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How the CIA Got It Wrong on Iran's Nukes

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  • How the CIA Got It Wrong on Iran's Nukes

    How the CIA Got It Wrong on Iran's Nukes


    In a stunning departure from a decade of assessments, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran declared: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program," including "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" and covert uranium enrichment. Even more astonishingly, it attributed this change to "increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work." In other words, the threat of sanctions had ended that country's surreptitious effort to obtain nuclear weapons.

    This assessment suggested that further action against Iran was unnecessary. Unfortunately, as the Obama administration has now acknowledged, the NIE's conclusion was dead wrong, costing us precious time in dealing with a serious threat.

    The question remains, what caused such a disastrous mistake?

    .In 2007, there was still much the same mountain of evidence that led U.S. intelligence to conclude in the 2006 NIE with equally "high confidence" that Iran was secretly engaged in a nuclear weapons program. This evidence included verified reports that Iran had experimented with Polonium 210, a key ingredient in the trigger of early-generation nuclear bombs. And documents recovered from a stolen Iranian laptop described its efforts to fit a warhead in the nose cone of its Shahab 3 missile that would detonate at an altitude of 600 meters, which is too high for anything but a nuclear warhead to be effective.

    The CIA had learned that Iran had most likely acquired a digital copy of a Chinese nuclear warhead design from the A.Q. Khan network. It also had monitored Iran's crash program at Natanz to build a nuclear enrichment plant that could house up to 50,000 centrifuges.

    Taken individually, these secret activities might have a nonnuclear explanation. For example, Iran claimed the purpose of its Polonium 210 experiments was merely to find a power source for an Iranian spacecraft (though Iran had no known space program at the time). Taken together, however, these efforts added up an inescapable conclusion: Iran was going nuclear.

    What helped change this conclusion, in addition to the reorganization of U.S. intelligence following the report of the 9/11 Commission, was the receipt of new secret intelligence from Iran. This intelligence included convincing evidence that the facilities of the weapons-design program (code named "Project 111") revealed on the stolen laptop had been closed down in 2003. Satellite photographs showed that buildings involved in the program had been bulldozed, communications intercepts indicated that scientists were no longer at the location, and a high-level defector from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ali-Reza Asgari, reported that Project 111 had stopped functioning.

    Since the Iranians knew that we knew about Project 111 in 2004—the CIA had released technical drawings from it to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—it was not surprising that the Revolutionary Guard, which runs Iran's nuclear activities, shut it down. The issue was how to interpret the closure. Had the weapons-design work been quietly moved to avoid further scrutiny? Had it been closed because the warhead design had been solved with the acquisition of the digital blueprints of the Chinese nuclear weapon? Or had Iran abandoned its quest for a nuclear weapon?

    Deciphering a government's intentions is no easy task. It is especially difficult in a closed and terrorized society in which the U.S. has no diplomatic relations and little direct access. So it came down to espionage to illuminate the intentions behind the shut-down of Project 111.

    Over the years, the CIA had recruited a network of Iranian agents who had, or claimed to have, access to the thinking of Iran's governing elite. These agents were in a position to cast light on Iranian nuclear intentions, and presumably they provided reports that supported the thesis that Tehran decided to end its nuclear weapons program. In any event, the authors of the 2007 NIE cited secret evidence to support the conclusion in its publicly released summary document that "Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been [previously] judging."

    As we now know, the Revolutionary Guard was secretly completing the construction of new facilities in 2007. For example, at Fordo, 20 miles north of the holy city of Qom, it was reinforcing tunnels leading inside a mountain cavern designed to house a new uranium enrichment plant. This underground facility was only disclosed by Iran to the IAEA in late 2009. Clearly, Tehran was not abandoning its nuclear-weapons program.

    What may have misled the CIA was a flaw in its espionage system. James Risen, the New York Times's national security reporter, explains in his book "State of War" that since the CIA had no embassy base in Iran, it communicated with its agents through state-of-the-art satellite transmissions, which it assumed were invisible to the Iranian security services.

