Alternate N. African/Middle Eastern Front, WWII

[zraver]

While the RN may get augmented by US aid and ship production, I think it would be awful difficult to resist a German land presence on one or both sides of the strait. Actual German control of Vichy Algeria and Morocco in 1941 and the building of airbases would pose a severe threat to the RN. Could the Brits manage to get enough airframes and fuel to Gibraltar to fight something on the scale of the Battle of Britain at the Strait? Once the Brits lose air superiority I think the beginning of the end is near. As we know from WWII a navy opposed by aircraft without aircraft to defend is a turkey shoot.

Would Britain even be in the war? I don't think Churchill could have survived the loss of the Suez and Gibraltar so soon after the fall of France and loss of Greece.

AFAIK, the Soviets were sending the Germans everything they wanted and I see no reason why they wouldn't for the time being. Stalin's wish was for Germany and the West to wear each other down while waiting in the wings to swoop down on the carcass of Europe. I'm not familiar with the actual amount of resources Germany was able to extract from conquered areas of the Soviet Union, but I'm skeptical that it was a large amount, and tended more toward living off the land.

IIRC the amount of material the Soviets were actually sending was about half what they promised and were obligated to by treaty, but this was still more than Hitler got by invading.

Historically we have Barbarossa from June 1941 through May 1945. That's a long period of time. In this scenario, Germany is marching unopposed west through French North Africa and east toward the Suez with with 50 divisions. In late 1941, the Axis and Allies were evenly matched in numbers in the Western Desert Campaign. In this scenario, we're looking at 6+ to 1 in favor of the Axis.

I don't think Germany can sustain 50 divisions in North Africa. I think they have to go East block/seize the Suez with a panzer armee. Then using other units once the supply requirements of the 3 or so panzer corp are reduced because they are standing on the defensive, move into Vichy North Africa. This, with other units and set up a Luftwaffe operation to seize Gibraltar. Once the port and airfields are seized the fortress itself is doomed.

As for later American involvement, only if the UK somehow stays in the war. Assuming Pearl Harbor still goes down as it did in history a Germany first program won't mean much until late 43. meanwhile during the Luftwaffe operation to take the Rock, Hitler probably heads east in Russia but doesn't get as far and is bogged down. If Britain is out of the war and the US doesn't join in, then he still goes east and gets a bit farther before bogging down. In a one front war between Nazi Germany and the USSR its anybodies guess as to who finally wins. If Hitler does not have to defend the skies of the Reich, divert troops to the West and South and can buy oil on the open market because he is at peace with the UK then the Soviets face a very tough fight.

[Albany Rifles]

I think the Brits stay in. There was the rest of the Commonwealth to work with. Now does Churchill stay in power? That I don't know.

I am not saying anything could prevent the fall of NA....but as Zraver and I have said I don't know how sustainable they would be in the long term.

I am nto looking for a May 45 end of the war....but I do see the USSR in as an ally....and I do see the use of atomic weapons by mid to late 1945. This kind of German success would accelerate A bomb research.

I also would expect the air campaign to go on anyway...because going on your time shcedule, the Battle of Britain has already been fought and won by the British (which may have bought Churchill his time).

Great Britain hunkers down and builds power....and perhaps builds its bases up in sub Saharan Africa to move northward to take the straights.

[Ironduke]

z,

I think you've got the order backwards. By first moving westward unopposed through French territory, the Germans can cover their ass, so to speak, by building airbases to threaten British shipping traffic in the western Mediterranean. If they could establish a strong presence in western Algeria, they could achieve air supremacy over the Alboran Sea, with or without the help of Spain at this point. The British would then be effectively bottled up at the Strait of Gibraltar and the Germans could further advance toward their objective, possibly with Spanish assistance or acquiescence, under air cover.

