorist organisation in secret files obtained by the Guardian.

Recommendations to interrogators at Guantánamo Bay rank the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) alongside al-Qaida, Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon as threats. Being linked to any of these groups is an indication of terrorist or insurgent activity, the documents say.

"Through associations with these … organisations, a detainee may have provided support to al-Qaida or the Taliban, or engaged in hostilities against US or coalition forces [in Afghanistan]," says the document, dated September 2007 and called the Joint Task Force Guantánamo Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants. It adds that links to these groups is evidence that an individual poses a future threat.

The revelation that the ISI is considered as much of a threat as al-Qaida and the Taliban will cause fury in Pakistan. It will further damage the already poor relationship between US intelligence services and their Pakistani counterparts, supposedly key allies in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants in south Asia.

Relations between America and Pakistan have been tense for years. A series of high-level attempts have been made in recent weeks to improve ties after the American CIA contractor Raymond Davis killed two Pakistanis in January.

In November the Guardian published evidence that US intelligence services had been receiving reports of ISI support for the Taliban in Afghanistan for many years. The reports were frequent and detailed, if unconfirmed and sometimes speculative.

The Threat Indicator Matrix is used to decide who among the hundreds of Guantánamo detainees can be released. The ISI is listed among 36 groups including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by al-Qaida deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri; the Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs; the Iranian intelligence services; and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Though the document dates from 2007 it is unlikely the ISI has been removed from the current Threat Indicator Matrix.

In classified memos outlining the background of 700 prisoners at Guantánamo there are scores of references, apparently based on intelligence reporting, to the ISI supporting, co-ordinating and protecting insurgents fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan, or even assisting al-Qaida. Pakistani authorities have consistently denied any links with insurgents in Afghanistan or al-Qaida.

The documents detail extensive collaboration between the ISI and US intelligence services. Many of those transferred to Guantánamo Bay, including senior al-Qaida figures such as Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, who planned the 9/11 attacks, and Abu Farraj al-Libbi, one of the group's most capable operators, were arrested with Pakistani help or turned over to American authorities by Pakistani intelligence services.

The memos rely on a variety of sources to make their case. Though the broad argument for releasing or detaining an individual has sometimes been made public during military tribunals at Guantánamo, the material underpinning those arguments has remained secret until now. Sources for that material include the interrogation of the detainee whose release is being discussed, as well as the records of the questioning of hundreds of other prisoners.

Intelligence from elsewhere, including foreign spy agencies such as the Afghan National Directorate of Security, appears to have been extensively used. There is little independent corroboration for the reporting and some of the information is likely to have been obtained under duress. Systematic human rights abuses have been recorded at Guantánamo.

The details of the alleged ISI support for insurgents at the very least give an important insight into the thinking of American strategists and senior decision-makers who would have been made aware of the intelligence as it was gathered. Many documents refer to alleged ISI activities in 2002 or 2003, long before the policy shift in 2007 that saw the Bush administration become much more critical of the Pakistani security establishment and distance itself from Pervez Musharraf, who was president.

One example is found among reasons given by Guantánamo officials for the continued detention of Harun Shirzad al-Afghani, a veteran militant who arrived there in June 2007. His file states he is believed to have attended a meeting in August 2006 at which Pakistani military and intelligence officials joined senior figures in the Taliban, al-Qaida, the Lashkar-e-Taiba group responsible for the 2008 attack in Mumbai and the Hezb-e-Islami group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

The meeting was to discuss operations in Afghanistan against coalition forces, says the memo. It cites an unidentified letter in the possession of US intelligence services describing the meeting which, it says, ended with a decision by the various insurgent factions "to increase terrorist operations in the Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar provinces [of Afghanistan], including suicide bombings, mines, and assassinations".

Harun Shirzad al-Afghani was reported to have told his interrogators that in 2006 an unidentified Pakistani ISI officer paid 1m Pakistani rupees to a militant to transport ammunition to a depot within Afghanistan jointly run by al-Qaida, the Taliban and Hekmatyar's faction.

