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  • #91
    I never said war was likely, but the Chinese building program is sparking an arms race in Asia.
    Are you saying that China's military buildup ?Should I should be proud of China which is so important that her military buildup can cause all Asia nations have to build up their military?I don't think it's just a game about China。And what weapons you guys have deployed?

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    • #92
      but the Chinese building program is sparking an arms race in Asia.

      The vast majority of their stuff is hopelessly obsolete.


      Checking wikipedia, it looks like all that is being planned/building is 7-9 submarines, 3 carriers, 1 frigate, 1 landing platform. I'm not seeing it as much of a threat, given that even the newer stuff is still a generation behind what SK, Japan, and the US is using,
      Last edited by outcast; 13 Sep 09,, 04:56.

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      • #93
        Originally posted by outcast View Post
        The vast majority of their stuff is hopelessly obsolete.


        Checking wikipedia, it looks like all that is being planned/building is 7-9 submarines, 3 carriers, 1 frigate, 1 landing platform. I'm not seeing it as much of a threat, given that even the newer stuff is still a generation behind what SK, Japan, and the US is using,
        In the past decade the PLAN has added nearly 40 modern combat vessels in the DDG, FFG, SSN, and SS classes.

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        • #94
          Originally posted by zraver View Post
          Chinese missiles would ahve to be moved from where they are to hit Seoul, a war would be by sea unless (very improbalby) it was PRC/NK v US/SK.



          I never said war was likely, but the Chinese building program is sparking an arms race in Asia.
          And why would SK think they can keep up with the pace of China? Unlike Japan or NK, China's economy potential and military-industrial complex is unchecked. An arm race (not even a conflict) with China would drag SK into a depression. If you look at the financial health of SK, it heavily depends on China's credits to survive, not a good idea to arm race your bigger neighbor who happens to finance your daily operation.

          Comment


          • #95
            Originally posted by astralis View Post
            gents-

            from an AF perspective, SK buy-list is determined almost solely on japanese acquisitions. that is no secret.

            cdude, see astralis's post.
            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

            Comment


            • #96
              Originally posted by zraver View Post
              In the past decade the PLAN has added nearly 40 modern combat vessels in the DDG, FFG, SSN, and SS classes.

              Good point, but how well do those vessels stack up against what we have?

              Comment


              • #97
                Originally posted by zraver
                Japan doesn't have SSM's or cruise missiles to fire at the ROK, nor does the ROK have them to fire at Japan.
                The Sejong the Great has both anti ship missiles and land attack missiles in abundance. Japan doesn't have land attack missiles, but its ships do carry Harpoons. Not to mention the craploads of Standards both sides carry, which have a significant anti ship capability also.

                Japan's air force also has anti ship missiles, and I'd be surprised if SK didn't too.
                Last edited by ArmchairGeneral; 17 Sep 09,, 16:05.
                I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

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                • #98
                  Sorry I've only just got back to reading through the thread.

                  Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                  What you are ignoring is that ABCA does not mean American lead nor dominated. Before these American Wars, the BCA part of the Alliance had real committements to fulfill. In the case of the British and Canadians, UN Peacekeeping Missions. In actual fact, the two most deployed NATO armies before the Iraq War were the Brits and the Canuckians, most often on Peacekeeping missions approved by the US and at times started by US sponsored resolutions.
                  Thats true - i was trying to simplify it down to some readily discernable context - in that because One goes to war - does not mean another will anymore in the way it used to mean (at least from what i've gained from Australia's political perspective)

                  Likewise, in the context of your post, it would therefore be unfair of me not to point out that Australia was very over committed in ET, Solomons, NE, PNG.

                  To demonstrate this lets not forget that in the case of OIF, the scenario was WMD's. Such was the concern of WMD's that a real commitment in terms of potential damage to make an understatement, was somewhat lacking. Highlighting a point, the Genesis of Australias M1 MBT buy is that Howard wanted to send some Leo 1's to Iraq. On being told that basically they werent true match for Iraqi T-72's that idea was scrapped. There are, (im sure im preaching to the converted here) various sectors of Army that while some are overstretched - others, and their ability to deploy are only hindered in their flexibiliy by other sectors that are overstretched that they rely on. In which case flexibility is provided by another nation to meet that short fall. In our case sending Leo's to the Iraq War would have been a direct hindrance to the operations of other nations, because of a need to specifically plan around a nations inability to meet specific threats expected of a fully fledged coalition partner because of inept procurement. If the alliance is strong then your ability to contribute is measured in several forms. Your political support is really only tokenism if you send SAS. (your afraid of casualities) Your political support is tokenism if you specifically interfere where your stabilisation force will be deployed (afraid of casualities). Its tokenism if you won't commit regular army (afraid of casualties, or the equipment is sub par). It's tokenism if your political structure and it's affect on defence (For instance our Fortress Australia Mentality crap in the 80's) Really did damage to our ability to contribute, from what was always an expeditionary force in all reality. We are only now just swinging back to that role which bodes well for better contribution in the future.

