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  • Battle of Hong Kong

    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Based on what was known, Hong Kong was EXTREMELY defensible.

    The Canadian official history quotes a memorandum from Churchill,

    Originally posted by Churchill to Ismay on 7 Jan 41, emphasis added

    This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale.

    C.P. Stacey's discussion of the decision suggests that it was purely political (vol 1, p.437-42) in both the UK and Canada.

  • #2
    Originally posted by cape_royds View Post
    C.P. Stacey's discussion of the decision suggests that it was purely political (vol 1, p.437-42) in both the UK and Canada.
    Read again, the military picture, based upon the military thinking of the time and not what the IJA was prepared to do, ie avoid the roads.

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    • #3
      Now I know that the Allied defenses in Malaya were repeatedly outflanked when the Japanese unexpectedly went off-road into dense forests.

      But was such also the case at Hong Kong?

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      • #4
        Originally posted by cape_royds View Post
        But was such also the case at Hong Kong?
        You're not understanding. The British defence on Hong Kong was based upon controlling the roads. The Japanese attack on Hong Kong was based upon avoiding the roads.

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        • #5
          Now I get your point. Thanks.

          But why do you think that Churchill, almost a year before the battle, hold such a sceptical view of the defensibility of Hong Kong?

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          • #6
            The assumption is based upon the RN being unable to break an IJN blockade. A view that was not shared by the Admiralty.

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            • #7
              Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
              You're not understanding. The British defence on Hong Kong was based upon controlling the roads. The Japanese attack on Hong Kong was based upon avoiding the roads.
              Was the Japanese attack based on the predicted British defense and thereby avoiding it?

              As far as the general debate of broad versus narrow, I don't know except that the results proved success for the broad method, but I find it good reading and the "my dad can beat up your dad" between the various supporters of generals amusing. :))
              Last edited by rj1; 15 Oct 09,, 20:04.

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              • #8
                Originally posted by cape_royds View Post
                Now I get your point. Thanks.

                But why do you think that Churchill, almost a year before the battle, hold such a sceptical view of the defensibility of Hong Kong?
                And to think Churchill was in charge of the admiralty during the Galipoli Campaign, and was sacked. I wouldn't listen to him if I were in the Admiralty.

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                • #9
                  Was the Admiralty assuming a large fleet at Singapore? They would also have to assume the US Pacific fleet intact and able to base in the Philippines. Otherwise, with Japanese bases at Formosa and Indochina the prospects of relieving HK would seem pretty bleak.

                  By Jan '41 had Churchill made the basic decision to prioritize the Mediterranean over the Pacific?

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                    The assumption is based upon the RN being unable to break an IJN blockade. A view that was not shared by the Admiralty.
                    Given that RN/ABDA forces were unable to successfully challenge the IJN & its air support nth or east of Singapore until late in the war & were not even able to keep the Japanese out of the Indian ocean for a time, was the Admiralty's view sustainable?

                    How did they propose to keep open supply lines to HK? Even with dispositions as they were in early 1941 I would have thought it difficult. As long as Britain was fighting in the Med & the Atlantic were there really the naval forces necessary to challenge the IJN & Japanese air power?
                    sigpic

                    Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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                    • #11
                      You forget that pre-Pearl Harbour,the balance of forces was tilted against the IJN. While the RN/ABDA wasn't at full strength given their pre-occupation elsewhere, the USN was more than the IJN could have handled if they weren't caught taking a nap.

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                        You forget that pre-Pearl Harbour,the balance of forces was tilted against the IJN. While the RN/ABDA wasn't at full strength given their pre-occupation elsewhere, the USN was more than the IJN could have handled if they weren't caught taking a nap.
                        Sir, with all due repsect, pearl harbor probalby saved thousands of lives and several battleships. The USN was no more prepared for the range of Japanese air power than the RN was. Instead of the Prince of Wales and Repulse or as well as I should say. You'd have incidents like the California, Oklahoma and Arizona sunk far outside of what was though to be hostile air space as they sailed to relieve the Philippines for example. The old US battleships sucked for AAA armament.

                        Pearl taught the US how to beat Japan, but in 41-42 without Pearl those lessons haven't been learned and the technology has not yet been delivered.

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                        • #13
                          Let me rephrase. Before Pearl Harbour, the IJN was viewed to have insufficient strength to challenge both the RN and the USN.

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                          • #14
                            Hong Kong was doomed to be one of the first British outposts to go as Winston Churchill said privately In early 1941, that there was not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or of relieving it if the Japanese attacked.

                            Situated where it was, a stones throw away from the mainland with 12,000 untried British & Commonwealth troops against the vast forces the already blooded Japanese could throw at it, it's a miracle it lasted 17 days.

                            And the RN couldn't do jot about it, Churchill came up with the brilliant plan of sending the Repulse & the Prince of Wales plus a carrier to Singapore which the chief of the Admiralty argued against to no avail, [as it happened the carrier ran aground & couldn't join the task force] & the two Brit capital ships were sunk in the blink of an eye by Japanese air power, without even firing a shot at any Japanese task forces.

                            And there would be no help from the Americans.

                            At Placenta Bay in August '41 Churchill urged the US to join Britain if British bases were attacked, but Roosevelt turned him down.
                            He was still not ready to commit the US to joining the war if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions in the far east, or even send cruisers to fly the flag in Singapore, America was still unprepared for war & the isolationist situation in the US had his hands tied.


                            The book by Tony Banham ''Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941'' an amazingly well researched book and in methodical detail relates what happened.


                            Bye the way, what happened to Clackers?

                            Wondering what he did to get kicked out, IMHO he was one of the best posters on the board.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by ANZAC View Post
                              Hong Kong was doomed to be one of the first British outposts to go as Winston Churchill said privately In early 1941, that there was not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or of relieving it if the Japanese attacked.

                              Situated where it was, a stones throw away from the mainland with 12,000 untried British & Commonwealth troops against the vast forces the already blooded Japanese could throw at it, it's a miracle it lasted 17 days.
                              I strongly disagree. At no point during the Asian Mainland War was a determined defence ever mounted. Hong Kong, Shanghai, and even Nanking could have turned into a Stalingrad. The Chinese certainly had the bodies for it and the IJA never had the bullets to do what Paulis did. It was a fight of bayonets and the ONLY reason why the Japanese won was because they wanted it more, NOT because of any reason of logistics nor firepower.

                              Originally posted by ANZAC View Post
                              And the RN couldn't do jot about it, Churchill came up with the brilliant plan of sending the Repulse & the Prince of Wales plus a carrier to Singapore which the chief of the Admiralty argued against to no avail, [as it happened the carrier ran aground & couldn't join the task force] & the two Brit capital ships were sunk in the blink of an eye by Japanese air power, without even firing a shot at any Japanese task forces.
                              Does the fact that Yamamoto could not see a victory tell you anything? The IJN started from a disadvantage. They had the element of surprise and superior usage of a WWI army. For Pete sakes, Eighth Army did circles around Rommel, you're telling me that the British could not recover and smash Japanese brigade level ops?

                              Originally posted by ANZAC View Post
                              And there would be no help from the Americans.
                              That is against historic facts. China got bloodied far more than the UK ever did but she stayed in the fight.

                              Originally posted by ANZAC View Post
                              The book by Tony Banham ''Not the Slightest Chance: The Defence of Hong Kong, 1941'' an amazingly well researched book and in methodical detail relates what happened.
                              Except one thing - the lack of will.

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