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USS Massachusetts BB-59 vs Bismarck

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  • #16
    The claim of twenty 16in hits on Kirishima is not based on surveys of the wreck or any other recent source--except that it is recent to Westerners. The original damage control sketch from Kirishima's DC officer showed about twenty large-caliber hits. I think I can claim partial credit for this "news" by reporting it in English in Warship International a couple years ago. My collaborators and I showed the absurdity of the usually quoted hit figures for the 16in and 5in batteries and traced them back to their source, the testimony of a Kirishima gunnery officer in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. The same guy is responsible for the false claim that his ship was scuttled.
    A friend of mine who calculates hit probabilities figured that seven 16in hits would be at the lower end but still on the curve for what might result from a proper FC solution in that situation. Obviously twenty hits would be nearer the upper end of the probable.

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    • #17
      ^just went back and scanned that thread at Warships1, and I had remembered incorrectly. Ballard's dive on Kirishima was discussed, but wasn't part of that report...that's where I got my memories crossed.

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      • #18
        Welllll, I never took the time to research how many hits Washington got on Kirishima. However, I did meet a former gunner's mate of the Washington (secondary 5"/38 mounts) who was building a 1:96 scale model of his ship in Dreadnaught Helpers shop. I was able to find the plans for the boat and airplane crane for him and it was made up in photo-etched brass.

        He said that the firing was so intense it was difficult to see what turret or mount was hitting the Japanese ship. His mount was on the outer side and the Captain turned Washington around so the gunners on his side could get in their licks also.

        So, it doesn't really make any difference if Kirishima was hit 9, 15, 20 times plus the 5-inchers. The Washington was going to make sure that it was going to go down no matter what.

        Incidentally, his model turned out extradinarily beautiful and I think it is now on display in some museum.
        Able to leap tall tales in a single groan.

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        • #19
          "Mk 3 radar did not provide much in terms of blind fire. It was little more than a rangefinder. An expert operator could generate some bearing data, but not much of use for gunnery"

          *Not only were the Mk 3 in service, you had the primitive SC radar aboard the San Francisco (Scotts flagship) and you had the even better SG radar aboard the other cruisers Helena, Boise and Salt Lake City. Scott’s flagship (San Francisco) radar, the SC set was purposely restricted that evening since the Japanese radar at the time had receivers that could pick them up and could have given away their position. So San Frans FC (Mk 3) radar was employed as were the cruisers FC (Mk.3) radars along with their SG sets. The FC’s were given specific bearings to sweep upon. FC (Mk 3) radars were used not only for main battery direction (gun laying) but also for short range search. If picked up on the Mark 3 after a short range search then gun laying can indeed happen in the dark and without visual aid. The mere fact that the cruisers were using their FC Mk3 radar for search on a known range of degrees proves that not only can it lay guns well but also perform short range search for targets. Its successors were even more advanced and succesfull.

          *Bearing data, Scott already had two critical pieces of data in hand that helped him formulate his battle plan and movements.

          1) He knew the Japanese had been spotted by guadalcanal. He now knew "where and "when".

          At 1810, ComAirWing ONE reported his search planes had again sighted two enemy cruisers and six destroyers on course 120° T., bearing 310° T., steaming at 20 knots some 110 miles from Guadalcanal. There was little doubt that it was the force originally reported.

          2) He knew from intelligence reports that the Japanese would run the Tokyo Express down the "slot" once again to re-supply japanese troops on guadalcanal.

          *This gave a relative bearing that could be used by Scott to get his BG underway and in an area and formation most favorable to a gun battle at night.

          At 2325, the Helena's SG apparatus recorded an unmistakable surface vessel at bearing 315° T., range 27,700 yards. A minute later, the Salt Lake City's SG recorded three ships on bearing 273°, 16,000 yards distant, proceeding at about 20 knots on course 120° T.17 .

          *Now he had a heads up from Helena at 27,700 yards or 5.2 nautical miles away in the darkness. The Japanese had no idea they were there until opening fire.