                  Morally speaking the political will actually demonstrated to commit to war is far removed from operational estimates on what is required to win the war. We hide behind the U.S. ABCA has continuously shown this. We will contribute, but what will we contribute. Sure we send warships to the gulf - into a warzone, but what are they doing? Boarding commercial vessels. a necessary part of overall effort, sure - but when viewed against the overall contribution of that nation especially in terms of us ABCA isn't anywhere near as solid as the Commonwealth was in ww2. It wasn't even solid as far as Suez was concearned. Nor Malaya. Nor Timor. It's dotted with imperfections.
                  In the case of Canada, I agree with Vietnam but I do not agree with ODS and OIF.

                  During ODS, we already had two battlegroups committed to peacekeeping. We've sent a CF-18 sqn and a naval task group. If the Soviets ever crossed the Iron Curtain, within 30 days, Canada was supposed to have a fighter sqn, a naval task group, and a brigade in theatre. We sent two out of the three to ODS and was juggling our commitements around to supply the 3rd. 4th Brigade was getting ready to deploy when the ground war started.

                  My bad on ODS. We sent some navy ships and the standard P-3s. Some major overstretch seems present for you guys in ODS.
                  For OIF, while our political commitements were noticably absent, our military contribution was not. Our Naval task group protected the left flank of American CVGs launching airstrikes against Iraq. This was done under the authority of Operation APOLLO which was supposed to be under the authority of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM but since CENTCOM commands both OIF and OEF, that line was blurred to allow the naval actions.
                  Picket ships yeah? The yanks have problems with allowing ships which do not have AEGIS be resposible for really being responsible for protection of a CVBG - in terms they assist, and the UK has actually demonstrated it physically in this form in ODS. AFAIK the Spanish F-100's (I think) are one of the few nations which can actually integrate, meaningfully into a CVBG. Thats not to besmirch hte role provided by other navies. Picket ships generally bear the brunt in modern conflict - and in turn are probably more likely to be targetted for pickings - if possible than a CVBG - thus actually have just as dangerous a job - if not more dangerous. Which then means which side of the picket do they contribute to. If I can liken it to WW2 and the British Pacific Force as it's element of the U.S 3rd fleet, and in turn subject to political influence. Conversely, and interestingly there is adverse public politics when it comes to be being seen as 'integrating' with other armed forces that I suppose hinder that process in itself.
                  However, the way it turned out was better for everyone all around. The Americans wanted our Flag in Iraq but they needed our brigade in Afghanistan.
                  At the end of the day I have to agree. The way it panned out, no matter what ones view on the war is, that the way assets were contributed, in reality was what could have been reasonably contributed without jeapordising other operations elsewhere that (IMO) require a big degree of sincerety and conviction. The yanks were happy to have anyflag they could get (Mongolia / Fiji).

                  From the perspective of BCA members, we have stood right most of the time.
                  I think there's a stronger sence of comradie amongst those three, but if you include those three, at least, in the percerption of many retired vets - you need NewZealand there too. It's not to say that it does not extend to the Yanks. We get miffed though. the U.S should have always respected New Zealands view about nuke ships - and in turn respected Australia's diplomatic attempts to see it for what it was - the chest beating that went on was crap and Australia did, very much so believe operating with Kiwi's was part of a physche & tradition. Friends don't make friends choose sides or put them in difficult positions. It could have happened in a lot more hush hush fashion. IF ABCA truly ever did include NZ, then the dummy spit by the U.S should serve as medicine as to where ABCA lies. It didn't just end there, the Petty crap the U.S has played with NZ in regards to trying to offload it's skyhawks to a foreign buyer in the U.S...

                  But there are positive signs, which is why I don't beleive that the alliance could be described as flimsy. The RAAF has bought C-130 J's, and C-17's in the past Decade - considerably upping our self reliance. Likewise, Ordering two LHD's considerably enhances our sustainability, Ordering AEGIS equipped AWD's enhance our Integration, and the M1 MBT buy also bodes well for contributing when we want to. We've got serious with Ordering A-330 tankers, and AEWC aircraft - so our ability to contribute in 10 years time is much greater than 10 years ago. A lot of those orders stem from the intervention in Timor where we were embarrassed - where it looked pathetic for us to rely on the U.S - U.K etc. So we have been forced away, by necessity (thank god) from the Fortress Australia Crap. In otherwords, we will not have much preventative reason for contributing in the future as demonstrated with OIF.