According to Afghani, who was captured in the eastern Nangarhar province, the depot contained "about 800 rockets, AK-47 and machine gun ammunition, mortars, RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] and mines" and had been established "in preparation for a spring 2007 offensive".

More than 230 western troops were killed in Afghanistan in the course of 2007; 99 between January and June.

A separate document about a 42-year-old Afghan detainee cites intelligence reports claiming that in early 2005 Pakistani officials were present at a meeting chaired by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the supreme chief of the Taliban, of an array of senior insurgents in Quetta, the Pakistani city where it has long been believed the Taliban leadership are based.

"The meeting included high-level Taliban leaders … [and] representatives from the Pakistani government and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate," the document says. It adds: "Mullah Omar told the attendees that they should not co-operate with the new infidel government (in Afghanistan) and should keep attacking coalition forces."

Many references are more historic. A memo about another detainee, Abdul Kakal Hafiz, cites intelligence that in January 2003, insurgents in the Zabul province of Afghanistan received a month of training in explosives, bomb-making and assassination techniques from "three Pakistani military officers". The training was apparently "conducted in preparation for a planned spring campaign to assassinate westerners". A Red Cross water engineer, Ricardo Mungia, was shot and killed by insurgents on 27 March 2003 in Oruzgan province. The murder had a major effect on humanitarian and development programmes in south and eastern Afghanistan and was a huge setback for western-led efforts.

According to the files on an Afghan known simply as Hamidullah, captured by Afghan national army soldiers in July 2003, intelligence "reporting" from December 2002 "linked detainee to a Pakistani ISI initiative to create an office in [the Pakistani frontier city of] Peshawar combining elements of the Taliban, HIG [Hekmatyar's group] and al-Qaida".

The memo said that intelligence indicated "the goal of the initiative was to plan and execute various terrorist attacks in Afghanistan" including one on the HQ of foreign entities in Kabul in January 2003.

Another file on a high-profile Afghan religious and political leader detained months after the initial invasion of Afghanistan and released in 2008 refers to ISI operations in the eastern province of Kunar during 2002 that were, the memo says, designed to destabilise the new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai, who had been installed as interim president by the US-led coalition.

"In January 2002 ISI financed the activities of several factions … in Kunar … in order to destabilise the Afghan [government]. In March 2002 [the ISI] reportedly provided $12,000 … to finance military operations against the new government," the document says.

The file reveals that the detainee, Mullah Haji Rohullah, was working with the British government, and possibly MI6, when detained. "This detainee ... had dealings with the United Kingdom and with the Pakistani [ISI]," says the memo, dated 17 June 2005.

The documents show the varying interpretations by American officials of the apparent evidence of ISI involvement with insurgents in Afghanistan. There are repeated "analyst's notes" in parentheses. Several in earlier documents stress that it is "rogue elements" of the ISI who actively support insurgents in Afghanistan.

One describes how "rogue elements of the ISI are known to have had sympathies for and provided support to anti-coalition militia. The most significant was sniper training and the use of remote control improvised explosive devices." Another file from 2005 says that "rogue factions from the ISI have routinely pursued private interests and acted against the stated policy of the government of Pakistan".

The analysis that such operations were not sanctioned policy for the ISI was current among US and British intelligence officials as late as 2007. By 2008 the view of western services had changed and such caveats are rare in later documents.

The files reveal much of the shadow war in Afghanistan fought out by secret services – a contemporary form of the 19th century Great Game. There are a series of references to Iranian intelligence; these again are unconfirmed. One intelligence report cited in the file on an Afghan called Khair Ulla Said Wali Khairkhwa, who arrived at Guantánamo in May 2002, refers to "a meeting initiated by Iran, possibly by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps" between Iranian officials and Taliban representatives near the Afghan-Iranian border in October 2001. The officials allegedly offered to broker a coalition between the Northern Alliance, which was allied with the west, and the Taliban in their fight against US intervention. According to the memo, the Iranian delegation "offered to open the borders to Arabs who wanted to cross into Afghanistan to fight against US and coalition forces".

