How necessary were BB's in WWII?

[Dreadnought]

Why stand up to them if we can bomb them again and again? They will need to escape the bombings first before we have to worry about standing up to them. Even if they did somehow escape air attack, could they have chased down our fleet carriers?

*Gun, what would happen if the CV was caught by itself? It happened before and not just to us but the Brits as well if not mistaken.;)

Our Essex class of heavy CV (Essex herself CV9) didnt fit out until late 1942 and didnt appear in the Pacific theatre until late May 1943. So we had very few CV's to work with in the Pacifice until the Essex class began to appear.

As far as chasing them down speed was somewhat comparible, sea keeping in bad weather would have counted greatly and a BIG problem had she fell into gunnery range of even one of those enemy BB's.

[Dreadnought]

They were helpful to have, just like any other tools in the bag. But I don't think they were necessary.

*IMO,as necessary as any other ship. When your enemy has both (as in Japans case) then you fight with both or build one idea better.

Let's flip the question around. What if we had only battleships and no carriers?

*Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor thats exactly what the USN battle line consisted of. A line of BB's with very little in the way of CV's on the scale that Japan had. The USN had 8 CV's at the time including her first USS Langley CV1, all were a mixture of displacements and conditions at the time of Pearls attack and the Pacific War.

Germany only created one CV the Graf Zepplin and that disappeared into Russian hands after Germany surrendered.

[gunnut]

*Gun, what would happen if the CV was caught by itself? It happened before and not just to us but the Brits as well if not mistaken.;)

What happens if a battleship was caught by herself against an enemy task force? Or worse, a sub?

Our Essex class of heavy CV (Essex herself CV9) didnt fit out until late 1942 and didnt appear in the Pacific theatre until late May 1943. So we had very few CV's to work with in the Pacifice until the Essex class began to appear.

As far as chasing them down speed was somewhat comparible, sea keeping in bad weather would have counted greatly and a BIG problem had she fell into gunnery range of even one of those enemy BB's.

The problem with battleship was their weapons only had a range of roughly 20 miles. They could fire at night, but that would be very inaccurate. Japanese and Germans didn't have advanced radar sighting equipment. They still relied on optics to sight the guns. These didn't work too well in the dark.

During daylight, the carriers would have launched the planes. Battleships would have to take evasive actions, which would have slowed them down. Slowing meant not catching up to the carriers to use their big guns. Meanwhile, carrier planes had a range of hundreds of miles. They could catch up to any ship in the ocean. Or disengage from any ship at any time they wanted.

Battleships were helpful to have, but not necessary. Carriers were critical. What would have happened if we only had battleships but no carriers?

[gunnut]

*IMO,as necessary as any other ship. When your enemy has both (as in Japans case) then you fight with both or build one idea better.

I disagree. We could have built only carriers and still won the war, with similar results (as in not significantly more difficult in achieving victory).

*Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor thats exactly what the USN battle line consisted of. A line of BB's with very little in the way of CV's on the scale that Japan had. The USN had 8 CV's at the time including her first USS Langley CV1, all were a mixture of displacements and conditions at the time of Pearls attack and the Pacific War.

Right, and after that the Essex class came out in large numbers. We didn't built battleships in large numbers. Not only did we build the Essex in large numbers, we built escort carriers in HUGE numbers. A few escort carriers combined can match the firepower of a battleship, exceed the utility, and vastly outrange the battleship's guns.

What would have happened if we concentrated on building battleships instead of fleet carriers, and light cruisers instead of escort carriers? I believe our victory would be significantly more difficult to achieve.

[Dreadnought]

I disagree. We could have built only carriers and still won the war, with similar results (as in not significantly more difficult in achieving victory).

*At a much greater cost in both expense and the possibilty of lives. Weather affected Carrier ops greatly in WWII since the USN had never fought a battle over such a wide tract of ocean and you still had to counter Germany's influence in the Atlantic as well with their surface raiders.

Right, and after that the Essex class came out in large numbers. We didn't built battleships in large numbers. Not only did we build the Essex in large numbers, we built escort carriers in HUGE numbers. A few escort carriers combined can match the firepower of a battleship, exceed the utility, and vastly outrange the battleship's guns.

