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  • Remembering 1962 China war heros.

    They fought to the last man for India

    November 18, 2008

    India may have lost the 1962 war with China, but it was not completely a saga of defeat. Hamstrung by an indecisive leadership and poor military equipment, the Indian army put up a valiant resistance along the McMahon Line. It is another matter the political leadership of the day did not back them.
    One such spot where our soldiers fought back, and repelled, the Chinese incursions was at Razang La near Chushul, in the Himalayan heights. On November 18, 1962, 114 soldiers of the 13th Kumaon fought till the last man, and last bullet, in sub-zero temperatures, to beat back the huge Chinese army. A grateful nation acknowledged their valour by posthumously conferring the Param Vir Chakra on Major Shaitan Singh.

    Forty-six years later to the day, Tarun Vijay undertook an emotional journey to Chushul and Razang La, site of a memorial to commemorate the brave souls who died so we may live in peace and security, to file this audio report.


    'Sir, a national crisis has been created as a result of the Chinese attack on the northern border. China has expansionist designs, it has set its eyes like a vulture on 48,000 square miles of land belonging to India.

    'On August 25, 1959, while speaking on the Kerala debates the prime minister (Jawaharlal Nehru) had stated that India would not remain India if per chance it becomes Communist. The same thing applies to China as well. The defence minister (V K Krishna Menon) has a doubtful past and his present conduct is dubious. He has Communist leanings. In his message on the Territorial Army Day he said that India should not keep a large army because keeping a large army was not compatible with our morality.'
    -- Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha, December 22, 1959

    The ironies of history take strange shapes. In 1962, Nehru didn't listen to the warnings of the erstwhile Jana Sangh, believed 'the Chinese can never attack us' and lost face and land both to his 'bhai'-like friends. Then the government arrested more than 400 top Communist leaders on charges of sedition and invited volunteers of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh to participate in the 1963 Republic Day Parade at Raj Path in New Delhi in full uniform, recognising its services during the war.

    In 2008 the Communists have become the darlings of the Congress that still sources its legacy to Nehru, and the RSS is sought to be banned.

    By 1962, China had taken Aksai Chin and invaded NEFA.

    In 2008, China is still occupying Aksai Chin and has rebuffed our foreign minister with a renewed claim on Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as NEFA).

    But can the nation forget the 1962 war? Who were those who fought and died? For who? And to what avail?

    One of the stories India can never forget is the battle we fought in the Indus valley, near Chushul village.

    The battle of Rezang La, fought at an altitude of 17,000 feet, is one of the most incredible sagas of valour and courage that Indian soldiers have showed. That was November 18, 1962, exactly 46 years earlier. They fought and died for Indian soil.

    In 2008, we are still waiting for a leader to show any will or resolute action to indicate we are serious to take back the land that China grabbed.

    The Congress changed post-Nehru, so did the others. Politics and immediate interests have overpowered security concerns, and distinctions between the identities of the enemy and patriots are as blurred as they were in 1962.

    Unanswered questions

    Forty-six years later, the question remains still unanswered: why did we have to fight a war, and why was it that the brave 114 soldiers of the 13th Kumaon had to offer their supreme sacrifice fighting till the 'last man and last bullet' in sub-zero temperature (minus 15 degrees Celsius) at Rezang La on November 18, 1962? What were the causes of that war and what happened afterwards? Who remembers them except a few ex-soldiers and the patriotic crowd at Rewari (Haryana), hometown of most of the martyred Ahirs who had fought at Rezang La? Why does no politician think it a matter of honour to send his children to join the army? Why do we have an important road in Delhi named after Krishna Menon, the disgraced defence minister of the '62 war, and nothing significant to honour the men who gave their lives to save India in Chushul?

    These were the thoughts on my mind when I set out for Chushul last fortnight to get a feel of 'November in Rezang La' and pay my homage to the bravehearts.

    The 1962 war with China is a sad story of a completely incapable leadership, favouritism at the top echelons of the army, and a disregard of the nation's security needs by those who were hailed by the people as their saviours. Neville Maxwell, a British journalist, writes in his famous book India's China war: 'At the time of independence, [B M] Kaul appeared to be a failed officer, if not one disgraced. But his courtier wiles, irrelevant or damning until then, were to serve him brilliantly in the new order that independence brought, after he came to the notice of Nehru, a fellow Kashmiri Brahmin and, indeed, distant kinsman.'


    ************************************************** ********

    people don't remember Kargil Heros.....a 10yr old war how can we expect them to be aware of 62? congress does not want Indian kids to read actual history and always opposes any attempt to revise History books. In 1962 commies are the biggest enemys to the nation as told by congress. but in 2004 when it comes to grabbing power the same congress married them.
    I hate these opurtunistic congress politicians.
    Of course its now the dynasty of fake indian - sonia (maino ) gandhi ?!

  • #2
    Originally posted by lmar View Post
    They fought to the last man for India

    people don't remember Kargil Heros.....a 10yr old war how can we expect them to be aware of 62? congress does not want Indian kids to read actual history and always opposes any attempt to revise History books.

    !
    I would not agree... we did not forget those war heros, we just forget to remember them. There is difference, the later happens as me move forward and other bigger issues arise.

    Originally posted by lmar View Post
    They fought to the last man for India

    In 1962 commies are the biggest enemys to the nation as told by congress. but in 2004 when it comes to grabbing power the same congress married them.
    I hate these opurtunistic congress politicians.
    Of course its now the dynasty of fake indian - sonia (maino ) gandhi ?!
    The circumstances in 62 were different and communists threat was bigger, so congress did not embrace them, in 2004 their threat was not a issue... Again, i believe, congress was not against communist followers, but against the communist idea... and we all are....

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by lmar View Post
      They fought to the last man for India
      One such spot where our soldiers fought back, and repelled, the Chinese incursions was at Razang La near Chushul, in the Himalayan heights. On November 18, 1962, 114 soldiers of the 13th Kumaon fought till the last man, and last bullet, in sub-zero temperatures, to beat back the huge Chinese army. A grateful nation acknowledged their valour by posthumously conferring the Param Vir Chakra on Major Shaitan Singh.
      we respect those heros, too.
      there were POW of 3,968,they did not fight to the last man.
      the number of kia was less than pow.

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by lmar View Post
        In 2008, we are still waiting for a leader to show any will or resolute action to indicate we are serious to take back the land that China grabbed.
        well, actually,
        we are also waiting for a leader to show any will or resolute action to indicate we are serious to take back the land that india grabbed.

        if only one leader of both sides will stand out, your desire will come true.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by Richer Mexican View Post
          well, actually,
          we are also waiting for a leader to show any will or resolute action to indicate we are serious to take back the land that india grabbed.

          if only one leader of both sides will stand out, your desire will come true.
          well if you are indicating about Arunachal then it is better to you that don't wait.

          Comment


          • #6
            unfortunately, this is "South Asian Defense Topics" .
            Last edited by Richer Mexican; 24 Nov 08,, 11:12.

            Comment


            • #7
              Move on. This is a dead horse....wait it is actually a fossil now.
              sigpicAnd on the sixth day, God created the Field Artillery...

              Comment


              • #8
                lmar,

                I have a question for you. Name one Chinese regiment in that war.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                  lmar,

                  I have a question for you. Name one Chinese regiment in that war.
                  i donot know why you are asking this question. but here is my answer.

                  109 Engineering Regiment

                  Took Part in the Sino-India War of 1962.

                  3rd Independent Frontier Defense Regiment (1 Cavalry Btn)

                  Took Part in the 1962 Sino-India War.

                  11 Highland Motorized Division (36101) Wulumuqi

                  32nd and 33rd Infantry Regiments took part in the 1962 Sino-India War.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Really?

                    What is your source on that because they don't correspond to the Chinese sources that I have.

                    And the reason I ask is is that while you are lamanating all about the Indian sacrafices during that war, you really don't have a clue about that war.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                      Really?

                      What is your source on that because they don't correspond to the Chinese sources that I have.