                  My Apologies for the simplification on Canada's role - although I see a common thread of an alliance in name only. Should the shit hit the fan tommorrow - complacancies might well be exposed.
                  Ego Numquam

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                  • #99
                    Originally posted by Chunder View Post
                    Picket ships yeah? The yanks have problems with allowing ships which do not have AEGIS be resposible for really being responsible for protection of a CVBG - in terms they assist, and the UK has actually demonstrated it physically in this form in ODS. AFAIK the Spanish F-100's (I think) are one of the few nations which can actually integrate, meaningfully into a CVBG. Thats not to besmirch hte role provided by other navies. Picket ships generally bear the brunt in modern conflict - and in turn are probably more likely to be targetted for pickings - if possible than a CVBG - thus actually have just as dangerous a job - if not more dangerous. Which then means which side of the picket do they contribute to. If I can liken it to WW2 and the British Pacific Force as it's element of the U.S 3rd fleet, and in turn subject to political influence. Conversely, and interestingly there is adverse public politics when it comes to be being seen as 'integrating' with other armed forces that I suppose hinder that process in itself.
                    West flank between Iraq and the CVGs launching air strike. FYI, the Canadians are better integrated with the USN than any other navy on earth ... for obvious reasons. Our gear must meet USN standards and while not AEGIS per say, Maritime Command integrates with ease. The HALIFAX suite was designed to meet American standards. Maritme Command is the only other navy on earth that must cross an ocean to meet her NATO commitments and hence, act as ASW and for American convoys.

                    But this is getting into a p!ssing contest I rather not participate in. When the sh!t did hit the fan, Canada acted without a 2nd thought. Opened our homes to potential terrorists and accepted planes that might have crashed into our Parliment just so that Americans got somewhere to land safely.

                    The fact was when the Americans needed help, BCA answered.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Chunder
                      The yanks have problems with allowing ships which do not have AEGIS be resposible for really being responsible for protection of a CVBG - in terms they assist, and the UK has actually demonstrated it physically in this form in ODS. AFAIK the Spanish F-100's (I think) are one of the few nations which can actually integrate, meaningfully into a CVBG.
                      Subs are as scary as planes for a carrier, and you don't need Aegis for ASW. Heck, we're still using FFG-7s, they don't have Aegis.
                      I enjoy being wrong too much to change my mind.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by ArmchairGeneral View Post
                        Subs are as scary as planes for a carrier, and you don't need Aegis for ASW. Heck, we're still using FFG-7s, they don't have Aegis.
                        mmm I recognise that - but every day in every way the USN would rather have an Aegis Ship as part of the CVBG, than one taking up the spot that does not. It's not new news - Im trying to underline the point that to be a solid alliance one nees to show willfull participation in both men & materials, and particularly from a political perspective - in roles that share the same liklihood for casualties as other countries. Tech - relationship & trust wise ACBA may be strong. Political commitment wise it often is not. There is quite strong antiwar sentiment here - particulary as far as OIF was concerned - the political will to commit troops in an unpopular climate just isn't there - even if one can support behind the scenes. thats not a pissing contest - thats saying it how it is. At present for instance, the Govt is resisting putting extra troops to A-ghan, even though it is in a position to do so. The PM openly recognises the war is not a popular one.
                        Ego Numquam

                        Comment


                        • Investigation: Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan

                          September 20, 2009

                          The Pakistani scientist who passed nuclear secrets to the world’s rogue states has been muzzled by his government. In a smuggled letter, AQ Khan reveals his side of the story


                          It could be a scene from a film. On a winter’s evening, around 8pm, in a quiet suburban street in Amsterdam, a group of cars draw up. Agents of the Dutch intelligence service, the AIVD, accompanied by uniformed police, ring the bell and knock on the door of one of the houses. The occupants, an elderly couple and their unmarried daughter, are slow to come to the door. The bell-ringing becomes more insistent, the knocks sharper. When the door opens, the agents request entry but are clearly not going to take no for an answer.

                          The year was 2004. The raid went unreported but was part of the worldwide sweep against associates of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist and “father of the Islamic bomb”, who had just been accused of selling nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea. The house belonged to one of his brothers, a retired Pakistani International Airlines manager, who lived there with his wife and daughter. The two secret agents asked the daughter for a letter she had recently received from abroad. Upstairs in her bedroom, she pulled it from a drawer. It was unopened. The agents grabbed it and told her to put on a coat and come with them.