          Now he has range, time and bearing and a favorable formation for battle. All the tools you could possibly ask for given the circumstances. It wasnt the Mk 3 radar that prevented him from opening fire on the Japanese earlier then what they did, it was the fact that Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey were then almost directly in the line of fire after manuvering with the cruisers and turning inside of them. Scott hesitated, because he didnt want to fire upon his own ships and would not fire until they were identified. This allowed the Japanese forces to move even closer during the 10 minutes it took to ID them.

          He (Scott) had the radar to conduct accurate albeit blind night firing with the Mk 3, It may have allowed them (Japanese) to move closer (due to short range search) then comfort allows but what he didnt have was his DD's in the correct positon and not in the line of fire.

          *This battle would soon bare a few major points for night engagements in confined waters such as Iron Bottom sound and the slot between Guadalcanal and Savo Island. One major point that Scott and Lee (see below link) point out is that American DD's need to have a way to 1) identify themselves during battles and especially night battles. It is made a point in the declassified report. And 2) Troubles with DD's locations in the van and manuvering with the capital ships.
          Last edited by Dreadnought; 08 Feb 10,, 19:52.
          Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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          • #20
            At Guadalcanal, USS Washington (a crack gunnery ship) could fire only when in visual contact with the enemy. Her Mk 3 radar did prevent her needing to close to absurdly close range before opening fire on Kirishima.

            The account from the Japanese:
            http://usswashington.com/***_acct.htm

            The American account.
            Third Battle Of Savo Island

            *Lee commenced firing at 18,500 yards (slightly over 10.5 miles) by use of radar range (more then likely Mk.3 aided by the SG radars) and optical training. Kirishima was estimated to have been hit by the third salvo.

            *Most importantly of the article is that Lee (as a gunnery expert) is noted as expressing his trust in a muti-teered radar solution. The SG (surface search) was invaluable in locating long range targets, and "coaching" the main battery FC (Either Mk.3 or its successor) on to its percieved target.

            When taking all of the situation into mind it is not diffacult to understand why Washington came in close, you had smoke screens, torpedo's in the waters, night illumination (star shells), ships on fire, radical manuvering of Washington and South Dakota and Savo island illuminated in the background. IMO, I would say he had his hands full the entire time.

            *Washingtons official declassified report of the battle.

            http://usswashington.com/washingtonguadalcanal.pdf
            Last edited by Dreadnought; 08 Feb 10,, 19:37.
            Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

            Comment


            • #21
              Washington opened fire at 18,500 yards against Sendai (I believe). Against Kirishima, she opened fire at 8400 yards. Note that in this context, "gun laying" refers to gun elevation, that is, range. The Action Report specifies that gunfire was by optical training, and sixty-two rounds of starshell were used during the Kirishima phase. When firing with radar or plotting against visually obscured targets (Sendai), they had to use "turret spread" to cover a wider arc of possible locations--not good. The secondary battery used radar training against Sendai as well. Not surprisingly, Sendai was not hit. The AR also indicates the need for radar-based spotting in deflection. The Mk 8 would bring an excellent spotting capability.

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              • #22
                Originally posted by Tiornu View Post
                Washington opened fire at 18,500 yards against Sendai (I believe). Against Kirishima, she opened fire at 8400 yards. Note that in this context, "gun laying" refers to gun elevation, that is, range. The Action Report specifies that gunfire was by optical training, and sixty-two rounds of starshell were used during the Kirishima phase. When firing with radar or plotting against visually obscured targets (Sendai), they had to use "turret spread" to cover a wider arc of possible locations--not good. The secondary battery used radar training against Sendai as well. Not surprisingly, Sendai was not hit. The AR also indicates the need for radar-based spotting in deflection. The Mk 8 would bring an excellent spotting capability.
                *Well aware of gun laying in this sense, Turret spreads are the most reasonable use in this case as it would cover a larger area such as in a blanket effect. The very same was for shore bombardment from the turrets, a blanket effect. The Mark 8 was not available at the time so they had to use what they had and in cases couple that with other radars.

                A brief write on the FCR's available at the time.

                [4.4] US CENTIMETRIC SHIPBOARD RADARS
                * While centimetric ASV had been the Rad Lab's priority effort, radars for other platforms were not ignored. Bell Labs had developed a longwave fire-control radar, initially known as the "CXAS" and then the "FA" or "Mark 1", and then the improved longwave "FB" or "Mark 2". These radars were basically just rangefinders.

