Indian Nuclear Testing

[gunnut]

Be Honest, You just like the Dead Chick.

But no luck today, your post is on topic and adds to the thread.

No dead chick pics. (unless you really just want to see her )

As much as I want to see the dead chick, let's think of other members' delicate psyche and spare them of this unpleasantness.

[gunnut]

Finally!

This kind of sums up my argument from the other thread.

Only I need to have that Mauser first. AND I need to convince you (other nuclear powers) that I can get it off before getting swamped.

Right now I have a single shot countrymade katta (pistol) .... and its (reportedly) not even loaded.

Unfortunately you are up against people with automatic weapons and there's a new ban coming up. All those with automatic weapons already, get to keep them. There will be no more sale of guns and ammo is restricted as well. One may replace old ammo, but not add to the collection. There's even a ban on testing of ammo. One won't know what works and what doesn't.

Gungrape?

I know you've told me that you (the US, and therefore by exension, the Russians as well) are prepared to loose a few million (read cities) of your own. You have factored that in.

But that is my point.

You have factored in those fatalities AFTER hostilities break out.

While my deterrence argument, of having a long (adequate) range ICBM, was to prevent YOU from INITIATING hostilities IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

Answer this question first. US attacks India using conventional weapons. You are in charge. Do you return fire using nuclear weapons?

Bolstered by all other efforts from my side (non threatening, friendship, commerce, trade, growing my economy, partnerships in science, defense, anti-terrorism, etc., cultural ties and people to people contact, large influential and constructively contributing diaspora, etc.) to assure you and keep you assured that I am your friend and there is no reason to attack me. There is nothing to gain from attacking me.

But there is something (however small) to lose from attacking me.

There's always a loss from a war. Usually the loss is greater than the gain. The winning side loses less than the losing side, usually by definition.

[antimony]

And obviously you have not comprehended what SB is trying to say. You trying to ape Oracle's way of putting other people down when he has nothing else to contribute?

Feel free to check out the other posts where I actually responded with substance? Also, consider taking something to combat the acitidty and ulcers

[antimony]

And this is why I prefer not to engage with you and some other worthies here.

Big on snarkies, low to bankrupt on substance.

Oh well, mea culpa for feeling expansive and friendly today. Back to pretending you do not exist.

Feel free to answers the actual points I responded with. This one was just for fun. feel free to put your grumpy hat back on.

Also, it is not wide off the mark. If you do not understand something as simple (comparatively) as a gun metaphor, what makes you think you can handle a nuclear metaphor?

[Oracle]

Feel free to check out the other posts where I actually responded with substance? Also, consider taking something to combat the acitidty and ulcers

Blade's trying to save the clan members. In this case the Hindu nazis. And the common denominator is the hate for the US/UK/West.

[antimony]

It's not a great analogy. It's only good up to the part of "who wants to take the first shot?" and the "unexpended round is a deterrent, but once the round goes off, it's done."

You can look at the prisoners as from different countries. They won't work together and have language barriers. They are all China's conventional neighbors. The model also assumes the 2 dominant nuclear powers are absent. They can probably take down China if they all work together. But they all are weary of each other as well. Why should I take a hit for this other guy? I'm gonna hold back some and let the others fight it out. Again, psychology is at work here.

Here is why I think it a good analogy. Handguns vs. ARs + caseloads of ammo.

Handsguns : India, China and Pakistan. Short range, less number of rounds, somewhat weaker rounds
AR: US and Russia (UK and France not relevant). Longer range, more powerful rounds, many, many rounds

Also add the fact that the guys with the AR have had lost of practice time compared to the handgun guys. They know the strategies and tactics. The hand gun guys, esp. India and Pakistan don't.

The "nuclear armed nation" term is somewhat misleading. A civilian, less trained guy with a Webley revolver is "armed", as is a professional soldier with an Glock, an MP5 and a fucking Gattling. We all know who is going to be "deterred" and who is going to be destroyed.

Also, I don't think anybody is going to sit out. US said a clear no to USSR's idea of nuking China. US and USSR worked together to shut down Israel and UK. So they would cooperate to prevent a nuclear exchange.

[Officer of Engineers]

Agreed. But a nuclear deterrent can also hold true as a deterrent against/to a conventional attack. Especially when the conventional attack is graded high enough to decapitate and take out the nuclear deterrent. The opposite was Kargil, where each side very very carefully never ever threatened the same.