                          The daughter, Kausar Khan, was taken to the local police station, although, contrary to usual practice, she was neither signed in nor signed out. The Dutch agents wanted to know why she had not opened the letter and whether she knew what was in it. She didn’t; she had merely been asked to look after it. Inside the envelope was a copy of a letter that Pakistan did not want to reach the West. The feared Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had found the letter when they searched Dr AQ Khan’s home in Islamabad. He had also passed a copy on to his daughter Dina to take to her home in London, as rumours of Khan’s “proliferation” — jargon for the dissemination of nuclear secrets — swept the world. The Pakistani ISI were furious. “Now you have got your daughter involved,” they reportedly said. “So far we have left your family alone, but don’t expect any leniency now.”

                          Dr Khan collapsed in sobs. Under pressure, he agreed to telephone Dina in London and ordered her to destroy the documents. He used three languages: Urdu, English and Dutch. It was code for her to obey his instructions. Dina dutifully destroyed the letter. That left the copy that was confiscated by the Dutch intelligence service in Amsterdam. I know there is at least one other copy: mine.

                          Just four pages long, it is an extraordinary letter, the contents of which have never been revealed before. Dated December 10, 2003, and addressed to Henny, Khan’s Dutch wife, it is handwritten, in apparent haste. It starts simply: “Darling, if the government plays any mischief with me take a tough stand.” In numbered paragraphs, it outlines Pakistan’s nuclear co-operation with China, Iran and North Korea, and also mentions Libya. It ends: “They might try to get rid of me to cover up all the things they got done by me.”

                          When I acquired my copy of the secret letter in 2007, I was shocked. On the third page, Khan had written: “Get in touch with Simon Henderson… and give him all the details.” He had also listed my then London address, my telephone number, fax number, mobile-phone number and the e-mail address I used at the time. It has been my luck, or fate, call it what you will, to develop a relationship with AQ Khan.

                          Khan became an idolised figure in Pakistan from the 1980s onwards because of his success in building a uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta, near Islamabad. In February 2004, three years after his retirement, he was accused of proliferating nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, and made a televised confession.

                          General Pervez Musharraf, at the time the ruler of Pakistan, pardoned Khan for his “crimes” but kept him under house arrest and largely incommunicado in Islamabad until February this year, when a court ordered his release. He was declared a “free man”, but in practice nothing changed.

                          His freedom lasted a day or so before international protests, mainly from the United States, locked him back up again. A few months ago, he was refused permission to attend his granddaughter’s high-school graduation. “I continue to be a prisoner,” Khan complained.In Washington, a State Department spokesman said that Khan remained a “proliferation risk” but, after being shut away for five years, that seemed hard to imagine. So why was he silenced? Was it because of what he did, or because of what he knows about Pakistan’s active role in spreading nuclear technology to some of the world’s worst regimes?

                          Any relationship with a source is fraught with potential difficulties. One doesn’t want to be blind to the chance of being used. Government officials and politicians in any country are seldom interested in the simple truth. They all have their particular story to tell. In this context, I am frankly amazed that Khan has chosen me to be his interlocutor with the world.

                          I have been writing about Pakistan ever since I arrived there in June 1977, sent by the BBC to be a stringer because the local man was considered to be under the thumb of the then prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the father of the assassinated Benazir), who had held disputed elections and was facing widespread street protests.

                          At the time I had never heard of AQ Khan, although, it turns out, he and his family had also lived months earlier at the same small hotel in Rawalpindi where I had lodged for a while. Pakistan was already vying to be a nuclear power and America was pressuring France to stop the sale of a reprocessing plant which would have enabled Pakistan to acquire plutonium, a nuclear explosive.

                          I returned to London in 1978 to join the Financial Times, and was replaced by a journalist who latched on to a bigger story: that Pakistan was building a centrifuge enrichment plant to make highly enriched uranium, the alternative route to an atomic bomb. A Dutch-trained previously unknown Pakistani scientist, Dr AQ Khan, was leading the project.My intrepid replacement went to visit Khan’s nuclear construction site at Kahuta. He also found out where Khan was living and went to his home. Khan’s security guards beat him up before he reached the front door.

                          The FT sent me back to Pakistan to help broker a deal whereby my replacement could leave without being prosecuted. At that point, I began my own investigations of Khan, which led to a frontpage story about his purchasing network in Britain. I doubt that either Khan or the Pakistan government was happy to see the exposé.

                          Even so, the first time I contacted Khan, he was civil to me. It was 1986 and he had just won, on a technicality, an appeal against a Netherlands court judgment that he had attempted to steal centrifuge secrets. Although my story was not a whitewash, it did quote him accurately, and Khan wrote to me with some more information about his case. I replied, and he reciprocated. It started a “penfriendship” that has continued for 23 years and has included two visits.

