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Meeting the challenge - When time runs out

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  • Meeting the challenge - When time runs out

    Found the following on another site that I read from time to time.

    I have never heard of the Bipartisan Policy Centre and am not sure of the credibilty weight the authors carry within the U.S.

    Never the less, I have waded through most of the article and found it interesting and informative.

    If any choose to read the whole 60 pages, I would be interested to see your response.

    A summary of the article below and the link to the full PDF is;http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/de...l%20062210.pdf

    Meeting the Challenge – When Time Runs Out


    Bipartisan Policy Center: Decisiveness is now essential.

    Executive Summary of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Updated Report on Iran

    07:22 GMT, June 24, 2010 The most immediate national security threat to the United States is Iran’s rapid progress toward achieving nuclear weapons capability – and time is running out. A nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran must be prevented, as it cannot be contained. Indeed, it would spark a dramatically destabilizing proliferation cascade in the Middle East – already a combustible region – and lead to a critical conflict.

    In this, our [the Bipartisan Policy Center's – Ed.] third report on this most serious challenge, we elucidate the outcomes we are likely to face if we do not now act decisively to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions.[1] We recognize the difficulties we face in addressing this threat. Any solution requires imagination, resolve and risks. But compared with what will happen when time runs out, the choice cannot be clearer. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) data indicate that by July 2010 Iran is on track to stockpile sufficient low-enriched uranium (LEU) to develop, with further enrichment, a small-yield nuclear device. That would make it possible for Iran to turn this LEU into fissile material for a weapon in less than three months.

    Our best chance for successfully meeting the Iranian nuclear challenge is a robust and comprehensive triple-track strategy, involving the simultaneous pursuit of: diplomacy; sanctions; and visible, credible preparations for a military option. This strategy, which we have advocated in our earlier reports, is consistent with President Barack Obama’s pledge last year at Camp Lejeune “to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.”[2]

    Decisiveness is now essential, yet to date the White House has not matched its determined rhetoric with an assertive policy that demonstrates its commitment to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions. We supported the Obama Administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran last year and its current pursuit of international sanctions, but after eighteen months neither has proven successful in slowing, let alone stopping, Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, the decision to downplay potential military options has weakened our leverage and undermined the possibility of a peaceful resolution.

    We recognize the difficulties inherent in pursuing a comprehensive strategy that includes military preparations. Our support for this strategy is informed by an evaluation of possible outcomes in the absence of a more forceful and effective U.S. effort. With time rapidly dwindling before Tehran achieves nuclear weapons capability, two outcomes become likely. The most probable outcome, regardless of U.S. objections, is an Israeli military strike against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities. Israeli military action would trigger retaliatory strikes by Iran and its proxies – Hezbollah from Lebanon and Hamas from Gaza – and terrorist attacks.

    If Israel strikes Iran, the U.S. will be put in a very difficult position. If the U.S. stood neutral in such a conflict this would only embolden Tehran, antagonize our regional allies, and lead to greater conflicts down the road. On the other extreme, the U.S. could be dragged into a conflict at a time not of its choosing. We expect the U.S. to stand by our Israeli and Arab allies threatened by Tehran and remain focused on the overarching strategic objective to prevent a nuclear Iran – thus assuring our continued commitment to the security and stability of the region.

    The second likely outcome is that Iran, in the absence of effective international opposition, will gain all the elements needed for a nuclear weapon – fissile material, detonators and delivery vehicles. Even without assembling or testing such a device, the Islamic Republic would become a de facto nuclear power, which would threaten U.S. and regional security and set off a proliferation cascade across the Middle East, effectively ending the international nonproliferation regime. As one of the world’s chief sponsors of terrorism, Iran would be in a position to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist allies. Further, a nuclear-capable Iran would seek to dominate the energy-rich Persian Gulf, threaten Israel’s existence, destabilize moderate Arab regimes, subvert U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, embolden radicals, violently oppose the Middle East peace process and increase support for terrorism and proxy warfare across the region.

    There is a growing belief in Washington that these negative consequences could be minimized through a strategy of containment and deterrence. However, we do not believe a nuclear-capable Iran can be contained as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. American credibility, so integral to deterrence, would be seriously diminished, if after repeatedly issuing warnings to the contrary it permitted Tehran to cross the nuclear threshold. Restoring U.S. credibility would then require extraordinary action. In addition, nuclear capability would embolden the already risk-tolerant Iranian regime. Moreover, we lack politically stable, militarily robust and reliable Arab allies who would permit the permanent stationing of U.S. troops as a tripwire.

