NATO vs. Warsaw Pact

[lwarmonger]

Because of the need to sustain battle momentum.

Wouldn't bringing up the new front accomplish that? Where are these replacements coming from anyways?

We have a substantially larger reserves than they do. All our and theirs warplans are based upon the fact that we could not field those reserves in time. Canada alone can field a corps within 60 days.

Yeah, but their category A divisions are readily accessable.

Speed bumps and very ineffective ones behind the Rhine.

Attack the units assigned to take them out of there in addition to attacking the sites themselves. Lightly armed rear area units should be fairly easily disrupted, as should command and control for them, and commando units operating in conjuction with air strikes... The Spetznaz/airborne forces don't have to take the equipment, they just have to delay it's evacuation until the armoured columns get there.

No, it does not mean that at all. The best historic example of a Soviet Deep Battle was Manchuria, 1945 in which 80% of the IJA Kuangtum Army never saw combat.

But that was an operation against an opponent with next to no mobile reserves, which is why the operation was so successful. Not going to happen against an entirely mechanized army like that in West Germany.

No, they do not mean that. If REFORGER got into place, then they're front line troops. The strategic reserves I've been stating are actually front line units. In the case of VII Corps, the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group stationed at Canadian Forces Base Lahrs, FRG.

So basically it is whatever forces can be put together into coherant battle groups from front line forces?

In support of a nuclear armed strike. But again, we've taken nukes out of the equation. Much like the 10 day march to the Rhine, the strategic picture against the Chinese changed dramatically without nukes.

Damn rules of engagement!!!!

Except the fact that ALL sides would be rushing to flush out the reserves. And on that, the Soviets are on the losing side. The Chinese alone had a militia numberring in the millions and with even a 30 days warning, more than able to flush the front lines.

Yeah, but could those militias be committed to offensive operations? Could they be deployed quickly inside of China (Chinese infrastructure is far from extensive in 73)? Could they then be supplied for their march into the Soviet Union? Those C divisions could have been used in a defensive or offensive role. The Chinese militia?

[Officer of Engineers]

Wouldn't bringing up the new front accomplish that? Where are these replacements coming from anyways?

Timing is the issue. The time taken for a new front to come up is also the the time a corps needs to get across the Rhine. A regiment marches much faster than a front.

Yeah, but their category A divisions are readily accessable.

And readily committed and readily in need of rebuilding.

Attack the units assigned to take them out of there in addition to attacking the sites themselves. Lightly armed rear area units should be fairly easily disrupted, as should command and control for them, and commando units operating in conjuction with air strikes... The Spetznaz/airborne forces don't have to take the equipment, they just have to delay it's evacuation until the armoured columns get there.

While their Air Assault elements have substantially more fire assets than our airborne elements, they are no match for even a single armoured battle group. If it deemed necessary, VII Corps could release the 4CMBG to deal with the incursion while the VII Corps HQ itself acts as its own strategic reserves

But that was an operation against an opponent with next to no mobile reserves, which is why the operation was so successful. Not going to happen against an entirely mechanized army like that in West Germany.

From my vantage point, at least three out of five strategic reserve units would remain in tact. There was simply no way for the Soviets to maul 5 corps. They'll smash into all 5, trying to find one breakthrough. At the very best, they would cut off one corp which would leave the four others to retreat in good order.

Foreign Military Studies Office Publications - COUNTERPOINT TO STALINGRAD, Operation Mars (November-December 1942): Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Defeat

So basically it is whatever forces can be put together into coherant battle groups from front line forces?

No, REFORGER forces already have their taskings and it's not adhoc.

Yeah, but could those militias be committed to offensive operations? Could they be deployed quickly inside of China (Chinese infrastructure is far from extensive in 73)? Could they then be supplied for their march into the Soviet Union? Those C divisions could have been used in a defensive or offensive role. The Chinese militia?

While the Chinese would love to paint a picture of their militia as guerrilla fighters and sabateours, the sexist job they have is recee. However, the greatest contribution that the militia could make is the LOG train, ie human mules. I have an entire collection of a militia formed division just carrying supplies during the 79 Sino-VN War.

Also, just how much training do you need to grab a guy, sit his ass down on a spot and tell him to shoot whatever comes his way and then place a machine gun behind him so that he doesn't run away?

[lwarmonger]

Timing is the issue. The time taken for a new front to come up is also the the time a corps needs to get across the Rhine. A regiment marches much faster than a front.