And like the above sequence of choices and responses, if the nuclear deterrent does not deter the conventional attack, then China has already lost.

At least with the DF-41, she has given the enemy one more significant step in its attack calculus.

What?

1962 US-Soviet
1969 Sino-Soviet
1967 and 1973 Soviet-Israeli

[sated buddha]

Unfortunately you are up against people with automatic weapons and there's a new ban coming up. All those with automatic weapons already, get to keep them. There will be no more sale of guns and ammo is restricted as well. One may replace old ammo, but not add to the collection. There's even a ban on testing of ammo. One won't know what works and what doesn't.

Nope. You've stretched the rubber band of the analogy beyond breaking point now. India reserves the right to keep testing. And keep producing. We've never really bought into the hypocrisy and the double speak of the nuclear haves and have nots clubs. National security remains paramount. And no paper is going to change that.

Answer this question first. US attacks India using conventional weapons. You are in charge. Do you return fire using nuclear weapons?

But that's the point I have been making all along. Its not my question to answer first, but yours. Before I answer your question, you need to answer mine. Are you willing to lose some of your cities to start something you do not need to? By developing the means to hit you, I force you to answer the question first before your first roll of the dice. Be it nuclear or conventional. It makes no difference. You then do not get to make the rules as to my response. Or even whether I would respond. You do not know. And even if that ambiguity of my response then forces you into an all or none non grade first strike, you will never ever be able to say with certainty whether you have gotten all of mine in time. Your cities are still hostage to that doubt, and always will be.

There's always a loss from a war. Usually the loss is greater than the gain. The winning side loses less than the losing side, usually by definition.

I agree. Should our deterrent prove insufficient to deter you, we lose. But would you take the risk? That really is the first question.

We have seen how the US reacts to the loss of a single American life. Your response to the death of 3000 of your own.

No one is going to buy the (military) bluff that you would be so blaise about losing a few milion (the 50,000 figure is another mindgaming downplay) to start something you have no reason to. Something we would never be stupid enough to give you reason to.

But we reserve the right to account for your stupidity (or bravado - however one looks at it).

Because there is just no way for us of knowing where you are going to stop once you start. Hence we ensure that there is no way you know how we would react once you start.

You will have to take that choice. You will have to gamble with some of your cities. And we will do all we can to ensure that you do not think it to be worth the risk. Both by not giving you a reason, and by escalating the cost way beyond your acceptable mental redline.

This is also MAD. Only the "mutual" is replaced with "minimal" here.

[sated buddha]

What?

1962 US-Soviet
1969 Sino-Soviet
1967 and 1973 Soviet-Israeli

My point was that just because the MNP attacks you conventionally (because he can) does not mean the NNP will also respond conventionally.

The nuclear deterrent would still be on the table. If the conventional strike of the MNP equals in effect and impact a nuclear strike, strategically. As Pakistan keeps reminding us, should we cross their red lines, even conventionally.

[gunnut]

Nope. You've stretched the rubber band of the analogy beyond breaking point now. India reserves the right to keep testing. And keep producing. We've never really bought into the hypocrisy and the double speak of the nuclear haves and have nots clubs. National security remains paramount. And no paper is going to change that.

You would sign a treaty and then disregard it? You are losing credibility on the international stage.

But that's the point I have been making all along. Its not my question to answer first, but yours. Before I answer your question, you need to answer mine. Are you willing to lose some of your cities to start something you do not need to? By developing the means to hit you, I force you to answer the question first before your first roll of the dice. Be it nuclear or conventional. It makes no difference. You then do not get to make the rules as to my response. Or even whether I would respond. You do not know. And even if that ambiguity of my response then forces you into an all or none non grade first strike, you will never ever be able to say with certainty whether you have gotten all of mine in time. Your cities are still hostage to that doubt, and always will be.

Are you telling me that you would retaliate against a conventional attack with nuclear weapons? is that your nuclear doctrine? Yes or no?

I agree. Should our deterrent prove insufficient to deter you, we lose. But would you take the risk? That really is the first question.

We have seen how the US reacts to the loss of a single American life. Your response to the death of 3000 of your own.

And not a single nuclear weapon came out. Fancy that.

No one is going to buy the (military) bluff that you would be so blaise about losing a few milion (the 50,000 figure is another mindgaming downplay) to start something you have no reason to. Something we would never be stupid enough to give you reason to.

But we reserve the right to account for your stupidity (or bravado - however one looks at it).