*Only problem is it can do little of either against a BB or Heavy Cruiser in high seas, rain or fog and almost nothing if a BB or Cruiser appeared from behind a rain squaw or a fog except attempt to run as happened in many encounters in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Airpower no doubt showed its strength and it weaknesses during the Pacific and Atlantic battles. Mother nature also proved that even though radar was in its infancy and gaining ground, weather and land masses could wreak havoc with it on a whim.


What would have happened if we concentrated on building battleships instead of fleet carriers, and light cruisers instead of escort carriers? I believe our victory would be significantly more difficult to achieve.

*Airpower did infact change the dynamics of sea battles that was a given. All forms had their strengths and weaknesses.

Examples:

Halsey himself was a aviator however he choose the BB's (SD) (NJ) & (MO) as his flag after the Doolittle Raid and for the majority of WWII.

Tovey chose a BB (KGV) as well against the Germans in sea battle against Bismark.

Vice-Admiral Günther Lütjens chose the Bismark as his flag for Commerce Raiding exercises against the RN in the Atlantic.

The IJN Admirals majority chose Cruisers and later Yamamoto chose both Nagato pre Pearl Harbor raid and Yamoto and Musashi as his flag later in WWII.

Why? IMO, the chances of taking battle damage and survival from a rival with comparable weapons. More armor, more protection.

[gunnut]

*At a much greater cost in both expense and the possibilty of lives. Weather affected Carrier ops greatly in WWII since the USN had never fought a battle over such a wide tract of ocean and you still had to counter Germany's influence in the Atlantic as well with their surface raiders.

How do you figure? Weather affected carriers as well as battleships. Carriers couldn't launch planes and battleships' limited range was limited further.

*Only problem is it can do little of either against a BB or Heavy Cruiser in high seas, rain or fog and almost nothing if a BB or Cruiser appeared from behind a rain squaw or a fog except attempt to run as happened in many encounters in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Airpower no doubt showed its strength and it weaknesses during the Pacific and Atlantic battles. Mother nature also proved that even though radar was in its infancy and gaining ground, weather and land masses could wreak havoc with it on a whim.

Carriers would have screens. They didn't operate by themselves. Besides, if it were this simple to just sneak up on a carrier task force, the Japanese would have done it already. They didn't do it not because they were afraid of US battleships (in fact they relished the thought of going head to head with US battleships), they didn't do it because they couldn't sneak up on a task force.

*Airpower did infact change the dynamics of sea battles that was a given. All forms had their strengths and weaknesses.

Examples:

Halsey himself was a aviator however he choose the BB's (SD) (NJ) & (MO) as his flag after the Doolittle Raid and for the majority of WWII.

Tovey chose a BB (KGV) as well against the Germans in sea battle against Bismark.

Vice-Admiral Günther Lütjens chose the Bismark as his flag for Commerce Raiding exercises against the RN in the Atlantic.

The IJN Admirals majority chose Cruisers and later Yamamoto chose both Nagato pre Pearl Harbor raid and Yamoto and Musashi as his flag later in WWII.

Why? IMO, the chances of taking battle damage and survival from a rival with comparable weapons. More armor, more protection.

So the strength of a battleship was thick armor (naturally) to protect the flag? That's kinda expensive, don't you think? I figure they picked battleships for their flag because of prestige rather than protection. That and maybe a battleship was bigger and could accommodate the staff better.

By the way Dread, your last post was #750,000 of this board. :)

[Dreadnought]

How do you figure? Weather affected carriers as well as battleships. Carriers couldn't launch planes and battleships' limited range was limited further.

*Correct,Carriers couldnt launch planes during heavy seas and storms, the only protection they had were the screen and her 5" galleries and those couldnt fire across the deck like the Japanese carriers also couldnt and had to turn to bring those galleries to bare. But, the BB could fire on either beam with the main battery plus the 5 inch batteries and the AA mounts. Most times the BB's also had the DD screen just like the carriers did but in some rare cases traveled without them.

Anything with sight range from 10-12 miles even during storms gave the BB a better chance then any US carrier. The BB's (post Pearl) could also use indirect fire to scare anyone away that appeared on radar. The carriers didnt have that tool to use. In as much as most BB's didnt have the CAP the Cv's enjoyed. The DD's in many cases did the work for the carriers as they were primarily focused on air ops. The DD's also did the same work for the BB's in turn when in line or the 5-5-v formations.

