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A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Re: CCF

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  • A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Re: CCF

    This US military writer seems to be effusive in praise on the PVA troops in Korea. It's been more than 20 years since original publication; for the experts on the forum, what flaws do you find in his analysis?

  • #2
    Need the reference.

    Comment


    • #3
      http://carl.army.mil/resources/csi/content.asp

      Scott McMichael

      I'm assuming the PLA has lost the capability to do this type of warfare, and it's only the North Koreans who still bother with this kind of stuff, especially with their hundred-thousand man special-operations force.

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      • #4
        This is out of date material. The Chinese rendered two entire armies combat ineffective (50% reduction per army) trying to encircle the Eighth Army. Therefore, the research is flawed to begin with.

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        • #5
          Are you referring to the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir?

          The writer seems to be biased towards the strengths of light infantry; but in his analysis he does note the limitations of that particular army. In part due to poor logistical factors caused by UN air superiority and an inferior Chinese industrial base, the Chinese could not fight on the operational level. They could achieve tactical successes, but they could not sustain an offensive over 3 to 4 days. On the other hand, the Chinese were tactically sophisticated in the maneuver phase of the war and sufficiently adept in the stalemate phase for it to be effectively a stalemate. The Chinese also had an organizational advantage expressed in a morale advantage, against US forces which at the time expected that ground wars would become obsolete due to nuclear weapons, although as the war dragged on and PVA strengths were negated, morale began to flag.

          I do note that most of their tactics would be obsolete against a modern Western army, mainly because night-fighting is now a major strength of Western armies, due to superior IR technology and training. This was evident in the recent Iraq War where the US military actually preferred to fight at night.

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          • #6
            Had MacArthur stood his ground and turned the Eighth Army around to face the blunt of the PVA, the Chinese would have lost two armies and Kim would be shouting his propaganda from Beijing.

            The PVA's victory in Korea had as much to do with MacArthur losing nerve as it did with Chinese operational planning. When you had to leave 4 Artillery Divisions behind in attempt for your foot infantry to outrace the Eighth Army, you were surrendering your already disadvantaged firepower in an attempt to gain maneuver and maneuver has never replaced firepower.

            At the end, you had one single PVA company trying to cut off an entire Eighth Army. While getting that one single PVA company into place was indeed impressive, it was nothing more than suicide.

            You will note that once the PVA came up to the Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong, they were stopped.

            Maj McMichael concentrated too much on their successes (and without proper context, ie MacArthur's lack of will) and not enough on their failures.

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            • #7
              Thanks.

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              • #8
                Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                Had MacArthur stood his ground and turned the Eighth Army around to face the blunt of the PVA, the Chinese would have lost two armies and Kim would be shouting his propaganda from Beijing.

                The PVA's victory in Korea had as much to do with MacArthur losing nerve as it did with Chinese operational planning. When you had to leave 4 Artillery Divisions behind in attempt for your foot infantry to outrace the Eighth Army, you were surrendering your already disadvantaged firepower in an attempt to gain maneuver and maneuver has never replaced firepower.

                At the end, you had one single PVA company trying to cut off an entire Eighth Army. While getting that one single PVA company into place was indeed impressive, it was nothing more than suicide.

                You will note that once the PVA came up to the Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong, they were stopped.

                Maj McMichael concentrated too much on their successes (and without proper context, ie MacArthur's lack of will) and not enough on their failures.
                Sir your more studied on the issue than I am. Do you think the 8th Army could ahve stood its ground initially, and if not then where. The initial assault hit UN troops that were at the far end of along supply line in hostile country with poor rear area protection and widely spaced units. Whose troops were shivering from the cold, exhausted from the march, denied air cover and led by Walker whose failings as CinC of the 8th are legion. But whose death would rattle the confidence of the Army.

                I don't think the UN could have stood its ground in the beginning. Then once the rout starts how do you stop it. You might argue that the 8th should have stood in front of Seoul or the North Korean coastal plains along the west coast but this is when Walker was killed. Once an army loses its commanders there is going to be trouble especially before a new commander can assert himself.

                I think that if your going to bring out the knives vs mac it should be for his complete disregard of the threat the Chinese posed. He could not conceive of it and so did not prepare for it even when warned. Once the Chinese hammer blow landed the 8th shattered and I think it may have taken what it took historically to put it back together. namely Spring weather, new commander, shorter lines, reinforcements, friendly air cover, and an exhausted enemy.

