Battle of Hong Kong

[Officer of Engineers]

I guess it's fortunate that it was only two battalions [not fortunate for those men who did go though] & not more were sent, they would have ended up in the same boat as their comrades.

I really hate this. You are looking at this post Hong Kong, not pre-HK. Can you SERIOUSLY tell me that you would not have made the same decision based upon warfare knowledge at the time, or the very least, expect them to held out longer than they actually did?

Hong Kong felled a lot earler than Churchill expected ... and that is the point. No one knew how the Japanese would circumvate British defences ... not even the Japanese.

[cape_royds]

Sorry, OoE, but I just quoted a memo from Churchill to the CIGS from March '41. I'll quote Churchill again: "If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it."

Churchill liked to hold fortresses. He wanted to hold Tobruk. He wanted to fight hard at Singapore. Early in his warlord career, in 1914, he had tried to single-handedly organize the defense of Antwerp. So it's not like he wasn't aware of the potential of fortresses to resist. It's not like he wasn't an optimist by nature.

Nevertheless, that optimistic fortress enthusiast took one look at HK and told the Chief of his general staff, "not the slightest chance." And that wasn't something he was writing in his memoirs afterwards. He wrote that eight months before Japan attacked.

There's no doubt that Churchill did not expect HK to hold. There's no doubt that he was sceptical of the value of reinforcing the garrison.

Churchill changed his mind and decided to reinforce the garrison anyhow.

So the question can only be, "why did Winston change his mind?"

I would say that the reason he changed his mind was mainly political. Remember that over the course of 1941 the USA was taking a harder diplomatic line toward Japan. The reinforcement of HK was less to deter Japan, than to be a gesture of support and solidarity towards the USA.

Another thing that had changed between his March '41 memo to Ismay and the dispatch of reinforcements to HK was that the USSR was now in the war. Britain was no longer fighting alone against Germany, and perhaps no longer had to conserve every battalion as carefully as before. Britain could now gamble on making the odd political gesture in the Far East.

[Officer of Engineers]

So the question can only be, "why did Winston change his mind?"

My apologies. I've misunderstood your question and intent.

Hong Kong could not have been held forever but that was never the intent.

The Japanese could take Hong Kong after a long fight (28 days) but could not hold onto Hong Kong, not with the USN intact and the Singapore Garrison rushing forces forward.

Pearl Harbour is what collapsed all defensive organizations.

[ANZAC]

I really hate this. You are looking at this post Hong Kong, not pre-HK. Can you SERIOUSLY tell me that you would not have made the same decision based upon warfare knowledge at the time, or the very least, expect them to held out longer than they actually did?

Churchill thought it was a lost cause, the first Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Pound believed it couldn't be relieved, not in hindsight but from what was known at the time based on the resources available, the fact that there were a few who seriously underestimated the Japanese capabilities is not a very compelling argument to suggest they were mistaken, especially when history shows they were right.

Hong Kong felled a lot earler than Churchill expected ... and that is the point. No one knew how the Japanese would circumvate British defences ... not even the Japanese.

Japanese military planners were EXTREMELY confident, that's why they only committed eleven divisions to the strike South & just about everything worked exactly as planned.
Expectation of success correctly rested on the obvious fact that British, Australian and Dutch forces, already drained of the best personnel and materiel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, & with the RN involved in the Atlantic & Mediterranean they would be unable to provide much more than token resistance to the better armed battle hardened Japanese.

I would say that the reason he changed his mind was mainly political. Remember that over the course of 1941 the USA was taking a harder diplomatic line toward Japan. The reinforcement of HK was less to deter Japan, than to be a gesture of support and solidarity towards the USA.

You've nailed it in one cr, mainly political on Churchills part.

Churchill was brilliant in the way he rallied and united British resolve in the war, but as a warlord he was a bit of a dud, especially as far as Aussies & Kiwi's go.

Gallipoli ment thousands of ANZAC casualties, [along with the Brits] then the sacrifice of the ANZACS in the doomed Greek & Crete campaign, & when Australia's best divisions were called back to defend the homeland, Churchill tried to over rule the Aussie PM Curtain & have them sent to Burma, [which would have been the end of them] but Curtain dug in his heels & got them home.

[Officer of Engineers]

Churchill thought it was a lost cause, the first Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Pound believed it couldn't be relieved, not in hindsight but from what was known at the time based on the resources available, the fact that there were a few who seriously underestimated the Japanese capabilities is not a very compelling argument to suggest they were mistaken, especially when history shows they were right.

The entire battle plan rested with Pearl Harbour. Had Pearl survived as a fighting force, all these questions would have an extremely different outlook.

Japanese military planners were EXTREMELY confident, that's why they only committed eleven divisions to the strike South & just about everything worked exactly as planned.

Eleven divisions was about all they could have done. Not after the pasting they've got up north and the Chinese far from being out of the fight.