Around 18 months after the fall of the Taliban, another memo claims, Iranian intelligence gave a former Taliban commander and Hekmatyar US$2m to fund "anti-coalition militia" activities. Citing further intelligence reports, the file says: "In December 2005, representatives of Ismail Khan, former governor of Herat and minister of water and power in Afghanistan, met with two Pakistanis and three Iranians to discuss the planning of terrorist acts and to create better lines of communication between the [Hekmatyar group] and Taliban."

This latter claim appears highly speculative as Khan is a long-term enemy of Hekmatyar and the Taliban – in 2009 he narrowly survived a suicide attack for which insurgents claimed responsibility.

[S2]

1980s Reply

"Here's another: Timing mean anything..."

Maybe, though I'm inclined to believe the CJCS isn't motivated by the latest from the GUARDIAN.

To be fair to Mullen, he's said nothing that isn't long-known even here. A variety of sources having nothing to do with Guantanamo but at least as reliable (if not more so) attest to this relationship.

Most damning IMV were the accounts rendered by NYT reporter David Rohde's kidnapping at the hands of the Haqqani clan coupled with the duo arrests (and releases) by Pakistan of a senior Haqqani family member responsible for fundraising inside the Persian gulf. There's more, of course.

Simplest was the video of vast numbers of taliban surging towards the Pakistani border in late 2001 as their government collapsed and Kabul's capture was imminent.

Why if not a sense of safety to be had there? What since then has contradicted such? The American congress has been co-opted into this intrigue by pleas from our government that there's more here than meets the eye. Indeed there is but the collusion of our so-called friends with our enemies requires no deep analysis.

Why we've acquiesced to such, however, will prove to be the most fascinating and enduring story yet untold of this war.

[S2]

Eight U.S. Soldiers Killed By Afghan Pilot

An afghan military pilot shot dead eight U.S. soldiers and wounded five Afghan soldiers during an argument at a meeting in Kabul's airport at a military facility-

Afghan Military Pilot Guns Down 8 NATO Troops-VOA April 27, 2011

The GUARDIAN reports that NATO has recorded some 20 incidents where afghan soldiers have killed their NATO allies-

NATO Troops Record 20 Incidents Where Afghan Security Forces Have "Turned"-GUARDIAN April 27, 2011

[Cactus]

Pakistan Urges Afghanistan to Ally With Islamabad, Beijing

Phase III Begins?

Pakistan to Afghanistan's Karzai: Drop U.S. - WSJ.com

By MATTHEW ROSENBERG

Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan's president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan—and its Chinese ally—for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say.
...

After routine pleasantries about improving bilateral ties and trade, Mr. Gilani told Mr. Karzai that the U.S. had failed both their countries, and that its policy of trying to open peace talks while at the same time fighting the Taliban made no sense, according to Afghans familiar with the meeting.

Mr. Gilani repeatedly referred to America's "imperial designs," playing to a theme that Mr. Karzai has himself often embraced in speeches. He also said that, to end the war, Afghanistan and Pakistan needed to take "ownership" of the peace process, according to Afghans familiar with what was said at the meeting. Mr. Gilani added that America's economic problems meant it couldn't be expected to support long-term regional development. A better partner would be China, which Pakistanis call their "all-weather" friend, he said, according to participants in the meeting. He said the strategic partnership deal was ultimately an Afghan decision. But, he added, neither Pakistan nor other neighbors were likely to accept such a pact.

Background:

Mr. Karzai is wavering on Pakistan's overtures, according to Afghans familiar with his thinking, with pro- and anti-American factions at the presidential palace trying to sway him to their sides.