This would leave the British with one route to resupply and reinforce the North African front, the Suez Canal. Reinforcing Malta at this point is going to be extremely difficult if not practically impossible. Going for Malta first in my opinion is an unnecessary diversion and a waste of time. It can be "hopped" over. Better to seal up the western Med before turning their attention east. This option would also make available the ports of southern France for supply and reinforcements, instead of relying solely on the Strait of Sicily as was the case historically. Striking first for the Suez while ignoring all else gives the British two resupply routes, of which the Strait is superior, while dangerously forcing the Germans to rely on the Strait of Sicily. Closing the Strait of Gibraltar first presents immense logistical difficulties for the British position in Egypt.

[zraver]

z,

I think you've got the order backwards. By first moving westward unopposed through French territory, the Germans can cover their ass, so to speak, by building airbases to threaten British shipping traffic in the western Mediterranean. If they could establish a strong presence in western Algeria, they could achieve air supremacy over the Alboran Sea, with or without the help of Spain at this point. The British would then be effectively bottled up at the Strait of Gibraltar and the Germans could further advance toward their objective, possibly with Spanish assistance or acquiescence, under air cover.

This would leave the British with one route to resupply and reinforce the North African front, the Suez Canal. Reinforcing Malta at this point is going to be extremely difficult if not practically impossible. Going for Malta first in my opinion is an unnecessary diversion and a waste of time. It can be "hopped" over. Better to seal up the western Med before turning their attention east. This option would also make available the ports of southern France for supply and reinforcements, instead of relying solely on the Strait of Sicily as was the case historically. Striking first for the Suez while ignoring all else gives the British two resupply routes, of which the Strait is superior, while dangerously forcing the Germans to rely on the Strait of Sicily. Closing the Strait of Gibraltar first presents immense logistical difficulties for the British position in Egypt.

The problem in 41 for Hitler is the fiction of Vichy Independence, however this fiction already covers his butt in the west. Thanks to the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet the Vichy French are no ally of the British. They stay hostile until the Germans move in. Move in too soon and you also toss the British Vichy Syria and its considerable garrison. Plus, Student's paras are already in Crete and Luftflotte 2 is already in theater. Taking Malta uncovers Alexandria and does much the same as taking the Rock but with fewer troop movements. This gives a Panzer Armee Afrika (rather than the DAK) a much freer hand to reach the Suez since once they take Alexandria they get a good deep water port. Once the Suez is cut, British fortunes in the Middle East outside of Arabia are seriously waning. The rail line (I think its still a single track at this point) into Palestine won't support a large build up.

The goal should be the defeat of the 8th Army before the reduction of Gibraltar. Once Egypt is secure, Gibraltar loses much of its importance anyway.

[Ironduke]

The problem in 41 for Hitler is the fiction of Vichy Independence, however this fiction already covers his butt in the west. Thanks to the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet the Vichy French are no ally of the British. They stay hostile until the Germans move in.

In northwest Africa, the Vichy stay hostile until Operation Torch, or in other words, when the Allies enter. It's a matter of days before they surrender and/or join the Allies.

Move in too soon and you also toss the British Vichy Syria and its considerable garrison.

You're off the mark. Vichy Syria was lost no matter what the Germans did. The Brits commenced operations in Syria 7 days after the end of the Battle of Crete, and it was in Free French/Allied control within 13 days. Syria / Lebanon are a lost cause no matter what.

The paratroopers in Crete are lightly armed, and there were 20,000 men available there who were in no position to carry out further operations. There were no means of transport to Egypt or Libya, except back through Greece to Italy then Libya. Any forces that were to be used against Egypt would have to disembark at Tripoli and move east across the desert.

Taking Malta uncovers nothing, as it could be effectively neutralized for the same effect as was the case for half of 1942.

Moving into Egypt then into the Middle East prematurely poses the risk of overextension and logistical problems while still facing the Brits, Commonwealth, and GOI in the Middle East while leaving the western flank wide open. Cutting the Suez Canal isn't a master stroke that makes the entire British position in the ME untenable, rather, they are retreating toward their own lines (India). Closing the Strait of Gibraltar opens the ports of France, cuts Britain off from direct access to the Med, and allows for a wide latitude of Axis naval movement in the Med.

