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Clark: What's Wrong with U.S. Policy in Iraq

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  • Clark: What's Wrong with U.S. Policy in Iraq

    As General Wesley K. Clark wades into the Presidential race as a Democrat, his views on Iraq, the terrorist threat, and national security should be of utmost interest to the electorate. His new book, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire (PublicAffairs, 2003), is, in effect, Clark's campaign manifesto, providing insights into what he believes and what he would do as Commander-in-Chief. As a book, it is a smart take on the battlefield tactics used in Iraq as well as a tough-minded critique of the military strategy and the geopolitical doctrine followed by the Bush Administration. With the campaign heating up and talk of an Iraqi "exit strategy" growing, Clark's book offers a vision that contrasts sharply with that of President George W. Bush. Agree or disagree with the four-star general, here is what he says:
    -- The war in Iraq "has thus far been a perfect example of dominating an enemy force but failing to win the victory." Clark says the Administration made the classic mistake of equating the defeat of an enemy with achieving its larger political goal. That goal was to set up a democratic, stable, secular Iraq which would help stop terrorism. Clark argues that this required higher force levels and a different strategy: "Victory means not the defeat of the opposing army but rather winning the follow-through operation to accomplish the aims and intent of the plan." Too few troops on the ground going in left Saddam's Sunni heartland unconquered and rearguard supply troops vulnerable to attack. Moving unilaterally meant there were no European or other foreign troops to help in combat or policing the peace. And inadequate postwar planning meant few Arabic-speakers on hand, hardly any power generators, and no portable communications equipment. The Pentagon's war strategy, in effect, had "a profound flaw -- the endgame."

    -- The war in Iraq has weakened, not strengthened, the fight against terrorism "by diverting attention, resources and leadership, alienating allied supporters and serving as a rallying point for anyone wishing to do harm to the U.S. and Americans." Clark, who was publicly against the war from the start, argues that the Bush Administration failed to make the case that Iraq was an imminent danger. More important, the Administration was caught up in the Cold War policy template of fighting states, not supranational terrorists such as al Qaeda, and was predisposed to attack Iraq well before September. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and others believed that state-sponsored terrorism was the problem and that regime change could end the terrorist threat to the U.S.

    Wrong, says Clark -- this policy is making the U.S. less secure. Safety can come only through joint intelligence and police work with close allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, he says, and through a greater focus on homeland security; regime change is a diversion. "Not only did the Bush Administration misunderstand the lessons of modern war, it made a policy blunder of historic proportions," he writes.

    -- The Rumsfeld doctrine of making the U.S. military a smaller, more mobile, more high-tech force is responsible for the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and for the postwar chaos in Iraq. Clark, a four-star U.S. Army general, places the current debate over transforming the military within a broader fight between the Air Force and Army that goes back to World War II. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of his book. Clark says that the Air Force has been trying for decades to prove that it can win wars alone, without the Army, through decisive and devastating air power. Rumsfeld, of course, is an ex-Navy pilot and a believer in air power. Clark concedes that air power won out in Serbia and Kosovo. But while he backs high-tech warfare, Clark also sees boots on the ground as essential. Special Ops units working with the Air Force couldn't destroy al Qaeda, but a division of Army soldiers might have. "It was a strategic opportunity lost."

    -- Iraq may destroy the all-volunteer Army. Clark spends dozens of pages exalting the bravery and abilities of the men and women of the armed forces in his book. But he warns that the U.S. Army is not an army of occupation. The "quasi-imperial" America envisioned by the neocons in the Bush Administration is not matched by the military force that is supposed to create it. Nor should it be, according to Clark. He argues that the U.S. military is built for war-fighting, not long-term policing. It is a relatively small force (just 500,000 active Army troops), composed of volunteers, many of whom are married, with family commitments. Rapid and frequent rotation back to families for the enlisted -- and to their jobs for the reservists -- is crucial to maintaining the volunteer force. With Iraq tying down so many troops, that's not happening.