                      And the reason I ask is is that while you are lamanating all about the Indian sacrafices during that war, you really don't have a clue about that war.
                      china-defense.com and global security.
                      here is the total article.
                      Date: April 1984
                      The roots of the Border
                      War extend back into the 19th Century, when India and China
                      first asserted claims to borders in the remote mountain areas
                      between the two countries. Military expeditions, intrigue,
                      and uncompromising diplomatic exchanges did nothing to resolve
                      the border issue. Major changes in both governments in the
                      late 1940s brought the two countries to friendly relations in
                      the 1950s. But "intrusions"--military strategic projections.
                      including a Chinese military highway, into each other's
                      claimed territory--would produce skirmishes between them and
                      eventual war in October, 1962.
                      Many factors would influence the conduct and outcome of
                      the 1962 Border War: military and logistic preparedness,
                      foreign military aid, readiness for alpine warfare, general-
                      ship and command, intelligence (or lack thereof), assumptions,
                      and international diplomatic intervention.
                      The significant fighting occurred in October and Novem-
                      ber, 1962, along three widely separated fronts. In virtually
                      every battle, the Chinese forces either overpowered or out-
                      maneuvered the unprepared Indian troops. In less than six
                      weeks of bloody fighting, the Chinese completely drove the
                      Indian forces back behind Chinese claim lines. On November
                      21, 1962, the Chinese dramatically declared a ceasefire after
                      having achieved her limited strategic objectives. Following
                      the ceasefire, China kept the territory around her military
                      highway, but gave to India about 70% of the disputed border
                      lands!
                      Because of the difficulty in obtaining primary source
                      documents, especially Chinese primary source documents, the
                      paper relies on secondary source accounts of both causation
                      and conduct of the Border War. Accounts from both the Indian
                      and Chinese perspective are available. Yet, an important
                      example of the limited Chinese information available has been
                      this author's inability to obtain Chinese casualty figures
                      for the Border War. Especially valuable in the development
                      of this paper's thesis are the historical background of the
                      border disputes by British historian Alastair Lamb, and the
                      detailed reporting of the Border War by British newspaper
                      correspondent Neville Maxwell.
                      The significance of studying the China-India Border War
                      lies in two areas: the military lessons to be learned, and
                      the impact of the Border War on subsequent world history.
                      The swift defeat of the Indian forces by the Chinese Peoples
                      Liberation Army emphasizes the following lessons: beware of
                      assumptions; good intelligence is important to success;
                      logistic/supply readiness is vital; one must be prepared for
                      special (e.g. alpine) warfare; politicians can't ignore the
                      advice of senior officers regarding military readiness; and,
                      generalship and command is important. The Border War had
                      significant consequences in Asia in the years following the
                      Border War. The Pakistanis saw how weak India was; thus, the
                      China-India Border War was important in the roots of the 1965
                      India-Pakistan Border War. India saw how weak her Army was,
                      and began a massive buildup and modernization of her Army in
                      the mid-1960s. Much of the World viewed China as the aggres-
                      sor in the China-India border War, making China's military
                      victory a political setback. China had very limited strategic
                      goals in the China-India Border War; she would again demon-
                      strate limited objectives in the 1979 China-Viet Nam Border
                      War. The military lessons are still relevant to military
                      leaders today. And the insights from the Border War remain
                      strategically relevant today; for example, can we expect
                      limited (vs. global) strategic objectives from China, in
                      spite of her ballooning population and need for food, in
                      the 1980s and 1990s?
                      Chapter I
                      Historic Roots - Early Border Claims
                      India and China, both amongst the largest and most popu-
                      lous nations of the world, share over two thousand miles of
                      common border; the exact figure is difficult to ascertain
                      because of border disputes. India, the seventh largest and
                      Click here to view image
                      second most populous* nation in the world, lays at the
                      southern extension of Asia. China, the third largest and
                      most populous* nation of the world, occupies central and
                      western Asia. The length of the China-India border increased
                      dramatically following the 1950-51 annexation of Tibet into
                      the People's Republic of China.
                      The roots of the disputed border between the two nations
                      extend back into the 19th Century. Two general areas were in
                      contention: the northeast border areas of Kashmir (including
                      Aksai Chin), the northern section of India on China's south-
                      western border; and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), the
                      northeastern portion of India, on China's southern border.
                      At the western extremity of the Himalayan Range lies
                      Kashmir, composed of mountains, watersheds and valleys; large
                      sections of this area are uninhabited. Yet in this region,
                      three international disputes have raged in recent decades:
                      the China-India conflict we now examine, the India-Pakistan
                      conflict which resulted in a brief but bloody war in 1965,
                      and the China-Soviet conflict which has smothered since the
                      1960s. The history of the border claims in Kashmir is com-
                      plex, and has been thoroughly examined by British historian
                      Alastair Lamb1. However, a brief review of Kashmir's history
                      and of various border claims in Kashmir is relevant in estab-
                      lishing the roots of the 1962 China-India border War.
                      * Propulation and area figures are 1965 figures: India -
                      1,227,180 square miles and 479,000,000 population; China -
                      3,691,500 square miles and 700,000,000 population.
                      Because of its strategic location between India, China,
                      Russia and Afghanistan, Kashmir and neighboring Tibet have
                      been the focus of international events in Asia for centuries.
                      In 1720, the Chinese Emperor K'ang Hsi invaded Lhasa, Tibet.
                      Later Mongol invasions into Tibet made China aware of the
                      vulnerability of its border lands. In the late 18th Century,
                      the British East India Company began to explore Tibet as a
                      commercial market; the Chinese reaction thwarted British
                      interests. In the 19th Century, the expansion of Imperial
                      Russia eastward collided with Manchu expansion westward; this
                      started the Sino-Soviet disputes which continue into the cur-
                      rent time. While Imperial Russia tended to prevail in the
                      early disputes, the Chinese people continued to strive for
                      Chinese occupation of all lands which they consider "tradi-
                      tionally Chinese." As Kashmir gained in geographic impor-
                      tance, numerous surveys and border claims arose in the late
                      19th and early 20th Centuries. In 1904, the British invaded
                      Tibet to thwart what Lord Curzon described as the "Russian
                      Domination of Asia."2 In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed
                      to a neutral buffer zone, extending from Persia to Tibet, to
                      separate the two empires. Chinese suzerainty over Tibet
                      suited both Russia and England. Soon, Britain pressed for a
                      secondary buffer zone between Tibet and China--"Inner Tibet"--
                      but China would continue to insist for sovereignty over Tibet.
                      Even as a weakened China approached the Japanese occupation
                      and World War II, she maintained her legal claim to terri-
                      tories she considered art of China.
                      The post-World War II era saw dramatic change in the
                      area. India acquired independence from Britain and became
                      a sovereign state. However, this process of decolonization
                      saw two new states emerge on the subcontinent: India and
                      Pakistan, and both clashed over Kashmir. At the same time,
                      the Chinese Communists came to power in China. Both India
                      and China were conscious of their new status and of past
                      history. The stage was thus set for India and China to come
                      to conflict over the Aksai Chin area in the Karakoram Moun-
                      tains of Kashmir.
                      As noted above, the various border claims within the
                      Aksai Chin area are complex. And while China and India dis-
                      puted the border on two fronts (east in NEFA and west in Aksai
                      Chin, this western border was especially significant, for
                      China had built a military highway--to link Sinkiang and
                      Tibet--here in 1956-57; Peking was adamant in retaining her
                      right to this land. However, China would eventually readily
                      surrender her claims in North East Frontier Agency.
                      Until the 19th Certury, the desolate highlands of Aksai
                      Chin were rarely visited or explored; no major migrations or
                      invasions crossed the Karakoram Range. Until the middle of
                      that century, there was a general understanding that the Kara-
                      koram Range separated areas traditionally Indian and Chinese,
                      although no specific attempt was made to demark a boundary.
                      But in 1864, the Kashmir Survey set out to define the boun-
                      dary; this Survey included both surveying and inquiries to
                      local mountain residents as to the location of the "traditional"
                      boundary. A surveyor, W. H. Johnson, was responsible for the
                      Ladakh-Tibet border in the entire Aksai Chin area. Johnson's
                      work has been severely criticized for gross inaccuracies,
                      with description of his boundary as "patently absurd"; he
                      even extended it eighty miles further north than the Indian
                      claim when she and China came to conflict over the border.
                      Johnson was reprimanded by the British Government for crossing
                      into Khotan without permission, and resigned from the Survey.
                      Despite the criticisms of Johnson, his boundary still appeared
                      on some maps in the late 1860'3.
                      In 1874, a Kashmir map "based on good surveys and accom-
                      panied by explanatory notes" appeared; this map was based on
                      surveys by F. Drew, Governor of Ladakh in 1871. Drew, even
                      in improving upon the Johnson survey, noted that his maps
                      have "not the same degree of detail as the maps (of India),
                      . . . tracts which have been regularly surveyed, for it was
                      made on a hurried journey over ground where to halt was to
                      starve." Drew, in describing the Aksai Chin boundary, ad-
                      dressed the area which would later become the center of
                      controversy between China and India:
                      A great watershed range divides the two
                      territories (Turkestan and hashmir). But
                      it will be observed that from the Karakoram
                      Pass eastward to past the meridian of 80o,
                      the line is more finely dotted. This has
                      been done to denote that the boundary is
                      not defined. There has been no authori-
                      tative demarcation of it at all; and as the
                      country is quite uninhabited for more than
                      a hundred miles east and west and north and
                      south I cannot apply the principles of
                      representing the state of actual occupa-
                      tion. I have by the dotted boundary only