[Dreadnought]

Carriers would have screens. They didn't operate by themselves. Besides, if it were this simple to just sneak up on a carrier task force, the Japanese would have done it already. They didn't do it not because they were afraid of US battleships (in fact they relished the thought of going head to head with US battleships), they didn't do it because they couldn't sneak up on a task force.

*Gun, One must remember that for a good part of war prior to Midway the Japanese strongly relied upon the Mark one eyeball and all of its mistakes and phantasms. None of the Japanese ships at Midway had radar and all communicated via one frequency to the CAP and their airwings making it diffacult to assign targets.

The test beds for the Japanese radars were the BB's Ise and Hyuga. These were still experimental at this point in time while the USN was already an approximate 2 years ahead of them.

I want to check a reference first to see if they infact had them and what they were.

One reference I found real quick was that BB Ise recieved Type 21 radar operationally in late August 1943. This would have been Surface and Aerial search radar. About the same time their AA gunfire control radars appeared.

One note on Hyuga:

20-28 May 1942:
A Type 22 surface search radar is installed. HYUGA tests the set in detecting the ISE in the Inland Sea, but it is deemed unsatisfactory by Captain Matsuda and is removed.

I have my doubts, so I will check an official source on this to see when she did actually get a functioning set.

[blidgepump]

Slugging it out....

I've been following this thread for several days between Dread & GG & Gun.

The wealth of information that each has read, studied, or lived along with the passion brought forth reminds me of Battlewagons slugging it out. :))

[Dreadnought]

So the strength of a battleship was thick armor (naturally) to protect the flag? That's kinda expensive, don't you think? I figure they picked battleships for their flag because of prestige rather than protection. That and maybe a battleship was bigger and could accommodate the staff better.


*Well Gun, in my opinion these men were old school, the BB was pretty much still considered by many to be arbitrator at sea (many naval historians and experts of those days relied upon the notion that if you didnt have battleship in your navy, your navy really didnt rank) if they went by Naval teachings including Japanese believes of one final show down between battlelines with giant guns heavy armor and speed. I would guess harkening back to the age of sail for the Americans, Im not too familiar with Japanese Naval history prior to WWI though. The BB's did offer every comfort the CV's did but had thicker armor, etc. and perhaps maybe even better sea handling qualities in other words less rock and roll in negledgable sea at speed due to beam etc.. Only one of the South Dakotas was modified for Flagship purposes that I read of. Two 5"/38 mounts were removed from her (South Dakota) to make Flag space so she only carried 8 mounts total. The Iowas im not so sure about how many were built with that space already in mind but at some point they all had Admirals aboard through out different conflicts so Im guessing they were all built with that or modified into that at points.

*As far as expensive goes Gun remember your President and other Heads of State of other Countries, Royalty etc traveled aboard the BB's in those days. Some traveled aboard the Cruisers as well. No Air Force One yet.:)

By the way Dread, your last post was #750,000 of this board.

Yeah, we have become quite popular havent we. If we have that many posts can you imagine how many visitors that dont post and just browse?:)

[bonehead]

I still think the fact that the peace treaty was signed on the Missouri, rather than a carrier, which would have a lot more room for spectators and participants, showed just how important battleships were to the people in that time.

[Dreadnought]

The proof that they were not needed, or more precisely that no more were needed was the US canceling the Montana class and the last 2 Iowas. Along with delaying the building of the Mo and Whisky for more important priorities. Essex Carriers

*An interesting passage about King and his decisions regarding cancellation of the Montana's.


Investing in the Revolution

If the phrase “show me your defense budget and I’ll show you your defense priorities” carries any weight, the Navy dramatically changed its priorities promptly following the transformational battles in the spring of 1942. Even after Pearl Harbor, the General Board had resisted moving toward a carrier-centered fleet. The board wanted to increase the number of carriers, but it opposed converting light cruiser hulls into small carriers, and proposed a building program that would lay down only nine additional carriers through 1944.49

In May, however, King, now Chief of Naval Operations, unilaterally modified the General Board’s recommendations, indefinitely deferring five battleships and replacing them with five carriers and ten cruisers.50 King was supported in Congress by a powerful ally, Representative Carl Vinson, who in June submitted a bill authorizing construction of 1.9 million tons of carriers, cruisers and destroyers—but no additional battleships. While to some degree the bill reflected the shortage of battleship armor plate, to an even greater degree it acknowledged that the battleship had been displaced by the carrier as the centerpiece of the fleet. In fact, King later slipped the priority for battleship production to sixth.51 The Navy’s wartime construction program proved a watershed in the ascendancy of the carrier force.