    -- American unilateralism is bad military policy and bad foreign policy. Clark sharply criticizes the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America paper that postulates a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy for the country. He argues that the U.S. leverages its military and political power around the world through multilateral institutions such as NATO and the U.N. and that abandoning them has cost it dearly in Iraq. In effect, he says that the U.S. doesn't do nation-building very well and should outsource it to the U.N. Clark also dislikes talk of an American Empire. "Old ideas of empire have to be replaced with a new strategic vision."

    That vision, of course, is the exit strategy out of Iraq. Clark says the U.S. must return to its multilateral roots and get Europe to share the burden in Iraq. He concedes that NATO and the U.N. need reform but says this can occur only through constructive U.S. leadership. Above all, he says the military should be powerful enough to achieve its goals but be used only as a last resort and with allies, if possible. Sounds much like the Powell Doctrine.

    Winning Modern Wars succeeds on many levels, including the Stephen E. Ambrose-like description of battles and tactics used by General Tommy Franks in pacing the war. Clark clearly admires the courage and capabilities of the soldiers on the ground. But he also presents a cogent critique of Pentagon leadership and White House politics. As a military man, his insights go beyond the predictable Republican-Democratic partisan dialogue. It's a valuable perspective no matter which candidate you vote for.

    http://www.businessweek.com/magazine...9/b3851061.htm

  • #2
    After Clark announced his candidacy, he shot up to the top of the Democratic candidates.

    They did a Gallup poll, 49% said they would vote for Clark, 46% for Bush.
    "Every man has his weakness. Mine was always just cigarettes."

    Comment


    • #3
      So, I see Gen Clark has become a politician after all and learn to lie through his teeth.

      -- The war in Iraq "has thus far been a perfect example of dominating an enemy force but failing to win the victory." Clark says the Administration made the classic mistake of equating the defeat of an enemy with achieving its larger political goal. That goal was to set up a democratic, stable, secular Iraq which would help stop terrorism. Clark argues that this required higher force levels and a different strategy: "Victory means not the defeat of the opposing army but rather winning the follow-through operation to accomplish the aims and intent of the plan." Too few troops on the ground going in left Saddam's Sunni heartland unconquered and rearguard supply troops vulnerable to attack. Moving unilaterally meant there were no European or other foreign troops to help in combat or policing the peace. And inadequate postwar planning meant few Arabic-speakers on hand, hardly any power generators, and no portable communications equipment. The Pentagon's war strategy, in effect, had "a profound flaw -- the endgame."
      And what of the war of his own doing? Kosovo. Are we leaving anytime soon, having defended Al Qeida's best friends?

      -- The war in Iraq has weakened, not strengthened, the fight against terrorism "by diverting attention, resources and leadership, alienating allied supporters and serving as a rallying point for anyone wishing to do harm to the U.S. and Americans." Clark, who was publicly against the war from the start, argues that the Bush Administration failed to make the case that Iraq was an imminent danger. More important, the Administration was caught up in the Cold War policy template of fighting states, not supranational terrorists such as al Qaeda, and was predisposed to attack Iraq well before September. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and others believed that state-sponsored terrorism was the problem and that regime change could end the terrorist threat to the U.S.
      For God sakes, the war has been going on for over 10 years. Iraqi gunners had been shooting at American planes. How much more immeniant danger do you want?

      Weakened the fight against terrorism? An age old tenet. If you can't find the enemy, let the enemy find you. Al Qeida and their every ally is converging on Iraq. They're going to fight American soldiers over there instead of attacking civilians over here. It's a fight I relished.

      -- The Rumsfeld doctrine of making the U.S. military a smaller, more mobile, more high-tech force is responsible for the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and for the postwar chaos in Iraq. Clark, a four-star U.S. Army general, places the current debate over transforming the military within a broader fight between the Air Force and Army that goes back to World War II. This is one of the more intriguing aspects of his book. Clark says that the Air Force has been trying for decades to prove that it can win wars alone, without the Army, through decisive and devastating air power. Rumsfeld, of course, is an ex-Navy pilot and a believer in air power. Clark concedes that air power won out in Serbia and Kosovo. But while he backs high-tech warfare, Clark also sees boots on the ground as essential. Special Ops units working with the Air Force couldn't destroy al Qaeda, but a division of Army soldiers might have. "It was a strategic opportunity lost."
      Now, those are lies and lies. The 3rd Yugoslav Army sufferred 12 pieces lost. The entire corps evaced the province in less than a week. What does this mean? It means that Clark's much vaunted air power did didly squat against the 3JA. Furthermore, the 3JA's LOC were never cut according to doctrine. Lastly, it was the British and the French prep work for a ground war that finally scared Milosevic into surrendering. The 3JA nearly revolted when they've gotten their orders. They were still combat effective at NINETY-FOUR percent strength.

