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Ancient Chinese battle case studies

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  • #16
    The Huns.
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    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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    • #17
      .................
      Attached Files
      “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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      • #18
        I'll get to this post a bit more when I have more time, but I always have some doubts on modern depictions of more dated periods of the Chinese equipments, we just don't really know enough to say for sure, most of the detailed manuels didn't survive the ages, and the surviving text only give glimps of those details at best. weapons burial isn't a big thing in China either. (but tomb robbing was which makes it even harder)

        From what I have read, I'm skeptical that the western han had any horse armor at all, and I'm skeptical that the eastern han had the fully armored cataphract style depicted in that picture, both seem to be one era ahead (i.e eastern han had the lighter horse armor while the period after the han had fully armored cataphracts) I'm also skeptical that the Qin warriors didn't wear any helmets at all, seeing that we have discovered helmets in other states and periods even further back, the reference derive almost entirely from the terra cotta warriors, but then we must ask, is that depicting the army in real life in battle? or is it depicting a army in ceremony, or a army in ideal ?

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        • #19
          Nice images Andy. It would be nice to get some scale on them as I was under the impression that the warhorses were typically pony stock.

          any historical records on the average height of chinese males in those periods?
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          • #20
            gf,

            throughout most of China's history, their horse were mere Mongolian "ponies", with the exception of Han and Tang, where great effects were in place to import the larger Arabian rides.

            As RollingWave pointed out, only the selected few were equipped with a Arabian mount for ceremony purpose or reserved as imperial guards. What makes the Campaign of Han Wudi interesting is that it is one of the few instances in history where heavy infantry (Han) was able to overcome the light cav (Hun). The tactic the Han employed was similar to how the cow boys fought the Indians, they would circle their armored wagons and shot back with heavy cross bows. Each "wagons-stations" would support each other and they can stay alive if they don't get isolated. In another word, they used fire power to overcome mobility.






            Steppe, the Silk Road, and Han Wudi

            The Cambridge Illustrated History of China
            Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Cambridge University Press


            THE STEPPE AND THE SILK ROAD

            The success of the unified bureaucratic form of government owes a great deal to military necessity: beginning in the third century BC, in circler to lend off incursions from the steppe, north China needed a government capable of deploying huge, well-trained fighting forces.

            From long before Han times, China's contacts with the outside world had involved a combination of trade and military conflict. Chinese products like silk and lacquer-ware were superior to those of its neighbours, creating a demand for Chinese goods. Some neighbours had goods they could offer in exchange, such as timber, horses, sheep and cattle. But raiding was a common alternative to trade; non-Chinese groups who found that they could acquire the goods they wanted by force had less incentive to trade. Moreover, those normally willing to trade might turn to raiding when previously established trade relations were disrupted or when drought drove them to desperate measures. Defending against the raids of non-Chinese peoples had been a problem since Shang times, but with the rise of nomadism in the arid steppe north of China proper in mid Zhou, the severity of the problem was greatly exacerbated.

            The Inner Asian steppe is a vast region of grasslands, mountains, and deserts, capable of supporting only a sparse population. In the best grasslands, such as those of modern Mongolia, rainfall is too light for grain to grow but animals can be pastured. Nomads of the steppe near China raised sheep, goats, camels, and horses, moving their camps north in summer and south in winter. Their skill as horsemen and hunters, especially their ability to shoot arrows while riding horseback, made them a potent military striking force. The typical social structure of the steppe nomads was tribal, with family and clan units held together through loyalty to chiefs selected for their military prowess. This structure could be exploited for efficient military mobilization when enough tribal units coalesced. The differences in the modes of living of farmers and herders led to sharp contrasts in their social values. For most of the imperial period, Chinese farmers looked on horse-riding pastoralists as a scourge, as pitiless gangs of bullies who preferred robbing to working for their living. The nomads, for their part, gloried in their military might and looked with scorn on farmers as weaklings incapable of defending themselves.

