Astralis Reply
"...we -had- the opportunity to leave like this in 2004 or 2005. we just had to do what we're doing NOW with the ANA then... but we effectively sat around and screwed off until the insurgents rebuilt in late 2006 and 2007"
No. We had a window of opportunity available IF exploited adroitly. There's a lot involved in getting there from here-starting with resources. Resourcing Afghanistan correctly back then, however distasteful or seemingly impossible given Iraq, was actually the easy part. We've since proven incapable of unlocking a policy pathway to some modicum of sustainable success. That ineptness has been at the fore throughout.
"i'm saying is that i think the prospective costs for fighting it out two more years and building up the ANA will be a better option, for now, than getting out ASAP (which wouldn't be for at least 6-12 months anyway, just to move everything we've got out)."
I've no faith that two more years will make any difference as matters are currently managed. It will be your way in any case and whatever is left behind will provide the foundation for the politicized spin which follows.
"...we might not get the government part right but we can get the military part right..."
Based upon what? Astralis, I'm just not seeing the rationalization of programs and policies to even do that modestly well. Even so, I'm not seeing an ANA that's a sustainable institution for the public good in the face of other institutions unable to use its promised cover to expand their reach.
I'm a naysayer now. I've seen enough of our inabilities coupled with afghan inabilities to reach my conclusions. You haven't and continue to reach for a continuously re-defined brass ring-and shall have your way. We'll have a bevy of "peace with honor" platitudes issued as we depart the premises. Oh, and a few more dead troops to little justifiable purpose IMV.
I deeply rue the loss of each one of those lads and lasses now. They're the instruments of mis-placed priorities and poorly-practiced policies.
"...as long as a military and the military bureaucracy is there, by dint of organization, force, and money they will be a controlling force. the military, if nothing else, can act as a nationalizing institution in face of the internal fiefdoms. we saw some of this in iraq"
There's more that the ANA must face besides competing fiefdoms and an inept corrupt nat'l gov't. There's the small matter of a taliban government and army awaiting in Pakistan. The taliban will eat out of that cadaver.
Oh well. You see it one way. Based upon what preceding evidence, I don't know? I think the evidence of our performance to date strongly suggests otherwise but I don't make policy. You and others do. I've never disputed that Bush and Petraeus reversed a declining situation in Iraq and, indeed, I favored ratcheting upward our ante. In so doing we bought the time necessary for Iraq to have a fighting chance after a stumbling start. Nothing is etched in stone there, though. Still, a fighting chance is all anybody can best hope for anyway.
I don't, however, see parallels here-not without an effort far greater than we're presently committed to make. It's a half-measure, at present and projected forward, leading nowhere. To that end, therefore, a waste of effort, money, and lives IMV.
"as it is, your gamble pretty much acknowledges that afghanistan is going to break down into those fiefdoms, and have the surrounding nations deal with the mess as they see fit. well, perhaps..."
Or the taliban begin their reconquest of Afghanistan incrementally. You also ignore how other regional powers will view matters in the present context and under different circumstances. Clearly, as a general example, Russia has changed. India? They've undergone some considerable change as well.
"...but how does that differ from what we were doing re: afghanistan prior to 9/11/2001?"
It ignores my intent to remain engaged in counter-terror operations on a sustained basis against Al Qaeda. None of that existed before. I believe we've the present operational and tactical acumen to insert forces as necessary in pursuit of discrete objectives and destroy those targets-whether by ground, air or both.
It ignores the manifest message our combat operations in late 2001 sent to the taliban government about our capability to remove them from power. That remains a shining example of money well and efficiently spent. It also serves as a clear reminder of the consequences to any government that permits Al Qaeda an operational foothold sufficient to plan and conduct attacks against our nation.
That military operation, btw, can be again conducted for a fraction of the cost we'll endure departing Afghanistan as presently configured.
Most of all, our departure removes us from the cross-hairs of localized vulnerability and restores our strategic freedom of manuever WRT other nat'l entities in that neighborhood.