Because there is just no way for us of knowing where you are going to stop once you start. Hence we ensure that there is no way you know how we would react once you start.

You will have to take that choice. You will have to gamble with some of your cities. And we will do all we can to ensure that you do not think it to be worth the risk. Both by not giving you a reason, and by escalating the cost way beyond you acceptable mental redline. This is MAD. Only the "mutual" is replaced with "minimal" here.

You still don't get this game.

[sated buddha]

You would sign a treaty and then disregard it? You are losing credibility on the international stage.

I wouldn't sign the treaty. I haven't signed the treaty.

Are you telling me that you would retaliate against a conventional attack with nuclear weapons? is that your nuclear doctrine? Yes or no?

I am telling you that there is no way for you to know what we are going to do or how we are going to see your conventional attack.

And not a single nuclear weapon came out. Fancy that.

Against non nuclear states. Who cannot hit you on your soil. Our discussion centers around nuclear states who can.

You still don't get this game.

I'm willing to work towards it.

[sated buddha]

INDIA’S MILITARY LESSONS FROM GULF WAR II: An Analysis

Paper No. 644 27/03/2003

by Dr Subhash Kapila

This paper may kindly be read in conjunction with the following papers of this author:

*The United States Two Gulf Wars: A Comparative Analysis, SAAG Paper 598, dated 04-02-2003

* United States Debates War Against Iraq, SAAG Paper524 dated 01-10-2002

* United States War Plans Against Iraq, SAAG Paper 496 dated 19-07-2002

Introduction: Gulf War II is in full swing for over a week now. Its inevitability stood analysed in the above papers since the summer of 2002. The United States began clearing the paths to Gulf War II even before it launched operations in Afghanistan in December 2001.

Soon after 9/11 an intense debate took place within the United States corridors of power that 9/11 provided an adequate alibi for launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq. The hawks within the Bush Administration had to content themselves with the war on Afghanistan, as no direct evidence was available linking Iraq with 9/11 events.

President Bush enunciated his “Axis of Evil” doctrine classifying Iraq, Iran and North Korea as members of this axis. 9/11 did not yield any direct evidence linking these three countries with that diabolical crime. Notably 9/11 did yield significant pointers of the involvement of the United States own creation of “Axis of Evil”, namely Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Bush Administration ignored these linkages (See this author’s paper: “United States and the Other Axis of Evil”, SAAG paper No. 548 dated 20-11-2002).

Gulf War II-The United States Rationale: The United States justifications and rationale for Gulf War II followed sequentially, with some over-laps the following logic:

* Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and endangered global and regional security

* Iraq was linked to the Islamic terrorism network of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda.

* Iraq could pass on WMD assets to Islamic Jehadis.

* Regime change was a necessity to pre-empt all of the above and “liberate” the Iraqi masses under suppression from Saddam.

The United States has till date been unable to provide any concrete evidence in support of its charges against Iraq. Iraq lay prostrate since Gulf War I under 12 years of UN sanctions and daily bombardments by US and British Air Forces for the same 12 years. UN inspection teams either did not offer any evidence.

In United States reasoning, all of the above, posed a significant military threat to United States national security interests. "Wars of Pre-emption", a new coinage in United States strategic vocabulary was now to be used as an instrument of United States foreign and strategic policy.

Having taken recourse to a “War of Pre-emption”, the United States from mid-2002 commenced preparations. Recourse to the United Nations route in the following months provided cover to US military preparations.

The remainder sequence of events till Gulf War II in progress are well known.

Gulf War II- Some Distinctive Characteristics: The following characteristics distinctively mark the nature and impulses which led the United States to launch Gulf War II:

* “Wars of Pre-emption” were to became an accepted part of United States strategy.

* “Regime Changes” in other countries would also justify United States “Wars of Pre-emption” in future

* “National Security Threats” in United States perceptions could range from human rights causes to environmental threats.

* The United States was not obliged to obtain United Nations approval or concurrence to launch America’s “Wars of Pre-emption”

* In American perceptions, the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution and conflict management was irrelevant

* The Unites States had no use for security and regional organizations like NATO, WEU and the European Union or Arab League if they did not ditto US decisions.

* In United States “Wars of Pre-emption”, it looks that economic muscle would be used against the “Coalition of the Unwilling” eg. France and Russia to be excluded from Iraqi reconstruction contracts and a re-constituted UN food-for-oil project pertaining to Iraq.

