Rear Area Operations

[Aussiegunner]

During a couple of threads on artillery mention has been made of the way some armies have specialist units to deal with rear area incursions during big conventional operations. Coming from an Army which isn't big enough to have this and which isn't focussed on big set piece ops in any case, I'd be interested to hear more details about these types of units from those who have experience with them.

[Officer of Engineers]

4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group was the US VII Corps' strategic reserves. I'm not sure what your question means though. We would not have responded to anything less than a regiment level incursion and even then only if their target is VII Corps HQ. Basically, our job is to stop the pincer movement against Corps HQ while the rest of VII Corps ... and II (GE) Corps withdraw to regroup.

[S2]

RACO in S. Korea

41st Separate Infantry Brigade had a RACO mission in S. Korea for I Corps. 2-218 FA was the direct support battalion for the brigade. So far as I know, we were the only U.S. element which had such a mission for Korea.

During Team Spirit, our reps would spend as much time down near Uijongbu as most units did up near the DMZ. Our batteries were expected, like our rifle battalions, to operate semi-autonomous across the Corps rear area. Our brigade H.Q. was supposedly going to be co-located with a ROK division H.Q. for security and comms. Don't know what they were going to do with our Arty battalion H.Q. but we were the brigade's alternate TOC.

[Aussiegunner]

41st Separate Infantry Brigade had a RACO mission in S. Korea for I Corps. 2-218 FA was the direct support battalion for the brigade. So far as I know, we were the only U.S. element which had such a mission for Korea.

During Team Spirit, our reps would spend as much time down near Uijongbu as most units did up near the DMZ. Our batteries were expected, like our rifle battalions, to operate semi-autonomous across the Corps rear area. Our brigade H.Q. was supposedly going to be co-located with a ROK division H.Q. for security and comms. Don't know what they were going to do with our Arty battalion H.Q. but we were the brigade's alternate TOC.

This was one of the anecdotes that generated the question, along with Kato's description of the German units with this type of role. Were the rifle battalions mounted or was it more of a static defence role for important infrastructure?

[Aussiegunner]

4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group was the US VII Corps' strategic reserves. I'm not sure what your question means though. We would not have responded to anything less than a regiment level incursion and even then only if their target is VII Corps HQ. Basically, our job is to stop the pincer movement against Corps HQ while the rest of VII Corps ... and II (GE) Corps withdraw to regroup.

I was probably not specific enough, I'm talking about specialised units for rear area operations like S-2 is talking about rather than reserve front line units. Thanks for the answer though.

[S2]

Aussiegunner Reply

"I'm talking about specialised units for rear area operations like S-2 is talking about rather than reserve front line units."

Nothing specialized about the 41st S.I.B. It was a light infantry brigade that trained and tested to the same U.S. Army mission essential task list (METL) as all brigades similarly equipped. No doubt, if required, we'd very quickly find ourselves moving into the main battle area. Equally there's little doubt in my mind that if additional forces were required to secure I Corps rear area other forces from either ROK, stateside, or even the frontlines would be allocated on no-notice.

"Were the rifle battalions mounted or was it more of a static defence role for important infrastructure?"

Our rifle battalions moved via LPCs (leather personnel carriers) with some exception. They were adequately trained in air assault operations as were the batteries of our battalion.

We weren't site security forces. Every sensitive C3I node, ASP (Ammo Supply Point), etc. in S. Korea already had/has those provided by either the ROK or ourselves.

As I understand our primary mission, we were expected to be an on-call reinforcement/relief for locations threatened or under attack by NKPA special forces. Our secondary missions included blocking valley exits to avenues of approach leading from the MBA into the Corps rear area if threatened, holding open MSRs at key junctions/bridges, and facilitating the rearward passage of friendly forces when and where necessary.

[Aussiegunner]

Our rifle battalions moved via LPCs (leather personnel carriers) with some exception.

Interesting, I didn't know that apart from the specialised units like the 82nd /101st/rangers/mountain infantry etc that the US had had any light infantry for a very long time.

[S2]

AussieGunner Reply

"I didn't know...that the US had had any light infantry for a very long time."

Nobody was REALLY mountain. 10th Mountain Division (Ft. Drum, N.Y.) only carried the name as a legacy from W.W.II. All light infantry units trained to the same standards once their feet were on the ground-even the 101st and 82nd. Only the Rangers trained to specialized mission tasks.