                The Mark 1 was built in small numbers. The Mark 2 was on the drawing board when the magnetron came along. Since the design of the Mark 2 was modular, the design team found it straightforward to adapt it to centimetric wavelengths. This exercise produced a 40 cm (750 MHz) surface fire-control radar, the "Mark 3" or "FC", with horizontal lobe switching to give it a horizontal targeting capability; as well as a 40 cm (750 MHz) antiaircraft fire-control radar, the "Mark 4" or "FD", which added vertical lobe switching. Both these radars were in production by late 1941. They were eventually linked to the vessel's gun gyroscopic stabilization systems to improve targeting in rough seas.

                *In other words the FC systems stable vertical.

                The Mark 4 proved to have difficulty determining the altitude of low-flying aircraft, due to reflections from the surface of the water. This led in 1943 to the "Mark 12", which was essentially an improved Mark 4, coupled to a smaller X-band height-finding radar, the "Mark 22", mounted alongside. The Mark 22 had some conceptual similarities to the British AMES Type 13 CMH, but many differences as well. The Mark 22 had an "orange slice" antenna, in the form of a curved, narrow, elliptical grid mounted with the long axis vertical, to focus the radar beam in a narrow horizontal fan. As with its British equivalent, the antenna nodded to sweep the sky for targets. A land-based version of the Mark 22 was also built, known as the "AN/APS-10" or "Little Abner", named after the hillbilly in Al Capp's popular comic strip who liked to sit in his rocking chair. The British also used the AN/APS-10 as the "AMES Type 60".

                * The next level of sophistication involved addition of "electronic steering", in which adjusting the relative phase of the waveforms supplied to array elements shifted the direction of the beam without mechanically moving the radar. A radar using electronic steering is known as a "phased array radar".

                Bell Labs used this approach to build a new X-band surface fire control radar, the "Mark 8" or "FH". The Mark 8 had a very unusual appearance. It was based on an antenna element known as a "polyrod", which was a pipelike microwave waveguide with a polystyrene plug in the end. The Mark 8featured an array of 42 polyrods, organized as 14 rows of three.

                Signal phase to each triplet of polyrods was controlled by mechanically switching electronic delay elements into the output signal path. If the signals were sent in phase to all the triplets, the beam went straight out forward. If the signals were delayed from one end of the row to the other, the beam was diverted in the direction of the delay.


                The Mark 8 provided increased accuracy, with a beam width of 2 degrees that could be swept over a 30 degree arc, and a 0.4 microsecond pulse width to provide tight range accuracy. Of course it did not provide height information. A high peak output power of up to 20 kW gave it excellent range, and it also featured a plan-type display that made it much easier to locate and pinpoint multiple targets in the radar's field of view.

                Following tests of the prototype "CXBA", the Mark 8 was put into production by Western Electric in October 1942. While phased array technology predated the war and had already been implemented in certain German longwave radars, the Mark 8 was the first microwave phased-array radar. A derivative of the Mark 8 with an auxiliary height-finding radar, designated the "Mark 14", was introduced late in the war.

                *The height finding radar would be one of the first radar sets that could be used for shore bombardment accurately since it was built with this in mind among other considerations.

                *By the time the two North Carolina's left service, the Washington was carrying the SK sets and North Carolina was carrying the oval shaped SK-2 radars. Technology had caught up past the SJ sets but alot of these were unavalable at the time of the night battles around Savo Island and Iron Bottom sound because the ships would have to come back to major yards to have the new sets installed and tested before approval. IMO, they problably could not be spared at that time for the change outs to occur. It happened to many classes of ships.
                Last edited by Dreadnought; 08 Feb 10,, 21:51.
                Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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                • #23
                  This from USS Washington page:

                  *Bold only used for highlite purposes.;)

                  According to the best data available, overall SPGPM was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline was excellent.

                  The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely:

                  Collective fire, Director I (Forward main-battery director) controlling in train. Group I controlling in Plot.
                  Director IV (Stable Vertical I located in plotting room) controlling in continuous level and cross level.
                  Director IV controlling firing circuit (Plot.)
                  Radar ranges by indicating and voice.


                  Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual target. During the time when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated by using previously observed relative motion of firing ship and target, a turret spread in deflection was fired.