      On the eve of Milosevic surrender, the SAS/SBS/JTF II were poised to enter Kosovo to finally direct air strikes. On top of that, the British 4th Armoured Brigade was receiving a fourth battalion (3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment) of light inf as the airborne assualt package.

      All this was planned and executed by British Gen Sir Michael Jackson. No input nor authorization was sought from Clark.

      -- Iraq may destroy the all-volunteer Army. Clark spends dozens of pages exalting the bravery and abilities of the men and women of the armed forces in his book. But he warns that the U.S. Army is not an army of occupation. The "quasi-imperial" America envisioned by the neocons in the Bush Administration is not matched by the military force that is supposed to create it. Nor should it be, according to Clark. He argues that the U.S. military is built for war-fighting, not long-term policing. It is a relatively small force (just 500,000 active Army troops), composed of volunteers, many of whom are married, with family commitments. Rapid and frequent rotation back to families for the enlisted -- and to their jobs for the reservists -- is crucial to maintaining the volunteer force. With Iraq tying down so many troops, that's not happening.
      So, he could parrot what everything from what Gen Shinseki has been saying on day 1.

      -- American unilateralism is bad military policy and bad foreign policy. Clark sharply criticizes the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America paper that postulates a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy for the country. He argues that the U.S. leverages its military and political power around the world through multilateral institutions such as NATO and the U.N. and that abandoning them has cost it dearly in Iraq. In effect, he says that the U.S. doesn't do nation-building very well and should outsource it to the U.N. Clark also dislikes talk of an American Empire. "Old ideas of empire have to be replaced with a new strategic vision."
      Gee, what kind of UN permission did we get for OAF? Is the UN in charge of Kosovo now? Now, who set that up?

      That vision, of course, is the exit strategy out of Iraq. Clark says the U.S. must return to its multilateral roots and get Europe to share the burden in Iraq. He concedes that NATO and the U.N. need reform but says this can occur only through constructive U.S. leadership. Above all, he says the military should be powerful enough to achieve its goals but be used only as a last resort and with allies, if possible. Sounds much like the Powell Doctrine.
      Squaks like a parrot. Shits like a parrot. The man was not trusted by allies and politicians alike. His command was not even in the go-no-go loop in that Chinese Embassy bombing. I've already stated what Gen Sir Jackson did to him.

      Winning Modern Wars succeeds on many levels, including the Stephen E. Ambrose-like description of battles and tactics used by General Tommy Franks in pacing the war. Clark clearly admires the courage and capabilities of the soldiers on the ground. But he also presents a cogent critique of Pentagon leadership and White House politics. As a military man, his insights go beyond the predictable Republican-Democratic partisan dialogue. It's a valuable perspective no matter which candidate you vote for.
      Unfortunately, the American public would not be exposed to this man's true lack of abilities.

      I'm sorry. I have no respect for a man who was told to do a job half assed and who chomped down on people when they went to do the job full blast and then blame his bosses for failing to do the job properly and then bullshitting his successes on a job undone.
      Last edited by Officer of Engineers; 23 Sep 03,, 05:56.

      Comment


      • #4
        I know of two reports that came out of that war. One was from the Canadian Air Command that stated that the Canadians only met with 10% success rate - on par with the rest of strike packages.

        The other report came from Gen Clark's command in which they stated that OAF sortie success was 78%.

        The difference.

        The Canadians counted targets hit.

        Gen Clark's office counted weapons release.

        Comment


        • #5
          It's a shame this guy is just another shrill.

          I really wish there was someone worth voting for.