Nations all over the globe have to take into account these new definitions of United States strategic policies and American national interests.

It would not be far fetched to analyse, that in the future, the United States policy of “Wars of Pre-emption” could also be used in aid of its allies or favoured nations, or also in the furtherance of interests of these strategic partners, where they synchronised with American national interests.

The connotations of the above logic are ominous.

Gulf War II-Military Characteristics: Gulf War II, like Gulf War I is marked by the following major military characteristics:

*Overwhelming use of air power both in terms of strategic softening-up of the enemy’s military infrastructure, strategic assets and in ground attack role.

* Preponderant use of Cruise missiles with extensive stand-off capabilities for the above roles.

* Greater reliance on sea-based platforms and minimal use of land-bases of strategic partners.

* Use of high technology to enhance day and night and all weather operations.

Military Implications for India: India needs to take note of both the distinctive characteristics of the United States rationale and impulses for “Wars of Pre-emption” and also the military characteristics. While the United States and India are not set on any collision course, but it does not take long for international equations to change.

India is an emerging regional power with aspirations for a global role. In the pursuit of such goals, India’s actions could contradict American national interests. As it is one of the overall objectives of United States strategic policies in Asia states:

“Prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. Any political Asian hegemon would seek to undermine the US role in Asia--- the domination of the region by a hostile power would pose a global challenge and threaten the current international order”.

--RAND, Project US Air Force Report 2001.

Any emergence of a regional power even when functioning peacefully in its own natural pre-eminence in the region is bound to be misconstrued as hegemonic. Further the “perception of being hegemonic lies in the eye of the beholder.” The United States in some distant future could view India as hegemonic.

There are other countries too who may now be tempted to resort to the precedent set by the United States.

India cannot mortgage its national security to future pious intentions of any major power. Therefore India in terms of lessons of Gulf War II needs to put into implementation steps which could deter any wars of pre-emption against her. The following strategic imperatives advocated in my earlier papers bear repetition:

*ICBMs India must acquire ICBM capabilities under a crash programme.

* SLBMs The third leg of India’s nuclear triad must become operational

* Aircraft Carriers India needs at least four aircraft carriers, three operational and fourth in dry dock

* Anti- missile Systems A top most priority for India in large numbers to intercept both cruise and other missiles.

* Air Defence Systems Multi layered systems in terms of technology, ranges, manual and automation are required.

* Military Satellites Dedicated to the Armed Forces for day and night and all weather surveillance.

India has the money to afford all of the above, it only has to exhibit the will to have these acquisitions despite pressure from any quarter.

Conclusion

Historically and contemporarily two stark facts stand out, which need to be noted by India:

* Japan would not have been the victim of atomic bombings, if it too had the capacity to do the same.

* Iraq would not have been subjected to Gulf War II if it had credible WMD capabilities. Why is North Korea with proven WMD being not subjected to similar treatment as Iraq?

The answers are obvious and it is these that must prompt and galvanise India to initiate a crash programme for achievement of the recommendations made in the earlier Para.

India has pressing strategic imperatives to upgrade and expand her strategic assets – that itself would be the first demonstration of India’s will in strategic matters.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email <drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com>)

INDIA

[sated buddha]

India's need for an ICBM

By Radhakrishna Rao

July 05, 2011

For sometime now, there has been an animated debate in India over the need to bolster the country’s strike capability with an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) equipped to hit targets at a distance of 10,000 kms. Indian strategic analysts argue that the country cannot afford to remain a silent spectator to the massive build up of an ICBM arsenal by China. Moreover, an ICBM capability is considered a natural corollary to India’s emergence as an economic, technological and military power of global standing. Further looking beyond the possibility of a Chinese threat, India should build up a sturdy ICBM capability to sustain its evolution into a truly global military power in the none too distant future. Right at the moment only a handful of countries in the world possess an ICBM strike capability.

India’s strides in designing and developing a range of military missiles and civilian space vehicles could easily be exploited to put in place a technological building blocks of an ICBM. As it is, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has time and again made it clear that developing an ICBM along with realising the technology of MIRV (Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicle) is well within its capability .What is more, DRDO has also highlighted the need for India to develop an anti-satellite system with a view to prepare India for futuristic warfare in which space assets will play a key role in determining the outcome of the battle.

