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  • #46
    Originally posted by zraver View Post
    The Soviet system fails for several reasons

    1- no proffesional NCO's means a lack of long term instatutional memory.

    2- twice a year induction

    3- 2 year terms of service

    4- IIRC a lack of the longer AIT type schools.

    5- large numbers of non-Russian speakers
    Practice makes perfect. This is a wise saying, which the Soviet Army accepts.
    Accordingly, during his service every soldier goes through the same cycle of instruction four times.
    Each of these lasts for five months, with one month as a break before the next one begins. During this interval, the soldiers who have completed their service are demobilized and the new intake arrives. In this month the recruits go through their Young Soldier's Course: the remainder overhaul and repair equipment and weapons, and do maintenance work at barracks, camps and firing-ranges. They are also used for various sorts of heavy work. This is not always for the Armed Forces; sometimes they become labourers on State projects. Then the five-month cycle of instruction begins. All the subjects in the training schedule are covered but during the first month the emphasis is on the individual training of each soldier. The youngest ones learn what they need to know and do, while the older ones repeat everything for the second, third or fourth time. As a soldier's service lengthens, the demands he must meet increase. A soldier who has only just joined may be required to do, for instance, 30 press-ups, one who has served for 6 months 40, after a year he will have to do 45 and after 18 months 50. The standards required increase similarly in every type of activity-shooting, running, driving military vehicles, resistance to CW materials, endurance without an air-supply in a tank under water, etc.
    In the second month, while work continues on the improvement of individual skills, sections, crews and military teams are set up. In reality they exist already, since 75% of their members are soldiers who have already served in them for at least six months. The young recruits adapt quickly, for they are made to do the work for the whole team: the older members do not exert themselves but they squeeze enough sweat for ten out of the new arrivals so as o avoid being accused of idleness themselves and in order not to incur the wrath of their platoon or regimental commander.
    From the second month, weapon training is no longer individual but to whole sections. Similarly, the sections, teams and other basic combat units receive all their tactical, technical and other instruction as groups. At the same time, members of these sections, teams and groups learn how to replace one another and how to stand in for their commanders. Sub-machine gunners practise firing machine-guns and grenade launchers, machine gunners learn to drive and service armoured personnel carriers, members of rocket launcher teams are taught how to carry out the duties of their section commander. Members of tank, gun, mortar and rocket-launcher crews receive similar instruction.
    The third month is devoted to perfecting unit and in particular platoon cohesion. Exercises lasting for several days, field firing, river crossing, negotiation of obstacles, anti-gas and anti-radiation treatment of personnel and equipment-the soldiers carry all these out as platoons. During these exercises, section commanders receive practice in commanding a platoon in battle. Then come field firing and other practical exercises lasting for two weeks each, first at company, then at regimental and finally at divisional level. Two final weeks are taken up with large-scale manoeuvres, involving Armies, Fronts or even complete Strategic Directions.
    After this an inspection of all the formations which make up the Soviet Army is carried out. Checks are carried out on individual soldiers, sergeants, officers, generals, sections, platoons, companies, batteries, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions and Armies. With this the cycle of instruction is completed. A month is set aside for repair and refurbishing of equipment, firing-ranges, training grounds and training centres. In this month, again, the demobilization of time-expired soldiers and the reception of a new intake of recruits takes place. This is followed by a repetition of the entire training cycle-individual instruction and then the welding together of sections, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, then the large-scale exercises and finally the inspection. So it goes on, over and over again.


    by a book of v.suvorov.

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    • #47
      Originally posted by Mihais View Post
      Thanks Zraver.I'm aware of the limitations of the soviet army(and I would be curious of what Russian members have to say,but that would be offtopic).But what puzzled me was that in order to get a task force in the field the US division or brigade has to switch battalions(and lower level units)from different HQ's resulting in mixed units that did not know each other.
      The units know each other, the typical US Brigade in a heavy unit (when I was in) was either 2 armor and 1 inf or 2 inf and 1 armor. Much like a combined arms regiment set up.



      Now,from what s-2 said I understand that US brigades achieved cohesivenes by being located and training together in a rather informal way.As long as you train and fight as a team it's ok,but why not create a combined force from the start,give it an identity as a permanent outfit and ,if need arise in combat,augment it with a higher echelon assets.
      Duplication of effort is the main reason. Instead of 2 master gunners in an armor brigade you'd need 3 for every slot. By grouping them in organic units you cut down on administrative costs and can then detail out units and support as needed.



      To make my point more clear,you don't see brigade size task force composed of more than 2-3inf battalions 1-2 armour 1arty battalion and 1-2 engineer companies (give or take some of these)+some recon assets etc.. .The Soviet organization with 4maneuver battalions,1arty,etc... seems more stable(and I don't talk here about training or the fact that they lack experienced personnel;I'm just talking about organizing a force).
      2 armor and 1 inf battalions will create 9-12 mixed asset company teams. A US armor battalion can have as many as 54 tanks (14ea in A,B,C,D +2 for the CO and XO) A 3 company battalion will have 44 tanks. Compare this to the Russian formations which vary from 29-47. A real mixed bag. Plus US units use a base 2 system. lead and wingman 2 pairs being a platoon, 3 platoons +command element being a company (2 up 1 back typical). Soviet units liked base 3, but this leaves somebodies butt in the win.