          I wish i could save my vote, and vote twice in the next election.... :(

          Comment


          • #6
            That's just half of it, have you heard his economic and gun policies?

            He calls for a "progressive income tax" sounds like Marx to me.

            And he's pro-gun control.


            This guy's all image, he makes Dean look good.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by ironman420
              After Clark announced his candidacy, he shot up to the top of the Democratic candidates.

              They did a Gallup poll, 49% said they would vote for Clark, 46% for Bush.
              Hmmm, Strange, the new CNN/Time poll just came out recently showing that not even Clark beat Bush.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Gio
                He calls for a "progressive income tax" sounds like Marx to me.
                You do know what a progressive income tax is, yeah? Nothing at all to do with Marx and a whole lot more to do with avoiding economic collapse.

                Anyway, you already have a progressive income tax, just like every other first-world country.
                SWANSEA 'TILL I DIE! - CARN THE CROWS!

                Rule Britannia, No Surrender

                Staff Cadet in the Australian Army Reserve.

                Soli Deo Gloria

                Comment


                • #9
                  Please refer to the following passage from the Communist Manifesto...
                  Communist Manifesto, 1848 wrote:
                  "A heavy progressive or graduated income tax."

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    What is a progressive income tax?
                    Meddle not in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup.

                    Abusing Yellow is meant to be a labor of love, not something you sell to the highest bidder.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      There is a difference between the heavy progressive tax describedd by Marx and what you have in most first-world countries.

                      A progressive tax is basically, the more you earn, the higher percentage of tax you pay. Ie, you earn $40,000 and pay 25% tax, 65,000 38% tax, $120,000 55% tax.

                      A flat tax is where everyone pays the same percentage, no matter how much they earn.

                      I used to support a flat tax (or at least a very low progressive tax grade), but looking at its effects, I changed my mind.

                      See, there are certain things in life that people need. In Australian society this is housing, transport, food, education, employment. Once someone is earning enough to get these, any money that they earn, they don't really need. It would be better spent providing suppport for pensioners or disabled people than buying some guy a new boat.

                      I am an advocate of user pays, but if someone is working a full day, yet not earning enough to provide for his family, he will need help. And he should get it. If someone is sitting around on his ass, he can starve. If he isn't capable of working (in the case of old or disabled people), society should take care of them, and those that are more able to contribute should.
                      SWANSEA 'TILL I DIE! - CARN THE CROWS!

                      Rule Britannia, No Surrender

                      Staff Cadet in the Australian Army Reserve.

                      Soli Deo Gloria

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Ziska
                        A progressive tax is basically, the more you earn, the higher percentage of tax you pay. Ie, you earn $40,000 and pay 25% tax, 65,000 38% tax, $120,000 55% tax.

                        A flat tax is where everyone pays the same percentage, no matter how much they earn.

                        I used to support a flat tax (or at least a very low progressive tax grade), but looking at its effects, I changed my mind.

                        See, there are certain things in life that people need. In Australian society this is housing, transport, food, education, employment. Once someone is earning enough to get these, any money that they earn, they don't really need. It would be better spent providing suppport for pensioners or disabled people than buying some guy a new boat.
                        Hosreshit you earn it its yours, if you want to take 500 dollars out to the nearest homeless man and burn it right in front of him well hey its YOUR money YOU earned it.... Old people are the only people whom I think have a right from the government for compensation in their retirement. Everyone else can blow me, I'm sick to death of hearing about some poor woman with 19,000 kids so she can collect a bigger GD welfare check, Unemployement pay wouldn't be on my shit list either if it wasn't f*cked up as hogans goat.
                        Your look more lost than a bastard child on fathers day.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          :)

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            "See, there are certain things in life that people need. In Australian society this is housing, transport, food, education, employment. Once someone is earning enough to get these, any money that they earn, they don't really need. It would be better spent providing suppport for pensioners or disabled people than buying some guy a new boat."

                            Good christ all mighty....that makes you a communist. :(

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Repent!!! You must repent!!!
                              Meddle not in the affairs of dragons, for you are crunchy and taste good with ketchup.

                              Abusing Yellow is meant to be a labor of love, not something you sell to the highest bidder.

                              Comment

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