                      represented my own opinion of what would be
                      defined were the powers interested to at-
                      tempt to agree to a boundary. . . . I can
                      vouch that the boundary marked accurately
                      represents the present state. For this
                      part my information dates from 1871, when
                      I was the Governor of Ladakh. This applies
                      also to the rest of the boundary between
                      the Maharaja's and the Chinese territories.4
                      Drew's map, while based on good surveys, was not an
                      official map. Official maps, generally published by govern-
                      ments, usually represent official demarcations of boundaries.
                      Drew's lines were simply his best estimate of an unofficial
                      boundary in this remote mountainous area of Aksai Chin.
                      Thus, by the late 1870s, there were two Aksai Chin boun-
                      daries. One, the Johnson line, was published in Atlases but
                      was clearly inaccurate and may have had some British political
                      pretenses. The other--essentially the Drew boundary--was
                      better documented, an alignment based on history, tradition,
                      and surveys in Ladakh. For London, the exact border did not
                      matter, for British interests in Aksai Chin were simply
                      strategic: a buffer between India and Tibet, China, and
                      Russia to the north. Under these circumstances, the specific
                      boundary line was flexible, the key intent only to maintain
                      Britain's buffer zone.
                      By 1890, the Chinese began to assert their claim to the
                      Karakoram Range as their southern boundary in Sinkiang. In
                      1892, they placed a pillar of stone and wooden boundary
                      notice on the summit of the harakoram Pass. The Indian
                      Government, in 1907, learned of the Chinese border marker and
                      expressed themselves in favour of the
                      Chinese filling up the "no-man's-land"
                      beyond the Karakoram. . . . and as seeing
                      no reason to remonstrate with the Chinese
                      over the erection of these boundary marks,
                      though they could not regard them as having
                      any international value, the demarcation
                      not having been undertaken by (Britain and
                      China) jointly.5
                      The British then asked the Chinese to clarify their intentions
                      and ambitions in the Karakoram area, showing the Chinese a
                      Russian map which showed the boundary considerably north of
                      the Karakoram Range--probably the Johnson line--and placing
                      Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. The Chinese responded with
                      a survey team sent to Aksai Chin; this survey team produced a
                      map showing the karakoram Range as the Sino-Indian boundary,
                      with Aksai Chin as part of China. But the Chinese survey, too,
                      was of poor quality, and did nothing to clarify or to make
                      official the boundary in the Aksai Chin area.
                      Perhaps the best attempt to resolve the Aksai Chin boun-
                      dary occurred in 1896; George Macartney, the British represen-
                      tative in Kashgar, brought the issue of the disputed border to
                      the leading Chinese official in Kashgar. Macartney was half-
                      Chinese and spoke fluent Chinese; his father had been advisor
                      to the Chinese Legation in London. Macartney was loyal to
                      Britain, yet he had a deep understanding of the Chinese.
                      Macartney agreed that the British claims (the Johnson line)
                      were inappropriate, and that if this deserted area were to be
                      divided, then it should be half British and half Chinese. He
                      felt that Aksai Chin proper, north of the Lokzhung Range, was
                      Chinese; south of the Range, British. In the summer of 1898,
                      Lord Elgin's Indian Government incorporated Macartney's ideas
                      into a definite proposal. The proposal asked the Chinese to
                      accept a verbal description of the Kashmir boundary, and that
                      physical demarcation on the ground did not seem necessary in
                      this remote area. The relevant portion of the proposal was
                      as follows:
                      From the Karakoram Pass the crests of
                      the range run nearly east for about half a
                      degree, and then turn south to a little below
                      the 35th parallel. . . . Rounding . . . the
                      source of the Karakash, the line of hills to
                      be followed runs north-east to a point east
                      of Kizil Jilga and from there, in a south-
                      easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung
                      (Lokzhung) Range until that meets a spur . .
                      . which has hitherto been shown on our maps
                      as the eastern boundary of Ladakh.6
                      Lord Elgin's proposal was fortunate not only as an
                      attempt to resolve the boundary, but also to stem the growing
                      number of lines demarking the Kashmir border in Aksai Chin.
                      Map Two (page 13) shows the variety of claims which had evol-
                      ved by the turn of the century.
                      On March 14, 1899, Sir Claude MacDonald, the British
                      minister to China, submitted the description of this align-
                      ment of the proposed border (in writing, but regretably
                      without any maps) to the Chinese Department of External
                      Affairs in Peking. The MacDonald proposal included the boun-
                      dary suggested by Macartney, and further added:
                      It will not be necessary to mark out
                      the frontier. The natural frontier is the
                      crest of a range of mighty mountains, a
                      great part of which is inaccessible. It
                      will be sufficient if the two Governments
                      (of Great Britain and China) . . . enter
                      into an agreement to recognize the frontier
                      as laid down by its clearly marked geo-
                      graphical features.7
                      Click here to view image
                      The Department of External Affairs in Peking communi-
                      cated the proposal to the Sinkiang Provincial Government.
                      The Sinkiang Government had no objections to the boundary
                      alignment, and the British Legation was informally notified
                      that there were no objections; however, no formal acceptance
                      was forwarded from Peking. By the time the Chinese had
                      responded, the British were beginning to reconsider the pro-
                      posed boundary; hence, the British made no efforts to secure
                      a formal response to MacDonald's proposal. The Chinese Com-
                      munist government of the mid-20th Century would regret that
                      the 1899 Chinese government did not convey a formal acceptance
                      of the MacDonald boundary proposal; as Map Three shows, the
                      controversial Chinese military road--the key issue which
                      eventually led the two nations to war--lies to the north (the
                      Chinese side) of the 1899 MacDonald line.
                      Click here to view image
                      The rising British interests which called for a more
                      northern (Johnson line) boundary in Kashmir were clearly not
                      the issue of whether India or China would lay claim to the
                      barren Aksai Chin area; rather, Great Britain simply wanted
                      her border as far north as possible to maximize the buffer
                      zone between British India and Imperial Russia. The Elgin
                      Government, which had rejected the Johnson line and had sub-
                      mitted the 1899 MacDonald proposal, was replaced by Lord
                      Curzon's ministry that year. Lord Curzon, and Lords Minto
                      and Hardinge who followed him, advocated the northern (John-
                      son) boundary. For the next decade, the British made no
                      attempt to secure either a Chinese definition of the Kashmir
                      boundary or an official boundary agreement with China. From
                      the turn of the century, the Johnson* boundary became accepted
                      British policy.
                      The Chinese Revolution erupted in 1911, toppling the
                      imperial dynasty. In the disorder which followed , the central
                      government's power collapsed in Central Asia. Great Britain
                      and Russia began negotiations regarding the status and boun-
                      daries of Kashmir; however, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917
                      ended attempts to resolve boundaries in Central Asis. At the
                      end of World War I, British India emerged with the Johnson-
                      Ardagh boundary as its more-or-less official border in Aksai
                      Chin.
                      In 1927, the Indian Government appears to have decided
                      to adjust their version of the Kashmir frontier border. From
                      *Also known as the Ardagh or Johnson-Ardagh boundary
                      Afghanistan to Karakoram Pass, the Indian Government abandoned
                      the northern Johnson-Ardagh line in favor of a boundary along
                      the Karakoram Range (up to Karakoram Pass); while this would
                      indicate an abandonment of the Ardagh line, the old (Ardagh)
                      line remained on British and Indian maps until about 1950!
                      These maps also continued to show the Johnson-Ardagh line as
                      the Indian boundary around the north of Aksai Chin, even
                      though the border was still never openly discussed with China
                      or Tibet.
                      By 1940, Britain still had never attempted to establish
                      outposts or exert authority in Aksai Chin; China still con-
                      sidered the territory theirs, as was reflected on Chinese
                      maps. World War II distracted the governments from minor
                      border claims. The bleak and empty reaches of Aksai Chin
                      thus remained without an official boundary between India and
                      China/Tibet.
                      In 1947, the new Indian government took as its boundaries
                      those claimed by Britain for decades; thus, India considered
                      Aksai Chin as part of her state of Kashmir. But the rulers
                      in Peking had other ideas about this. The new regimes, in
                      India and in China, thus would soon find disagreement and
                      conflict over the Ladakh frontier.
                      Between Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency,
                      there were minor border disputes. In the Spiti, Niti Pass,
                      and Nilang regions--about 200 miles south of Aksai Chin and
                      100 miles northwest of Nepal--laid several disputed borders.
                      But the total contested area here was small, about 200 square
                      miles (compared to over 15,000 square miles contested in Aksai
                      Chin). These small areas had practicied dual allegiance to
                      British India and to Tibet for decades. So long as Britain
                      felt that she had enough influence to exclude rival powers in
                      these regions, she was content with an informal boundary on
                      the plains beneath the foothills in the Nilang region.8 When
                      the Chinese and Indian border disputes arose, the aggression
                      in this middle section was minimal. The western (Aksai Chin)
                      and eastern (NEFA) disputes were far more grave; thus, this
                      disputed middle section came to have only minimal importance
                      in the Border War.
                      The eastern element of dispute centers around the North
                      East Frontier Agency (NEFA), with a 700 mile border and about
                      32,000 square miles disputed between India and China. The
                      North East Frontier Agency is a sparsely populated mountainous
                      area in the extreme northeast of India. Britain acquired the
                      territory in 1826 as a result of victory in the First Burmese
                      War; the Treaty of Yandaboo gave all of Assam to the British.
                      The northern section of Assam was to become the North East
                      Frontier Agency (see Map Four, page 18).
                      The Tawang Tract, in the western end of NEFA and ad-
                      joining east Bhutan, had been heavily influenced by Tibetan
                      culture, religion and government for centuries. Through the
                      19th Century, the Tawang Tract was an important trade route
                      between India and Tibet; it was this trade route that first
                      attracted British attention here. In the middle of the 19th
                      Century, however, Britain was surprised to learn that Tawang