            The first great confederation of nomadic tribes in Inner Asia was formed by the Xiongnu in the late third century BC. The First Emperor of Qin sent 100,000 troops against them in 213 BC, and his Great Wall was intended for defense against them. The early Han emperors tried conciliatory policies, wooing the Xiongnu leaders with generous gifts, including silk, rice, cash, and even imperial princesses as brides. Critics of these policies feared that they merely strengthened the enemy; and indeed, in 166 BC 140,000 horseman raided deep into China, reaching a point less than 100 miles from the capital.

            Wudi took the offensive. He sent 300,000 troops far into Xiongnu territory in 133 BC. Subsequent expeditions, like those in 124, 123, and 119, often involved over 100,000 men. These campaigns were enormously expensive, requiring long supply lines and entailing great losses of men and horses. The gain was territory: regions north and west of the capital were acquired, cutting off the Xiongnu from the proto-Tibetan Qiang, whom they had subjugated. Four commanderies were established in Gansu, and more than a million people were dispatched to colonize this northwest region. At the same time Wudi sent troops into northern Korea to establish commanderies that would flank the Xiongnu on their eastern border.

            Wudi turned his attention to Central Asia as well, in part to find allies, in part to improve the supply of horses for the army. In 139 BC he sent one of his officials, Zhang Qian, west in search of allies to fight against the Xiongnu. Captured and kept prisoner for ten years, Zhang eventually escaped and made his way to Bactria and Ferghana, returning in 126 BC. In 115 BC he set out on a second journey west. From his reports, the Chinese learned for the first time of other civilized states comparable to China that had developed independently of China. Ferghana, for instance, he described as 10,000 li (about 3,000 miles) due west of China, a land of fortified cities and dense population, that grew wheat and grapes for wine and had fine horses that sweated blood. He described Parthia in similar terms, but drew particular attention to its merchants and to its coins, made of silver and bearing the image of the king's face. Zhang Qian discovered that these regions were already importing Chinese products, especially silk. In 101 BC, after three years' effort, a Chinese army made its way beyond the Pamir Mountains to defeat Ferghana, seize large numbers of its excellent horses, and gain recognition of Chinese overlordship, thus obtaining control over the trade routes across Central Asia. The territorial reach of the Han state had been vastly extended.
            Last edited by xinhui; 18 Jan 10,, 09:20.
            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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            • #21
              Originally posted by gf0012-aust View Post
              Nice images Andy. It would be nice to get some scale on them as I was under the impression that the warhorses were typically pony stock.

              any historical records on the average height of chinese males in those periods?
              The horses in the region is predominantly of the Mongolian stock, so yes they're generally smaller . though on the steps of Mongolia they're also extremely numerous and durable.

              The Han dynasty started importing horses from central Asia, presumably those are horses closer to the modern Arabians. though they were never in large supplies. and because the breeding was generally controlled by the government (instead of in Europe, where even during Roman times it was a pretty decentralized affair), it's effectiveness comes and goes along with those governments. Chinese commoners had little demand for horses them self (and those that did breed horses were rarely done for war purpose).

              Another issue is that horses became extinct in China proper in the wild (Yellow River region) somewhere around or before the Tang dynasty due to the wide spread and advanced developments of Chinese agriculture (during the Han dynasty China proper still had Rhinos!). much like how Syrian / African Forest elephants cease to exist after early Roman periods. so for later dynasties even the Mongolian horses must be imported and / or bread.



              Originally posted by xinhui View Post
              gf,

              throughout most of China's history, their horse were mere Mongolian "ponies", with the exception of Han and Tang, where great effects were in place to import the larger Arabian rides.