                          At the time, I thought Khan might make a good subject for a book. I amassed material, but never thought I had enough, and was not even sure if he was interesting enough for a biography. For his part, Khan was cautious. “When I write my autobiography, Mr Henderson, I shall ask you for your help.” It wasn’t the answer I wanted.

                          Frankly, in news terms, there wasn’t a great deal of interest in him, even in 1998, when Pakistan first tested its 1,500-kilometre-range Ghauri missile, a Khan-directed copy of the North Korean Nodong rocket, and went on to test two nuclear weapons. In 2001, when he turned 65, he retired. We kept in touch, but it was mostly Christmas cards.

                          Then, in late 2003, he became the story again. I was in London, on a bicycle ride by the River Thames, when my mobile phone rang. A voice said: “I am a friend of your friend in Pakistan.” I knew my “friend” must be Khan. The voice on the line said he had been asked to call.

                          My “friend’s” associates were being arrested — former colleagues at KRL, the Dr AQ Khan Research Laboratories, as the Kahuta centrifuge plant was known. I asked why. The voice said “Iran” — which was attempting to go nuclear. I asked what my friend wanted me to do with the information. The voice said I should try to publish it. It might help.I explained that I was happy to listen to what I was being told, but I needed some corroboration. I told him that my friend should call or e-mail me; he didn’t have to go through the details again. As far as I was concerned, he could just say “Merry Christmas”. I cycled home quickly and took a shower. Thirty minutes later, Khan rang from Pakistan and wished me merry Christmas.

                          The next few weeks were turbulent. A week or so after Khan’s call to me, Libya announced that it would abandon weapons of mass destruction. Shortly afterwards, in December 2003, The Wall Street Journal revealed that a German cargo ship called BBC China had been intercepted on its way to Libya with thousands of centrifuge components, and diverted to Italy. There was a Khan link there as well, but Khan declined my request for an interview. His “friend” called to say the time was not right and Khan was exhausted after long bouts of interrogation.

                          Khan was placed under house arrest on February 1, 2004, and since then he has rarely been able to leave his house. What do you do when under house arrest in Islamabad? You watch the BBC on satellite television. I knew he would. So, in 2006, when Panorama came to me saying they were making a film about Khan’s role in nuclear proliferation and would I be interviewed, the answer was simple: “Yes”. I told them that, from my knowledge of Pakistan and Khan, he could not have acted without the permission and collaboration of the government.

                          Khan watched the programme. After that, one thing quickly led to another. I came to know of the existence of the letter, and also learnt that its contents were known to Dutch intelligence, and also to anyone they might have passed details on to — including, in all likelihood, the British and Americans.Why were Dutch intelligence agents so keen to seize it? On the face of it, the letter’s contents are a damning indictment of a generation of Pakistan’s political and military leadership, who used Khan’s nuclear and missile skills to enhance Pakistan’s diplomacy.

                          It was not rocket science to work out a plausible explanation for the Dutch seizure. Bloggers will probably err on the side of more imaginative conspiracy theories, but the truth is probably simpler. After the September 11 attacks, the West in general, and the United States in particular, had to work with Pakistan to counter Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in neighbouring Afghanistan. That meant that they had to work with President Musharraf, even though he was no democrat. As part of the bargain, Pakistan’s nuclear sins also needed to be placed to one side.

                          As sins go, they were big: Pakistan had been spreading nuclear technology for years. The first customer for one of its enrichment plants was China — which itself had supplied Pakistan with enough highly enriched uranium for two nuclear bombs in the summer of 1982.

                          There it was in the letter: “We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km southwest of Xian).” It went on: “The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%).” (UF6 is uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous feedstock for an enrichment plant.)

                          On Iran, the letter says: “Probably with the blessings of BB [Benazir Bhutto, who became prime minister in 1988] and [a now-retired general]… General Imtiaz [Benazir’s defence adviser, now dead] asked… me to give a set of drawings and some components to the Iranians…The names and addresses of suppliers were also given to the Iranians.”

                          On North Korea: “[A now-retired general] took $3million through me from the N. Koreans and asked me to give some drawings and machines.”

                          In late 2003, with Al-Qaeda far from vanquished in Afghanistan and Pakistan-linked centrifuge components heading towards Libya, President Musharraf was under tremendous pressure from Washington. In all likelihood, he was offered a way out: “Work with us and we will support you. Blame all the nuclear nonsense on AQ Khan.” Although Musharraf had lavished praise on Khan at a banquet in 2001, he didn’t like him personally. So the choice was simple. Khan was made a scapegoat.