                      was part of Tibet.
                      Click here to view image
                      Major J. Jenkins, Agent for the North East Frontier,
                      filed a report in 1847 noting that the Tawang Raja "is a
                      fuedatory of the Raja or Governor of Lassa."* The Tawang
                      Tract boundary was the only one in NEFA to be demarked in
                      the 19th Century. In 1872, four monastic officials from
                      Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement
                      *Lhasa, Tibet
                      with Major R. Graham, NEFA official, which included the Tawang
                      Tract as part of Tibet. Thus, in the last half of the 19th
                      Century, it was clear that the British treated the Tawang
                      Tract as part of Tibet. This boundary was confirmed in a
                      June 1, 1912 note from the British General Staff in India,
                      stating that the "present boundary (demarcated) is south of
                      Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near
                      Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border."9
                      The Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 created
                      the "Inner Line" and the "Outer Line." The Inner Line was an
                      administrative line, in the Assam triba areas, to keep hun-
                      ters and traders out of the Assam tribal areas; no taxes were
                      collected beyond the Inner Line. The Outer Line (see Map Five)
                      Click here to view image
                      was the international boundary of British India. Part of the
                      Outer Line was demarcated, from the Bhutanese border to the
                      Baroi River at latitude 27o, longitude 93o 20'. East of the
                      Baroi, no demarked Outer Line existed; the line was verbally
                      defined as a readily recognizable line along the foot of the
                      hills as far as Nizamghat. However, little publicity was
                      given to the demarcation of the Outer Line. In the 20th Cen-
                      tury, the British would attempt to deny that the international
                      border ever followed the foothill alignment. However, a 1908
                      map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam (32 miles to
                      the inch), prepared for the Foreign Department of the Govern-
                      ment of India, showed the international boundary from Bhutan
                      continuing to the Baroi River.
                      In 1905, Noel Williamson, Assistant Political Officer in
                      Sadiya, argued that British officers should venture further
                      into tribal areas, establish posts, and make the tribes aware
                      of the benefits of British rule in India. Lord Morley, Secre-
                      tary of State for India, rebuffed this notion because estab-
                      lishment of British posts would be
                      . . . followed by further progressive annex-
                      ation to which it would be difficult to set
                      a limit. . . . At the back of the Abor hills
                      lies foreign territory, Tibet, and between
                      the Abors and Tibet proper there may be
                      tribes which are more or less under Tibetan
                      influence.10
                      Williamson was formally warned not to cross the Outer Line
                      without expressed permission. In 1908, 1909, 1910, and 1911,
                      Williamson made four trips into the Tawang Tract, well north
                      of the Outer Line, against Government prohibitions. Then on
                      March 30, 1911, Williamson and a tea estate doctor were
                      attacked and killed by Abor tribesmen in Kebang, well north
                      of the Outer Line. Williamson's death provided for the re-
                      vision of the tribal policy for which Williamson himself had
                      argued for years.
                      In 1904, the British had sent an army to Lhasa, osten-
                      sibly because of Tibetan refusal to communicate with the
                      Government of India; the real reason for the expedition was
                      Lord Curzon's fear of Russian influence in Tibet. As a result
                      of the British occupation of Lhasa, Chinese influence in Tibet
                      grew; the British refused to deal with Tibet except through
                      China. Tibet was soon incorporated into the Chinese provin-
                      cial structure. Between 1905 and 1910, the Chinese attempted
                      to assert their influence in Nepal and Bhutan, regions adjoin-
                      ing British Assam. The British became alarmed as Chinese
                      activity and influence penetrated into the Tawang Tract. In
                      1910, Chinese troops planted boundary flags just below Walong;
                      the British could not protest, as they regarded Walong as
                      marking the Tibetan border. Yet, they felt that they could
                      not stand by and let China assert influence into the Tawang
                      Tract.
                      The British had to do something. Sir Lancelot Hare, the
                      Lieutenant Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam stated that
                      "in view of the Chinese pushing forward, that it would be a
                      mistake not to put ourselves in a position to take up stra-
                      tegic points of defense."11 The British Government in both
                      India and London rejected moving the Outer Line northward to
                      meet the present limits of Chinese influence; they feared
                      Russian reaction to any advance. The 1911 murder of William-
                      son appears to have provided the solution.
                      A British expedition, headed by Major General Hamilton
                      Bower, was mounted in late 1911; the mission continued until
                      1913. The alleged purpose of the expedition was punitive;
                      indeed, the Abors were punished for slaying Williamson. How-
                      ever, much of the expedition's time and manpower was spent in
                      determining the extent of Chinese penetration, and in estab-
                      lishing a new boundary which would keep the Chinese as far as
                      possible from the Assam tea plantations. The ultimate objec-
                      tive of the expedition was to define a new border along the
                      mountain crests and watersheds, to exercise British control
                      up to that boundary, and to inform the Chinese of the new
                      limits of British sovereignty. By the end of 1913, the British
                      had explored much of the Assam Himalayas. The British had
                      inspected the Chinese boundary markers near Walong and put up
                      British markers beside them. The British surveys were to pro-
                      vide a good map of the Himalayas in Assam and in the Tawang
                      Tract--all as an indirect result of Williamson's murder.
                      These surveys and maps would soon form the basis for the
                      McMahon Line.
                      While the British were exploring Assam, the 1911 Chinese
                      Revolution erupted. By 1912, Chinese influence in Tibet had
                      fallen drastically. As Chinese power in Tibet waned, Chinese
                      pressure on the Assam border ceased to exist. The British
                      now endeavored to secure the Assam Himalayas from any future
                      Chinese intervention.
                      The fall of Chinese power in Tibet led to negotiations
                      between British Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan delegates to the
                      Simla Conference of 1913-14. The British had decided to make
                      Tibet a genuine buffer state. The British chief delegate,
                      Sir Henry McMahon, introduced the idea of a second buffer into
                      the long Sino-Tibetan debates over the boundary between Chi-
                      nese control and the Tibetan buffer. McMahon wanted to divide
                      Tibet, just as Mongolia had been divided. Outer Tibet would
                      be the buffer between China and the British Indian frontier.
                      Inner Tibet would be part of China. However, the complexity
                      of this concept provided severe problems for the Conference.
                      The Chinese could not accept the definition of the Outer Ti-
                      bet-Inner Tibet boundary which was agreeable to the Tibetans.
                      In April, 1914, McMahon pressured the Chinese delegate into
                      initialing a text based on the Tibetan-approved line. The
                      Chinese government immediately repudiated the agreement. The
                      Chinese rejection was a blow to McMahon's buffer scheme. How-
                      ever, McMahon had meanwhile negotiated another buffer and zone
                      of defense for the Himalayas. He had made a separate agree-
                      ment with the chief Tibetan delegate; this agreement defined
                      the frontier line along the crest of the Assam Himalayas,
                      based on the 1911-13 Abor Expedition. The line was marked on
                      a large-scale (eight miles to the inch) map; however, this
                      map and the details of the McMahon-Tibetan agreement were not
                      communicated to the Chinese. On a much smaller-scale map,
                      which was used in the discussions of the Inner Tibet-Outer
                      Tibet boundary, the McMahon-Tibetan boundary (which would be-
                      come the McMahon Line) was shown as a sort of appendix to the
                      boundary between Inner Tibet and China proper (see Map Six,
                      below). The McMahon Line was never discussed with the Chinese
                      Click here to view image
                      at the Conference. The Chinese (both Koumintang and Communist)
                      have maintained that the negotiating of the McMahon Line was a
                      British trick, and have prefixed the word "illegal" to any
                      mention of the McMahon Line or the boundary it represents.
                      Lamb asserts that, in a sense, it was a British trick, since
                      McMahon realized that the Chinese were capable of arguing the
                      border for years without resolution, and McMahon wanted to
                      get the Assam border settled with a minimum of fuss.12 It is
                      likely, though, that the Chinese were somewhat aware of what
                      McMahon was doing; in any case, the Chinese Government had
                      rejected the April 1914 text.
                      In July, 1914, after McMahon had failed to acquire
                      Chinese agreement to the April text, he again negotiated
                      directly with the Tibetan delegate. McMahon and the Tibetans
                      initialed a new Convention with a text only slightly modified
                      from the April text. At the same time they signed a decla-
                      ration pronouncing the Convention binding, and denied to the
                      Chinese any rights under it until they too agreed. Thus, the
                      Simla Convention would become the basis for much controversy,
                      and the question of a boundary along the Himalayas was essen-
                      tially left unresolved.
                      The old Outer Line had protruded east from Bhutan just
                      south of the 27th line of latitude. The new McMahon Line
                      extended from Bhutan at latitude 27o 45', to 92o of east lon-
                      gitude, and thence northeasterly. All of Tawang was now
                      within the British Indian Empire. In the eastern Lohit Val-
                      ley, the boundary retreated northwards from Walong (where both
                      Chinese and british markers had been placed) to Kahao, 20
                      miles north. It simply appeared that the British wanted the
                      boundary alignment northward to permit good defensive points
                      in ranges far enough north to eliminate any Chinese influence
                      into Assam. It is possible that the British simply wanted to
                      take over Tawang, for a better strategic border alignment.
                      The Tibetans apparently had no qualms with the McMahon
                      Line, and continued to conduct traditional Tibetan adminis-
                      tration in those areas where it extended across the new boun-
                      dary. The Chinese, on the other hand, denied that the Con-
                      ference had any validity. Not only had the Chinese failed to
                      validate the McMahon Line, but the Chinese also repudiated
                      Tibet's authority to negotiate any treaty or boundary inde-
                      pendent of Chinese influence or sovereignty. Chinese maps of
                      the 1930s showed the border with Assam to follow the old
                      Outer Line, with the Himalayas shown as part of Tibet and
                      hence as part of China. It is interesting that the 1929
                      Encyclopaedia Britannica showed the disputed area as part of
                      China, with the boundary following the alignment shown on
                      Chinese maps!
                      In January, 1914, T. O'Callaghan, assistant administrator
                      of the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier, was sent up
