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Thread: The China Reading List.

  1. #16
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    Not reading but certainly most educational

    Col Dennis Blasko's presentation on the Chinese Armed Forces at Speaks at Whittier College

    Part 1


    Part 2

  2. #17
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    I'm now looking for a copy of THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY written by the NDU for their officer training course.

  3. #18
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    Not nearly as heavy or academic as a lot of the stuff that you guys are mentioning, but I recently read this and found it to be really interesting. Besides, being a banned book is a good enough reason to read anything as far as I am concerned.

    Amazon.com: Will the Boat Sink the Water?: The Life of China's Peasants: Chen Guidi, Wu Chuntao: Books

    I was also lucky enough to get to see James Fallows speak at the Shanghai Literary Festival a couple of months ago. Easily the best public speaker I have ever seen in person. Picked up this collection of articles that he wrote and liked it.

    Amazon.com: Postcards from Tomorrow Square: Reports from China (Vintage): James Fallows: Books

    Finally, again a easier read, but I couldn't put this one down.

    Amazon.com: China Road: A Journey into the Future of a Rising Power: Rob Gifford: Books

  4. #19
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    What about Berzinskis Grand Chessboard?

    Even if the book is more about the whole region.

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    Axis of Convenience By Bobo Lo

    This is the most up-to-date book on Sino-Russian relations. Questionable conclusions, but well researched & well written.

    Axis of Convenience, Bobo Lo, Book - Barnes & Noble

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    It was a good read, also recommended by Foreign Affairs.

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    This was another good read when I did my thesis. It focuses on the historical changes in Russia's perceptions of China. The author is a professor at MGIMO - Russia's premiere school of international relations.

    The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century
    By Alexander Lukin

    China and Russia, two giants dominating the Eurasian landmass, share a history of understanding and misunderstanding whose nuances are not well appreciated by outsiders. In his interpretation of this relationship from the Russian point of view, Alexander Lukin shows how, over the course of three centuries, China has seemed alternately to threaten, mystify, imitate, mirror, and rival its northern neighbor. Lukin traces not only the changing dynamics of Russian-Chinese relations, but also the ways that Russia's images of China more profoundly reflected Russia's self-perception and its perception of the West as well. As both Russia and China take distinctive approaches to political and economic integration in the twenty-first century global economy, this reinterpretation of their relationship is valuable not only to historians but to all students of international affairs.

    Amazon.com: The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia's Perceptions of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations Since the Eighteenth Century (9780765610256): Alexander Lukin: Books

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    Here is a good panel discussion from the Council on Foreign Relations on the recent development of the PLA. Click on the link below, download the MP3, and listen to it in your own time.



    China 2025: Panel III: China's Security Future (Audio) - Council on Foreign Relations


    China 2025: Panel III: China's Security Future (Audio)
    Speakers: Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Director, China Strategic Issues Group, CNA
    James C. Mulvenon, Director, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis
    Mark Stokes, Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute
    Presider: Randy Schriver, President and CEO, Project 2049 Institute

    October 19, 2009
    Conference Panel Session: China 2025: Panel Three: China’s Security Future

    This session was part of a CFR symposium, China 2025, which was cosponsored with the Project 2049 Institute.


    Streaming Audio
    Last edited by xinhui; 31 Oct 09, at 00:53.
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    I'll throw out there The Soong Dynasty by Sterling Seagrave. Amazon.com: Soong Dynasty (9780060913182): Sterling Seagrave: Books

    It seems that Seagrave likes to burst people balloons (either those of Chinese people on either side of the Taiwan Strait by showing some of Sun Yishan--Yet-san--'s less than desireable qualities, or the traditional and brief narrative of US high school textbooks by showing the nasty side of the Nationalist movement and how they bilked the US government for millions in WWII), and his absolute inability to pick a romanization system and stick with it (he says he does it to make it easier for the reader, but honestly I find it makes it considerably harder), but it is a really fascinating book that can hook you in very well.