[dalem]

As for the Japanese and Pearl Harbor? My belief is that a more succesful Germany would have raised the overall readiness of the US military,,,making the likelihood of surprise less than what it was.

I was thinking more along the lines of higher readiness -> more ships in Atlantic -> fewer ships/none at all in Battleship Row at Pearl. If the whole bloody fleet isn't sitting at anchor in peacetime status, does Yamamoto even bother making the stretch to Pearl?

-dale

[Albany Rifles]

I was thinking more along the lines of higher readiness -> more ships in Atlantic -> fewer ships/none at all in Battleship Row at Pearl. If the whole bloody fleet isn't sitting at anchor in peacetime status, does Yamamoto even bother making the stretch to Pearl?

-dale

Ahhhh, what you said.

Yes, more of the fleet at use in the Atlantic. By November 1941 the Atlantic Fleet was on a war footing and involved in a shooting war. The Pacific and Asiatic Fleets were just playing at it.....same with USAAFFE and the Hawaiian Department.

Also.....since the Brits are gone from the Med....does Yamamoto, et al, learn abotut he shallow running British torpedoes at Taranto? ;)

[Ironduke]

Also.....since the Brits are gone from the Med....does Yamamoto, et al, learn abotut he shallow running British torpedoes at Taranto? ;)

I think you guys are thinking too far. :)

[zraver]

In northwest Africa, the Vichy stay hostile until Operation Torch, or in other words, when the Allies enter. It's a matter of days before they surrender and/or join the Allies.

In part because the Americans are there, the Brits are not going to come ashore to a welcoming party.

The paratroopers in Crete are lightly armed, and there were 20,000 men available there who were in no position to carry out further operations. There were no means of transport to Egypt or Libya, except back through Greece to Italy then Libya. Any forces that were to be used against Egypt would have to disembark at Tripoli and move east across the desert.

Those troops are still enough to overwhelm the defenses of Malta.

Taking Malta uncovers nothing, as it could be effectively neutralized for the same effect as was the case for half of 1942.

Malta was an unsinking unmoving aircraft carrier covering Alexandria and corking the supplies from Sicily.

Moving into Egypt then into the Middle East prematurely poses the risk of overextension and logistical problems while still facing the Brits, Commonwealth, and GOI in the Middle East while leaving the western flank wide open. Cutting the Suez Canal isn't a master stroke that makes the entire British position in the ME untenable, rather, they are retreating toward their own lines (India). Closing the Strait of Gibraltar opens the ports of France, cuts Britain off from direct access to the Med, and allows for a wide latitude of Axis naval movement in the Med.

Moving into the ME is not something I advocate, you won't find it in this thread. The furthest I have ventured is Palestine. The fact is one ribbon of rail is not going to supply the British in Palestine with enough material to conduct an armored war.

In the West, what exactly are the British going to invade Vichy North Africa with? Once Malta is seized and the Suez is cut, Gibraltar is low hanging fruit.

Also seizing Malta, Egypt and Gibraltar is about more than just winning tactical victories, but are also attacks on the British political stability in order to shake open the door to peace.

[Ironduke]

Those troops are still enough to overwhelm the defenses of Malta.

Those men are barely enough to garrison Crete. They've just fought a brutal battle to capture the island and taken 25% casualties (mainly dead). They have to contend with PoWs greater than their number and insurgents and partisans. The Germans lost most of the aircraft involved in the operation.

Not going to happen.

Malta was an unsinking unmoving aircraft carrier covering Alexandria and corking the supplies from Sicily.

That's a cliche. In reality it was hanging on a thread as it is. The Germans had no problems neutralizing it in 1942 allowing the Axis to move tens/hundreds of thousands of men and supplies across the Strait. Their ability to maintain that was determined by needs of the Eastern Front. Guess what, no Eastern Front. And the more I think about it, the better off it is left for the time being while the Germans move west. It's a magnet drawing British naval forces and shipping to a location where it can be conveniently sunk.