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                • #9
                  Z,

                  You've already made an eval on the new intel

                  http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/war...spiracies.html
                  Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 12 Jan 10,, 06:21.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                    Z,

                    You've already made an eval on the new intel

                    http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/war...spiracies.html
                    yes sir I ahve, but that was dealing with the question of why China jumpe din, not if the US could have stopped the assault. I think the factors in December 1950 doomed the 8th Army to a route given poor direction from mac and poor leadership from Walker combined with the factors I outlined above. Once the route started, I don't see how it could have been stopped until the Chinese shot their bot and the UN forces were the ones operating on interior lines under a new and capable commander with better weather for their style of firepower based warfare.

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                    • #11
                      Z,

                      I do not want to put words into your posts but I had thought your observations were spot on. The timeline presented by the Chinese (that they only prepared for war after Mac crossed the 38th) was crap. By the same token, can the Chinese had actually marched that fast from the Yalu to the 38th had Mac actually decided to defend?

                      Do reacall the first primary stopping action was Kapyong where the Commonwealth Brigade decided to make a stand and succeeded.

                      Added to this, the Eighth Army was surrounded by no less than 8 times beginning at the corps level at the Yalu ending up with a company blocking force at the 38th. Simply put, Mac did not read the AARs, else he would have realized the Chinese were surrounding him with less and less forces each and everytime.

                      Ok, that was what we have known during Korea.

                      With the new intel, we were NEVER in an unattenable situation. The only thing the Chinese had on us was the element of surprise. However, I am willing to disregard this new intel but I cannot disregard that the last blocking force against the Eighth Army was company strength. Mac could not have read into that?

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        Z,

                        I do not want to put words into your posts but I had thought your observations were spot on. The timeline presented by the Chinese (that they only prepared for war after Mac crossed the 38th) was crap. By the same token, can the Chinese had actually marched that fast from the Yalu to the 38th had Mac actually decided to defend?

                        Do reacall the first primary stopping action was Kapyong where the Commonwealth Brigade decided to make a stand and succeeded.

                        Added to this, the Eighth Army was surrounded by no less than 8 times beginning at the corps level at the Yalu ending up with a company blocking force at the 38th. Simply put, Mac did not read the AARs, else he would have realized the Chinese were surrounding him with less and less forces each and everytime.

                        Ok, that was what we have known during Korea.

                        With the new intel, we were NEVER in an unattenable situation. The only thing the Chinese had on us was the element of surprise. However, I am willing to disregard this new intel but I cannot disregard that the last blocking force against the Eighth Army was company strength. Mac could not have read into that?
                        I am not saying the Chinese moved that fast per se, but a routed army will run from rumors to where they think they are safe and to where the commanders can reestablish cohesion and command.

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                        • #13
                          Ok, I think we're talking pass each other here. The UN Forces stopped running only after Kapyong. If 2 PPCLI had collapsed, then the line was again the Pusan Perimeter. It was only from that point on that MacArthur felt comfortable enough to stop running.

                          It took one decisive action for the UN Forces to stop running ... but those decisive actions were abound way before Kapyong. The Chinese let the Marines escape at Choisin mainly because they could not do a damn thing about it. By the same token, had the Marines decided to stay, the Chinese could also do nothing about it. They were already exhausted and ready for collapse.

                          The point I'm trying to make here is that the signs were there that the Chinese were exhausted. A good general should have read them. And a good general did - at Kapyong.

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                            Ok, I think we're talking pass each other here. The UN Forces stopped running only after Kapyong. If 2 PPCLI had collapsed, then the line was again the Pusan Perimeter. It was only from that point on that MacArthur felt comfortable enough to stop running.

                            It took one decisive action for the UN Forces to stop running ... but those decisive actions were abound way before Kapyong. The Chinese let the Marines escape at Choisin mainly because they could not do a damn thing about it. By the same token, had the Marines decided to stay, the Chinese could also do nothing about it. They were already exhausted and ready for collapse.

                            The point I'm trying to make here is that the signs were there that the Chinese were exhausted. A good general should have read them. And a good general did - at Kapyong.
                            But what general should get the blame? Walker was the man on the ground, Mac was in Japan. It can be argued that it was Walker who owns the greater part of the disaster.

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                            • #15
                              The Longest Retreat in USArmy history and even Seoul was abandonned a second time and Inchon dynamited. Those decisions clearly rest with MacArthur.

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