    I'd also throw out there Spence's To Change China: Western Advisers In China Amazon.com: To Change China: Western Advisers in China (9780140055283): Jonathan D. Spence: Books

    It's fascinating in how it shows the common problems that many different and prominent foreign advisors have come across in China, namely in their quest to change China for the "better" (or at least the better as they saw it). Of course most of this stems from Chinese culture and many longstanding tactics for dealing with foreigners... A good read if your interested in negotiation or diplomacy.

  10. #25
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    wrote this review two weeks ago, enjoy.





    Book Review: Red Star Over The Pacific

    Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes.

    Both authors are noted professors at the US Naval War College and this book is a surprisingly refreshing read. It is not a "bean counting" book that recites weapon performance and their numbers, nor does it cherry-pick China related incidents to argue one's political agenda like many recent China related books. Bean-counting and bias are fine in that they serve a purpose, but for those who are looking for a more in-depth analysis, "Red Star Over the Pacific" is a welcome addition.

    During the first part of the book, the authors surveyed the current strategic debate regarding China under the framework of Mahanian theory (coined by Alfred Thayer Mahan). Mahanian debates can become heated when competing schools of thought--ranging from Neo-Mahanian, to classical Mahanian to Continentalists--exchange intellectual salvos with their associated think-tanks and journals.

    While the authors correctly conclude that there is no single dominant school that governs China's maritime strategy they do put forth a more thoughtful analysis on the direction China's future maritime strategy. After reviewing the debate inside of China, the authors also called for Western PLA watchers to take a fresh perspective with statements like: "not so long ago, western mariners and scholars deprecated Chinese naval power;" "(they need) to revise their once-mocking estimate" and "old thinking about Chinese Sea Power." The author made a strong argument that a fresh perspective is needed on a regular basis as the development of the Chinese sea power is progressing at an amazing speed.

    As history is a guide, the book examines the German and Japanese precedent for China's quest for Sea Power, in addition to Mao and Zheng He's continuing influence in the strategy domain. The authors explain that the German and Japanese (and to some extent the Soviet) models seem to match the Chinese experience on the surface, but China is not adopting them wholeheartedly.

    In the thick of the book the authors spell out the current Chinese concept (subject to author interpretation) of Fleet Tactics, Missile and Anti-missile interaction at sea, A2/AD, and China's emerging undersea nuclear deterrent. The authors focused on where the PLAN would operate their limited underwater nuclear assets instead of simply pointing out what their inventory is likely to be. This is a very insightful analysis considering the recent news of a newly modified Yuan class, as it offers a framework into the PLAN's operational pattern.

    The tail end of the book reviews different strategic schools on China's Soft-Power at Sea, especially in light of Zheng He's historical narrative, and the current economic interest in guaranteeing free passage for China's trade. All these elements are part of what the author’s call China’s maritime identity.

    "Security is about more than tallying up numbers and capabilities. Those scholars' insights make a useful way to evaluate China's maritime identity." Page 154.



    After reviewing the book, I believe Mahan's first trident of commerce, politics and military power will still "command the barrel of the gun" -- to continue author's attempt of fusing Mao and Mahan.

    Simply put, China's current "influence" is the direct result of its economic power; other aspects of Chinese strength seem less relevant. Besides Vietnam, no member of ASEAN will rush into a Chinese style of authoritarianism, no matter how attractive Chinese growth is. Oddly enough, Vietnam is the only country that modeled its political and economic systems after China yet is the most anti-Chinese of the ASEAN block (one of the few ASEAN nations that do not operate the Chinese C-801 anti-ship missile). The recent Sino-Japanese dispute, while distasteful, did not alter the course of general economic integration of both nations (rare earth elements not withstanding).

    Without a large chain of bases overseas, Chinese investments will continue to branch out, from Special Economic Zones in Egypt, Ports in Greece, railroad infrastructure in South America, farms in Africa, just to name a few. The greatest constraint for China's naval expansion is not the 1st island chain, nor the second. It is the deep pocket of the defense budget, a budget which is linked to the well-being of the trade-dependent economy. For that, the subscribers of Mahan's first trident are likely to prevail over the third trident (military force) in establishing a regional pecking order. At the end of the day, without oversea bases, it is difficult to imagine China replacing the USN as the guardian of the high-seas. The PLA high command might not admit it, but they should be thankful they do not have a “guardian” role.