"...we -had- the opportunity to leave like this in 2004 or 2005. we just had to do what we're doing NOW with the ANA then... but we effectively sat around and screwed off until the insurgents rebuilt in late 2006 and 2007"
No. We had a window of opportunity available IF exploited adroitly. There's a lot involved in getting there from here-starting with resources. Resourcing Afghanistan correctly back then, however distasteful or seemingly impossible given Iraq, was actually the easy part. We've since proven incapable of unlocking a policy pathway to some modicum of sustainable success. That ineptness has been at the fore throughout.
"i'm saying is that i think the prospective costs for fighting it out two more years and building up the ANA will be a better option, for now, than getting out ASAP (which wouldn't be for at least 6-12 months anyway, just to move everything we've got out)."
I've no faith that two more years will make any difference as matters are currently managed. It will be your way in any case and whatever is left behind will provide the foundation for the politicized spin which follows.
"...we might not get the government part right but we can get the military part right..."
Based upon what? Astralis, I'm just not seeing the rationalization of programs and policies to even do that modestly well. Even so, I'm not seeing an ANA that's a sustainable institution for the public good in the face of other institutions unable to use its promised cover to expand their reach.
I'm a naysayer now. I've seen enough of our inabilities coupled with afghan inabilities to reach my conclusions. You haven't and continue to reach for a continuously re-defined brass ring-and shall have your way. We'll have a bevy of "peace with honor" platitudes issued as we depart the premises. Oh, and a few more dead troops to little justifiable purpose IMV.
I deeply rue the loss of each one of those lads and lasses now. They're the instruments of mis-placed priorities and poorly-practiced policies.
"...as long as a military and the military bureaucracy is there, by dint of organization, force, and money they will be a controlling force. the military, if nothing else, can act as a nationalizing institution in face of the internal fiefdoms. we saw some of this in iraq"
There's more that the ANA must face besides competing fiefdoms and an inept corrupt nat'l gov't. There's the small matter of a taliban government and army awaiting in Pakistan. The taliban will eat out of that cadaver.
Oh well. You see it one way. Based upon what preceding evidence, I don't know? I think the evidence of our performance to date strongly suggests otherwise but I don't make policy. You and others do. I've never disputed that Bush and Petraeus reversed a declining situation in Iraq and, indeed, I favored ratcheting upward our ante. In so doing we bought the time necessary for Iraq to have a fighting chance after a stumbling start. Nothing is etched in stone there, though. Still, a fighting chance is all anybody can best hope for anyway.
I don't, however, see parallels here-not without an effort far greater than we're presently committed to make. It's a half-measure, at present and projected forward, leading nowhere. To that end, therefore, a waste of effort, money, and lives IMV.
"as it is, your gamble pretty much acknowledges that afghanistan is going to break down into those fiefdoms, and have the surrounding nations deal with the mess as they see fit. well, perhaps..."
Or the taliban begin their reconquest of Afghanistan incrementally. You also ignore how other regional powers will view matters in the present context and under different circumstances. Clearly, as a general example, Russia has changed. India? They've undergone some considerable change as well.
"...but how does that differ from what we were doing re: afghanistan prior to 9/11/2001?"
It ignores my intent to remain engaged in counter-terror operations on a sustained basis against Al Qaeda. None of that existed before. I believe we've the present operational and tactical acumen to insert forces as necessary in pursuit of discrete objectives and destroy those targets-whether by ground, air or both.
It ignores the manifest message our combat operations in late 2001 sent to the taliban government about our capability to remove them from power. That remains a shining example of money well and efficiently spent. It also serves as a clear reminder of the consequences to any government that permits Al Qaeda an operational foothold sufficient to plan and conduct attacks against our nation.
That military operation, btw, can be again conducted for a fraction of the cost we'll endure departing Afghanistan as presently configured.
Most of all, our departure removes us from the cross-hairs of localized vulnerability and restores our strategic freedom of manuever WRT other nat'l entities in that neighborhood.
Comment