                          Years earlier, Khan had been warned about the Pakistan army by Li Chew, the senior minister who ran China’s nuclear-weapons programme. Visiting Kahuta, Chew had said: “As long as they need the bomb, they will lick your balls. As soon as you have delivered the bomb, they will kick your balls.” In the letter to his wife, Khan rephrased things: “The bastards first used us and are now playing dirty games with us.”

                          George Tenet, the director of the CIA at the time of 9/11, has described Khan as “the merchant of death” and “as bad as Osama Bin Laden”. Khan has been accused of unauthorised nuclear proliferation, motivated by personal greed. On top of this, he has been depicted as overstating his contribution to Pakistan’s success in making nuclear weapons and missiles with which to threaten the whole of India.

                          These themes, which were repeated endlessly across the world, are now accepted as universal truths. But Khan was a government official and an adviser with ministerial status even after he retired in 2001. If his dissemination of nuclear secrets was authorised by the government, it could not be illegal and he would enjoy sovereign immunity for his actions. Pakistan is also not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), so its nuclear trades, however reprehensible, were not against international law.

                          Khan is adamant that he never sold nuclear secrets for personal gain. So what about the millions of dollars he reportedly made? Nothing was confiscated from him and no reported investigation turned up hidden accounts. Having planted rumours about Khan’s greed, Pakistani officials were curiously indifferent to following them through. General Musharraf told a British newspaper at the time of Khan’s arrest in 2004 that “He can keep his money”. In another interview a few months later, he said: “We don’t know where his funds are.”

                          But was there any money? Much was made of a “hotel”, named after Khan’s wife, Henny, built by a local tour guide with the help of money from Khan and a group of friends in Timbuktu, west Africa. It is a modest structure at best, more of a guesthouse. A weekend home at Bani Gala, outside Islamabad, where Khan went to relax, is hardly the palace that some reports have made it.

                          In fact, there seemed to be no money. By summer 2007, Khan was finding it difficult to make ends meet on his pension of 12,200 rupees per month (at the time about $200). After pleading with General Khalid Kidwai, the officer supervising both Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and Dr Khan, the pension was increased to $2,500 per month and there was a one-off lump-sum payment of the equivalent of $50,000. I have copies of the agreement and cheques.

                          As for his role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile forces, I have little doubt that Khan won the race between his KRL organisation and the official Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to develop both a nuclear bomb and a missile system, a rivalry deliberately constructed by the dictator General Zia ul-Haq in the 1980s and sustained by later governments.

                          But there is a simple way to clarify matters. Pakistan’s system of national civilian honours is topped by the Nishan-i-Imtiaz (Order of Excellence), abbreviated as NI. A second tier of honour is the Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Crescent of Excellence), or HI. Khan was awarded the NI twice, a distinction never achieved before or since. He was also earlier awarded the HI. It is stretching one’s imagination to think that Khan could hijack the country’s honour system and the judgment of successive presidents.

                          Although the West continues to condemn Khan, Pakistan’s own energy to do so is fading, particularly since the departure of Musharraf in 2008. Frustrated by his house arrest and legal limbo, Khan has repeatedly this year pressed for remedy by the courts.

                          Khan was supposedly freed from house arrest in February, but the terms of that freedom were detailed in a secret “annexure A” of the court judgment, the final version of which Khan only saw later. One of the lines in the original draft that he was asked to sign was: “That in case Mr Simon Henderson or anyone else proceeds with the publication of any information or material anywhere in the world, I affirm that it would not be based on any input from me and I disown it.”

                          That line was eventually deleted and replaced with a more general prohibition about unnamed “specific media personnel”. Despite the court judgment specifying that the contents of the annexure “shall not be issued to the press or made public in any manner”, a copy reached me in the West.

                          Khan went back to court last month to challenge the terms of the annexure that he never accepted. Justice Ejaz Ahmed, the presiding judge at the Lahore high court, lifted all the curbs on his movement. “Dr Khan can come and go anywhere he pleases and no one should prevent him from doing this,” he ruled. “There should be no limitations.” Two days later another Pakistani court reimposed the ban.

                          America is pressing hard for Khan’s continued confinement. Deprived by Pakistan of the opportunity to interrogate Khan, the US is concerned that he may revive his old networks. Echoing the official view, The New York Times called this month for restrictions to remain on Khan for his “heinous role as maestro of the world’s largest nuclear black market”.

                          If Khan is free to travel and speak openly, there is a danger that he will give his own account of events, opening up a can of worms and complicating relations with Washington. Now his letter has been revealed, he hopes his story will be told differently.

                          Investigation: Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan - Times Online

                          Sorry if i posted in a wrong thread. Did not want create a new thread.

                          Comment


                          • There is a lot of speculation in this write up.