    It might be beyond scope of this book, but geopolitical developments in the Pacific can be tiring to the internal politics of member nations (ASEAN +3) and it can have a great impact on the regional security framework in unexpected ways.
    Last edited by xinhui; 03 Nov 10, at 17:36.
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  11. #26
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    My review.




    Book Review: "China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership"



    In the fourth volume of the series "Studies in Chinese Maritime Development" authors from the US Naval War College and their Chinese counterparts (including Rear Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army) map out a possible path for a maritime security partnership.

    The goal of this book was not to provide "in-depth analyses" as was the seen in the previous three volumes (China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force, China's Energy Strategy, and China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspectives) but rather to focus on the requirements to establish political and institutional frameworks in hopes of creating a stable, mutual and beneficial relationship for both sides.

    The authors from both sides are professionals -- given today's political reality between the two nations, especially the predominant concern in the Taiwan Strait, they focus on MOOTW and non-traditional security threats and opportunities. These threats range from anti-terrorism, civil maritime enforcement, humanitarian operations, submarine rescue, to the prospects for Sino-US naval cooperation against avian influenza. For example, the Sino-US Coast Guard (USGC) cooperation has been successful – the USCG/CFLEC (China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command) team was credited with reducing illegal driftnet fishing by Chinese flagged vessels in the North Pacific Ocean. In April 2008 an unidentified cargo ship collided with the Chinese F/V Hu Hai Yu 5662, killing two fishermen. With the help of the LAPD, the unidentified cargo ship was discovered in the Port of Los Angeles. Lastly, the USCG marine inspection officers were granted multiple entry visas, a rarity among non-diplomatic US government officials.

    Of course, it is unrealistic to expect civilian cooperation to translate into the military space as long as the Chinese sticky point of "sovereignty" is in question (or the perception of). A great length of the book is devoted to sharing common interests, and addressing common uncertainties and mistrusts between both sides. The PLAN’s deployment to the Gulf of Aden is frequently cited as an example of military-military cooperation, but it should not be the only one. Other events such as PME exchange and submarine rescue (China is already getting support from England) should also be included in building up the political and institutional framework. The Chinese contributors to this volume also expressed interest in the U.S Navy’s Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP), which is a good start.

    Unfortunate incidents will occur again, and angry OpEds that paint using black-and-white will inevitably fill our screens, but one could hope that with time and further understanding, such unfortunate events will be managed with greater ease. The attempt by the good folks at the US Naval War College should be applauded – the impact of this important work will move from academia to shape the policy between two great nations and half the world. As David N. Griffiths phrased it "China and the United States cannot afford to leave incident management to chance or instinct. The stakes are too high."

    Book Review: "China, the United States and 21st - Century Sea Power Defining a Maritime Security Partnership" Edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li.

    Contributors:

    Mr. Gabriel B. Collins, OSD/ONA research follow at the U.S. Naval College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.

    Prof. Peter A. Dutton, an associate professor of strategic research in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College.

    Dr Michael J. Green, holds Japan Chair and is a senior advisor at CSIS, in addition to being an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University.

    Mr. David N. Griffiths, is an independent consulting analyst.

    Dr. James R. Holmes, is an associate professor of strategy & policy at the U.S Naval War College.

    Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.) A consultant on Asian security affairs.

    Captain Bernard “Barney” Moreland, USGC, is the senior analyst for the US Navy’s Pacific fleet.

    Prof. William S. Murry is an associate professor of warfare analysis & research at the U.S Naval War College.

    Dr. Paul J. Smith is an associate professor of international politics at the U.S Naval War College.

    Dr. Su Hao is a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University, Director of its Center for Asia-Pacific Studies.