The leaks about what went on at the April 16 meeting officials appear to be part of that effort. Afghans in the pro-U.S. camp who shared details of the meeting with The Wall Street Journal said they did so to prompt the U.S. to move faster toward securing the strategic partnership agreement, which is intended to spell out the relationship between the two countries after 2014. "The longer they wait…the more time Pakistan has to secure its interests," said one of the pro-U.S. Afghan officials.

[RoccoR]

Cactus, et al,

Let's start back clean, with the basics.

Phase III Begins?

Pakistan to Afghanistan's Karzai: Drop U.S. - WSJ.com

Background:

(QUESTIONS)

• What US strategic interests rests in Afghanistan that require any type of alliance that is going to cost us military assistance or foreign aid (any type)?
  
• What is the return on our investment?
  
• What is wrong with the Chinese taking the lead on development and stabilization?

(COMMENT)

I simply don't understand what our involvement is? I don't understand what our goals and objectives are within the AFPAK Region?

Most Respectfully
R

[InExile]

I simply don't understand what our involvement is? I don't understand what our goals and objectives are within the AFPAK Region?

I have totally given up figuring that one out, and the US - Pakistan relationship

[1980s]

US pushes Osama onto Afghan chessboard

By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - United States President Barack Obama and top administration officials have taken advantage of the killing of Osama bin Laden to establish a new narrative suggesting the event will pave the way for negotiations with the Taliban for peace in Afghanistan.

That good news message, reported by Washington Post senior editor Rajiv Chandrasekaran on Tuesday, suggested that the administration would now be able to negotiate a deal that would make it possible for the United States to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.

The Chandrasekaran article quoted a "senior administration official" as saying that bin Laden's death at the hands of US forces "presents an opportunity for reconciliation that didn't exist before". The official suggested that administration officials were seeking to "leverage the death into a spark that ignites peace talks".

The claim of new prospects for peace conveyed to Chandrasekaran appears to be dependent mainly on the assumption that Taliban leaders in Pakistan will now fear that they will be captured or killed by US forces, as was Bin Laden.

An official familiar with administration policy discussions on Afghanistan said the fact that the United States could locate and kill Bin Laden "so deep inside Pakistan" is presumed to "have an impact on the Taliban's thinking".

The idea that US policy is now on the road to an "end game" in Afghanistan glosses over a central problem: the publicly expressed US determination to keep a US combat presence in Afghanistan indefinitely is not an acceptable condition to the Taliban as a basis for negotiations.

The Chandrasekaran report anticipated the announcement soon of a "strategic partnership agreement" between the United States and the government of President Hamid Karzai as "another potential catalyst for talks".

But that agreement is likely to reduce the Taliban willingness to open negotiations with the US rather than increase it, because it is expected to include a provision for a long-term US military presence to conduct "counter-terrorism operations" as well as training.

None of the Taliban officials interviewed by Pakistani officials on behalf of the United States last year said that there could be a peace agreement in which US troops would be allowed to stay in Afghanistan.

"There is no doubt that the number one aim of the Taliban in negotiations would be getting the US military to leave," said Michael Wahid Hanna, a program officer at the Century Foundation, who attended meetings held by a task force sponsored by the foundation with a wide range of Taliban and former Taliban officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Hanna said the signing of an agreement for a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan "would not be a helpful step" for starting peace negotiations.

The new narrative portrays the Obama administration as sharply divided between military and Pentagon leaders who want to maximize the number of troops in Afghanistan for as long as possible and some civilian advisers who want a much bigger and faster drawdown.

But that description of the policy debate on Afghanistan, which is accurate as far as it goes, fails to make clear that the civilians in question - including Obama himself - are not aiming at withdrawing all US forces from Afghanistan, even if there is a negotiated agreement with the Taliban.

In an interview with 60 Minutes airing Sunday night, Obama says the Bin Laden killing "reconfirms that we can focus on al-Qaeda, focus on the threats to our homeland, train Afghans in a way that allows them to stabilize their country. But we don't need to have a perpetual footprint of the size we have now."