              As RollingWave pointed out, only the selected few were equipped with a Arabian mount for ceremony purpose or reserved as imperial guards. What makes the Campaign of Han Wudi interesting is that it is one of the few instances in history where heavy infantry (Han) was able to overcome the light cav (Hun). The tactic the Han employed was similar to how the cow boys fought the Indians, they would circle their armored wagons and shot back with heavy cross bows. Each "wagons-stations" would support each other and they can stay alive if they don't get isolated. In another word, they used fire power to overcome mobility.
              Actually, from what I've read the Han expedition was predominantly cavalry based as well, at least it's main combat troopers were, the infantry acted more as a logistical train guard . the tactic was like a carrier fleet on land, where the infantry = carrier group , while the cavalry = fighter / bomber strike group, the infantry would be moving along with all the supplies, and when encountering enemies they would use those wagons as a defensive barrier (often forming them into makeshift circle forts, kind of like what the colonist did in the early 1800s while moving through Indian territories. ) from there they can snipe at enemy riders with bows / crossbows at leisure. and the Huns didn't really have serious means of breaking through such defenses . this is basically the standard tactics of all later dynasties as well, basically it's fighting the nomads like nomads. with the difference being that the Chinese logisitcs were limited but well defended.

              Their cavalry would rally around the logistic trains but then set out and seek out the Hun army and/or their camps. obviously while the Huns were nomads they still had camps, just that they move them when they need to. and those camps didn't have the same defenses like the Han logistic trains. (but obviously, they had one huge advantage over the Han, in that those defenseless camps are self sufficient while the Han's weren't).

              It's more or less a hide and seek (or seek and destroy) game. and while the Han did score some serious victories, in the longer run it didn't really make a whole lot of difference. especially the later campaigns. (the early campaigns targeted actual agricultural settlements on the border area that was lost during the fall of the Qin, so those were obviously lasting gains)

              The Han was limited in terms of supplies. as not only food but fuel was also a serious issue, it is often said that most of the Han casualties probably came due to wounds that didn't have enough doctors / medical supplies to treat and the cold instead of actually being killed in action. some scouts set out and couldn't find their way back to the train and was never seen again as well (though that was not quiet as common).

              The only expedition that set out without any serious cavalries was probably the famous disaster of Li-Ling, but from the records you read that using the mobile fort tactics he held off a much larger Xiong Nu forces, but he couldn't get back to Han territory while moving like that, and was finally forced to surrender when he must pass through a narrow pass with the Xiong Nu archers already taken up position on the high points.
              Last edited by RollingWave; 18 Jan 10,, 11:15.

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              • #22
                One of the problems with the later Han campaign is the lack of reliable troops. With the policy of re-populate the recovered agricultural settlements, there was not enough to adult conscripts available and thus An-Nan (Northern Vietnamese) and Korean merc were used instead.


                W.r.t Li-Ling, his failure to reach back to the great wall was due to the betrayal of one of his captains, not the tactic employed. After he ran out arrows and bolts, he was advised to escape with his guards, but he choice the bitter end instead.
                “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                • #23
                  I guess your referring to Guan Gan, but by the time he "betrayed" Li-Ling, Li had basically ran out of ammo and supplies anyway, it was just that the Xiong Nu feared it was a trap that they were still hesitant of making the final assualt. he was still about 2-3 days march away from safty when he surrendered, it was unlikely that he would have made it even without the betrayal.

                  And in the end, what if he did? he still got forced back and wasn't really able to achieve his objective, so what if he inflicted heavier casualties ? you don't win war based on your kill ratio .
                  Last edited by RollingWave; 19 Jan 10,, 06:29.

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                  • #24
                    RollingWave

                    Thanks for the correction, but the Chinese history is clearly pointing finger at Guan Gan as the "badguy/turncoat."
                    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                    • #25
                      Interesting.The circled wagons were used by the Russians at Kalka and by the Hungarians at Mohi.In the first case the defenders surrendered due to thirst and in the second they fell in the Mongol trap,that allowed them to escape only to chase the fleeing host.
                      So it's a risky bussiness.How were the nomads forced to give battle?They could just withdraw until the Imperial forces tired of chasing.
                      Those who know don't speak
                      He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

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                      • #26
                        take and hold water sources, kill their cattle. In another word, economic warfare.
                        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                          Interesting.The circled wagons were used by the Russians at Kalka and by the Hungarians at Mohi.In the first case the defenders surrendered due to thirst and in the second they fell in the Mongol trap,that allowed them to escape only to chase the fleeing host.
                          So it's a risky bussiness.How were the nomads forced to give battle?They could just withdraw until the Imperial forces tired of chasing.
                          because aside from the case of Li-Ling, the Han expedition was also coupled with a massive horse archer force them self, so the circle wagon tactic was only meant for the purpose of protecting the supplies from sudden attacks.