But frittering away one's reserve forces piecemeal is less effective than using them as a concentrated mass isn't it?

While their Air Assault elements have substantially more fire assets than our airborne elements, they are no match for even a single armoured battle group. If it deemed necessary, VII Corps could release the 4CMBG to deal with the incursion while the VII Corps HQ itself acts as its own strategic reserves

The Canadian battle group can not be everywhere. And the goal of the special and airborne forces is not to defeat our rear area troops, but to disrupt them. That they have a chance of accomplishing, as their goal would be to delay the withdrawal of the yet to be manned pre-positioned equipment so it can be overrun by Soviet armor.

From my vantage point, at least three out of five strategic reserve units would remain intact. There was simply no way for the Soviets to maul 5 corps. They'll smash into all 5, trying to find one breakthrough. At the very best, they would cut off one corp which would leave the four others to retreat in good order.

I'm not saying that they are going to destroy NATO in West Germany. What I am saying, is that if they manage to reach the Rhine, they'll have hurt NATO at least as much as NATO has hurt them. That becomes especially true if they have cut off a NATO corps or two in West Germany. Either way, there was no way that deep battle would succeed as well against NATO as it did against the Japanese in Manchuria, simply because the Japanese lacked mobile reserves. NATO is almost entirely mechanized, and as such far less vulnerable to being cut off.

No, REFORGER forces already have their taskings and it's not adhoc.

Then what are the other strategic reserves? The Canadian Mechanized brigade isn't capable of doing the job for more than one corp (not enough men or equipment), and looking at the rest of the front, it would appear that most units would be engaged very quickly. I really don't see any strategic reserves worthy of the name, other than those being mobilized in the United States. Our airborne formations are nowhere near heavy or mobile enough to make the fighting withdrawal required, and would be better employed elsewhere. Other than that, all I can think of is the French, and Belgian and Dutch reserve units.

While the Chinese would love to paint a picture of their militia as guerrilla fighters and sabateours, the sexist job they have is recee. However, the greatest contribution that the militia could make is the LOG train, ie human mules. I have an entire collection of a militia formed division just carrying supplies during the 79 Sino-VN War.

A relatively confined war, as was Korea, with limited objectives and not a lot of geographical scope. Compared to the sheer area where this war would be taking place in Siberia, how useful would porters really be for resupply?

Also, just how much training do you need to grab a guy, sit his ass down on a spot and tell him to shoot whatever comes his way and then place a machine gun behind him so that he doesn't run away?

How useful would that be on the offensive, against enemy mechanized divisions with lots of room to manuever? Not very, unless I miss my guess.

[Officer of Engineers]

But frittering away one's reserve forces piecemeal is less effective than using them as a concentrated mass isn't it?

1st, they're not being grittering away piecemeal. They're whole combat regiments being inserted to committed divisions.

2nd, they're not reserves. They're the 2nd and 3rd echelons.

The Canadian battle group can not be everywhere. And the goal of the special and airborne forces is not to defeat our rear area troops, but to disrupt them. That they have a chance of accomplishing, as their goal would be to delay the withdrawal of the yet to be manned pre-positioned equipment so it can be overrun by Soviet armor.

You're not seeing the picture. The 4CMBG is ONLY the VII Corps strategic reserves. They are not whole NATO's reserve. Each corp would have a brigade specifically tasked as its strategic reserves.

Each corp will only deal with the specific threats to its own rear area. To prevent any disruption in VII Corp's rear area is the job of the 4CMBG and that's where any Soviet air assualt element specifically tasked against VII Corp would be overwhelmed. Each of the other corp would also have similar bdes performing the same job.

I'm not saying that they are going to destroy NATO in West Germany. What I am saying, is that if they manage to reach the Rhine, they'll have hurt NATO at least as much as NATO has hurt them. That becomes especially true if they have cut off a NATO corps or two in West Germany. Either way, there was no way that deep battle would succeed as well against NATO as it did against the Japanese in Manchuria, simply because the Japanese lacked mobile reserves. NATO is almost entirely mechanized, and as such far less vulnerable to being cut off.

And render any chance of a Soviet victory inconceiveable. If three or four corps manages to cross the Rhine, then the re-enforcements from North America couple with the reserve mobilization would render the numeric advantage to NATO.