Obama's statement hints at his intention to continue to maintain a much smaller military "footprint" in Afghanistan for many years to come.

The Chandrasekaran report suggested that that the real obstacle to beginning talks has been the unwillingness of the Taliban to renounce its ties with al-Qaeda.

But there is no need for more pressure on the Taliban on the issue of its ties with al-Qaeda, according to observers who have met with Taliban officials.

Well before Bin Laden's assassination, some senior Taliban officials with ties to the Quetta shura made statements to the Century Foundation Task Force that appeared to be open to such a commitment. "They said this can happen - something to that effect - as part of an agreement," recalled Jeffrey Laurenti, director of foreign policy programs for the Century Foundation, who accompanied task force members in those meetings.

In early December 2009, the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" - the official name by which the Taliban identifies itself - sent out a statement to press organizations declaring it had "no agenda of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and is ready to give legal guarantees if foreign forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan".

Although it did not explicitly mention al-Qaeda in the statement, it was clearly a response to the Obama administration pointing to Taliban ties with al-Qaeda as central to the rationale for the US-North Atlantic Treaty Organization war.

But the Taliban are not expected to make a declaration explicitly naming al-Qaeda in advance of an agreement, much less before negotiations begin. "It makes no sense for the Taliban to concede this point on the front end - without receiving any commensurate concession from the other side," the Century Foundation's Hanna told the Associated Press this week.

"They portray any pre-emptive severing of ties as a type of unilateral partial disarmament," he added.

The new narrative also suggests that the killing of Bin Laden may now reduce another obstacle to peace negotiations - Pakistani policy. US officials were said to believe that Pakistani officials had "interfered with peace efforts in the past", but now that Pakistan is under fire for possible complicity in Bin Laden's living near the capital for years, "have an opportunity to play a more constructive role".

Pakistani policy has opposed peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan regime behind Pakistan's back. But contrary to the new narrative, Pakistan has been more eager to begin peace negotiations than the United States.

Pakistan has long complained that it was not being informed about US negotiating aims and strategy - especially with whom the United States is willing to talk and whether it hopes to impose stiff demands on the Taliban through military force. Speaking at the New America Foundation on April 22, Pakistani Foreign Minister Salman Bashir hinted strongly that his government disagrees with the US strategy of hoping that military pressure will yield a better settlement.

"In Islamabad we have our own assessment of the situation in Afghanistan," said the foreign minister. "The US says the momentum of the Taliban has been halted, but is fragile and reversible. Our own assessment is that the security situation has continued to deteriorate."

The new Obama administration narrative seems to suggest that Pakistan will now display a less skeptical attitude toward US diplomatic strategy and urge the Taliban to negotiate despite the signals of US determination to keep a long-term military presence in Afghanistan.

Asia Times Online

[Mihais]

This was in waiting for a long time and it was made clear by the administration since 2009.
I have a very personal desire.I wish Obama has Osama's fate.There is a betrayal of the Afghan allies in the making as well as one of the original mission and the thousands of dead servicemen.
The only possibility for the Taliban to become legitimate is their disarming and peaceful integration in the Afghan political landscape.Pigs will fly before that.

There are times when I have an absolute hatred of the scumbags called politicians ,opposed to normal times when I just wish them dead.

[rj1]

This was in waiting for a long time and it was made clear by the administration since 2009.

I have a very personal desire.I wish Obama has Osama's fate.There is a betrayal of the Afghan allies in the making as well as one of the original mission and the thousands of dead servicemen.

The only possibility for the Taliban to become legitimate is their disarming and peaceful integration in the Afghan political landscape.Pigs will fly before that.