                  The selected train firing key was used in plot to insure that the firing pointer could see the light that indicates when the director train is on target. It has been standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target.

                  Against the first main battery target, 18,500 yards, radar range was used in conjunction with visual train. The target became obscured after the second salvo. The target was lost by all radar's after this salvo. As a result the last salvos went out in what amounted to generated. That is, the present range was let ride and the director being in automatic remained on the generated train. On the second main battery target the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least five minutes. When the target finally came into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on. In this connection it is noted that a considerable period of time is taken to adapt the trainer's eyes to the telescope at either night or day after looking at the radar scope (train indicator.) The reverse is also true. As a result of this difficulty, main battery Director II found it desirable to let the trainer keep track by radar and the pointer observe by telescope. Such a system is made possible by the fact that the director is trained automatically by generated bearing. Therefore small corrections only are necessary and such corrections can be made by coaching from a pointer's station.

                  Radar spots were used against the first target while the target echo was present. It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.


                  Full text.
                  Third Battle Of Savo Island

                  *The South Dakota class USS Indiana carried the updated Mark 8 system for the main batteries.

                  USS Alabama carried a combination Mark 8 and Mark 4 FCR.

                  *Found it. USS North Carolina had both the Mark 3 for main battery FCR and Mark 4 fitted to her 5" directors in November of 1942. If I had to guess then Washington was indeed carrying the Mark 3 FCR on her main directors if she had not made the update as of yet. North Carolina got the FCR update while in yards hands after her bow damage repair 15 Nov 1942. The Third Battle of Savo Island was the very same month.
                  Last edited by Dreadnought; 09 Feb 10,, 03:12.
                  Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Much knowledge and recitals....

                    Originally posted by connaye View Post
                    "Most significantly, however, Washington soon engaged Kirishima in the first head-to-head confrontation of battleships in the Pacific War. In seven minutes, tracking by radar, the Washington fired 75 rounds of 16 in (410 mm) and 107 rounds of 5 in (130 mm) shells at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yd (7,700 to 11,600 m), scoring at least nine hits with her main 16 in (410 mm) battery, and about 40 with her 5 in (130 mm) guns, silencing the IJN battleship Kirishima in short order, and setting her on fire. Subsequently, Washington's 5 in (130 mm) batteries went to work firing on other targets spotted by her radar sets."

                    For the naval gunnery men who lurk on these boards, is a ratio of 9 hits out of 75 rounds fired considered "great" when using Radar ?
                    Thank you to everyone who contributed accounts and recorded history about the naval battles recital previously thus adding to my appreciation for the knowledge on this board..

                    Could some gun captains sum up a thumbnail answer of what is considered good gunnery ( hits on target for a naval ship) ? The Bismark had great gunnery against the HMS Hood, but granted scored poorly in her last battle.

                    If radar control does not add a significant improvement (% of accuracy ) over optics, what percent of salvos should be making contact with a target?
                    Last edited by connaye; 09 Feb 10,, 03:56.
                    " Lite all burners, make all steam! "

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                    • #25
                      I'll guess and say that there's no single figure that can characterize good shooting due to the host of variables--range, target size, visibility, target bearing, etc.
                      In World War II, radar was great for range data. Optics remained the best source for bearing data, when available.
                      For all the trouble she was having with her new guns and crew at Denmark Strait, Prince of Wales scored a hit percentage comparable to Bismarck's.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        If radar control does not add a significant improvement (% of accuracy ) over optics, what percent of salvos should be making contact with a target?

