A study published by the Strategic Studies Instituite on Soviet nuclear war doctrine, relying heavily on declassified documents and interviews with former Red officiers, concluded to the same effect. Soviet Union generals, after decades of fidgeting the idea of waging conventional a nuclear environment, realized that the concept was futile, and that Russia will not survive a nuclear exchange with America.
The study went on to say that simulated wargames convinced the Soviet military leadership that dettereance was the only meaningful way to use nuclear weapons, and Soviet use of nukes would be strictly retaliatory (i.e. only used when the adversary had deployed nuclear weapons) or preemptive (i.e. the adversary showed an imminent and certain intent to deploy nuclear weapons). Effectively, they gave up on the nuclear first strike policy.
The rest of the study could be downloaded for free on Strategic Studies Instituite for free.
*Edit: I forgot to mention that the Soviets did not envision any future clash with NATO as nuclear-arms free; this falls together with OoE's analysis perfectly. BtW, the Soviets certain took the probability of nuclear armagandon pretty seriously...
At least by the early 1970s, the interviews show that informed Soviet military leadershipconsidered victory in a nuclear war to be unattainable in any
meaningful sense. Akhromeev stated that in practical terms, neither
side would win a nuclear war. According to Tsygichko, the General
Staff understood the devastation that would result from a nuclear
war and therefore did not develop a working definition of victory.
Military planners instead focused on the destruction that they could
inflict on the enemy. They hoped that, in a nuclear exchange, some
pockets of civilization inside the Soviet Union would survive. . . .
The General Staff, beginning in the 1970s, developed
the idea that nuclear weapons were a political tool, with very limited
military utility. This applied to both the strategic and theater use of
nuclear weapons. By 1981, the General Staff concluded that nuclear
use would be catastrophic as well as counterproductive in combating
operations in the European theater.
meaningful sense. Akhromeev stated that in practical terms, neither
side would win a nuclear war. According to Tsygichko, the General
Staff understood the devastation that would result from a nuclear
war and therefore did not develop a working definition of victory.
Military planners instead focused on the destruction that they could
inflict on the enemy. They hoped that, in a nuclear exchange, some
pockets of civilization inside the Soviet Union would survive. . . .
The General Staff, beginning in the 1970s, developed
the idea that nuclear weapons were a political tool, with very limited
military utility. This applied to both the strategic and theater use of
nuclear weapons. By 1981, the General Staff concluded that nuclear
use would be catastrophic as well as counterproductive in combating
operations in the European theater.
The rest of the study could be downloaded for free on Strategic Studies Instituite for free.
*Edit: I forgot to mention that the Soviets did not envision any future clash with NATO as nuclear-arms free; this falls together with OoE's analysis perfectly. BtW, the Soviets certain took the probability of nuclear armagandon pretty seriously...
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