Airpower versus Artillery

[Kernow]

The counter battery radar is attached at division level or corps level ?

In our Case Division.

[gabriel]

In our Case Division.

I guess it is the same way in the U.S.

[Kernow]

I guess it is the same way in the U.S.

I wouldn't be too sure on that, they have a massive Army, so may work differently.

[S2]

Gabriel Reply

Here's a bit about target acquisition in the U.S. Army-

FM 6-121

Field Artillery Target Acquisition-FM 6-121

I was once a battalion S-2 officer (Intelligence) for a direct support field artillery battalion of a separate light infantry brigade. The brigade was equipped to operate in a semi-autonomous manner. Within our artillery battalion we had a target acquisition platoon that worked for me with a 1Lt platoon leader that was part of HHB (Headquarters, Headquarters Battery). It was comprised of a survey section, a metro section and our own weapons locating radar AN/TPQ 36 FIREFINDER section.

[gabriel]

thanks for the link ...

[gabriel]

The term "task force" has specific doctrinal meaning in the U.S. military. We mix and match company-sized armor and infantry units within brigades to create battalion-sized "task forces". We further mix and match platoons of those companies within that "task force" to create company-sized "teams".

So a brigade comprised of two infantry battalions and one armor battalion may be task-organized to create three battalion-sized "task force"[s] within the brigade. Artillery is allocated by mission.

What are the major differences between the concept of a task force and the concept of kampfgruppen used by the germans in ww2 ?

[S2]

Gabriel Reply

"Kampfgruppen"

Entirely "ad hoc". Remember, "task force" is embedded into our doctrinal terminology as also is "team". Those terms define battalion and company-sized organizations that have been task-organized for combat by their higher headquarters.

So too the Germans but it wouldn't be unusual to see this arrangement extend to the regimental level(example- Kampfgruppe Friebe at Tarnopol in April 1944), division level (example- Group Von Manteuffel near Trosno at Kursk in 1943), corps level (example- Kampf Group Esebeck comprising 4 & 12 Pz Div, again on the northern salient of Kursk), or even army (example- Armee Abteilung Kempf along the southern side of the Kursk salient in 1943).

U.S. Army divisions carry an extensive list of battalions within their organizational tables. They also carry five to six brigade headquarters (three manuever brigades, a support brigad, DIVARTY, and a combat aviation brigade). ASSIGNED to each of those brigade headquarters is one headquarters company-nothing else. All subordinate units (battalions and separate companies/platoons) are attached and detached to those brigades by the division chief of staff or G-3 (Operations) officer on behalf of the division commander's intent. It is conceivable, therefore, that a Combat Aviation Brigade headquarters might have NO aviation units temporarily under it's aegis.

To that end, brigades more closely adhere functionally to the kampfgruppe concept than the fully formalized regimental structure. Again, within a U.S. Army Armored Cavalry Regiment every single unit of it's core structure is ASSIGNED- not ATTACHED and, although an ACR appears to be (and is) a balanced formation, it was designed as such from origins and not an organization created to meet a specific combat mission.

[Mihais]

Did you know of any instance when this system failed because of different units lack of coordination?In the a soviet style force you have a balanced division made of several regiments balanced regiments.This regiments train together for a long time(at least in theory) so the men get to know each other.I know that UK and US forces train a lot and that helps,but historically mixing units did not produced the best results.

[S2]

Mihais Reply

We've manuever guys here who can speak to this but our divisions stateside and kasernes in W. Germany were, functionally, closely aligned. So while we practiced task organization, we worked from a common doctrine that was reinforced by "habitual relationships".

While not formally linked, in point of fact, units did settle into a routine of sorts. One reason in Europe would be that most kasernes were brigade sized.
3rd Armored Div had three brigades, each in a different German city, as example. These communities were closed and close. As such, task organization for training always occurred within the brigade's assets unless the division was training together. You worked with the same guys often.

Tours in Europe were three years. A soviet soldier mobilized, trained, and de-mobilized over two years. I'm unsure which organization may have offered the more stable training platform but I suspect that our's did.

[Mihais]

Thanks S-2.Now I have some questions regarding cavalry.While I find the whole US concept of cavalry fascinating and extremely useful under the right circumstances,doesn't the whole heavy equipment make sometimes the job more difficult?I mean it's good to have a mobile force at corps commander disposal that can kill enemy recon,delay enemy advance and provide security wherever is necessary.But let's presume that during an offensive operation when speed is of the essence you encounter pockets of resistance,blown out bridges,all kinds of obstacles that must be bypassed in order to achieve the objective.Doesn't the whole heavy equipment become a burden? It makes more sense to me to have a light unit designed for recon and security that can be augmented than to have tanks waiting for fuel,arty waiting for ammo,all of them spread and way ahead the main force.Again I must emphasize that I like the whole idea of cavalry and I know it worked like a charm against the Iraqis both in GW1 and GW2,but I'm curious how would you adress this kind of situation.