Then what are the other strategic reserves? The Canadian Mechanized brigade isn't capable of doing the job for more than one corp (not enough men or equipment), and looking at the rest of the front, it would appear that most units would be engaged very quickly. I really don't see any strategic reserves worthy of the name, other than those being mobilized in the United States. Our airborne formations are nowhere near heavy or mobile enough to make the fighting withdrawal required, and would be better employed elsewhere. Other than that, all I can think of is the French, and Belgian and Dutch reserve units.

I have to look up the orbat for that one but 7ARCOM is V Corps. I don't know III Corps nor any of the BW Corps.

A relatively confined war, as was Korea, with limited objectives and not a lot of geographical scope. Compared to the sheer area where this war would be taking place in Siberia, how useful would porters really be for resupply?

But the OPOBJs would be centred around very specific areas - Lop Nor, Harbin, Beijing, Shenyang, and Vladivostok. Also, the battle areas of the 1979 1st Sino-Vietnam War would at least match in geographic scope of the Eastern Chinese front.

How useful would that be on the offensive, against enemy mechanized divisions with lots of room to manuever? Not very, unless I miss my guess.

Unless they're sitting inside those garrisons to which the Soviets must take - Lop Nor for instance.

[Blademaster]

Does anybody ever consider that Russians may not go for the whole thing but by piecemeal after piecemeal separated by long lulls of peace?

Like for example, the Soviets would stop at the Rhine and dig in and declare a ceasefire and dare the rest of NATO to continue the war. At this point, no nukes has been exchanged and the rest of NATO will be suscetiple to nuclear blackmail and Soviet has gained some land.

I would consider that as a victory if I reunite Germany under the communism flag. I believe Hitler and Napolean's mistakes were trying to conquer the whole Europe in one swoop. History has shown that to be practically impossible. The Romans didn't conquer Europe in a day and neither did the British conquer India in a day. It took 2 centuries to master control over Europe for the Romans and a century and half for the British over India.

[Officer of Engineers]

That's a political decision. Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO militaries have an Area centric OPOBJ in which we seek to annihalate each other in those battle areas.

[lwarmonger]

1st, they're not being grittering away piecemeal. They're whole combat regiments being inserted to committed divisions.

2nd, they're not reserves. They're the 2nd and 3rd echelons.

But wouldn't committing an entire Army in regiment sized packets to existing formations be considered committing them peacemeal? Committing the army as a group would be concentrated?

Also, I was always under the impression that the role of the 2nd and 3rd echelons
was to exploit holes created by the first echelon. Isn't exploitation a function of reserves? Or am I just getting my terms mixed up here?

You're not seeing the picture. The 4CMBG is ONLY the VII Corps strategic reserves. They are not whole NATO's reserve. Each corp would have a brigade specifically tasked as its strategic reserves.

At what point, assuming that the Soviets do not create a major breakthrough, are those strategic reserves used?

Each corp will only deal with the specific threats to its own rear area. To prevent any disruption in VII Corp's rear area is the job of the 4CMBG and that's where any Soviet air assualt element specifically tasked against VII Corp would be overwhelmed. Each of the other corp would also have similar bdes performing the same job.

But how is the formation acting as a strategic reserves supposed to act as a coherant force if it is dispersed hunting down special forces and airborne elements?

And render any chance of a Soviet victory inconceiveable. If three or four corps manages to cross the Rhine, then the re-enforcements from North America couple with the reserve mobilization would render the numeric advantage to NATO.

So Russia has to destroy most of those corp in front of the Rhine, which it can't do without nuclear weapons? In the 80's, I'd say you are 100% correct, but in 73? Wouldn't those armies smashing into the various NATO corps do quite a bit of damage, even if they didn't break through? I only say this because the Soviet advantage in numbers is so marked, and we are not yet to the days of chobham armor.

But the OPOBJs would be centred around very specific areas - Lop Nor, Harbin, Beijing, Shenyang, and Vladivostok. Also, the battle areas of the 1979 1st Sino-Vietnam War would at least match in geographic scope of the Eastern Chinese front.

Really? I thought it was only a couple of hundred miles to Hanoi, and there really wasn't very good terrain for a war of manuever there (plus the Chinese were advancing against an equally unmechanized force). Also, wasn't one of the big reasons for the failure of the Chinese in that conflict a break down in supply?

Unless they're sitting inside those garrisons to which the Soviets must take - Lop Nor for instance.

Without nuclear weapons in the equation, why is taking Lop Nor, or any point in China for that matter, absolutely essential?