                      the Lohit Valley. Just below Walong, he found both old Chi-
                      nese boundary markers and a new marker placed in 1912 by the
                      Chinese Republic. O'Callaghan removed all the markers, took
                      them upstream, and simply replaced them near Kahao (see Map
                      Seven, next page), just below the McMahon boundary! He then
                      went to Rima, conferred with Tibetan officials, and found no
                      Chinese influence in the area. O'Callaghan proposed a road
                      to, and a post in, Walong; but his superiors showed no in-
                      terest in his proposal.
                      As late as 1936, the Tibetans were still administering
                      and taxing the Tawang Tract. The Governor of Assam noted
                      that Tawang was " undoubtedly British, (but) . . . controlled
                      Click here to view image
                      by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they
                      are not Tibetan."13 The Governor instructed Captain G. S.
                      Lightfoot of the Western Sector to go up to Tawang in 1938
                      and demonstrate British sovereignty. The Tibetan Government
                      protested Lightfoot's arrival, and demanded that he withdraw.
                      Upon his return, Lightfoot proposed that the Tibetans be
                      forced to withdraw all their officials in Tawang to the north
                      of the McMahon Line. The Government of India rejected this
                      proposal, not wanting any permanent occupation and further
                      expenditure
                      When World War II erupted, there was still no decision
                      about Tawang, and the Tibetans continued to administer it.
                      But the war showed the Government of India the vulnerability
                      (this time from the Japanese) of the eastern frontier of
                      India. British policy in the eastern Himalayas again gained
                      momentum, and Britain resolved to make the Simla Convention
                      boundary good. Official Chinese maps still showed the pre-
                      1914 Outer Line as the boundary in Assam; with Allied victory
                      coming in the Far East, the British feared an expansionistic
                      China. The British placed armed posts up the Lohit Valley to
                      the McMahon border. In the Dihang Valley, British military
                      patrols were sent to turn back Tibetan tax collectors. In
                      the Tawang Tract, British armed posts were established up to
                      Se La.
                      By late 1947, the British had thus laid the groundwork
                      for control up to the McMahon Line. But Tawang was still
                      essentially under Tibetan administration; the loyalties of
                      the tribes were still with Tibet. This was the situation
                      which the new Indian republic inherited from Britain.
                      The Indian republic, threatened by the Communist take-
                      over in China and then the Chinese occupation of Tibet,
                      formed the North East Frontier Agency to administer the Assam
                      frontier. It is of interest that NEFA came under the Minis-
                      try of External Affairs--despite British and Indian claims
                      that this area had been claimed as Indian for years. In
                      1951, an Indian NEFA official was stationed in Tawang, ending
                      any Tibetan control south of the McMahon Line.
                      Thus, as new regimes came to power in India and in China,
                      the new governments inherited the border disputes in NEFA and
                      in Aksai Chin. Just as strategic interests--India's desire
                      for a buffer zone between her and China, and Chin'a claims to
                      areas "always traditionally Chinese"--had created minor dis-
                      putes for decades, similar strategic objectives would create
                      problems for the two new governments. The NEFA and Aksai
                      Chin regions were question marks. India occupied NEFA and
                      believed it to be hers. But, as in Aksai Chin, China firmly
                      and honestly believed that the areas in question were Chinese
                      (or Tibetan, and therefore Chinese after the takeover of
                      Tibet).
                      The stage was set--in Aksai Chin and in the NEFA--for
                      controversy, frunstrating negotiations, and eventual conflict
                      and war.
                      Chapter II
                      Movement to Conflict -
                      Failure of Negotiations
                      In the late 1940s, the advent of new regimes in India
                      and in China brought new border problems and new border poli-
                      cies. The 1947 emergence of the Indian republic led to with-
                      drawal of British power from the Indian subcontinent and the
                      beginnings of a changing power balance in Asia. When the
                      Communist regime emerged strongly in 1949, the balance of
                      power tipped even further; however, border issues would
                      probably have remained, whether China was ruled by the Nation-
                      alists or the Communists.
                      The new Indian republic devoted little time or attention
                      to border conflicts with China in her first two years; rather,
                      India was preoccupied with Pakistan, resolving border conflicts
                      in Kashmir. In 1947, Muslim disorder grew in Kashmir, and the
                      Maharajah appealed to India for help; Indian troops responded.
                      Pakistan also responded, and bloody fighting continued spora-
                      dically until late December, 1948. In January, 1949, a United
                      Nations-supervised ceasefire and international frontier was
                      established; but tensions in Kashmir and Jammu continued for
                      years. In 1954, Kashmir constitutionally became part of
                      India. But tensions between Pakistan and India continued for
                      years; in 1965 and 1971 they would fight again. In 1950,
                      India's attention began to focus back toward China.
                      Two major Chinese ventures in 1950 would have important
                      impact on the Sino-Indian border problem. In October, the
                      Chinese army advanced on Chamdo, 370 miles east of Lhasa, and
                      Tibetan troops accepted defeat. The Government of India pro-
                      tested what it considered to be a wrongful and unnecessary
                      use of force; yet, Nehru tended to accept Chinese authority
                      over Tibet. By the end of 1950, China was in control of
                      Tibet. In May, 1951, a Chinese-Tibetan treaty was signed;
                      China would set up military and administrative committees in
                      Tibet, the Tibetan army would be integrated into the Chinese
                      army, and all of Tibet's external relations would be handled
                      by China. In 1951, Nehru reacted to events in Tibet by sen-
                      ding an Indian expedition to the Tawang Tract to assert Indian
                      influence up to the McMahon Line.
                      The second event, also in October, 1950, was China's
                      military support of North Korea in the Korean Conflict.
                      While China's part in Korea would draw upon her military and
                      economic resources, Korea did provide cold weather and moun-
                      tain warfare skills which China would use in the 1962 Border
                      War.
                      Relations between China and India were generally good in
                      the early 1950s, and the border issue remained quiet. India
                      exported grain to Chinese troops and civilians working in
                      Tibet. Chinese troops did not enter into NEFA. And India
                      did not challenge occasional Chinese troops in Aksai Chin.
                      In September, 1951, Chou En-Lai suggested talks to
                      stabilize the Tibetan frontier. While Chou stated that "there
                      was no territorial dispute or controversy between India and
                      China,"1 it seems clear through the early 1950s that China
                      did not accept the McMahon Line as India's northeast boundary.
                      India responded that negotiations would be welcome; yet, no
                      talks began for three years.
                      In April, 1954, India and China signed an agreement re-
                      garding trade, travel and representation between India and the
                      "Tibet region of China." This agreement included a pledge of
                      nonaggression, the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence":
                      mutual respect for the other's territorial integrity/sovereign-
                      ty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each
                      other's affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
                      coexistence. The 1954 agreement did not address any major
                      boundary disputes; the agreement simply named six passes in
                      the Middle Sector (between Ladakh and Nepal) as trade passes,
                      without specifying any boundary.
                      In the middle 1950s, Pakistan aligned with the United
                      States, and began receiving U. S. military aid. This dis-
                      turbed India, and forced Nehru to relax his policy of non-
                      alignment and seek support from Russia. While relations with
                      the Soviets cooled in 1956 following the Russian intervention
                      in Hungary, India did continue to seek Soviet aid, including
                      military aid which would fortify India's position in 1962.
                      Prime Minister Nehru visited Peking in October, 1954,
                      and raised the question of the border shown on Chinese maps.
                      According to Nehru's account, Chou assured Nehru that the
                      question was of no importance.2
                      Late in 1954, Chinese government pressure in Tibet was
                      stirring up increasing discontent amongst the turbulent
                      Khamba tribesmen in eastern Tibet. Military actions by the
                      Khamba tribesmen jeopardized Chinese lines of communication
                      with Tibet from the east, as early as 1955. The Khamba
                      actions were to have strong implications for the border situ-
                      ation, for it led China into building a new supply route into
                      Tibet.
                      In March, 1956, the Chinese People's Liberation Army
                      began construction of a military highway between western Sin-
                      kiang and western Tibet--directly across the Aksai Chin pla-
                      teau, an area which the Indians clearly believed to be Indian
                      (south of the Johnson-Ardagh line) and which the Chinese
                      clearly believed to be Tibetan/Chinese (north of the Macartney-
                      MacDonald line). Construction of the 1200 kilometer road,
                      under difficult conditions in Aksai Chin, lasted from March,
                      1956, until completion in October, 1957. It has already been
                      noted that Aksai Chin was remote and desolate, and that India
                      had minimal interests in the area; the Indian government did
                      not even learn of the road's existence until September, 1957!
                      In July, 1958, the existence of the highway was confirmed to
                      India by published Chinese maps which not only showed the new
                      route, but also placed all of Aksai Chin in Chinese territory.
                      In July, the Government of India sent an initial protest to
                      Peking, and sent two patrols to reconnoiter the road. The
                      two patrols were detained by the Chinese, sensitive about the
                      security of her new highway, for one month.
                      In December, 1958, Nehru wrote a friendly letter to Chou
                      En-Lai about the Chinese maps--but without specifically re-
                      ferring to the military road--showing Aksai Chin as Chinese.
                      Nehru reminded Chou of his statement about "no boundary dis-
                      pute" between them. Nehru further asserted that these "large
                      parts of India" being "anything but India, and there is no
                      dispute about them." In a polite reply, Chou pointed out that
                      the frontier and boundary had never been officially agreed
                      upon by the two governments. Chou reminded Nehru that no
                      central Chinese government had ever recognized the McMahon
                      Line, which he called "a product of the British policy of
                      aggression." Premier Chou was especially adamant about Aksai
                      Chin, stating that Aksai Chin had "always been Chinese juris-
                      diction" and that it was regularly patrolled by Chinese border
                      patrols. Chou proposed discussions leading to a mutually
                      agreed survey, and that both sides should maintain their
                      present positions--"maintain the status quo." Chou meant
                      "status quo" to mean the present positions, now, and Nehru
                      read "status quo" to mean the position which had been "until