    Then, in 2004, a CIA communications officer accidently included data in a satellite transmission to an agent that could be used to identify "virtually every spy the CIA had in Iran." This disastrous error was compounded, according to Mr. Risen, because the recipient of the transmission turned out to be a double-agent controlled by the Iranian security service.

    So the Iranians knew the identity of all the agents that the CIA had arduously maneuvered into positions of access, and the technical methods by which the CIA communicated with them. The agents (or their replacements) in Iran would have little choice but to allow the Iranian Security service to control the information they provided the CIA. If so, the CIA may have been vulnerable to receiving misleading secret intelligence that Tehran had abandoned it nuclear ambitions in 2004

    One Iranian agent who supplied information to the CIA is Shahram Amiri, who defected to the U.S. last year and re-defected back to Iran this month. He reportedly provided details about the termination of Project 111 that presumably dovetailed with other information we got from the CIA's compromised network. Iran now claims Mr. Amiri was a double agent all along.

    Whether Iran controlled his secret reports to the CIA will be hotly debated for years to come. But willful blindness on our part should not be ignored. There were high-level people in the newly reorganized U.S. intelligence community who wanted to believe Iran was ending its quest for the bomb, and messages to the CIA from agents inside the country that diplomatic pressure was accomplishing this task fell on receptive ears.

    Whether the erroneous conclusions in the 2007 NIE proceeded from Iranian deception or American self-deception, they undercut the case for taking more drastic action against Tehran. To the degree that other countries believed Iran had ended its nuclear program, they had little incentive to join us in imposing further sanctions.

    To be sure, Iran could not conceal forever the evidence of its massive increase in uranium enrichment capabilities at Natanz, its missile testing, and its preparation of other underground facilities. In the interim, however, Iran managed to upgrade a large portion of its centrifuges and stockpile enough low-enriched uranium gas to manufacture, if it chose to further process it, the fuel for a nuclear bomb.

    The moral of this sad spy story is that espionage is by its very nature a two-way game. Spies that are viewed as "assets" in a closed country can turn out to be very risky liabilities.

    Mr. Epstein, an investigative reporter, is currently completing a book on the 9/11 Commission.
    In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.

    Leibniz

  • #2
    Funny on this very board, those of us using open source intel have stated the exact same thing.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
      Funny on this very board, those of us using open source intel have stated the exact same thing.
      Yeah, funny that eh.... ;)
      In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.

      Leibniz

      Comment


      • #4
        The 2007 NIE report ( which surprised me personally to a jaw droop level) might have been intentional plan to put the IRI regime at ease going by its nuclear R&D and then catch them with their hands in cookie jar with plenty of undeniable evidence. Does it make any sense?

        Just a personal opinion though. Who knows? sound like a perfect script for a spy movie which I indulge myself watching quite often.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
          Funny on this very board, those of us using open source intel have stated the exact same thing.
          But it is all about verification, verification, and verification. CIA got burned by the WMD issue in Iraq and had no desire to see a repeat of it.

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
            But it is all about verification, verification, and verification. CIA got burned by the WMD issue in Iraq and had no desire to see a repeat of it.
            Well, they got burned by this one, didn't they? Especially when Qom was revealed.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
              But it is all about verification, verification, and verification. CIA got burned by the WMD issue in Iraq and had no desire to see a repeat of it.
              I don't know why some people around the world and specifically Americans insisted on verification for Saddam's WMD evidence. In 1984, 1986 and 1987 every one around the world had witnessed Saddam using WMD against Iranians and his own Kurdish population multiple times. WMD doesn't have to be some barrels full of chemical or any brewing apparatus, Saddam thugs in the regime had the knowledge between their ears capable of assembling weapons in very short period of time.

              Glad to see they are gone.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                Well, they got burned by this one, didn't they? Especially when Qom was revealed.
                Yes they did but not as disastrous as the WMD issue was in the Iraq War and the US was now paying billions of dollars through its nose and everybody was looking for a scapegoat.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Aryajet View Post
                  I don't know why some people around the world and specifically Americans insisted on verification for Saddam's WMD evidence. In 1984, 1986 and 1987 every one around the world had witnessed Saddam using WMD against Iranians and his own Kurdish population multiple times. WMD doesn't have to be some barrels full of chemical or any brewing apparatus, Saddam thugs in the regime had the knowledge between their ears capable of assembling weapons in very short period of time.