[Officer of Engineers]

*** DEEP BREATH ***

But wouldn't committing an entire Army in regiment sized packets to existing formations be considered committing them peacemeal? Committing the army as a group would be concentrated?

The issue is timing, mobilization, and battle momentum. The Cat B and C div cannot mobilize before hostilities. That would be a sign for us to rush the air elements of REFORGER into place. The Cat A div, once hitting our lines, would have battle momentum and once achieved, you better not stop. Else you allow NATO to retreat, regroup, re-evaluate, and re-committ on our terms. So, what kind of forces can you mobilize from the start of hostilities to the point just before the Cat A div runs out steam? And how would you committ them with effect?

Also, I was always under the impression that the role of the 2nd and 3rd echelons was to exploit holes created by the first echelon. Isn't exploitation a function of reserves? Or am I just getting my terms mixed up here?

Like I've said before, you have alot of things to unlearn. Reserves are part of a singular committement. Ecehlons are another individual committement.

At what point, assuming that the Soviets do not create a major breakthrough, are those strategic reserves used?

Most obvious one, the counter-attack.

But how is the formation acting as a strategic reserves supposed to act as a coherant force if it is dispersed hunting down special forces and airborne elements?

1st of all, the WP air assualt elements are being committed at the bde level. They don't have the fuel to go far and certainly do not have the fire assets to spread out. There's a point where you spread your units too thin to do anything and for the Soviets, the bde is it.

2nd, the corps strategic reserves ain't interested in snipers or even pltn size harrassement forces. They are the corps' strategic reserves, not the policemen for evey bn and coy out there.

3rd, each TF/BG would have its own protection forces at the the pltn lvl and thus, do not have to go crying for help for evey little inconvience.

So Russia has to destroy most of those corp in front of the Rhine, which it can't do without nuclear weapons? In the 80's, I'd say you are 100% correct, but in 73? Wouldn't those armies smashing into the various NATO corps do quite a bit of damage, even if they didn't break through? I only say this because the Soviet advantage in numbers is so marked, and we are not yet to the days of chobham armor.

If they can get through the minefields and earthworks. No matter how good armour technology will advance, it will never out-do good old Mother Earth.

However, the Soviets never had the kind of numeric superiority you're thinking of. It was 173 WP div against 87 NATO div. Soviet doctrine calls for 5-6 to 1 numeric superiority and 8-10 to 1 in fire superiority to do the kind of damage nukes would do. Thus, in general overall terms, they cannot maul the 5-6 corps facing them. The best they can do is to fix some of them in place while they mass for local superiority.

So, no, they cannot destroy most of those corps before the Rhine. The best they can do is to reach the Rhine and then cut off the escape for all the other corps and that is a strong tactical improbability.

Really? I thought it was only a couple of hundred miles to Hanoi, and there really wasn't very good terrain for a war of manuever there (plus the Chinese were advancing against an equally unmechanized force). Also, wasn't one of the big reasons for the failure of the Chinese in that conflict a break down in supply?

Without nuclear weapons in the equation, why is taking Lop Nor, or any point in China for that matter, absolutely essential?

Looking at a map would tell you all the answers.

[Bill]

You two are still going at it huh?

LOL...Sir, you're wasting thine breath.

[lwarmonger]

The issue is timing, mobilization, and battle momentum. The Cat B and C div cannot mobilize before hostilities. That would be a sign for us to rush the air elements of REFORGER into place. The Cat A div, once hitting our lines, would have battle momentum and once achieved, you better not stop. Else you allow NATO to retreat, regroup, re-evaluate, and re-committ on our terms. So, what kind of forces can you mobilize from the start of hostilities to the point just before the Cat A div runs out steam? And how would you committ them with effect?

Alright, this brings up a couple of additional questions sir. First, just how much preparation did the Soviets intend to put into an attack upon West Germany? Launching it straight from exercises would give their troops a bit more training, but it would also meet a somewhat alerted NATO. And launching the attack straight from the barracks would mean that a lot if Soviet units are not prepared for offensive operations, would it not (most militaries are not at full war readiness all the time)? Also, if the category B and C divisions were not meant to be used in offensive operations, what were they there for? If the initial offensive fails, were they to back up the remnants? Or were they simply there to occupy conquered territory?

Like I've said before, you have alot of things to unlearn. Reserves are part of a singular committement. Ecehlons are another individual committement.

So the purpose of the Soviet 2nd and 3rd echelons was to reinforce the first echelon?