The political leadership, though, in the national capital, New Delhi has not given serious thinking on the necessity for an ICBM. DRDO can take up a project to develop India’s ICBM only after permission from the Government of India. Since India is not a signatory to the so-called Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Indian government is not bound by “any treaty commitment” to cap the development of ICBM capability. But occasional reports appearing in a section of the media suggest that there is a voluntary moratorium on developing missiles beyond the range of 5,000 km.

As things stand now, the possibility of the US exerting pressure on India to abandon the plan for an ICBM – in the event of New Delhi giving a green signal for such a project cannot be ruled out. Both the US State Department and many privately funded think tanks in the country hold the view that DRDO has been “silently and subtly” making use of technologies that Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has developed for its space vehicles. Many of the technologies including electronics and communications devices, guidance and navigation packages as well as propulsion systems are common to both a civilian launch vehicle and a military missile.

Against this backdrop, the dominant view in USA was that the solid fuel technology developed for India’s first civilian launch vehicle SLV-3 was used for driving the Agni range of missiles developed as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) programme launched by DRDO in 1980s. The 17- tonne four stage SLV-3 which had its successful debut flight in 1980 was developed under the leadership of the former Indian President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam during his stint with ISRO. The American suspicion about the diversion of ISRO developed technologies for IGMDP was further strengthened by the fact that Abdul Kalam moved out of ISRO to head DRDO. In fact, Kalam’s leadership proved quite crucial for the success of IGMDP.

In the late 1990s, India had to postpone the test flights of its intermediate range Agni missile on more than one occasion under intense US pressure. What is more, way back in 1992, the USA had prevented an economically emaciated and politically weak Russia into dropping its plan to transfer the critical cryogenic engine technology to India with a view to help ISRO develop its high performance Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The argument of USA was that it contributed to “proliferation” and constituted the violation of MTCR. Subsequently, ISRO and the Russian space agency Glavkosmos came under the ambit of US sanction. Incidentally, the highly complex and difficult to handle cryogenic propulsion system is far from ideal for use in a military missile. For an overwhelming proportion of missile now being deployed are driven by earth storable, solid fuel systems. The logic is that a solid propellant driven missile is in a “perpetually ready to use” condition to hit the required systems.

With DRDO moving closer to preparing for the first test flight of the 5,000km range Agni-5, developing capabilities for ICBM would only be a matter of time and political decision. It is not for nothing that IAF chief Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik had made a strong pitch for India to develop ICBM if the technological capability already exists. He also wondered why India should put a voluntary cap on developing missiles beyond the range of 5,000 km. On a more practical plane, building up an ICBM capability is vitally essential for India since it has a declared a “no first use of nuclear weapon” doctrine. Evidently India has not yet signed the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) despite the sustained pressure from USA. Yet another convincing argument in favour of India developing an ICBM is that the country which is already working on putting in place a ballistic missile defence system should not stay away from developing ICBM capability

The growing military might of China as highlighted by its plan for a high tech space warfare supported by a variety of long range missiles should wake up India’s defence establishment to build at least “a semblance of counter measure” in the form of an ICBM to begin with. Further, one cannot rule out the possibility of China developing a Space Force like its neighbour Russia to give an integrated thrust to its space and missile defence strategy.

The integration of China’s space and missile defence strategy could be a cause of worry for not only India but also to US. The early 2007 anti-satellite test and anti-missile tests of 2010 provide a clear pointer to China’s vision for integrating, Air, Space and Missile capabilities into a single matrix. Similarly, China’s plan for an oribiting space station could provide a conspicuous edge in the futuristic battlefield where the supremacy in space will determine the outcome of a war.

(Radhakrishna Rao is a freelancer specializing in defence and aerospace issues)

India's need for an ICBM - Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

[sated buddha]

The challenge is in ensuring the autonomy and strength to deal with future coercion or military pressure. It is in this context that India will require a nuclear amplification and need it soon.

Very telling statement, and completely in line with what I heard from a senior staff level officer just a few days ago.

One can read both statements, 5 years apart, any number of ways of course.

[Officer of Engineers]

My point was that just because the MNP attacks you conventionally (because he can) does not mean the NNP will also respond conventionally.

The nuclear deterrent would still be on the table. If the conventional strike of the MNP equals in effect and impact a nuclear strike, strategically. As Pakistan keeps reminding us, should we cross their red lines, even conventionally.

In case you didn't get it ... and you didn't. In all the cases I've listed, the MNP told the NNP, "Go ahead. I dare you."