Again, on paper, 6 line battalions backed by artillery was hardly a light force. That the Canadians and the British made the mistake of making their primary lines of defence at the Kwolong border does not subtract from the initial commitements that was required.

Expectation of success correctly rested on the obvious fact that British, Australian and Dutch forces, already drained of the best personnel and materiel by two years of war with Germany, and heavily committed in the Middle East, North Africa and elsewhere, & with the RN involved in the Atlantic & Mediterranean they would be unable to provide much more than token resistance to the better armed battle hardened Japanese.

Seriously, this is revisionist BS. The Japanese were no better, no worst than the troops facing them. That the Canadians fought on was a testament that they did not collapse as the Japanese expected. In fact, in hind sight, the Japanese proved to be lesser material than the Canadians who went onto Dieppe and Juno.

You've nailed it in one cr, mainly political on Churchills part.

Churchill was brilliant in the way he rallied and united British resolve in the war, but as a warlord he was a bit of a dud, especially as far as Aussies & Kiwi's go.

Gallipoli ment thousands of ANZAC casualties, [along with the Brits] then the sacrifice of the ANZACS in the doomed Greek & Crete campaign, & when Australia's best divisions were called back to defend the homeland, Churchill tried to over rule the Aussie PM Curtain & have them sent to Burma, [which would have been the end of them] but Curtain dug in his heels & got them home.

Hong Kong is a lesser importance to Canada. Though an embarrasement, in all seriousness, it was not that important to us. The Battle of the Atlantic was our focus.

This being said, the Canadian Army had confidence that Hong Kong could be held out ... but when it felled, we were not going to relive it. We had more important things to do.

[Bigfella]

Seriously, this is revisionist BS. The Japanese were no better, no worst than the troops facing them. That the Canadians fought on was a testament that they did not collapse as the Japanese expected. In fact, in hind sight, the Japanese proved to be lesser material than the Canadians who went onto Dieppe and Juno.

Col. Yu,

Curious about this bit. Are you talking specifically about HK here or replying to the broader point ANZAC made about the campaign furhter afield?

I don't know much about the Canadians at HK, but I know a bit about the Australian & British troops in Malaya & Burma. There were some British & colonial units with battle experience, but I'm pretty sure that the majority of the British, Australian & Indian troops there had never seen combat. In some cases units were only recently trained. This didn't mean they could or would not fight, but my understanding is that it was a factor.

I don't know the precise makeup of the Japanese forces, But I have always understood that the units leading the advance were either experienced units that had fought in China or highly trained specialist units (paratroops, Naval infantry etc. in the NEI in particular). I would have thought that all things being equal, more experienced & better trained troops would start with an advantage.

While this was only one of many factors in the Allied defeats (air power, generalship etc.), I have always understood that it was a factor (in Burma, malaya & the NEI at least).

[ANZAC]

The entire battle plan rested with Pearl Harbour. Had Pearl survived as a fighting force, all these questions would have an extremely different outlook.

But it would not have saved HK, Singapore or Manila, refer you to zraver's post 109.

Again, on paper, 6 line battalions backed by artillery was hardly a light force. That the Canadians and the British made the mistake of making their primary lines of defence at the Kwolong border does not subtract from the initial commitements that was required.

The simple fact was that the Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in men, material and experience over the Commonwealth troops facing them.

Put it this way, if 60,000 Japanese can defeat 80,000 British & Commonwealth troops on Singapore, what hope did 12,000 Commonwealth troops have against 50,000 Japanese troops on HK.

Seriously, this is revisionist BS. The Japanese were no better, no worst than the troops facing them. That the Canadians fought on was a testament that they did not collapse as the Japanese expected. In fact, in hind sight, the Japanese proved to be lesser material than the Canadians who went onto Dieppe and Juno.

Revisionist BS? In what way? The Commonwealth forces were stretched thin fighting the Germans, the Royal Navy was tied down in the Atlantic & Mediterranean and the force deployed at HK was little more then a token one, all facts.

Here is a link as to how unprepared some of the units in the Canadian Regiments were ......many of the Aussies in Malaya were in the same boat.

http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/.../hancock01.pdf ... Pages 8 and 9.

Hong Kong is a lesser importance to Canada. Though an embarrasement, in all seriousness, it was not that important to us. The Battle of the Atlantic was our focus.

Not sure how Canadians on the whole feel about the losses on HK, but personally I don't think it was an embarrassment in any way, the Commonwealth troops on HK put up the best fight they could have under the circumstances.

[gf0012-aust]

The simple fact was that the Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in men, material and experience over the Commonwealth troops facing them.