    Dr. Wu Shicun is president of and a senior research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCS)

    Dr. Guifang (Julia) Xue is the director and professor of the Law of the Sea Institute, Ocean University of China (OUC)

    Rear Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

    Dr Toshi Yoshihara is an associate professor of strategy & policy at the U.S Naval War College.

    Dr. Yu Wanli is an associate professor at the School of International Studies and a member of the academic committee of the Center for International and strategic Studies at Peking University.

    Dr. Zhu Huayou is vice president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

    Prof. Zhuang Jianzhong is the deputy director of the Center for National Strategy Studies of Shanghai Jiao Tong University (CNSS)


    Editors:


    Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an associate professor in the strategic research department at the US Naval War College.

    Dr Lyle J. Goldstein is an associate professor in the strategic research department at the US Naval War College.

    Dr Nan Li is an associate professor at the US Naval War College.
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  12. #27
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    My next read.



    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/bo...gewanted=print

    May 13, 2011
    Henry Kissinger on China
    By MAX FRANKEL

    ON CHINA

    By Henry Kissinger

    Illustrated. 586 pp. The Penguin Press. $36.

    Henry Kissinger was not only the first official American emissary to Communist China, he persisted in his brokerage with more than 50 trips over four decades, spanning the careers of seven leaders on each side. Diplomatically speaking, he owns the franchise; and with “On China,” as he approaches 88, he reflects on his remarkable run.

    To the degree that Washington and Beijing now understand each other, it is in good measure because Kissinger has been assiduously translating for both sides, discerning meaning in everything from elliptical jokes to temper tantrums. At every juncture, he has been striving to find “strategic concepts” that could be made to prevail over a history of conflict, mutual grievance and fear. As President Nixon’s national security adviser, then secretary of state for Nixon and Gerald Ford, and since 1977 as a private interlocutor extraordinaire, Kissinger has been unwaveringly committed to surmounting what he considers the legitimate Chinese resentment of American interference in their internal affairs and Americans’ distaste for China’s brutal suppression of ethnic, religious and political dissent.

    The surprise buried in his lumbering review of Sino-American relations is that the much ballyhooed Nixon-Kissinger journeys to China in 1971-72 turned out to have been the easy part. “That China and the United States would find a way to come together was inevitable given the necessities of the time,” he writes. “It would have happened sooner or later whatever the leadership in either country.” Both nations were exhausted from war (Vietnam, clashes on the Soviet border) and domestic strife (antiwar protests in Nixon’s case, the Cultural Revolution in Mao’s). Both were determined to resist Soviet advances and so could quickly agree to make common cause. The menace of Moscow took the leaders’ minds off confrontations in Vietnam and Taiwan and quelled their ritual denunciations, whether of international imperialism or Communism. They decided that the adversary of my adversary was my pal, and for more than a decade that was fruitfully that.

    But that was a different time. China finally escaped from Mao Zedong’s mad doctrine of perpetual revolution and from the enfeebling nostrums of central planning; it became an industrial powerhouse. The Soviet Union and its empire collapsed. And the United States, feeling supreme, began promoting democracy with missionary zeal even as it grew dangerously addicted to foreign oil, goods and credit. The radical shift in the balance of power turned China and the United States into mutually dependent economic giants, but it left them without an overarching strategic design of partnership.

    It is to demonstrate the need for such a design that Kissinger reviews the ups and downs of Sino-American relations, reaching even into ancient Chinese history to define national characteristics. (He finds it apt that the Chinese like to play “wei qi,” or “go,” a protracted game of encirclement while we play chess, looking for control of the center and total victory.) Kissinger draws heavily on much recent scholarship and on notes of his trips to Beijing to celebrate the pragmatism of Mao’s successors. He says they are content to remain within their restored historic frontiers, willing to await a peaceful reunion with Taiwan, and most determined to continue their remarkable economic growth and to eradicate China’s still widespread poverty. He is less confident about America’s capacity to sustain a steady foreign policy, noting that “the perpetual psychodrama of democratic transitions” is a constant invitation to other nations to “hedge their bets” on us.