                          Like I said, it was a lot like a pre - modern carrier group on land. where the wagon formation = carrier group, and the cavalry = air-craft strike group. the purpose of the carrier group is simply to protect a base of operation for the air craft / cavalries to refuel / resupply .


                          The Han's intention was for their cavalries to find and destroy the Xiong Nu army and more preferably their camps and capture their live stocks. but to do that they need to keep a supply train out in the middle of steppes. which needs to be able to defend itself if they're caught with their cavalries being away.

                          Also, the Mongols were different from the Xiong Nu, especially by the time they reached Europe, in that by then they had defeated and captured a large amount of Chinese / Persians other central Asians that by then they had extensive siege technique and access to some gunpowder weapons. so such a tactic were less useful against them . (not to mention that no one can throw up a comparable cavalry force to fight them anyway).

                          In 119 B.C, was probably the largest showdown of the Han against the Xiong Nu, according to Shi Ji (which was written by a official serving in the Han court at that time)

                          元狩四年春,上令大將軍青、驃騎將軍去病將各五萬騎,步兵轉者踵軍數十萬,而敢力戰深入之士皆屬驃騎。驃騎 始為出定襄,當單于。捕虜言單于東,乃更令驃騎出代郡,令大將軍出定襄。郎中令為前將軍,太僕為左將軍,主 爵趙食其為右將軍,平陽侯襄為後將軍,皆屬大將軍。兵即度幕,人馬凡五萬騎,與驃騎等咸擊匈奴單于。趙信為 單于謀曰:「漢兵既度幕,人馬罷,匈奴可坐收虜耳。」乃悉遠北其輜重,皆以精兵待幕北。而適值大將軍軍出塞 千餘里,見單于兵陳而待,於是大將軍令武剛車自環為營,而縱五千騎往當匈奴。匈奴亦縱可萬騎。會日且入,大 風起,沙礫擊面,兩軍不相見,漢益縱左右翼繞單于。單于視漢兵多,而士馬尚彊,戰而匈奴不利,薄莫,單于遂 乘六驘,壯騎可數百,直冒漢圍西北馳去。時已昏,漢匈奴相紛挐,殺傷大當。漢軍左校捕虜言單于未昏而去,漢 軍因發輕騎夜追之,大將軍軍因隨其後。匈奴兵亦散走。遲明,行二百餘里,不得單于,頗捕斬首虜萬餘級,遂至 窴顏山趙信城,得匈奴積粟食軍。軍留一日而還,悉燒其城餘粟以歸。

                          you can see that

                          1. the infantry to cavalry ratio was at least 2:1, most sources seem to suggest it was 500,000 infantry and 140,000 cavalry.

                          2. it specifically noted that Wei Chin ordered his wagons to "circle into a fort"

                          3. Wei Chin himself lead the cavalries and it was the main fighting force. , the fort was there more or less to act as a safe rally point and protect their supplies.

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                          • #28
                            cavalry of the Hu Dynasty. Ready to do battle against Xiong Nu once again in Xinjing.
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                            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                            • #29
                              .........there are a total of two battalions in service. Actually they are extremely useful in S&R operations in the recent record snow storm.
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                              Last edited by xinhui; 05 Feb 10,, 05:28.
                              “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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                              • #30
                                what, no crouched lance tactics with bayonets ?:P

                                these horsese are nice examples of historical chinese hosres though, they're obviously mongolian stock horses.

                                notice how the western horses are significantly bigger?
                                Last edited by RollingWave; 05 Feb 10,, 07:37.

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