Most obvious one, the counter-attack.

What were plans for when the Soviet invasion had been repelled (assuming that a strategic nuclear exchange had not taken place by this time... only tactical nukes being used)? Was an invasion of Eastern Europe in the cards? Or would NATO leadership content itself with a stalemate in Germany?

1st of all, the WP air assualt elements are being committed at the bde level. They don't have the fuel to go far and certainly do not have the fire assets to spread out. There's a point where you spread your units too thin to do anything and for the Soviets, the bde is it.

But wouldn't enough of them cause significant problems, especially among transport companies?

2nd, the corps strategic reserves ain't interested in snipers or even pltn size harrassement forces. They are the corps' strategic reserves, not the policemen for evey bn and coy out there.

But didn't the Soviets have a lot of airborne formations? I'm just wondering how many subdivisions these reserves would have to be broken into to deal with the threat to the NATO rear areas.

3rd, each TF/BG would have its own protection forces at the the pltn lvl and thus, do not have to go crying for help for evey little inconvience.

Protection at the platoon level? I'm sorry sir, but I do not understand what you mean.

However, the Soviets never had the kind of numeric superiority you're thinking of. It was 173 WP div against 87 NATO div. Soviet doctrine calls for 5-6 to 1 numeric superiority and 8-10 to 1 in fire superiority to do the kind of damage nukes would do. Thus, in general overall terms, they cannot maul the 5-6 corps facing them. The best they can do is to fix some of them in place while they mass for local superiority.

Well, I guess the question I'm asking is how much damage could the fixing elements do to the NATO corp they are facing? Would it be significant? I'm not saying that they are going to destroy those corp, but to what extent would the fixing elements damage them?

So, no, they cannot destroy most of those corps before the Rhine. The best they can do is to reach the Rhine and then cut off the escape for all the other corps and that is a strong tactical improbability.

But what about damaging those corps to the point where they would have difficulty carrying out large scale offensive operations?


Alright, here is a question. How would you handle this situation, if you were in STAKVA's position sir? I'm not asking for standard Russian doctrine or what we thought there planning was, but how would you deal with a two front war against NATO and China in 1973 without nukes if you were the one making the calls?

[Officer of Engineers]

You two are still going at it huh?

LOL...Sir, you're wasting thine breath.

Feels like hitting my head against a brick wall.

[Officer of Engineers]

Alright, this brings up a couple of additional questions sir. First, just how much preparation did the Soviets intend to put into an attack upon West Germany? Launching it straight from exercises would give their troops a bit more training, but it would also meet a somewhat alerted NATO. And launching the attack straight from the barracks would mean that a lot if Soviet units are not prepared for offensive operations, would it not (most militaries are not at full war readiness all the time)? Also, if the category B and C divisions were not meant to be used in offensive operations, what were they there for? If the initial offensive fails, were they to back up the remnants? Or were they simply there to occupy conquered territory?

So the purpose of the Soviet 2nd and 3rd echelons was to reinforce the first echelon?

Do not read more into my statements than what's there. This was a very scenario specific reply in response to a no nuke scenario and in fact within months of the last nuke being withdrawn.

In general terms and not scenario specifice, both the WP and NATO expects some sort of political warning to at least get warning orders issued to both REFORGER and 2nd echelon elements.

What were plans for when the Soviet invasion had been repelled (assuming that a strategic nuclear exchange had not taken place by this time... only tactical nukes being used)? Was an invasion of Eastern Europe in the cards? Or would NATO leadership content itself with a stalemate in Germany?

1st, there's no such thing as a tactical nuclear exchange.

There may have been plans for a counter invasion but it would not have been part of my briefing which was the way it should. We would not know what units are left to provisionally put together a sufficient force. That is if it still made sense for counter-invading a radioactive wasteland.

But wouldn't enough of them cause significant problems, especially among transport companies?

How many of them can you insert into a single AO?

But didn't the Soviets have a lot of airborne formations? I'm just wondering how many subdivisions these reserves would have to be broken into to deal with the threat to the NATO rear areas.

They had 6 div but most are trained at the bde lvl.

Protection at the platoon level? I'm sorry sir, but I do not understand what you mean.

Every svc bn had a pltn specifically for force protection.

Well, I guess the question I'm asking is how much damage could the fixing elements do to the NATO corp they are facing? Would it be significant? I'm not saying that they are going to destroy those corp, but to what extent would the fixing elements damage them?