[zraver]

Did you know of any instance when this system failed because of different units lack of coordination?In the a soviet style force you have a balanced division made of several regiments balanced regiments.This regiments train together for a long time(at least in theory) so the men get to know each other.I know that UK and US forces train a lot and that helps,but historically mixing units did not produced the best results.

The Soviet system fails for several reasons

1- no proffesional NCO's means a lack of long term instatutional memory.

2- twice a year induction

3- 2 year terms of service

4- IIRC a lack of the longer AIT type schools.

5- large numbers of non-Russian speakers


Thus noone in the unit (company level and below) has more than about five years experiance and they are getting recruits who are barely trained even by the standards of a brandnew private in the US Army. On top of this the lack of a unifying language means commands and drill have to be simplified and done by rote limiting innovation and tactical flexability. What the unit is able to learn gets gutted by 12.5% per quarter- 50% per year.

Contrast this to an average US platoon that will have a platoon seargent with more than a decade of experiance, and several staff and buck seargents with five or more years and scads of corperals and Spec-4's with 3 or more years. That is a lot of instatutional memory. They all speak English, and the longer they stay in the more schooling they get. Plus a Spec-4 or higher has probalby been in two or more units, more as promotions role in. So a trick learned in one unit gets disseminated through the army. Even the recruits who do not re-up are in for a 3rd longer and brought in multiple times per year so there is rarely a big drop in overall experiance.

The US system isn't perfect, but it does work rather well. IIRc the British use a much more regimented system that in its own way works to preserve instatutional memory. One of the Brits here is better qualified to speak on that. But as I recall they still allow lifers among the lower ranks so that if Corperal Jones is happy where he is at, doing the job he loves and has mastered he does not get forced out if he wants to stay. The US Army is very much up or out.

[Mihais]

Thanks Zraver.I'm aware of the limitations of the soviet army(and I would be curious of what Russian members have to say,but that would be offtopic).But what puzzled me was that in order to get a task force in the field the US division or brigade has to switch battalions(and lower level units)from different HQ's resulting in mixed units that did not know each other.Now,from what s-2 said I understand that US brigades achieved cohesivenes by being located and training together in a rather informal way.As long as you train and fight as a team it's ok,but why not create a combined force from the start,give it an identity as a permanent outfit and ,if need arise in combat,augment it with a higher echelon assets.To make my point more clear,you don't see brigade size task force composed of more than 2-3inf battalions 1-2 armour 1arty battalion and 1-2 engineer companies (give or take some of these)+some recon assets etc.. .The Soviet organization with 4maneuver battalions,1arty,etc... seems more stable(and I don't talk here about training or the fact that they lack experienced personnel;I'm just talking about organizing a force).

[S2]

Mihais Reply

"The Soviet organization with 4maneuver battalions,1arty,etc... seems more stable"

There's no stability borne of their organization for combat. There is predictability and rigidity. Not just in their organizational structure but in their battle drills as well.

Why needlessly commit yourself to such rigidity if you've the talent and means to seamlessly tailor your forces to meet any contingent need? We feel very comfortable task-organizing because we're convinced that our doctrine (which binds us) is fully understood and adhered to at all levels.

If anything, we're better than ever here IMHO. Since OIF Phase IV, we've integrated with U.S. Marine forces on numerous occasions in Joint task forces and done so effectively.

[Mihais]

''Why needlessly commit yourself to such rigidity if you've the talent and means to seamlessly tailor your forces to meet any contingent need? We feel very comfortable task-organizing because we're convinced that our doctrine (which binds us) is fully understood and adhered to at all levels.''
Fully agree.If you can do it than do it.

[Mihais]

''There's no stability borne of their organization for combat. There is predictability and rigidity. Not just in their organizational structure but in their battle drills as well.''
I must admit that I'm speaking only from books and wargames,so it's common sense that I put more value in your opinion than in mine,but I think there's a little more than that.While US Army and Marines can go and adapt to various circumstances,thanks to being the most trained and experienced in the world today,others can't do it so easily.That was the point I was trying to raise and to which you have answered.Having a force that is somewhat predictible is a lot better than having a force that does not coordinates well or not having a force at all( see the Georgians last August).Again I must emphasize that I 'm convinced your way of integrating various assets for various tasks is the best way(and not different fundamentally from other great armies of history).