Reflections on a Revolution

In its role as the fleet’s new main fighting ship, the carrier also showed its weaknesses. Carrier aircraft became the chief naval weapon during daylight hours, but when the sun set, air power lost its grip on control of the sea, and surface combatant engagements proved the norm. In a number of maritime engagements during World War II, the battleship dominated.52 Moreover, battleships were hardly sitting ducks against carrier-based aircraft, particularly when operating as part of a carrier task force. Battleships in World War II were equipped with air defenses, perhaps some 100 times greater than those available during the attack on Pearl Harbor. For example, in the Battle of Santa Cruz in November 1942, one of the new US battleships shot down 32 Japanese planes in less than 32 minutes, while taking only one bomb hit that did little damage.53

Still, there could be no doubt as to the carrier’s new status in the fleet. This change reflected not only in budgets and naval operations, but also in the organization of the fleet. The Navy’s carrier task forces could launch “round-the-clock” offensive air operations and sustain themselves for long periods from a mobile fleet train. Battleships filled a new role, supporting carrier task force operations. The age of the carrier battle group had arrived. In the span of a few years, war at sea had been transformed.

The Navy’s transformation profile reflected all the key building blocks historically associated with military revolutions. In addition, and perhaps most important, the key lesson of the revolution at sea may be recognizing the critical requirement of achieving both mental and physical change before a break point can be crossed, and transformations mature into revolutionary new ways of war. At some point, all the force’s key dynamics—doctrine, technology, human and capital resources, and organizational design—must evolve sufficiently to allow the aspirations of vision to be realized in operational practices.



Keep in mind though the hulls for both additional Iowas (Kentucky and Illinois) were already being constructed and were not cosigned to scrap until Mid August 1945 for Illinois. The official closing of WWII happened August 14th 1945 and Kentucky's construction wasnt suspended in Norfolks Yard until Feb 17th 1947. The Montana's were canceled in July 1943, however their designs were pretty much finalized but their keels were never laid. Philly would have built a few of those as well.;)

*In retrospect to the above notations another notation:

Admiral Stark sucessfully pleaded with Roosevelt for two more Iowas (these would be Illinois and Kentucky), but Congress did not act on the administrations request until France fell to Germany.

The fear that England would go next rushed through the "Two Ocean Navy" Bill. This authorized the construction of the Montana class of battleships.

None of the Montana's were built as they were suspended after the Coral Sea action. They were cancelled July 21 1943. As for the Illinois and Kentucky, about 15% of the materials required for building were already gathered for them, When in April 1943, the Bureau of Ships proposed diverting their machinery to Midway class carriers. Admiral Ernest J. King (CNO) at the time shot back "I cannot acquiesce in a complete cessation of BB construction: these ships with their combination of gun power and ability to withstand damage are highly valuable and more then justify expenditure of the time and materials required for their construction. King actually wanted their building accelerated, Not postponed.;)

Source:

BuShips (Bureau of Ships) to VCNO (Vice Chief Naval Operations), April 1943, CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) Central file.
COMINCH (Commander in Chief) to VCNO, 16 April 1943, CNO Central file. NHC.

[Dreadnought]

Found when Hyuga recieved her functioning radars. It was after her conversion to a hybrid carrier.

7 June 1944:
At Kure. Drydocked. Two improved Type 22 surface search radars are fitted. A pair of Type 13 air-search radars and E27 radar detectors are probably also installed at this time.

[Dreadnought]

Kirishima is the only ship that was hurt bad by BB fire. Causing her skipper the scuttle her. But not before she hurt the SD.

*This I cannot agree with.