                  Glad to see they are gone.
                  Well considering that US had to fork over $500 billion to pay for the war in Iraq and the war had degraded US military readiness and took up many valuable resources, and the war was done on the basis of Iraq having WMDs in the first place in violation of UN rules, yeah I am pretty sure some people are gungho on verification.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
                    Yes they did but not as disastrous as the WMD issue was in the Iraq War and the US was now paying billions of dollars through its nose and everybody was looking for a scapegoat.
                    Are you kidding me, Hitesh? A dormant nuclear weapons program got neutralized forever versus an active program aided by AQ Khan himself. We went to war on a very legitimate reason to stop Saddam's WMD program. How is Iran any different?
                    Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 31 Jul 10,, 13:37.

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                    • #11
                      The difference is if we act on shoddy intelligence.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by snapper View Post
                        The difference is if we act on shoddy intelligence.
                        The intel was anything but. We got all we needed from the Lybians when they opened their nuclear program to the West. We know AQ Khan sold the Libyans, the Iranians, and the North Koreans a Chinese nuclear warhead blueprint. How did we know? Because the Libyans gave us that blueprint.

                        2ndly, we also know that the Iranians got pre-test Pakistani nuclear warhead blueprints. This was verified by the Pakistanis themselves and this is not AQ Khan but another general.

                        The Iranians openly violated the NPT. That is without a doubt.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                          Are you kidding me, Hitesh? A dormant nuclear weapons program got neutralized forever versus an active program aided by AQ Khan himself. We went to war on a very legitimate reason to stop Saddam's WMD program. How is Iran any different?
                          US went to war with Iraq on the premise that CIA told US that Iraq was actively pursuing a WMD program. Note the key word "actively" and US later found out that it was not the case.

                          CIA got burned by this one and more so when US went to war on CIA's word. Ever since, CIA has extremely been reluctant to give its word when a war could commence.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Blademaster View Post
                            US went to war with Iraq on the premise that CIA told US that Iraq was actively pursuing a WMD program. Note the key word "actively" and US later found out that it was not the case.

                            CIA got burned by this one and more so when US went to war on CIA's word. Ever since, CIA has extremely been reluctant to give its word when a war could commence.

                            It was a mistaken premise but even Saddam's top commanders were convinced that he had WMD...he played his cards that close to his chest. So in that respect it's not all that surprising that CIA's HUMINT sources inside Iraq were also convinced. But you are absolutely correct that CIA got burned, bad. While inexcusable it was also, probably, inevitable given the prevailing beliefs of the high command, which Saddam did his best to propagate.
                            Last edited by Red Seven; 07 Aug 10,, 21:08.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Red Seven View Post
                              It was a mistaken premise but even Saddam's top commanders were convinced that he had WMD...he played his cards that close to his chest. So in that respect it's not all that surprising that CIA's HUMINT sources inside Iraq were also convinced. But you are absolutely correct that CIA got burned, bad. While inexcusable it was also, probably, inevitable given the prevailing beliefs of the high command, which Saddam did his best to propagate.
                              As a consequence, the CIA and US leaders and decision and policy makers have been second guessing the current state of affairs in Iran and also its leaders and circumstances, thus seriously impeding any progress towards a consensus necessary to commence an action. Note several military leaders such as Ret. Admiral Fallon, Admiral Mullen, SecDef Gates, and other hawkish types are not advocating an attack on Iran nor want to attack Iran right now. Since some of the hawkish ones are not calling for attacks and even some of them are against the attacks, how can you blame Obama for not wanting to attack Iran when there is no consensus and the leadership is sharply divided? (I am just stating as a rhetorical, not meant to be personal to you). If this was something simple as a massive air raid, Bush would have done it long time ago even given the flimsy evidence. Notice his speech referring to Iran as part of the "axis of evil" several times and his vow to keep WMDs out of terrorists and mullahs. There is something that the US leaders are not telling us that explains their reticence about attacking Iran. I am mystified as to what.

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