                      now." This semantic difference would impair future under-
                      standings and discussions. Chou's January, 1959 reply also
                      implied that China would be willing to stay behind the
                      McMahon Line in NEFA if China could retain her claim to Aksai
                      Chin. Nehru's March, 1959 reply to Chou was an essentially
                      uncompromising account of the historical basis for the Indian
                      position on the boundary.
                      In March, 1959, disorder and fighting worsened in Tibet.
                      The Dalai Lama crossed the McMahon Line into India and was
                      granted political asylum. China had long suspected that India
                      was aiding the Tibetan rebels, and the deteriorating situation
                      in Tibet only aggravated Sino-Indian problems. In March, a
                      large number of Khamba tribesmen had escaped into Nepal and
                      India, acquired arms, and then disappeared back into Tibet.
                      China thus felt it necessary to seal off the Indian frontier
                      along the McMahon Line, to prevent Tibetan rebels from cros-
                      sing into India to acquire arms.
                      Meanwhile, the diplomatic exchanges continued. But Nehru
                      maintained that there was little to negotiate about the fron-
                      tiers claimed by India. He was prepared to discuss "minor
                      details" of border delimitation, but only if China would first
                      withdraw from, and renounce her claim to, Aksai Chin. Chou
                      En-Lai consistently refused to accept any of India's claims,
                      and again proposed that negotiations start from the basis of
                      actual position on the ground.
                      In mid-1959, India became sensitive about China's (anti-
                      Tibetan rebel) activity along the McMahon Line. Indian border
                      police began to establish checkposts along the McMahon Line,
                      and moved border patrols forward toward the frontier of Tibet.
                      This resulted in two clashes in August, 1959. In NEFA, the
                      Indians attempted to occupy the hamlet of Longju, north of
                      the McMahon Line, or at best a disputed border area.3 The
                      two sides exchanged fire, and the Indian border police soon
                      withdrew to the south.
                      The second clash occurred at Konga Pass, south of the
                      Karakoram Range in western Tibet. The skirmish at Konga (or
                      Konga La) Pass was a fire fight with losses on both sides--
                      probably nine Indians and several Chinese killed. Author John
                      Rowland gives an empassioned description of how the Indian
                      patrol was captured, mistreated, interrogated, and "brain-
                      washed."4 There was controversy as to which side fired first,
                      but India publicized the incident as a "brutal massacre of an
                      Indian policy party."
                      There was uproar in both countries about the Longju, Konga
                      Pass, and other minor clashes in 1959; both sides launched
                      letters of protest. Chou's September, 1959 letter repeated
                      the Chinese position that the border had never been officially
                      delimited; he stated that while China did not recognize the
                      McMahon Line, Chinese troops had not crossed the Line. Chou
                      described the boundary problem as a "complicated question left
                      over by history." He further stated that Chinese troops were
                      on the border solely for the purpose of preventing Tibetan
                      rebels from moving back and forth over the border; he further
                      commented that the Indian responses were provocative and
                      unnecessary. Nehru's September reply to Chou again outlined
                      the history and geography of the frontier question, and again
                      stated that no settlement could be reached until the Chinese
                      withdrew from all territory claimed by India, including Aksai
                      Chin.
                      Shortly after the Konga pass incident, President Eisen-
                      hower announced that he would visit New Delhi. To China,
                      this gave the appearance of India growing closer to both the
                      United States and Russia. This only strengthened China's per-
                      ception of India becoming more and more anti-Chinese.
                      In New Delhi, Nehru was receiving some criticisms of his
                      policy of thrusting patrols into the frontier and setting up
                      posts. Several senior Indian Army officers labeled the "for-
                      ward policy" as militarily unwise, on the grounds that the
                      Indian Army was neither militarily nor logistically prepared
                      to deal with Chinese military strength in the frontiers. His
                      response to this military advice, unfortunately, was to re-
                      place the officers with more subservient ones. Not only did
                      Nehru make the mistake of ignoring his senior officers' ad-
                      vice, he also made the simultaneous error of rigidly adhering
                      to three assumptions. He assumed that the Chinese would not
                      stand up against an India backed by both the United States
                      and Russia, that China would not oppose his patrols and out-
                      posts, and that Peking would readily withdraw under Indian
                      pressure. All these assumptions were to prove erroneous,
                      especially as Chou had warned Nehru not to pursue such a for-
                      ward policy.
                      The diplomatic letters between Chou and Nehru continued
                      through the end of 1959 and into 1960. In November, 1959,
                      Chou proposed that both sides withdraw their troops twenty
                      kilometers behind the McMahon Line, and also twenty kilometers
                      from the line up to which each side exercised actual control
                      in Aksai Chin. This would have removed the Indian army from
                      its positions along the McMahon Line, and would have retained
                      Chinese control, in Aksai Chin, over the Sinkiang-Tibet
                      military highway and a new road which the Chinese built in
                      1959. While Chou's proposal was, of course, favorable to the
                      Chinese, he was nevertheless proposing talks and a compromise.
                      Nehru's November reply neither totally accepted nor rejected
                      Chou's proposal. Nehru ruled out the idea of withdrawing
                      from the McMahon Line, but proposed instead that each side
                      refrain from sending patrols forward. For Aksai Chin, Nehru
                      proposed that each side withdraw behind the line claimed by
                      the other; this would have necessitated no drawback by the
                      Indians in the west, but would have deprived China of its two
                      Aksai Chin roads. Nehru implied that acceptance of this pro-
                      posal was a prerequisite for any further talks between him-
                      self and Chou. Nehru thus rejected what he must have known
                      to be the best Chinese offer he was likely to get without
                      going to war.5 Chou's December reply was that, since the
                      Konga Pass incident, China had stopped sending patrols out
                      along the entire frontier. Chou further stated that Nehru's
                      proposal was one-sided, and urged that the two leaders meet
                      in less than ten days. Nehru understandably declined to meet
                      on such short notice, but proposed no alternate date. In late
                      December, China replied with another historical view of her
                      side of the boundary dispute, and again asked for negotiations
                      but without specifying a date. Nehru replied in February,
                      1960, again giving the Indian historical position and noting
                      that there was little or no common ground on their respective
                      viewpoints. But Nehru did propose further talks, and Chou
                      did come to New Delhi in April, 1960; the talks were a total
                      failure. Like the one-sided diplomatic letters, neither side
                      was willing to change its position; hence, no compromises
                      were presented.
                      Thus, the early 1960 diplomatic efforts at settlement or
                      even compromise, between India and China, were essentially a
                      total failure. Talks in late 1963 resulted in complete dis-
                      agreement; each side even published incompatible reports of
                      the discussions.
                      In 1960, China made a preliminary border settlement with
                      Nepal. By the end of 1960, China had also made a boundary
                      agreement with Burma. The Sino-Burmese border began not at
                      the McMahon Line, but eight miles further south; this placed
                      Diphu Pass--a strategic approach to eastern Assam--in Chinese
                      territory. India was outraged and worried.
                      But no settlemt or compromise occurred in Sino-Indian
                      relationships. China was willing to compromise on NEFA; thus,
                      eastern Ladakh (Aksai Chin) emerged as the major area of dis-
                      pute. With the continued failure of diplomatic efforts, the
                      the uncompromising attitudes of both sides remained unchanged
                      until the outbreak of hostilities in 1962.
                      By 1961, India had acquired aircraft, helicopters, engi-
                      neering and other military equipment from the United States
                      and Russia. Thus equipped, the Indian army invaded Portugese
                      Goa in December, 1961. Goa was rapidly constitutionally in-
                      corporated into the Indian republic. Although no real pro-
                      tests or opposition occurred as a result of this action, the
                      annexation of Goa reinforced China's view of India as being
                      expansionistic.
                      This foreign military support also encouraged India to
                      pursue her forward policy in Aksai Chin. In 1961, India had
                      purchased eight Antov transports--complete with 40 Soviet
                      pilots, navigators and mechanics--for use in Aksai Chin.
                      Russian also supplied India with 24 Ilyushin-14 transports and
                      Mil'-4 helicopters, capable of lifting men and supplies to
                      altitudes of 17,000 feet. By mid-1962, India had also agreed
                      to buy two squadrons of Soviet MIG jet fighters. Thus forti-
                      fied, India pursued a more aggressive foreign policy against
                      China.
                      By the end of 1961, Nehru had sent enough Indian Army
                      troops into Aksai Chin to establish about 43 posts on the
                      Ladakh frontier claimed by China. Many of the Indian outposts
                      were parallel to, but about 100 miles from, the first Chinese
                      military road. However, three of the outposts were near Konga
                      Pass, in the vicinity of the second Chinese highway.
                      In August, 1961, China began sending a series of angry
                      protests to India. China had one basic arguement: that Indan
                      troops had intruded into Chinese territory. Nehru's response
                      to Chou's complaints was that his (Nehru's) purpose was to
                      "vacate the aggression (by the Chinese) by whatever means are
                      feasible to us. . . . I do not see any kind of peace in the
                      frontier so long as all recognised aggression is not vacated."6
                      The latter half of 1961 brought China and India to in-
                      creasing confrontations and skirmishes. Exchanges of fire
                      became commonplace. A November confrontation in Chip Chap
                      Valley left several Chinese soldiers dead; this was followed
                      by a Chinese withdrawal. Such "victories" convinced Nehru
                      that the Chinese would not be assertive and that his forward
                      policy of outposts and patrols was the correct course for
                      India. Despite continuing protests from senior Indian Army
                      officers that India should first build up forces and logistic
                      supplies in the frontier before embarking further, Nehru
                      ordered even more aggressive moves into Aksai Chin.
                      Thus, by early 1962, the Chinese leadership perceived
                      that the Indian government intended to launch a massive attack
                      against Chinese troops; they apparently believed that India
                      had decided to go to war over the issue. China's firm insis-
                      tence over her territorial rights to Aksai Chin and India's
                      aggressive forward policy of sending troops into the frontier
                      would soon bring further confrontations and eventual armed
                      conflict.
                      Chapter III
                      The Combatants: The
                      Chinese and Indian Armies