A recent study of the wreckage footage along with Officers testimony into the sinking revealed that Kirishima was believed to have been hit 20 times by large caliber gunfire (16" in this case) and 16 times by 5"/38 gunfire. Even Lee in his report to Nimitz sighted atleast 8 major caliber hits within a 7 minute time frame. There were many "shorts" reported but on closer analysis of the wreck they can now say Kirishima was also struck below the waterline with penetration atleast 7 times. The highest major caliber hit being the Compass platform and the lowest being her steering gear. The report suggests that Kirishima's water tight integrity ruptured at frame 148 and she sank due to progressive flooding. The report sights three Officers accounts of battle and the Chief Damage Control Officer as well.

The report:

Kirishima Damage Analysis by Robert Lundgren in contrast with Robert Ballard's film footage and inspection of the wreck dated 5 March 2010.

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/bat...e_Analysis.pdf

And Krishima wasnt the only ship Washington beat down that evening.

Third Battle Of Savo Island

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)
2 large cruisers (WASH 5".)
1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)

(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:

1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only.)
1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)
5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)
There was no melee. This ship was undamaged

[dundonrl]

For all the hype, the Iowas expended more 5/38 than 16/50 during the few landings that they took part in.

during the 1968/69 action the USS New Jersey was in off the coast of Vietnam, she expended 5,866 16-inch and 14,891 five-inch.. 11,000,000+ lbs of 16" and 700,000 lbs of 5" guess which was more effective..

"The Communist troops certainly don't like to come out when NEW JERSEY is firing", said Captain Finch. "One of our biggest problems flying into a Red infested area is the antiaircraft fire we take. But after NEW JERSEY got on station over here and started shooting, she held ground fire to a minimum. As long as you are in the area and firing, the Communists hole up with their flak machines and anti-aircraft weapons. This gives us more freedom in picking out better targets."

Captain Finch went on, "NEW JERSEY is best at rooting out and destroying enemy bunkers. The eight-inch, 155mm and 105mm land-based artillery make a small impression on the land, compared to what the 16-inch does; it really clears out the area."


In August of 1967, the decision was made to commission NEW JERSEY for the third time, this time to serve for the duration of hostilities in Southeast Asia. The program change decision which approved the activation of the battleship was "for employment in the Pacific Fleet to augment the naval gunfire support force in Southeast Asia". The real motivation behind the activation was that "a major calibre gunfire support ship is necessary if we are to continue, after October 1968, the present deployment level of two such ships (major calibre gunfire support) in Southeast Asia". Much has been said as to why the Secretary of Defense chose the battleship over another eight-inch cruiser. Some contend it was because the 16-inch guns have a greater range and pack a more powerful punch. This was not the rationale of the Secretary of Defense. His primary contention was that the battleship was significantly harder, i.e., less vulnerable than the eight-inch cruiser. Additionally, the Secretary's decision stated "analysis shows that the battleship with 16-inch guns provides greater effectiveness for equal cost than the cruiser with eight-inch guns in this limited mission (naval gunfire support)".

The problem with battleship was their weapons only had a range of roughly 20 miles. They could fire at night, but that would be very inaccurate.
Battleships were helpful to have, but not necessary.

How do you figure? Weather affected carriers as well as battleships. Carriers couldn't launch planes and battleships' limited range was limited further.

Radar range estimation provided a significant accuracy advantage over earlier ships with optical rangefinders. Off Truk Atoll on 16 February 1944 Iowa engaged the Japanese destroyer Nowaki at a range of 35,700 yards (32.6 km). While she did not hit the destroyer she did straddle her, setting a record for the longest ranged straddle in history.

this she could do at night or in the rain, as long as the radar was working..

Within a few hours of clearing the harbor, the ship encountered gale force winds with gusts up to 65 knots. Although some minor damage to exterior fittings resulted, the ship's combat readiness was in no way affected.

I still think the fact that the peace treaty was signed on the Missouri, rather than a carrier, which would have a lot more room for spectators and participants, showed just how important battleships were to the people in that time.

the USS Missouri was chosen by the President, because he was from Missouri, and there were no heavy carriers in Tokyo Bay during the surrender ceremonies because they would have been toast if the Japanese had decided to continue hostilities.



so.. as you can see from what I've posted as replies to different posts #1, yes she fired more 5" rounds than 16" rounds during Vietnam, but the 16" rounds were MUCH more useful..

while an aircraft carrier/aircraft are incapicated by bad weather/fog, a BB firing main guns definitely isn't.