Moving into the ME is not something I advocate, you won't find it in this thread. The furthest I have ventured is Palestine. The fact is one ribbon of rail is not going to supply the British in Palestine with enough material to conduct an armored war.

In the West, what exactly are the British going to invade Vichy North Africa with? Once Malta is seized and the Suez is cut, Gibraltar is low hanging fruit.

Going for Gibraltar first immediately seals the Mediterranean for all practical purposes. It's a quick move with a more decisive impact than taking the Suez. It immediately makes the British position in Egypt, where they are stronger, precarious. It puts southern France into play and gives the Axis wide latitude of movement in the Med instead of being confined to the Strait of Sicily. It's much easier pickings than heading east first. Greatest impact for the smallest sacrifice.

Perhaps you can illustrate how you believe it would be the exact opposite?

As it turns out, Raeder had a plan that I've pretty much replicated here. And Gibraltar was to fall first.

[zraver]

Perhaps you can illustrate how you believe it would be the exact opposite?

As long as the Suez is open and Alexandria is in operation the RN has a base in the eastern med and air cover and this is where the Germans need to operate. Knock Egypt out and any RN units have no place to go and no air cover. Gibraltar can't influence events East of Sicily and this is where the action is.

With Egypt secure and the British 8th Army pushed into Palestine Germany is free to move into Vichy North Africa and set up for the assault on Gibraltar at its leisure.

Malta is important for the importance Churchill placed on it. The objective is to knock him out of office with a rapid triple blow of major defeats: Malta, Egypt, Gibraltar.

[Ironduke]

I guess on this point we'll have to agree to disagree.

I was also thinking along the lines that with a complete Axis victory and all flanks secure in North Africa (west first, east second), Turkey could be more easily persuaded to join efforts in a pincer on British positions in the Levant. Whether that be the Turks in the north, Germans in the south, or more likely, Germans predominantly in the north having been given transit rights.

[Ironduke]

From my experience with strategic gaming (I knowm I know :) ) of WWII, getting Spain in on the Axis side just gives you a jillion more miles of coast to defend and some hungry mouths to feed.

They're better off neutral for you.

-dale

p.s. - Matt, you should read Downing's "The Moscow Option: An Alternative Second World War".

Having read up a bit on actual German views of Turkey (basically more of a pain in the ass to supply and feed than any real help), it would be better if the Germans used Spanish territory in Morocco and perhaps Iberia under formal protest to maintain a fiction of Spanish neutrality (which was to a certain extent the case anyways). Basically, "hey guys, the Germans are transiting our territory, and with the shape we're in, there's nothing we can do about it."

[cape_royds]

1. I'm not sure the Germans could have maintained a 40-division army on the offensive along the coastal road in Libya and into the Western Desert of Egypt, at least not a mechanized force of that size, and certainly not along with the sort of forward air bases that would have been required to support a major offensive by such a force.

2. The Italians just didn't have enough lift to transport the scale of forces envisioned moving to the Levant within a short enough time, and to keep such forces supplied meanwhile. Moving hundreds of thousands of personnel to Tunisia (and even those ill-supplied) in 1942-43 was one thing--look at the quick turnaround time of that voyage, and the good railheads at the Italian end. But moving large forces across the Eastern Mediterranean to land in Lebanon or Syria? The Italian navy and merchant marine just can't do the long hauls on that scale, Greece is a very inefficient staging place, and the Germans can't help them out much in that kind of sea war (for air cover see my next point).

3. Crete and Rhodes are simply not close enough to offer air cover for landings in the Levant, and those islands were poorly developed bases in any case. Nor did the Italians have any aircraft carriers. Without air cover, the Axis convoys in the eastern Med. would simply be massacred by British surface forces; it would have been a much bigger fiasco than the aborted Crete beach landings. The shipping losses would be practically irreplaceable, and the whole grand plan would be sunk along with the Italian fleet.

4. The British had more naval forces which they could devoted to protect Alexandria and points east. They would never have sent out Force Z to Singapore. They also would have thrown in their old R-class battleships: those vessels were liabilities at sea, but used as inshore batteries their 15-in. guns would have been a quick and valuable addition to the harbour defenses of Levantine ports.