                            Omaha greets an 'unusual visitor' from China
                            By Peter J Brown

                            Last summer, the Washington Times reported that "an unusual visitor not seen at any formal nuclear forces facility since allegations of Chinese nuclear-weapons espionage surfaced in the late 1990s" had attended the US Strategic Command's (US STRATCOM) first-ever conference on strategic deterrence which was held in Omaha, Nebraska in late July.

                            US STRATCOM which is headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha oversees all aspects of US nuclear warfighting.

                            Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was the "unusual visitor" in this instance. Yao is currently a senior researcher at Department of World Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science (AMS). She joined the PLA in 1970. She holds a master's degree of arts from the



                            PLA's Foreign Languages Institute, and a PhD in military science from the AMS - the first woman in China to earn a doctorate in this field of study.

                            All attempts to contact Yao via China's Ministry of Defense after the conference were unsuccessful. However, a brief yet cordial reply from Yao finally came from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University where she is currently a fellow - she previously spent a year at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. Yao's e-mail included a reminder that any contact she might have with the media required prior authorization from Beijing.

                            In early October, Asia Times Online was among the first news organizations to obtain a copy of the official transcript of Yao's remarks in Omaha, and this writer immediately detected errors in this document. US STRATCOM was informed of these errors, and yet after a review of the audiotape one more time, the transcript was deemed accurate. Two days later, however, after viewing the videotape of her presentation which had better sound quality, US STRATCOM admitted that the recommended changes to the transcript were necessary.

                            This revised transcript is mentioned because Yao's remarks have generated lots of media attention in the past. For example, during a dinner held in early 2007 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, she became the first Chinese military officer to comment publicly about the controversial 2007 Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test. Previously, only the Chinese Foreign Ministry had issued brief statements about the ASAT test.

                            The Associated Press reported that she said, "My wish is we really want to keep space as a peaceful place for human beings." She went on to add that China would like all countries to come to a consensus that space should be used only for peaceful purposes - "But personally, I'm pessimistic about it," said Yao. "My prediction: Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime."

                            Now, given what happened in Omaha, there is some validity to the idea that in Davos, what she really meant to say was that weapons in space were inevitable unless the international community made a very serious effort to do something about the situation. China's efforts - along with Russia - to promote a United Nations convention banning weapons in space are very consistent and visible. The US has blocked this effort. It is highly unlikely that Yao and her views on weapons in space would somehow fail to accurately reflect this stance which the Chinese government advocates.

                            Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington DC, met Yao in China several years ago. He stressed that the January 2007 ASAT test followed two or three previous Chinese ASAT tests. Therefore, what Yao may or may not have said in Davos about space weapons does not really matter.

                            "This amounts to the use of 'moral equivalence' to justify what is likely a long-standing PLA decision to develop active outer space military capabilities. On this subject and on other aspects of China's intentions with respect to strategic weapons, it is my sense that Yao knows far more than she is permitted to reveal," said Fisher.

                            So why was Yao in Omaha? US Air Force General Kevin Chilton, commander of US STRATCOM, simply wanted a PLA representative to participate in this symposium, and she was selected by her PLA superiors to attend.

                            Chinese military officers cannot visit "sensitive US facilities, including facilities involved in nuclear-weapon and power-projection capabilities", according to the Washington Times. However, Yao's trip took her to the Quest Center which is in downtown Omaha, so she never actually visited US STRATCOM headquarters. In fact, no PLA officer has ever been to US STRATCOM headquarters, according to a US STRATCOM spokesman. General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of China's nuclear forces, has been invited to visit there, but he has not accepted so far.

                            "General Chilton is a strong proponent of military-to-military engagement and dialogue and as such, has invited Chinese military representatives to engage in several symposia, notably the recent Deterrence Symposium," said this spokesman. "We anticipate additional engagements and dialogue in the future."

                            Dr Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager for the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientist's Global Security Program, is quite familiar with Yao's work, and he is not surprised that she was designated to attend this conference in Omaha. She is frequently invited to international conferences because her overall command of the English language is unusual for a senior Chinese military officer.

                            "She is a prolific author, who can write in English, and who submits her work for publication in English-language journals," said Kulacki. "And, most importantly, she is a very well-read scholar, diligent in her research and insightful in her analysis."

                            Yao quickly registered on the US diplomatic radar screen years ago after a conversation with former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger which was widely reported in the press.

                            "Kissinger is a highly respected figure in China. His praise for her response to his question elevated her profile," said Kulacki.