    Precisely because containment will not work, a strategy of acquiescence would lead to a far more dangerous conflict involving a nuclear-armed Iran, one that would inevitably drag in the United States at even greater cost.

    Many put their faith in the fall of the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad regime, and its replacement by an internationally responsible government, as a way to avoid military action or Iran achieving nuclear weapons capability. Hope, however, is not a strategy. There is no credible evidence that even reformist elements will abandon the country’s nuclear quest. Nor, amidst the brutal suppression of the opposition, does it appear plausible that the regime will fall in the little time left before the Islamic Republic acquires a nuclear weapons capability. Some have pointed to this hope as a rationale to discourage the U.S. from taking a more aggressive stance over the past several months. However, the only regime change that is currently taking place in Tehran is the militarization of the already hard-line government.

    With an Israeli strike very risky, containment almost certainly ineffective, and regime change improbable in the near term we return to the strategy we originally recommended, the simultaneous pursuit of a triple-track approach: diplomacy; sanctions; and visible, credible military readiness activity. We support unilateral sanctions legislation that is overwhelmingly supported in Congress. We also welcome the new United Nations sanctions that were passed by the Security Council in June 2010. While they lack sufficient bite, we hope they will encourage other nations to strengthen their own sanctions.

    To maximize the possibility of a peaceful resolution, the U.S. must negotiate with Iran from a position of strength. Toward that end, the U.S. needs to set nearterm deadlines for the parallel pursuit of diplomacy and sanctions and for determining their effectiveness. To lend these deadlines greater credibility, and to gird itself for the potential next step, the Administration needs to embrace active and public preparation for the military option.

    Many who condemned the Bush Administration’s lack of transparency prior to the invasion of Iraq today discourage public discussion of military options concerning Iran. But we ought not shirk this debate or dismiss it as warmongering; it is precisely a public recognition of a viable military option that might reduce or even preclude its need. The Administration needs to actively engage in a reasoned and public discussion and make clear that it is prepared to employ the military option as a last resort.

    Specifically, we recommend the United States: augment the Fifth Fleet presence in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, including the deployment of an additional carrier battle group and minesweepers to the waters off Iran; conduct broad exercises with its allies in the Persian Gulf; intensify our enhancement of the defensive and offensive military capabilities of our Persian Gulf allies; initiate a “strategic partnership” with Azerbaijan to gain enhanced regional access; and work with the Saudis and Iraqis to improve their capacity to ship oil out of the region without using the Strait of Hormuz. If such pressure fails to persuade Iran’s leadership, the United States and its allies would have no choice but to consider blockading refined petroleum imports into Iran, to send a strong signal and to ensure the effectiveness of proposed sanctions on gasoline imports. A blockade would effectively be an act of war and the U.S. and its allies would have to prepare for its consequences. Should these measures – in conjunction with diplomatic and economic pressures already being pursued – not compel Tehran to terminate its nuclear program, the U.S. military is capable of launching an effective targeted strike on Iranian nuclear and military facilities.

    This would only set back Iranian nuclear development; it would not destroy Iran’s nuclear knowhow. Taking military action would require continued vigilance in the years that follow, both to retain the ability to strike previously undiscovered sites and to ensure that Iran does not revive its military nuclear program. We fully recognize the risks of a strike against Iran: U.S. and allied casualties; rallying Iranians around an unstable and oppressive regime; Iranian reprisals against us and our allies – be they direct or by proxy; and Iranian-instigated unrest in the Persian Gulf states.

    We are under no illusions: there exist no easy or risk-free solutions. Our triple-track approach is complicated and challenging, without a guarantee of complete success. However, as we argue in this report, the likely alternatives are far more dangerous. The stakes are too high to rely on containment and regime change while not seriously preparing for the potential need for a military strike. We cannot wish this problem away, nor should we fall prey to the inertia of resignation. Sanctions and diplomacy have a chance to work only if backed by a credible military option. Bold U.S. leadership is required. The risks of inaction are too high and time is rapidly running out.

    (The full report can be directly downloaded here: http://tinyurl.com/37aajkf, PDF 1,71MB, 60 pages)
    Cheers.
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