The British also had more land forces they could have thrown into the N. Africa/Mideast fray. This would, of course, have meant giving up Burma and Malaya with hardly a shot fired, if the Japanese had attacked as they did. The British could also have committed more divisions from home, including a couple of Canadian divisions.

5. An invasion of Turkey would have been more feasible than major landings in the Eastern Med. But Turkey is too big, too rugged, with too poor an infrastructure for the Germans to overrun as quickly as they had Greece or Yugoslavia. The Germans wouldn't have started out with their foes outflanked right from the outset, as had been the case in the Balkans. Moreover, the Turks would have been united and willing to fight--they just lacked modern arms.

Britain would not have been the only source of modern arms for Turkey. More important would have been the USSR. Turkey and the USSR had enjoyed decent enough relations between the World Wars, and given a German invasion of Turkey, it's not hard to imagine Stalin doing what he could to tie down and embarrass the Germans--there was nothing in their non-aggression pact that forbade arms "sales" to third parties (take for instance the German aid to Finland during the Winter War).

With the Germans substantially preoccupied in this kind of southern strategy, while they would have had plenty of troops to deter an attack by the USSR, they nevertheless would not have had enough margin of available force to realistically threaten the USSR with invasion. So what leverage would they have had to discourage Soviet aid to Turkey? Not much.

So even a Turkish war could easily have become a mess. And in the end, there would still have been roadless mountain ranges between them and the oilfields (whether Caucasian or Mesopotamian) which were supposedly the main object of the whole project!

n.b. If the Germans failed to overrun Turkey fast enough, then Hitler's frequent nightmare might well have come true: enemy bombers based within range of the Ploesti oilfields, which btw was why Hitler wanted to capture Crete so badly, and why he lavished so much effort on taking and holding the Crimea.

6. I'm not even sure Vichy North Africa would have been cooperative with these plans. A big thing that kept Vichy cooperative with Germany, indeed a big reason why the French agreed so readily to the German terms in 1940, was that the Germans were completely hands-off regarding the French Empire and French fleet. If the Germans made a major move into Africa in 1941, Vichy-German relations would have cooled rapidly. I don't think Germany could have made Tunisia into a base without having to perform a military occupation of most of French North Africa, and that would have resulted in a renewal of hostilities.


Overall, I think a big German campaign in the Mediterranean would have caused them many military and political problems, with limited gains.

Germany was much better advised to do what they actually did, i.e. make use of their 1940 victory in the West to turn and then try to knock down the USSR in turn. That strategy was fundamentally sound. They had bought themselves nearly three whole years to get it done.

How was Hitler and the Germans supposed to know that after "kicking the door in," the "whole rotten structure" of the USSR would not "come crashing down"? The internal political resiliency of the USSR, even in the face of epic defeats in 1941, was the biggest surprise that awaited the Germans in WWII.

Bear in mind, finally, that Hitler always preferred to leave the British Empire alone, as indeed he had taken a detached view towards the French Empire. He wanted a negotiated peace with Britain.

It was the British coalition government under Churchill that was hardline. Note that even had Churchill fallen, he would probably have been replaced with another hardliner since the British people as a whole favoured the continuation of the war and so did King George V. Most of the British Labour MP's were hawks, too. The votes of confidence against Churchill were not pro-peace, instead it was the question of whether he was the man to win the war. Remember that from the perspective of a British person until late 1942, Churchill's whole career as warlord, stretching back to the Dardanelles, had consisted mostly of setbacks! The fall of Malta in 1941 or 1942, whatever its effect on Winston's tenure of office, would not have made much difference in terms of British belligerency.

[clackers]

Note that even had Churchill fallen, he would probably have been replaced with another hardliner since the British people as a whole favoured the continuation of the war and so did King George V. Most of the British Labour MP's were hawks, too.

Possibly, CR. Or a coalition government could have been built around a recalled Lord Halifax, aimed at preserving the Empire instead of defeating Germany.