Put it this way, if 60,000 Japanese can defeat 80,000 British & Commonwealth troops on Singapore, what hope did 12,000 Commonwealth troops have against 50,000 Japanese troops on HK.

ah but you now cross into the traditional danger of analysing on numbers and then extrapolating that out. :)

the reality was that the japanese had better commanders in that loc.

eg look at Milne Bay as a counter to that example....

[xinhui]

By all accounts the Japanese offensive was originally intended to prevent Chinese forces from helping the British Commonwealth forces engaged in Hong Kong. [which succeeded] But with the quick capture of Hong Kong it was decided to continue the offensive against Changsha in order to maximize the blow against the Chinese government.

But at those odds all it got the Japanese was a very bloody nose.

Not sure I can agree to that as the KMT of that time can't mount an offensive operation. Also, before they can get to HongKong, they need to reach Canton. KMT would not trade Guangzhou For HongKong.

[zraver]

ah but you now cross into the traditional danger of analysing on numbers and then extrapolating that out. :)

the reality was that the japanese had better commanders in that loc.

eg look at Milne Bay as a counter to that example....

Yes but the first step in analyzing is comparative force strength. 12,000 vs 50,000 all other things being roughly equal, or canceled out is only going to go one way 99% of the time.

Also Milne bay is not a very good example. There you have roughly a brigade sized force of Japanese vs roughly 2 brigades on the Aussie side. That is not really comparable to corps and army level engagements.

[ANZAC]

Yeah, the numbers more or less speak for them selves.

Unfortunately for the HK garrison, it was one of the few places that the Japanese had such an overwhelming superiority in numbers with two divisions for the assault [although only elements of one division was used to take the island.]

Japanese military intelligence was off the mark at Milne Bay, thinking there were less then 1000 Aussies, so sent a force of 1,800 to take care of them, when in fact they came up against 9,000 [4,500 combat troops] the Japanese bit off a bit too much that time.

Not sure I can agree to that as the KMT of that time can't mount an offensive operation. Also, before they can get to HongKong, they need to reach Canton. KMT would not trade Guangzhou For HongKong.

Just going by this......

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Changsha_(1942)

From 'China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945, pg. 158'

Some time back on a thread 'what was the most neglected front of WWII' I posted for me it was the Chinese front, that apart from the battles for the major cities, I couldn't name any other battle in the Sino/Chinese war, must swot up on it, because it was a major contribution to the Allies cause in the Pacific & Burma, tying down so many men & resources, & according to disputed Japanese records causing around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties.

And it cost the Chinese 3,220,000 military & 17,000,000 civilian casualties.

Must be some good sites out there.

What do the Chinese consider the start of the war, July '37, or September '31?

[zraver]

Yeah, the numbers more or less speak for them selves.

Unfortunately for the HK garrison, it was one of the few places that the Japanese had such an overwhelming superiority in numbers with two divisions for the assault [although only elements of one division was used to take the island.

Terms like division don't really mean much. Its not a uniform size so counting them is an exercise in futility. Some armies used big divisions, us Americans are famous for them, and apparently the Japanese did as well. 12,000 men is a division sized unit but 50,000 is a corps or small army sized formation in terms are very generic combat power.

Japanese military intelligence was off the mark at Milne Bay, thinking there were less then 1000 Aussies, so sent a force of 1,800 to take care of them, when in fact they came up against 9,000 [4,500 combat troops] the Japanese bit off a bit too much that time.

Yup

[xinhui]

What do the Chinese consider the start of the war, July '37, or September '31?

Both Chinese governments (KMT/CCP) considered the Sept 31 as the start date of the war.

There is one thing completely missing in this debate -- the local Chinese heroic stand to defend HongKong after the "western" forces gave up. I have visited mess burial grounds in Hongkong (one in North Point, right next to the North Point government elementary school) for those pack of resistance that fought to the last man.

[zraver]

Both Chinese governments (KMT/CCP) considered the Sept 31 as the start date of the war.

There is one thing completely missing in this debate -- the local Chinese heroic stand to defend HongKong after the "western" forces gave up. I have visited mess burial grounds in Hongkong (one in North Point, right next to the North Point government elementary school) for those pack of resistance that fought to the last man.

provide the info, as an American the battle for Hong Kong is not a common subject.

[xinhui]

Here is a quick one, the most detailed background is in Chinese.

The Defence of Hong Kong

On the evening of 18th December 1941 they launched an attack with three Regiments in area around North Point and Lee Yu Mun Barracks. Map 2 above shows this area, with notations showing the range of the various guns mounted in the area of the Barracks. Despite some severe fighting the Japanese succeeded in reaching the centre of the Island in twelve hours

A large memorial was constructed during the occupation to celebrate this Japanese victory, but the local Chinese destroyed this in 1945 when the Japanese surrendered. Throughout the war there was an active resistance, particularly in the New Territories, and the Japanese raised whole villages. Traces of some of these villages can still be seen today, such as Cheung Sheung Village in Sai Kun Peninsula .