                      in 1962
                      The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the unified
                      organization, under a single command, of all Chinese land,
                      sea, and air forces (see Figure 1, below). The estimated
                      Click here to view image
                      strength of the PLA in 1962 was approximately three million
                      officers and men. The 1962 ground combat forces consisted of
                      about 130 divisions, mostly infantry. China is divided into
                      eleven military regions, including the Sinkiang Military Re-
                      gion--responsible for Aksai China--and Chengtu Military Re-
                      gion--reponsible for the northeast Indian border.
                      Click here to view image
                      Chinese combat power was organized around an Army (see
                      Figure 2), with a strength of approximately 4,500 officers and
                      38,400 soldiers. Each Army has three Infantry Divisions, with
                      a strength of approximately 1,300 officers and 11,300 soldiers
                      in each Division. Major equipment of the Infantry Division
                      included the Light Machine Gun, Antitank Grenade Launcher, and
                      Mortars. Infantry Divisions included three Infantry Regiments,
                      a Tank Regiment and an Artillery Regiment. An Infantry Regi-
                      ment had three Infantry Battalions, equipped with 7.62mm Assault
                      Rifles and Carbines. Even with China's massive combat manpower
                      available, the nature of the 1962 Border War--mountain and cold
                      weather operations--dictated tactics generally limited to the
                      battalion and company level.
                      The PLA had both strengths and weakness in its readiness
                      for mountain warfare against India. Perhaps China's biggest
                      weakness was the economic and budgetary constraints on the
                      Army. The Soviets has willingly supplied the PLA in the
                      1950's. But deteriorating relations--including border disputes--
                      with Russia led to the end of Soviet military aid in 1960.
                      Further, China faced national economic difficulties in the
                      late 1950s and early 1960s. This resulted in progressive
                      cutbacks and constraints from 1960 to 1962 for the PLA:
                      ". . . . so serious was the shortage of military equipment
                      and materials that it caused trouble in the training pro-
                      gram. . . . The Ground Force is also facing the difficulties
                      of obtaining fuel, ammunition, and batteries for the use of
                      their vehicles and in training." The 1962 Taiwan Strait
                      Crisis put further strains on the PLA's resources. Clearly,
                      the watchword for the PLA was self-reliance--making due with
                      the supplies and equipment that were available. Finally,
                      while there has often been political control of the PLA,
                      there was especially tight central control regarding border
                      incidents; official orders in all border regions stated that
                      ". . . . under no circumstance should an officer upon his own
                      personal responsibility take steps to carry out an unauthorized
                      decision" regarding any border/international incident; officers
                      were directed to report incidents, and then await decisions
                      and orders.1
                      On the positive side, the PLA was well prepared for moun-
                      tain warfare in the Himalayas. China had gained extensive
                      experience in both mountain and cold weather warfare in Korea;
                      many Korea verterans were still in the PLA in the early 1960s.
                      Not only had China gained further experience in alpine warfare
                      over the past twelve years in Tibet, but she was fighting in
                      the same area (the Himalayas being the southern frontier of
                      Tibet). The Chinese were acclimitized to the weather and the
                      altitudes (see Figure 3). They had outposts, patrols, and
                      military construction (e.g. the two Aksai Chin roads) in the
                      frontier. Further, the Chinese augmented their strength and
                      mobility by using local Tibetan guides.
                      Click here to view image
                      Finally, the PLA was well prepared for this type of war-
                      fare. The troops had warm, padded uniforms. They carried
                      only what rations they needed to complete a particular mis-
                      sion. And they trained and practiced mobility, moving through
                      mountain passes or over ridges at night, encircling the enemy.
                      Even their mortars and small artillery was mobile. The Indian
                      soldiers would report that the Chinese burp gun and human wave
                      assaults were "demoralizing."
                      Despite its defense budget problems, the People's Libera-
                      tion Army appeared to be prepared and ready for military opera-
                      tions in the Himalayas. The Indian Army's readiness for alpine
                      warfare was quite a different story.
                      The Indian Ministry of Defense was the central agency
                      for formulating and implementing the government's policy deci-
                      sions on defense matters. There were three branches of ser-
                      vice: army, navy, and air force. The Army was organized into
                      three Commands - Western, Eastern, and Southern. Units from
                      the Eastern and Western Commands would be organized into Corps-
                      level Border Commands. XXIII Corps was responsible for all
                      of NEFA; within XXXIII Corps, 4 Division was responsible for
                      the McMahon Line. The IV Corps would be formed in September,
                      1962, to assume portions of the NEFA defense. In the west,
                      XV Corps had responsibility for Aksai Chin, (see Figure 4).
                      When India gained her independence in 1947, the Indian
                      components of the British Indian Army were divided between
                      Indian and Pakistan on a ratio of 2:1. The first years of the
                      Indian republic were marked with a generally anti-military
                      attitude; many Indian leaders remembered the role of the army
                      in the bloody civil war that preceeded independence; this
                      helped contribute to pacifistic attitudes. Further, Nehru
                      (and others) minimized foreign threats; in regard to China,
                      Nehru stated that the Himalayas "made an effective barrier."
                      Thus, the 1950s was generally a decade of neglect for the
                      Indian Army.
                      Because India believed that there was no external threat
                      to her--with the exception of Pakistan--the national defense
                      budget was minimal. In the mid-1950s, the Army numbered about
                      350,000, and there was only minimal growth in manpower over
                      the next several years; after India's 1962 defeat, the Army's
                      numbers would leap to 827,000!
                      Click here to view image
                      The Indian Army had significant personnel problems. The
                      Army had only eight divisions--seven infantry and one armor.
                      Only three battalions were available to the Western Command
                      in the early 1960s. The budget constraints on the army and
                      India's pacifistic attitude aggravated another problem: the
                      British had provided much of the leadership of the British
                      Indian army; without the British, there was a shortage of
                      experienced officers and NCOs. It was thus difficult to build
                      up military strength, especially when the advice of experi-
                      enced senior officers was often ignored.
                      Apparently, Indian intelligence was also lacking. Their
                      lack of preparedness for warfare in the Himalayas would indi-
                      cate a very poor concept of the topography and weather in the
                      area, resulting in very poor mobility across the mountains.
                      Indian intelligence and reconnaissence seemed ignorant of
                      Chinese strength, mobility and tactics, especially night move-
                      ments and human wave attacks which the Indians called the "Red
                      Ant Swarm."
                      The Indians had problems with fire power. Because of
                      limited budget, they had minimal artillery and difficulty
                      keeping it adequately supplied with ammunition. The artillery
                      they did have was often immobile in the mountains.
                      Another area affected by the budget was training. Tech-
                      nical training was lacking, and there were simply not enough
                      supplies and munitions for adequate training. Worse, there
                      was little training for mountain warfare.
                      Perhaps the major problem--another result of the limited
                      defense budget--was the logistic one. Even with foreign aid
                      (primarily from Russia), the Indian army was lacking in vir-
                      tually every area of equipment and supplies. The logistic
                      shortfalls had many serious consequences. India lacked the
                      engineering equipment for alpine operations. They had tentage,
                      but not enought to house even half the soldiers. Rations were
                      often in short supply, resulting in many hungry days for the
                      Indian soldiers. Their communications equipment was minimal.
                      And, almost unbelievably, the Indian army came to the Himalayas
                      (to altitudes above 15,000 feet) in cotton, summer uniforms!
                      Finally, transportation of supplies was a serious problem.
                      Roads into the mountains were few; often, supplies came on
                      long final legs by pack animal. The Indians resorted to supply
                      by air drop, but even this had problems. Aging parachutes were
                      used with supplies, and supplies crashed to the ground often
                      when the parachutes failed. To make matters worse, many of
                      the air drops landed on Chinese, rather than Indian, encamp-
                      ments (and to add insult to injury, the Chinese would throw
                      out the "inedible" Indian rations)!
                      In summary, the Indian army was in a poor state, especially
                      in their readiness for alpine warfare. Their fire power, supply
                      system, training, and readiness for mountain operations were
                      all quite lacking. They had significant personnel shortages,
                      and would often be outnumbered by the Chinese by 5:1.2 To pit
                      troops in such circumstances against an enemy superior in every
                      detail of military strength would be absurd; to leave them in
                      an early winter of heavy snow and freezing temperatures would
                      be to condemn them to steady and severe attrition from expo-
                      sure and illness and, before long, starvation.3 But this is
                      what India did.
                      Under these circumstances, India's forward policy was
                      militarily nonsensical. But some politicians and leaders sim-
                      ply believe what they want to believe. Nehru was still con-
                      vinced that his army would be almost invincible against the
                      Chinese. He would soon learn how wrong he was.
                      Chapter IV
                      Summer 1962 Skirmishes
                      Well into 1962, Nehru continued to ignore the advice of
                      his generals about the army's poor state of readiness; he also
                      continued to assume that China would not or could not assert
                      herself against India. Hence, Nehru continued his "forward
                      policy" of furter extending Indian outposts and border pat-
                      rols (see Map Eight).
                      Click here to view image
                      India's purpose was to pursue the forward policy to drive
                      the Chinese out of any area New Delhi considered hers. On
                      February 4, 1962, the Home Minister declared, "If the Chinese
                      will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to
                      repeat what she did in Goa. She will certainly drive out the
                      Chinese forces." The Indian strategy in early 1962 was to
                      move behind Chinese posts in an attempt to cut off Chinese
                      supplies. China's reaction any new Indian outpost, thought,
                      was usually to surround it with superior forces.
                      The diplomatic letters and protests continued, usually
                      totally uncompromising and unproductive. In January, both
                      sides accused the other of violating their air space. A Feb-
                      ruary 26th Chinese not suggested that maintaining the status
                      quo of the boundary was the only way to avoid military clashes,