But what about damaging those corps to the point where they would have difficulty carrying out large scale offensive operations?

Not enough. Do the math with the numbers I gave you.

Alright, here is a question. How would you handle this situation, if you were in STAKVA's position sir? I'm not asking for standard Russian doctrine or what we thought there planning was, but how would you deal with a two front war against NATO and China in 1973 without nukes if you were the one making the calls?

Way above my pay grade.

[lwarmonger]

In general terms and not scenario specifice, both the WP and NATO expects some sort of political warning to at least get warning orders issued to both REFORGER and 2nd echelon elements.

Then how did the Soviets hope to disrupt reforger?

1st, there's no such thing as a tactical nuclear exchange.

So in the event of a conflict, each side planned to initiate a full scale strategic nuclear strike right off the bat? What would be the point? Although I can understand how winning in 10 days becomes more important in that scenario. After that, there wouldn't be much ability to supply the attacking formations left.

There may have been plans for a counter invasion but it would not have been part of my briefing which was the way it should. We would not know what units are left to provisionally put together a sufficient force. That is if it still made sense for counter-invading a radioactive wasteland.

True enough.

They had 6 div but most are trained at the bde lvl.

That is quite a lot of manpower... assuming they could deploy most of it into West Germany, wouldn't that be sufficient to tie down our strategic reserves? Also, how much airlift capacity did the Soviet Union have to move those airborne formations?

[Officer of Engineers]

Then how did the Soviets hope to disrupt reforger?

Nukes.

You should really read the PHP site. 1st, the only war plane we had from the Warsaw Pact are the Czechs and that's only because they fielded the only independent corps in the entire pact.

What you have been reading/studying is our projections based upon our study of their doctrines and their exercises. We were extremely wrong about their war plans. So, their desire to disrupt REFORGER is based upon our read of their exercises that corresponded with Ex REFORGER.

So in the event of a conflict, each side planned to initiate a full scale strategic nuclear strike right off the bat? What would be the point? Although I can understand how winning in 10 days becomes more important in that scenario. After that, there wouldn't be much ability to supply the attacking formations left.

Have you even read the Czech document? It states over 100 nukes to be used in the 1st stage of the attack. That alone crosses the line between strategic and tactical exchanges.

Even still based upon our read at the lines, there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear exchange simply because of the escalation. We nuke them to stop their advance and they nuke us to blast us open. Now, I know you would take that to be litterally but what that means is that they would nuke a corps HQ while we would nuke an assembly area.

Two or three of that and we again cross into a strategic exchange, especially when you consider that the Czechs planned to be in Lyon following nuke strikes onto French territory.

That is quite a lot of manpower... assuming they could deploy most of it into West Germany, wouldn't that be sufficient to tie down our strategic reserves? Also, how much airlift capacity did the Soviet Union have to move those airborne formations?

How many can you fit into a single AO?

[lwarmonger]

What you have been reading/studying is our projections based upon our study of their doctrines and their exercises. We were extremely wrong about their war plans. So, their desire to disrupt REFORGER is based upon our read of their exercises that corresponded with Ex REFORGER.

I see. That makes sense, and does kind of render the airborne disruptions pointless, as they would pale in comparison with the havoc sown by the nuclear strikes.

Have you even read the Czech document? It states over 100 nukes to be used in the 1st stage of the attack. That alone crosses the line between strategic and tactical exchanges.

Even still based upon our read at the lines, there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear exchange simply because of the escalation. We nuke them to stop their advance and they nuke us to blast us open. Now, I know you would take that to be litterally but what that means is that they would nuke a corps HQ while we would nuke an assembly area.

Two or three of that and we again cross into a strategic exchange, especially when you consider that the Czechs planned to be in Lyon following nuke strikes onto French territory.

I did read the Czech document sir, and from what I understood those 130+ nukes would be concentrated upon NATO forces and air defenses, as well as our tactical nuclear capability in West Germany (with a few nukes in reserve for targets of opportunity). Also, they are comprised entirely of air and short range missile delivered warheads.

Pretty much what I mean by a strategic nuclear exchange is a full nuclear strike from our and their ICBM delivered nukes upon the respective homelands (both cities and counterforce). Would their be a difference between us nuking an assembly area in East Germany using a bomber delivered nuke, and nuking Kiev or Leningrad with a Minuteman ICBM? Or would the second the first nuke went off over an airbase or VII Corp headquarters, our respective deterants obliterate one another?