There are times when I have an absolute hatred of the scumbags called politicians ,opposed to normal times when I just wish them dead.

it's what most of the voters want for better or worse

to be fair to Obama on this, the Afghans have had ten years of us there, Karzai as leader for coming up on nine; at some point the training wheels have to come off and you have to sink or swim on your own merits

[1980s]

Barack Obama under pressure to slash Pakistan aid

White House set to clash with Congress as concerns mount about Osama bin Laden's presence in Pakistan and its nuclear stockpile

Ewen MacAskill in Washington and Julian Borger
guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 May 2011 20.36 BST

The Obama administration is facing a clash with Congress where pressure is building to slash the huge aid budget to Pakistan as punishment for Osama bin Laden's presence in the country.

Members of Congress are lining up to question continued spending on Pakistan, the third highest recipient of US aid and threatening retaliation. Barack Obama and US officials have said the fact that Bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, home to Pakistan's main military academy and many retired officers 40 miles north of the capital, Islamabad, suggests he had benefited from an extensive support network, possibly involving Pakistani officials.

The US administration is, however, urging Congress not to make snap judgments. It is stressing the overriding need for Islamabad's continued co-operation in the war in Afghanistan and for a crackdown on militants in Pakistan.

The discovery that Bin Laden was living in a largely military town has raised concerns about the security of the country's fast-growing nuclear stockpile, and the possibility that a terrorist group could steal the components for a bomb.

"There is no doubt Congress will cut aid," said Michael Krepon, a specialist on South Asia at the Stimson Centre think tank in Washington, who gave evidence on Pakistan last week to the Senate foreign relations committee. "It is hard to see Congress just waving away the presence of Bin Laden in Abbottabad," he said.

Members of Congress will not be appeased by remarks by Pakistan's prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, who on Monday said any future US operation within its borders similar to the unilateral strike against Bin Laden would be met with full force by the Pakistan military.

The US has allocated $1.5bn (£900m) in aid for Pakistan this year and again next year. Only Israel and Afghanistan receive more. Even before the Bin Laden row, resentment had been growing in Congress over the mismanagement of funds. The US government accountability office, in a report this year, found only $179.5m of $1.5bn allocated for this year has been disbursed.

The tension between the US and Pakistan over the CIA operative Raymond Davis this year also angered members of Congress, as did a report revealing an expansion in Pakistan's nuclear programme.

John Kerry, the Democratic chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, and Richard Lugar, the senior Republican on the committee, caution against hasty judgments on Pakistan. But both are the authors of a bill originally authorising aid to Pakistan.

They are easily outnumbered by members of Congress looking for cuts or at least concessions from Pakistan in return for continued aid. Some are demanding immediate suspension. Ted Poe, a Republican Congressman, introduced a bill last week "to prohibit any foreign aid from being sent to Pakistan until it can demonstrate that it had no knowledge of Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts".

Poe, who is a member of the House foreign affairs committee, said: "Pakistan has a lot of explaining to do ... Unless the state department can certify to Congress that Pakistan was not harbouring America's number one enemy, Pakistan should not receive one more cent of American aid."

A Republican senator, James Risch, who sits on the Senate foreign relations committee, told a hearing on Pakistan last week: "I have to tell you that my feeling is the American people, they're not stupid, and they aren't too red hot about doling out money to people who, number one, don't want it and aren't particularly appreciative of it ... in the future there is going to be massive cuts in federal spending. And I suspect this is one area that's going to get looked at pretty closely."

Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat, at the same hearing, said: "What does Pakistan's inability, just taking it at face value, to detect Osama bin Laden within Pakistan say about the security of its nuclear arsenal? It's one of the fastest-growing nuclear arsenals in the world."

The administration, sensing Pakistan's vulnerability and embarrassment over the issue, is hoping that it can use the row to push Pakistan into capturing other senior al-Qaida figures, such as its deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, who many members of Congress claim is in Pakistan, or the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, or to crackdown on lesser known militant groups. It may also seek concessions elsewhere, such as promises of increased safeguards or monitoring in relation to its nuclear stockpile.

Olli Heinonen, the UN's chief nuclear inspector until last year, said he believed Pakistan could have the world's fourth biggest nuclear arsenal by the end of the decade, as a result of a programme of rapid expansion involving the construction of four military reactors and two reprocessing plants for producing weapons-grade plutonium.

