aussie,
in addition to S-2's point above, i'd like to say that this was also true for british policymakers (so much for the cross-cultural work). in fact, the brits if anything were even more dismissive of the iranians and other middle easterners, which was true for the west as a whole.
and why not? in WW2, the brits, with an absolute minimum effort, defeated iraq and iran in approximately a month, despite poor odds. in the suez crisis, the tripartite alliance of second-rate powers beat the crap out of egypt with less than 250 dead all told.
of course what the minority and what you outline turned out to be a far better long-term strategy, but during the time most policymakers were interested in what they saw as an easy, cheap, short-term fix.
it took the malayan insurgency, the mau-mau uprising, algeria, and vietnam to really hammer into the heads of western decisionmakers that guerrilla warfare married to nationalism, cheap explosives, and AK-47s made imperial adventures expensive.
So far, there's been an avoidance of the psychological profiles of American policy-makers in this timeframe. These were men largely shaped by W.W.I, post W.W.I Europe (to include the rise of a Leninist Soviet Union), an epic global economic collapse and, later, W.W.II.
and why not? in WW2, the brits, with an absolute minimum effort, defeated iraq and iran in approximately a month, despite poor odds. in the suez crisis, the tripartite alliance of second-rate powers beat the crap out of egypt with less than 250 dead all told.
of course what the minority and what you outline turned out to be a far better long-term strategy, but during the time most policymakers were interested in what they saw as an easy, cheap, short-term fix.
it took the malayan insurgency, the mau-mau uprising, algeria, and vietnam to really hammer into the heads of western decisionmakers that guerrilla warfare married to nationalism, cheap explosives, and AK-47s made imperial adventures expensive.
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