Was it right for North Korea and its allies to attack South Korea? Was it really necessary?
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Korean War, right or wrong?
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Originally posted by BeechyWas it right for North Korea and its allies to attack South Korea? Was it really necessary?
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Originally posted by lwarmongerbut asking whether it was right or wrong strikes me as a fairly pointless question.No man is free until all men are free - John Hossack
I agree completely with this Administration’s goal of a regime change in Iraq-John Kerry
even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act-John Kerry
He may even miscalculate and slide these weapons off to terrorist groups to invite them to be a surrogate to use them against the United States. It’s the miscalculation that poses the greatest threat-John Kerry
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Beechy, I don't know what guys you were talking to, but its possible they meant "right" in a strategic sense, like that if there was going to be a war, North Korea was smart to attack first. If they were talking in a moral sense, then there is absolutely no way in hell North Korea was justified in attacking South Korea.
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Originally posted by ZFBoxcarBeechy, I don't know what guys you were talking to, but its possible they meant "right" in a strategic sense, like that if there was going to be a war, North Korea was smart to attack first. If they were talking in a moral sense, then there is absolutely no way in hell North Korea was justified in attacking South Korea.
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World Affairs Board - Korea: Reluctant Dragons and Red Conspiracies
Starting in 1992, a third wave of Korean War histories and historians arrived. Most were American-educated Asians who could read, write, and speak Chinese, Korean, or both. In sharp contrast to the earlier works, the third wave's thesis was soundly based on previously unavailable documents--not mere interpretation--namely a flood of declassified U.S. government papers and official histories that began to become available in the 1980s. These historians also drew upon newly available memoirs and official papers from the archives of the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. These included approximately five hundred previously secret wartime diplomatic messages the Russian government gave South Korea in 1994. The Asian-American historians also conducted interviews with Chinese and Soviet participants. Not surprisingly, their work is far more convincing than that of earlier Korean War historians, who for the most part had only public U.S. and South Korean sources from which to work.
The third-wave historians tell us much about the underlying causes of the military confrontation that characterized most of the Cold War from 1950 until 1989. Specifically, we are now aware of the extent of collusion among Moscow, Pyongyang, and Beijing in creating and prosecuting the Korean War. We know what the Communist leaders thought about the possibility of American military resistance to the North Korean invasion. The date of China's decision to enter the war has been identified, and its aim in doing so is now known as well. We have enough information to comprehend what Chinese military leaders expected to result from their army's battlefield collision with American troops. And, we now know their reactions after that first clash occurred. The mystery of the "November Lull"--the pause in combat between the first Chinese-American encounter and the full-blown and violent struggle a month later--is finally solved. And, we have learned much about Communist strategy from October 1950 until the 1953 cease-fire. Combining this new information with what we already knew about U.S. decisions, we have a much clearer understanding of one of the most important conflicts of the twentieth century.
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