"It is really important that the security system is not compromised. The investigation has to be wide enough, not just into why Bin Laden happened to be in this particular town. The whole security regime has to be reviewed to ensure that the nuclear assets are secure," said Heinonen.

Until now, the US has publicly accepted Pakistani assurances that its nuclear warheads – of which there are now thought to be about 100 – are under tight military control, but Heinonen said there were greater concerns about the security of the nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants, where the plutonium is made. "It is easier to steal from these bulk-handling facilities, and the question is: are they really as well-secured as the warheads? There is no international monitoring whatsoever at these places."

David Albright the head of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington said: "He was right in the heart of Pakistan and active, which raises the question that Bin Laden was more active than we thought, and that he may have been trying to infiltrate the nuclear programme by recruiting an insider. I'm sure [US officials] are looking frantically for that."

Bin Laden had declared the acquisition of a nuclear bomb a "religious duty", and his top lieutenant in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, said two years ago that the group hoped to seize and use weapons from Pakistan's arsenal.

"There are thousands of people involved in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium," said Albright, adding that Pakistan's expansion programme would inevitably put strains on security. "If you have to hire a lot of people at once time, it's harder to do the security checks and harder to monitor them."

Earlier this year, ISIS published a satellite photograph that it said showed a reactor under construction at the Kushab nuclear complex in Punjab province. If confirmed, it would be the fourth heavy water reactor to be built at the site, where work appears to be accelerating. Pakistan has one reprocessing plant for separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel near Islamabad, and is thought to be building another at Chashma, near to two new civilian reactors it is building with Chinese help.

"When more plants are producing and reprocessing more fissile material and there is more of it moving around, there is more chanced of it being seized," said Mark Fitzpatrick, a former state department official now a proliferation expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Barack Obama under pressure to slash Pakistan aid | World news | The Guardian

[RoccoR]

Mihais, et al,

I've been working in the ME Region, including IRAQ-AFGH-PAK and (now) YEMEN for a day or two (since 2004). The mission in all four (4) countries is a mess.

This was in waiting for a long time and it was made clear by the administration since 2009.
I have a very personal desire.I wish Obama has Osama's fate.There is a betrayal of the Afghan allies in the making as well as one of the original mission and the thousands of dead servicemen.
The only possibility for the Taliban to become legitimate is their disarming and peaceful integration in the Afghan political landscape.Pigs will fly before that.

There are times when I have an absolute hatred of the scumbags called politicians ,opposed to normal times when I just wish them dead.

(COMMENT)

The entire idea was to fight the terrorist threat. In the case of the "TALIBAN", they have not posed a threat of an international complexion.

The threat is localized to the region. It is a struggle with a US Foreign Policy that opposes the region determining its own destiny.

No insurgency lives in a vacuum. The indigenous population is providing support to the Taliban in both countries.

While there is an argument to be made that the Taliban threatens the success of the US/NATO Mission in the region, there will never be complete success unless the people of those two nations sort-out --- who they want to run their country.

Contrary to poular belief, it is not a choice the US can make for them. We cannot through might might, determine the outcome of this political struggle. It is up to the Afghan and Pakistan people to make the choice.

• So my questions are again:
• What is the purpose of our role?
• What does American have to gain? and
• How much should we invest of blood and treasure?
• And how do we justify our nation taking the decision making process out of the hand of the indigenous population of those lands?
  • What are the consequences of our decision to military intervene in the internal affairs of other nations?

We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.

Albert Einstein

Let's be distinct on what we are about and what our goals and objectives are; how much we intent to spend in lives and dollars, and what determines the mission is over.

If we are going to enforce a Foreign Policy that says: We are American and we determine what is best your country, and the world, then let's say so - with a loud and clear voice.

But if we adhere to a high order, that humanity, cultures and countries have a right to determine their own destiny... then we need to choose a different path.
Most Respectfully
R