    As students of Kissinger well know, he has long considered democracy to be a burden on statecraft — both the clamor of democracy within the United States and our agitations for democracy in other lands.

    He recalls yet again his agonies in office in the 1970s, when he thought that American demonstrations during the Vietnam War could have misled Mao into believing that a “genuine world revolution” was at hand. He argues that the “destruction” of Nixon in the Watergate crisis, the withdrawal of Congressional support for Vietnam, new curbs on presidential war powers and the “hemorrhaging” of intelligence secrets all combined to undermine the quasi alliance with China, making America appear ineffectual against the Soviets. He is glad that Jimmy Carter did not let his human rights concerns upset relations with China and that Ronald Reagan’s cheerful personality overcame the “almost incomprehensible contradictions” of his dealings with Beijing even as he promoted the idea of an independent Taiwan.

    The severest test of the quasi alliance, of course, was the brutal suppression of democratic strivings in Tiananmen Square in 1989. That violent crackdown also tested Kissinger’s tolerance for the assertion of American values in foreign relations.

    Looking back, he believes everything depends on circumstances: “There are instances of violations of human rights so egregious,” he writes, “that it is impossible to conceive of benefit in a continuing relationship; for example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the genocide in Rwanda. Since public pressure shades either into regime change or a kind of abdication, it is difficult to apply to countries with which a continuous relationship is important for American security. This is especially the case with China, so imbued with the memory of humiliating intervention by Western societies.”

    And so Kissinger admires the way President George H. W. Bush, “with skill and elegance,” walked the “tightrope” of punishing China with sanctions after Tiananmen while simultaneously apologizing with private letters and special emissaries. President Bill Clinton tried applying pressure for a time, Kissinger notes, but was shown no gratitude when he wisely relented; the Chinese “did not view the removal of a unilateral threat as a concession, and they were extraordinarily touchy regarding any hint of intervention in their domestic affairs.” And President George W. Bush, despite his “freedom agenda,” earns Kissinger’s praise for overcoming “the historic ambivalence between America’s missionary and pragmatic approaches,” by means of “a sensible balance of strategic priorities.”

    If America’s preference for democratic governance is made the main condition for progress on other issues with China, Kissinger concludes, “deadlock is inevitable.” Those who battle to spread American values deserve respect. “But foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made.” That choice “cannot be fudged,” he insists, even as he attempts to protect his flanks with a fudge of his own: “The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that principles need to be implemented over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the ‘realists’ to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies.”

    Still, in the end, Kissinger votes for national security über alles. Scattered through his history are tributes to American values and commitments to human dignity, which may indeed sometimes drive our policies beyond calculations of the national interest. Exactly that happened, in fact, after “On China” went to press, when President Obama ventured into Libya. Kissinger was perhaps surprised when that humanitarian intervention and bid for regime change failed to evoke a Chinese veto at the United Nations. But in Asia now more than Europe, he argues, “sovereignty is considered paramount,” and any attempt “from the outside” to alter China’s domestic structure “is likely to involve vast unintended consequences.” Besides, as he used to insist while practicing realpolitik in Washington, the cause of peace is also a moral pursuit.

    This central theme of Kissinger’s experience and counsel must be distilled from the sometimes *meandering and largely familiar history he tells in “On China.” Only in its last pages does he discuss the essential question of future Sino-American relations: With no common enemy to bind them, what will keep the peace and promote collaboration and trust between the world’s major *powers?

    Kissinger addresses this question by looking to the past, a memorandum written by a senior official of the British Foreign Office, Eyre Crowe, in 1907. Crowe argued that it was in Germany’s interest to “build as powerful a navy as she can afford” and that this would itself lead to “objective” conflict with the British Empire, no matter what German diplomats said or did. There is today a “Crowe school of thought” in the United States, Kissinger observes, which sees China’s rise “as incompatible with America’s position in the Pacific” and therefore best met with pre-emptively hostile policies. He perceives growing anxieties in both societies and fears they are exacerbated by Americans who claim that democracy in China is a prerequisite for a trusting relationship. He warns that the implied next cold war would arrest progress in both nations and cause them to “analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies” when in reality their main competition is more likely to be economic than military.