                            Yao attracted considerable attention again months after her ASAT remarks in Davos when she openly questioned US Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a regional defense forum in Singapore in mid-2007. This was Gates' first trip to Asia and the unusual assertiveness of the entire PLA delegation created quite a buzz at this forum. The delegation was headed by Lieutenant-General Zhang Qinsheng, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff.

                            Yao asked Gates, "Do you think there are still any Cold War approaches that are valid or relevant in coping with US concerns about China in general and about the Chinese military in particular? Also, do you think there are other approaches, post-Cold War approaches, that the United States should adopt in dealing with multilateral relations between China and the United States?"

                            "The years-long negotiations [with the USSR] played an extraordinarily valuable role in creating better understanding on both the Soviet and American sides about what the strategic intentions of each side were; what the strategic thinking was; what their motives were; where they were headed ... That kind of dialogue, whether or not it involves specific proposals for arms control or anything else, is immensely valuable. It is one of the great assets of the developing military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the People's Republic [of China]," Gates said.

                            The US Armed Forces and China's PLA have fundamentally different military command structures which impacts these engagements and exchanges, according to Kulacki. The US military has a single commander-in-chief, while the PLA is governed by China's Central Military Commission, and the US president has greater latitude in directing these exchanges than the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who chairs the Central Military Commission.

                            This difference shapes the perceived prerequisites and expectations of both sides "in ways that are inhibiting progress", according to Kulacki. United States military officials who conduct the exchanges have greater decision-making latitude than their Chinese counterparts. China and the US have different objectives, too.

                            "China wants the exchanges to contribute to an improved political climate that benefits the broader US-China relationship. They are part of a larger, political strategy directed by the Party leadership. The US wants the exchanges to produce working relationships on crisis management, and to facilitate communication at lower levels of the command structure," said Kulacki.

                            According to Fisher, China's objective here is to make sure that all military engagement remains in China's favor.

                            "Think-tanks and academies [which are part] of the PLA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of State Security often deploy 'academics' to US and other foreign universities. I know of no rigorous assessment of this practice, but I would be willing to bet their understanding of us has benefited far more than our understanding of them," said Fisher

                            In Omaha, Yao sat on a panel with the Russian ambassador to the US as well as senior active duty and retired military officers from Pakistan, India and France.

                            In her concluding remarks, Yao stated that "there are still some factors which complicate China's nuclear calculations".

                            She pointed out that China has three new nuclear neighbors, and that tension across the Taiwan Strait might draw the China and the US into a nuclear confrontation. As for the development and deployment of US ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, she was quite clear.

                            "[This] threatens the credibility of China's deterrence based on a very small arsenal and threatens the strategic stability between the United States and China," she said. Later on, she added that the US BMD system, "may result in a re-assessment of force components and force size but not in the abandonment of a policy which has served China's national interests for nearly half a century".

                            Yao's comments on the development and deployment of a US BMD system is what perplexed this writer, and triggered the above-mentioned corrections to the transcript. According to Kulacki, after the dust settled, Yao did not say anything new.

                            "China's strategy presumes nuclear weapons cannot actually be used. They are psychological weapons, used to coerce and influence behavior, not to fight and win wars," said Kulacki.

                            "In this case, what China needs is a force just large enough to give anyone thinking of using nuclear weapons to attack China an assurance that they can and will retaliate. Missile defenses are a threat to a small force like China, because they can be used to mop up whatever might be left after a first strike. China is modernizing and slightly increasing numbers [maybe] in order to leave that doubt about invulnerability in the minds of adversaries."

                            For this and other reasons, it certainly seems as if these exchanges are a very sound idea.

                            "Barring another round of arms sale or a decision to go ahead with the October 2008 sale [to Taiwan] by the [Barack] Obama administration, I think these exchanges will proceed, albeit at a very slow pace," said Dr Jing-dong Yuan, director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, and associate professor of International Policy Studies at the California-based Monterey Institute of International Studies. "This relationship is most fragile, but at the same time also most important to nurture and promote given the stakes."

                            Yao has an important role to play here as one of China's most eloquent participants in what will certainly be a very difficult and delicate series of discussions.

                            "I have met her once. She seems to be one of the people that the PLA has developed to interact with Westerners on these issues. She accurately reflects a point of view within the Chinese military," said Dr Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-proliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation in Washington DC, is the author of Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age, who added that these "exchanges have developed slowly, but that is to be expected. This is a very difficult process."

                            Yuan cautions that things will not get any easier over the coming months.

                            "The [US Nuclear Posture Review] later this year or early next and the Pentagon report on the Chinese military [due out] next spring will pretty define how the US views China in military terms; this will also incur Chinese reactions, depending upon the contents of these reports," said Yuan.

                            Chances are that Yao may be asked to explain those reactions.

                            Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.

                            (Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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