The 10th were one of three active and one nat'l guard division (29th Inf. Div-Virginia Nat'l Guard) that were stood up in the early eighties as light infantry divisions along with the 6th (Alaska) and 7th (Ft. Ord, California). Both the 10th and 6th depended upon roundout units from the Guard at the time as neither were at full establishment. IIRC, the 6th had two active brigades of two battalions (one airborne) for a total of four manuever battalions in the division. There was a USAR light infantry brigade from Minnesota that was their roundout.

We were the roundout for the 7th Inf. Div (Light) until they were raised to a full nine battalion establishment. Until then we'd gotten all sorts of groovy equipment-PADS, TPQ-36 radars, kevlar helmets, M-16A2 rifles, NVGs, Humvees, etc. Kept our M101A1 cannons though. Then we lost our mission. Scary. State Adjutant General desperately searching the halls of D.A. and the U.S. Army National Guard Bureau to find a mission.

Voila! RACO to I Corps.

[Albany Rifles]

As the Colonel has mentioned, the 4 CMBG had the mission for 7th US Corps and II GE Corps. They would eventually be backed up by (depending on REFORGER success) the 30th Mech Brigade, NC ARNG. The 218th Mech Brigade had the same mission for Vth US Corps.

Of recent history....during OIF and the march to Baghdad, the 101st AA was used to open up the MSR behind the 3rd ID and 1 MEF as they attacked forward. Not a true RACO mission but still rear battle. Similiar to what they did behind XXX Corps durign Market-Garden.

[kato]

Germany had a sheer insane, staggering amount of small and less small units for rear area operations.

In total, for rear area operations, there were planned out:

• ~300 security platoons (for static object defense, e.g. depots)
• ~150 light infantry companies (for local area defense)
• ~100 security battalions (for large objects, e.g. airfields or major HQs; including 12 battalions guarding divisional HQs)
• ~130 field training and replacement battalions (used for auxiliary tasks)
• 15 light infantry regiments, brigade-sized (for mobile rear area operations)
• 14 infantry brigades (in rear-area role, including one mountain infantry brigade and three air assault brigades)

These units obviously varied widely in capability, equipment and taskset of course. Additionally, there were other, non-combat troops, such as several dozen engineer battalions, scores of logistics units, or some 150 demolitions teams to blow up strategic approaches.

The above units were distributed by territory.

As an example, here's what the state of Northrhine-Westphalia (Defense Area III) had for operations in its territory in 1989 - warning, sorta longish list.

For reference, Northrhine-Westphalia today has about 90% the population of Australia, or about the same as Florida.

• Defense Area Assets:
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • 12 security platoons (for area command assets)
  • ~10 field training battalions
  • non-combat assets (battalions): four military police, four engineer, one transport, one NBC defence
  
  
• 53rd Area Defense Brigade (HSB 53):
  • two tank battalions (upgraded M48)
  • two infantry battalions (one in M113, one in trucks; with organic AT and mortar platoons)
  • artillery battalion (105mm guns)
  • support: NBC, medical, supply, maintenance, engineer (companies), replacement (battalion)
  • three infantry training centers
  
  
• 63rd Area Defense Brigade (HSB 63):
  • one tank battalion (upgraded M48)
  • two infantry battalions (in trucks; with organic AT and mortar platoons)
  • artillery battalion (105mm guns)
  • support: logistics, engineer (companies)
  
  
• 31st Defense Region Command (VBK 31):
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • four district commands with a replacement battalion and a security platoon each
  • one light infantry regiment (HSR 93):
    • infantry organized in three battalions with four combat companies each with four platoons each
    • 144 infantry squads with 12 men, a truck and one MG, one 40mm grenade launcher, two scoped rifles for longer-range work and one RPG7-style rocket launcher for AT each
    • one mortar company (18x 120mm) and one tank platoon (7x KanJgPz) as regimental assets
    • three autocannon platoons (7x 20mm) with one in each battalion
  • one security battalion
  • ten local area defense companies (under district commands)
  
  
• 32nd Defense Region Command (VBK 32):
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • four district commands with five replacement battalions total and a security platoon each
  • one light infantry regiment (HSR 83) (as HSR 93 above)
  • one security battalion
  • ten local area defense companies and one security platoon (under district commands)
  
  
• 33rd Defense Region Command (VBK 33):
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • four district commands with a replacement battalion and a security platoon each
  • one light infantry regiment (HSR 73) (as HSR 93 above)
  • eight local area defense companies (under district commands)
  