                        *Optics, the optical sights aboard the USN ships were of 25x power for the turrets. They are only good to the Horizion, and in some cases slightly beyond such as a mast being spotted or a fighting top. Beyond the horizion (10-12 nautical miles) radar assist helps guide them through multiple information fed through the main fire control computers along with several other bits of info taken from the ship itself. From spot #1 or spot #2 your vision is aided due to the height of the mast the FCR sits upon. The turrets are much lower so they cannot see as far as the optics with the FCR mount. Even Spot #3 atop the conning tower on the 04 level can see further. The whole idea for the main battery FCR & systems is to be able to put projectiles on your target from out of sight, long distance or in some cases obscured behind a land mass. No setting is infinite and all must be constantly adjusted by both men and machine. Radar can also bounce off of land masses etc or "echo". It is not fool proof so to say. Now days with satellite intervention, GPS, GIS and some of the guided shells that are out there (the Army particularly) such as Excalibur and its automated gunnery systems it makes it much easier when you can fire a projectile in the general direction and range of your target and let it find your target for you through guidance. This is ofcoarse well beyond the years of these ships. Its only percievable that soon these systems may end up aboard the newer ships in the distant future.
                        Last edited by Dreadnought; 09 Feb 10,, 18:17.
                        Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Sorry for revival of the death
                          Originally posted by Dreadnought View Post
                          Penetrating ability would favor the Mass.
                          comparative penetrating abilities
                          at 22,000 yards
                          against vertical armor
                          US gun ca 16.6 inch fh armor
                          german gun 16.2 inch fh armor
                          as we can see both guns were almost on par if we suppose identical ballistic properties for american and german fh armor
                          but german fh armor of same thickness(in the 15 inch area) had -evidenced by american ballistic tests at Dahlgren- approximately 5-8 percent higher ballistic limit than US average Fh armor according to the (few)ballistic tests done

                          But even the US projectile is able to pentrate through Bismarcks belt, the heavy slope behind the belt should deflect or break incoming projectiles preventing them from pentrating into vital areas (magazines and machinery).
                          so the german ship should have an advantage at distances where penetrating hits through the vertical protection are expected.

                          Against horizontal armor there is considerable advantage for the US gun, it is expected to penetrate approximately 5 inch rolled homogenous armor at 22000 yard. For the german gun the extrapolated value is approximately 3.1 inches.

                          The main reason can be found in the different AOFs of about 20,8 degrees(US projectile) vs 16.4 degrees (german projectile) - as the ballistic limit changes considerable with angle of incidence, additional the US projectile had an advantage in kinetic energy to start with, and because of its higher w/d³ ratio, relatively more energy should be available at more remote impacts and therfor relatively better horizontal penetration.

                          From pure ability of horizontal pentration of the german gun the US ship should be save at distances up to 36,000 yard
                          On the other side it is somewhat difficult to assess, how the american AP-projectile performs against the german horizontal protection especially against the flat part wich is approximately 82 feet wide and consists of the upper deck 1.96" and the main armored deck 3.14" over machinery/3.9" over magazines.

                          Post war british ballistic evaluation of the german arrangement found that the 1.96" + 3.14" was equivalent to 6" single plate, due to decapping and yaw effects/topple. It is therefore likely that the outer zone of immunity for vital parts was increased for the american projectile too.
                          Unfortunately there are no explicit american tests available for such arangements and for major naval projectiles. A US Army post war ballistic(1950) report on spaced armor confirmed that certain arangements may increase ballistic protection by about 30% if the arrangement decaps AP-projectiles and exploits yaw. The german protection was explicitely designed to work that way.

                          BTW the german ship received fully integrated radar-fircontrol for range and bearing during training period of Bismarck. And according to the report of the Artillerieversuchskommando (AVKS-700 Schlußbericht vom 31.05.1941) the set was also able to spot for fall of projectile. Nevertheless the comprehensive integration of radar into fire control was done the first time in german use.

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                          • #28
                            Just a quick question....

                            Why would you need penetrating through the side? The Brits shot from long range to open the battle before closing to close proximity and had already put two turrets out of action by doing just this. A testimate to long range gunnery when you look closely at where Bismark was hit. Baron Mullenheim Reckberg reported that KGV was in view @ 2.5 nautical miles distant to Bismark when he took control of Bismarks after turrets so its somewhat safe to assume Rodney was as close if not closer. From the damage reports, Bismarks belt was penetratated more then once as well as the splinter protection of the side of the ship.

                            Bismarks side belt was pentetrated by Rodney's 16"/45 same bore and caliber as the American South Dakota class of BB's. However slight differences in powder, bursting charge, projectile weight and velocity. And not by much.

                            The US BB should be well capable of the same damage Rodney imparted upon Bismark. Rodney would ofcourse have the advantage in shell dispersion having all three turrets close as compared to the American ship 2 foreward and one aft. The Americans having the further eye sight with the more modern FCR and being faster then Rodney.