    Indulging his habitual preference for diplomatic architecture, Kissinger insists that the common interests the two powers share should make possible a “co-evolution” to “a more comprehensive *framework.” He envisions wise leaders creating a “Pacific community” comparable to the Atlantic community that America has achieved with Europe. All Asian nations would then participate in a system perceived as a joint endeavor rather than a contest of rival Chinese and American blocs. And leaders on both Pacific coasts would be obliged to “establish a tradition of consultation and mutual respect,” making a shared world order “an expression of parallel national aspirations.”

    That was indeed the mission of the very first Kissinger journey to Beijing. And while he does not quite say so, he invests his hopes in a concert of nations represented, of course, by multiple Kissingers.

    Max Frankel, a former executive editor of The Times, covered the Nixon-Kissinger journey to China in 1972.
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  13. #28
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    half way done with the book, watching Henry on Charlie Rose now.


    Kissinger: So Wen Jiabao, you are the new Chinese Premier. Okay, you can hold my umbrella
    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

  14. #29
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    Some of my grad school favorites

    Whitson, William and Huang, Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71
    [battle-by-battle Chinese Civil War with extensive biographical sketches of the players.]
    ISBN-10: 0333150538

    Chang, Parris H., Power and Policy in China
    [One of the best on 1949-75 domestic politics]
    ISBN-10: 0840360991


    Some later works

    Zhang, Liang and Nathan, Andrew J., The Tiananmen Papers
    [scholars only for this one – very heavy going]
    ISBN-10: 1586481223

    Zhao, Ziyang and Bao, Pu, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang
    [historically fascinating, but not a page turner]
    ISBN-10: 1439149380

    Brook, Timothy, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement
    ISBN-10: 9780804736381

    Zhai, Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975
    [Much more, and much earlier than you might think]
    ISBN-10: 9780807848425

    Shih, Victor C., Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation
    [Very good factional analysis of 1990s and early 2000s politics]
    ISBN-10: 0521106478

    Hessler, Peter, Country Driving: A Journey Through China from Farm to Factory
    [Light, easy to read stories of the real China]
    ISBN: 0061804096

    = = = = =

    chagnasty,

    I loved Seagrave’s The Soong Dynasty, a real joy to read. Lovely fiction, but don’t mistake it for anything remotely resembling history.

    And, while we’re on the subject, Nobel House deserves a mention.

  15. #30
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    I just wrote this


    Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles, edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein




    This fifth installment in the series “Studies in Chinese Maritime Development” was the result of the fourth annual conference of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) hosted by the US Naval War College in Newport, R.I. Together with previous CMIS publications, the papers presented by this installation are of the highest quality with primary Chinese sources. They are written by the most respected authorities on the subject -- ranging from policy makers and influencers to retired flag officers, a former submarine captain and a former member of the PLA who has now become a professor at the USAF’s Air War College. In other words, no self-appointed journalists or political operatives were allowed in this publication.

    This installment is arranged in six parts to address the major challenges facing China. In addition to the much discussed maritime strike role for Ballistic missiles, other important areas were summarized: helicopter missions, airborne anti-submarine warfare, cruise missiles, aviation and naval doctrine, naval aviation capabilities and intentions, employment of naval UAV, C4ISR, the role of the new found carrier task force, and the Chinese concept of deterrence and possible US response.

    While unveiling fancy new equipment can generate headlines, the press generally doesn’t ask the deeper question of how new equipment may change existing PLA doctrine or examine potential implications. This is where the good folks from the CMSI come in and provide analyses that are lacking in the blogosphere (present company included). Upon closer examination, the challenges facing China are greater than the successes so far documented. China’s still weak ASW capability is often cited as case in point.

    In my opinion, having this honest and professional assessment will help not only Washington decision makers, but also those in Beijing to "try harder" (to borrow a phrase from Adm (ret) McVadon) by engaging each other without poisonous public emotion.
    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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