      For example if a US platoon is doing a bounding overwatch and just after the lead element crosses a FSCAM feild gets deployed- the unit has lost half its effective firepower. If this happens to a Russian platoon they lose either 33% or 66% depending. Or if a tank is lost in combat the Russian platoon has lost 33% of its fire, but a US unit only lost 25%. On the second tank 66% vs 50%

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      • #48
        Bugs,that was the theory and if properly enforced it could have produced a reasonably competent massive army.But in practice,every force recruited in the soviet style suffers from lack of discipline,sloppy execution of drills and little enthusiasm for doing the job right.Why don't you cite the chapter that describes Suvorov's first command?I'm not considering that author to be the ultimate source on soviet army but in his book there are both sides of the coin. Now,for US guys:I know that you went quite often at NTC and practiced against a soviet style opponent(at least during the old days;now the opfor may be different).Common sense says that you found out what worked and what did not and you took steps to rectify what didn't.Also I read that said OPFOR was considered the most experienced soviet style outfit in the world.What was the average number of trials needed for a US brigade to master the opponent?What were the consequences for brigade commanders that failed twice in a row?
        Those who know don't speak
        He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

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        • #49
          Originally posted by Mihais View Post
          Bugs,that was the theory and if properly enforced it could have produced a reasonably competent massive army.But in practice,every force recruited in the soviet style suffers from lack of discipline,sloppy execution of drills and little enthusiasm for doing the job right.Why don't you cite the chapter that describes Suvorov's first command?I'm not considering that author to be the ultimate source on soviet army but in his book there are both sides of the coin.
          Here is a link for the whole book:
          http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov12/index.html

          I consider the comparison of the capabilities of soviet forces versus western forces academic at best since is highly unlikely that a convention war in Europe would not turn in to a full nuclear exchange in a mater of hours.

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          • #50
            I had the book,but thanks for the link.My point was not to predict Nato vs. Soviets outcome in ww3 scenario.It has been done so many times that I will be bored to death to hear the same arguments,the same pro's and con's all over again.My point is,and always has been that while the US/UK system of task force/Battle group has clear advantages(flexibility being the most important,but others as well,as pointed by zraver),it is also somewhat more complex therefore more difficult to implement(its prequisites are experienced men and lots of training).From what S-2 and Zraver have said the main drawback I feared (poor cooperation between units)did not really occured.iNow,it would be interesting to know what happens when a newly formed army,with no significant traditions(Iraqi or ANA)is sent into the field.It works better with a somewhat rigid structure and command chain,or its better with the more flexible western approach(asuming they do have the basic skills and they do not flee the battlefield)?Plenty of experience in that respect in recent times.
            Those who know don't speak
            He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

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            • #51
              Originally posted by Mihais View Post
              My point is,and always has been that while the US/UK system of task force/Battle group has clear advantages(flexibility being the most important,but others as well,as pointed by zraver),it is also somewhat more complex therefore more difficult to implement(its prequisites are experienced men and lots of training).From what S-2 and Zraver have said the main drawback I feared (poor cooperation between units)did not really occured.iNow,it would be interesting to know what happens when a newly formed army,with no significant traditions(Iraqi or ANA)is sent into the field.It works better with a somewhat rigid structure and command chain,or its better with the more flexible western approach(asuming they do have the basic skills and they do not flee the battlefield)?Plenty of experience in that respect in recent times.
              The soviet style organization would not work for any former state in the former USSR (except maybe Russia) not because is worse than the western organization but because they do not have the resources that the soviets had to make it work.In a pure conventional conflict the soviet doctrine relies on maximum concentration of forces in order to achieve a STRATEGIC penetration ( that means that they are prepared to lose many assets at a TACTICAL level in order to achieve it). It is not as bad as it first looks. The concentration of forces also provides security and lower losses because the greater the numerical superiority that one side has the greater the damage he can inflict on the other side and the smaller the cost to himself.
              Neither Ukraine or Belorussia's or any state in the former USSR or the rest of the world for that mater has enough resources to achieve a numeric superiority as enjoyed by the former USSR .
              Plus unlike NATO , the WARSAW PACT was not a union of equals lead by a strong leader, but in the event of war they`re army's would be incorporated in the soviet army increasing it`s numbers.

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              • #52
                Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                ,it would be interesting to know what happens when a newly formed army,with no significant traditions(Iraqi or ANA)is sent into the field.It works better with a somewhat rigid structure and command chain,or its better with the more flexible western approach(asuming they do have the basic skills and they do not flee the battlefield)?Plenty of experience in that respect in recent times.
                It depends, it hasn't worked very well at all in most cases, but I ques it could. But for a new army or one with limited resources going with a mixed combined arms force right off the bat adds to the administrative costs. Every unit that has a tank, needs a tank mechanic, and 1-3 people rarely know everything. However if you group all the tanks and mechanics organically the mechanics learn from each other, know each other and know who to ask about a particular problem. Thus when you parcel the tanks and support assets out you still get some of the benefits of an organic grouping. Thus the western style task groupings would serve even a new army better, and actually aid the growth of institutional memory and reduce the cost.

                Now if you have enough resources, you can make a Soviet style system work, but most nations don't have the resources for that. Even the Soviets didn't. the 2 year term was a more a factor of cost and the need to have the Red Army act as a social glue than any tactical, strategic or operational need. If the Soviets had a professional NCO corps and a 3 year term their army would still not have been as good as the wests for reasons like language barriers and procurement issues, but it would have been much much better. Closer to Germany, although the Germans had a unified language and much small range of potential missions.

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                • #53
                  Just of curiosity,how did you perceived the Cold War era Bundeswehr?The Germans do have a very anti-militaristic culture these days.Were the officers and NCO's proud of their traditions ,or just doing their patriotic duty?How would you rate,on scale of 1-10 the 1988 Bundeswehr,presuming that US VII Corp and BAOR are 10?How about the smaller armies,Belgians,Dutch or anybody else that you had met?I know it is subjective,but I'm here to listen opinions and learn as much as posible.
                  Those who know don't speak
                  He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

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