                            *Also to keep in mind was that Rodney was "recalled" to join the chase, she was supposed to sail to American yards for a full refit so we can "assume" her guns were somewhat worn at this point and they still penetrated when they struck.

                            Lastly, as we all know Bismarks armored belt didnt account for much in the end as it was penetreated both above (HMS Rodney) and below it through the torpedo bulkhead previously (HMS POW) which hampered her operations and this circumnavigated by the hole that went clear through the bow which caused her list and flooded two compartments forward, this led to the unaccessable 1000 tons fuel problem for Lujten and thus the oil trail that recon would later follow.

                            As it turned out, her gunnery and armor wasnt enough to save her just prolong the enevitable. It was only going to be a matter of time.


                            *Consider this, If Bismark had been able to make off to St Nazier like Lujtens had wanted, although limping (we wont specify how critically) would it bo too foolish to think the Brits would have sent every other ship in the area including more air strikes and possible submarine attacks to prevent just that?

                            Also consider Bismark had no chance at rearming and she could possibly hold say 1000-1040 rounds just guessing of main battery shells at her firing rate of supposedly 2.3-3 rpm, minus rounds expended with Hood and POW and chasing off her pursuers, Reports claim she can hold 130 rounds per gun probably including the ready service rounds. At three rounds per minute, per gun, times 8 guns she would last 43 minutes approximately without having counting expended ammo rounds from previous fights. And she would need every one of them since she was running low on fuel and France was far away. The Brits would have prolonged gunfire and the option to rearm if necessary and dictate the speed of battle since Bismark couldnt steer. The Brits could also make torpedo strikes, It would be like the bullfighters slowly but surely spearing the bull until finally it had enough.

                            There are several possibilities to this story but the non- "essential" details is what doomed Bismark from the time Hood was sunk.

                            IMO,Bismark should have chosen not too fight BUT run to the open ocean, neither of the British ship at the time could have caught her besides that the POW was still having problems with her guns and Bismark had a partner in Prince Eugan.

                            Sorry to take us off topic.
                            Last edited by Dreadnought; 21 May 13,, 01:59.
                            Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              BTW the german ship received fully integrated radar-fircontrol for range and bearing during training period of Bismarck. And according to the report of the Artillerieversuchskommando (AVKS-700 Schlußbericht vom 31.05.1941) the set was also able to spot for fall of projectile. Nevertheless the comprehensive integration of radar into fire control was done the first time in german use.

                              Correct in more of an "automated" sense, however if you read the reports of Bismarks inspection they were definately in need of "tweaking" and several of the recommendations made clear were never addressed.

                              It is also written that Lutchens couldnt figure out how, when Bismark would turn to face the Brits shadowing him they would turn before he did and vanish. They had stronger radar sets and certainy Norfolk had descent FCR if she blew off Bismarks foreward FC director set. Between those shots and the ones that took out Bismarks turrets and put a gapping hole in her portside amid ships hangar area it is clear that Brits had good FC no doubt.

                              For instace, when examined by the Ballard expedition, it was found that turrets "Bruno" (foreward) and "Dora" (aft) both had shell holes in the exposed barbette and through the decks around them within feet.

                              If thats not accurate gunfire, then I dont know what is considering Hood was hit aft when she exploded and Bismark was hit in the barbettes both forward and aft and the decks around them and amidships penetrated.
                              Last edited by Dreadnought; 21 May 13,, 02:32.
                              Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Once off topic, finish the thought, too....

                                Originally posted by Dreadnought View Post
                                Just a quick question....

                                ..........

                                IMO,Bismark should have chosen not too fight BUT run to the open ocean, neither of the British ship at the time could have caught her besides that the POW was still having problems with her guns and Bismark had a partner in Prince Eugan.

                                Sorry to take us off topic.


                                Dread while I have read about Bismark and rooted for the underdog, I agree she was doomed.
                                Why didn't the Bismark run? The best question is .... ????? ( I wish I knew )
                                Remember Mr. L's discussion on another thread about the "real mission of the P.E. and the Bismark"?
                                Perhaps some truth in Mr. L's theory why the Bismark turned to fight?

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