  
• 34th Defense Region Command (VBK 34):
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • four district commands with five replacement battalions and a security platoon each
  • four local area defense companies (under district commands)
  
  
• 35th Defense Region Command (VBK 35):
  • battalion-strength package of signals and logistics units
  • three district commands with a replacement battalion and a security platoon each
  • six local area defense companies and one security platoon (under district commands)
  
  
• Support Command 3 WHNS (supporting Allied Forces):
  • logistics assets: four transport battalion, two ammo supply battalion, one POL supply battalion, one medical transport battalion
  • other assets: two escort batteries, one security company, one logistics company, one replacement battalion, one NBC defence battalion
  • three training centers (medical, NBC defence, supply)

The Area Command was officially a division-level command - even if "a bit" overstrength at probably at least 25,000 men. It effectively had five brigade-sized units (HSB 53, 63 and HSR 73, 83, 93) available as mobile units; in total some 150 tanks and 36 105mm tubes supporting 48 infantry companies in the field. There were also 78 120mm mortars in these units, with no mortars used at all in the other units below. ATGM usage was light, with only 36 Milan launchers deployed across the two HSB brigades, and none used otherwise.

In addition to those brigades the area command had five regional commands with on average a regiment-level strength of at least 1,500 men each, as well as the Support Command with at least 6,000 men.

The 38 independent area defense companies would be a reserve guarding possibly multiple strategic targets and approaches within their AOR, also supported by 19 demolitions teams - the usual approach was to blow a strategic approach and then detail a local unit to watch over it and engage hostile troops trying to cross. If an area was overrun, these units would have dispersed and provided a very limited behind-the-lines harassment capability. The engineer battalions would have additionally supported area denial efforts by laying minefields, creating various hindrances, and providing bridging and such for own combat units.

The two security battalions and the 33 security platoons would primarily guard the district commands and other static targets of military importance, such as depots located within the area command's territory.

The field training units would have primarily provided initial training to fresh draftees, but could have served in such functions as riot control, camp guard or cannon fodder (not aware of such plans for NRW, but there were suggestions along that line for Bavaria).
The replacement battalions were essentially holding units for reservists, training them until they were up to par again, and when necessary, providing replacements for combat losses in other units. These units could have over 1,000 men per battalion. The replacement units were used for general security tasks, such as guarding military installations, using pretty much only rifles.

The two escort batteries within the Support Command were intended to guard nuclear weapons. Each escort battery had almost 400 men and up to twelve 20mm guns as heavy fire support. They were primarily intended to counter special-forces usage to take out nuclear ammunition supply.

[Officer of Engineers]

With 7 Soviet Airborne/Air Assault Divisions and a not too small collection of Abn/AA regts/bdes, that was seen as the bare minimum required.

[kato]

Indeed. The above territorial troops were of course intended to merely provide a (major) hindrance to enemy operations; waiting for the Corps assigned to their area to send heavier troops, such as their air assault brigade.

[Mihais]

Kato,how many troops were active and how many reserves?Thinking a bit about what was known about Spetsnaz capabilities and missions my guess would be that most were active.But guessing isn't knowing.

[kato]

Important installations always had active battalions guarding them, e.g. Airforce CRCs or nuclear weapons storage sites generally had two active battalions for security with a third in reserve.
Half of the infantry brigades were partially active, meaning they could field most of their troops in peacetime without calling in anyone extra (the truck-mounted infantry battalion was reserve). Most of the rest was reserve. The local area defense companies would probably mostly have been able to field at least a platoon or two within a day or two after call-up, considering the soldiers assigned to these were often part of local reservist associations, training regularly.

[kato]

Maybe important - the troops given e.g. for Area Command III in the post above are just the territorial forces (the ones that wouldn't have come under NATO command). There were additional security troops in particular with the Airforce in the state, mostly active.

These were for example, in the same Area Command III territory:

For Defense Ministry:

• one security battalion (reserve)
• one guard battalion (active)
• one military police battalion (partially active)

For 31st and 36th Strike Wings and the 2nd Missile Wing:

• 10 security squadrons (4 active, 6 reserve)
• 4 ADA companies (reserve)

Other Airforce Assets (Wartime HQ structure and CRCs):

• 19 security squadrons (1 active, 18 reserve)
• 2 security platoons (reserve)
• 3 ADA companies (1 active, 2 reserve)

The above security squadrons each had between 200 and 400 men.