                      and again suggested withdrawing the troops of each side twenty
                      kilometers back. The note concluded with the statement that
                      "the door for negotiations is always open." In fact, China
                      had already stopped all patrols within twenty kilometers of
                      the border. But India again rejected th proposal, and con-
                      tinued to insist that the Chinese withdraw to behind the In-
                      dian claim line before there would be any negotiations on the
                      border question. In April, Nehru announced that "We do not
                      want war with China, but that is not within our control.
                      Therefore we have to prepare for the contingency."1 An April
                      Chinese letter protested Indian intrusions, and demanded that
                      India withdraw from the Karakoram area. On May 14th, the
                      Indians proposed to allow China to "continue to use the Aksai
                      Chin road for civilian traffic" if China would otherwise with-
                      draw from all Indian-claimed territory. China's reply rejec-
                      ted the idea but again stated that it was better to resolve
                      the issue than to fight. In June, the 1954 Trade Agreements,
                      including the Five Principles of Coexistence, expired; talks
                      produced no new trade agreement, and trade representatives
                      returned home. Relations between the two countries continued
                      to deteriorate.
                      Throughout the early months of 1962, China had several
                      external problems, especially the Taiwan Straits Crisis.
                      Chinese leaders continued to insist that they did not want
                      war, but that Aksai Chin was clearly Chinese and was stra-
                      tegically important to the People's Republic. China began
                      to commit more border patrols--in reaction to increased border
                      activity by Indian troops in Spring 1962. In June, when the
                      Taiwan Strait situation eased, China's attention returned to
                      the border situation and she brought more pressure to bear on
                      New Delhi. India, too, continued to escalate by establishing
                      new outposts to "defend Indian territory from further inroads."
                      The crisis had brewed for three years. Despite many
                      menacing confrontations and endless protests, there had
                      been very few casualties thus far. But in July this changed.
                      A Gurkha platoon had been sent forward to cut off Chinese
                      outposts in the Galwan Valley (in Aksai Chin). On July 10th,
                      a Chinese battalion surrounded the Indian post, cutting it off
                      from supplies. The Chinese were attempting to halt Indian
                      advances in Ladakh; but India continued to supply the Galwan
                      Valley outpost by air drop. New Delhi sent a reinforcing force
                      toward Galwan Valley, but it was turned back by the Chinese.
                      India was continuing to move forward in an attempt to pressure
                      China into withdrawing from the disputed area.
                      On July 21st, there was a skirmish in the Chip Chap Val-
                      ley. Two Indian soldiers were wounded, the first since Konga
                      Pass in 1959. The Chinese protested, and also accused India
                      of violating the McMahon Line in NEFA.
                      Indeed, General B. M. Kaul, then Chief of the General
                      Staff, had ordered the establishment of 24 posts along the
                      McMahon Line. In June, local Indian commanders had estab-
                      lished Dhola Post, in Tawang. The relevant issue was that
                      Dhola Post was one mile north of the McMahon Line, in Chinese
                      territory even by Indian standards. On August 4th, Peking
                      accused India of violating the McMahon Line (at Dhola), and
                      of aggression beyond its own claimed border--and therefore
                      into Chinese territory.
                      But Chinese pressure was ineffective. On August 14th,
                      Nehru told Parliament that India had three times as many posts
                      in Ladakh as China; Nehru asked for a free hand to deal with
                      China, and Parliament gave it to him.
                      In August, China improved its combat readiness in NEFA,
                      Tibet and Sinkiang. While there was no sign of a manpower
                      buildup in Tibet, there was construction of ammunition dumps
                      and shockpiling of ammunition, weapons, and gasoline.
                      On September 8th, the Chinese reacted to the Indian out-
                      post at Dhola. A Chinese patrol of sixty soldiers--which the
                      Indian commander reported as 600--moved over and down the Thag
                      La Ridge, into positions which dominated the Indian post at
                      Dhola. The Chinese patrol suggested that local officials meet
                      to discuss where the border lay. Orders from Nehru refuded
                      any discussions and orders the army to relieve the Dhola Post
                      and force the Chinese back behind Thag La Ridge. A serious
                      clash between the sides ensured. The XXXIII Corps commander,
                      General Umrao Singh, had protested that driving the Chinese
                      back behind the Ridge was militarily nonsensical; Singh was
                      later relieved and replaced by the more compliant General B. M.
                      Kaul. Nehru used the Thag La incident to whip up national and
                      international support. Further skirmished continued through
                      September.
                      By late September, China had resumed patrols along the
                      entire border. On September 20th, another clash occurred at
                      Chedong, at the junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet. Both
                      sides took casualties, including one Chinese officer killed.
                      The fighting for physical control of disputed land was in-
                      creasing.
                      There were both Indian and Chinese protests about the
                      Chedong incident: India accused China of expansionism, and
                      China warned that there was a limit to her patience and self-
                      restraint. Unfortunately for the Indians, Chedong was another
                      area where China seems to have had legitimate claim. Many
                      Indians must have questioned India's actions in Chedong, north
                      of the McMahon Line (and Nehru's orders to push the Chinese
                      back even further); pushing military force past India's claimed
                      boundary clearly made India the aggressor in this and some
                      subsequent clashes. Much of the more serious fighting to come
                      in October was not in the areas which both China and India
                      claimed, but in areas (Tawang and Walong) where China had a
                      legitimate claim or where India had pushed beyond the McMahon
                      Line.
                      Sporadic fighting in the Chedong area continued for the
                      next few weeks, suggesting that India was determined to drive
                      Chinese forces back. Now, India seemed unwilling even to dis-
                      cuss any border issues or proposals. An October 3rd Chinese
                      note suggested a meeting to discuss the entire border was met
                      with a curt Indian refusal.
                      On September 26th, General Kaul assumed command of XXXIII
                      Corps; this Corps was hampered by widely dispursed troop con-
                      centrations, few weapons, inadequate supplies, and no winter
                      clothing. On October 5th, India created a special Border Com-
                      mand under the command of General Kaul. Kaul was already in
                      NEFA, preparing an "all out effort" to expel the Chinese from
                      Thag La.
                      On October 9th, General Kaul ordered General John Dalvi,
                      Commander of the Seventh Brigade, to take Yumtso La Pass.
                      Dalvi argued that he lacked the military resources--and the
                      winter clothing--to take the 16,000 foot Pass. Kaul compro-
                      mised, and sent a fifty man patrol to Tseng Jong. the patrol
                      reached Tseng Jong before dark on October 9th without Chinese
                      resistance. Little did the patrol know that bloody fighting--
                      and the China-India Border War--was only a few hours away.
                      Chapte V
                      The Border War
                      The serious fighting of the 1962 China-India Border War
                      extended from October 10, 1962, until November 20, 1962. While
                      the entire border was the issue, the actual fighting occurred
                      in three widely separated areas: Walong, Tawang, and Aksai
                      Chin. It is significant that while over 47,000 square miles
                      of frontier were in contention between China and India, that
                      the fighting was confined to areas where the Chinese felt that
                      they had legitimate claims. In Walong, the British (O'Calla-
                      ghan, in 1914) had moved the previously agreed British and
                      Chinese border markers northward. In Tawang, portions of
                      India's forward policy extended even north of their claim,
                      the McMahon Line. And in Aksai Chin, the Chinese firmly be-
                      lieved that the (1899) MacDonald-Macartney Line had been the
                      accepted boundary for decades. In any case, no official boun-
                      dary, over the 2,500 miles frontier, had ever been negotiated
                      and established between the two countries.
                      An Indian patrol of fifty Rajputs had moved to Yumtso La
                      without incident on the evening of October 9th. At daybreak
                      on October 10th, they began to move toward the Yumtso La
                      bridges. Outnumbering the Indians by about 20:1, a full bat-
                      talion of Chinese emerged from their positions and quickly
                      moved down the ridge, to form for attack. The Indian positions
                      came under fire from heavy mortars. The Indians were able to
                      hold off the first Chinese assault; the Chinese were apparently
                      unaware of the Indian positions covering Tseng Jong village
                      from the flank, and enfilade fire caused heavy Chinese
                      casualties. The Indian commander at Tseng Jong asked for
                      covering fire while he withdrew from what he felt was a hope-
                      less position; but the covering fires were refused. As the
                      Chinese pressed their attack, the Indian force of fifty was
                      ordered to disengage and retreat to the river; engagement at
                      Tseng Jong would have meant disaster for the Indians. The
                      Chinese allowed them to withdraw, and held their fire as the
                      survivors crossed the bridge to the south. Chinese casualties
                      were 33 killed or wounded. Indian casualties were seven
                      killed, seven missing, and eleven wounded--50% casualties.
                      The Chinese buried the Indian dead with full military honors,
                      in plain view of the retreating Indian comrades withdrawing
                      south of the river.
                      The brief battle at Tseng Jong would have grave implica-
                      tions. The Chinese had attacked the Indians with force and
                      determination. Most important, Chinese forces had not retired
                      as General Kaul and Prime Minister Nehru had assumed when they
                      formulated their forward policy. It was now clear to Kaul
                      that capturing Thag La Ridge was out of the question. The
                      Seventh Brigade remained on the Namka Chu (see Map Nine, next
                      page), and was even ordered to extend its posts to the western
                      end of the ridge. On October 12th, Nehru confirmed that he
                      had ordered the army to clear the Chinese from Indian terri-
                      tory. But by Octover 18th, it was evident that the Chinese
                      were making preparations for an attack; their troop and supply
                      buildups provided ample indication of pending assault.
                      Click here to view image
                      Meanwhile, on October 18th, the Indians were concerned
                      about Tsang Le; Tsang Le was no more than a positon marked
                      by a herdsman's hut at the sourse of the Namka Chu, but it
                      was tactically important as a possible flank approach to the
                      Chinese positions below Thag La Ridge. One Indian company
                      had occupied Tsang Le since early October; the Chinese had
                      promptly dispatched troops to protect against a flank attack.
                      On October 18th, General Kaul ordered two companies to
                      Tsang Le. Tsang Le, though, was not only north of the McMahon
                      Line, but also was inside Bhutan; the Indian companies were
                      told to ignore the Line and the boundary.1 On the 19th, the
                      two companies prepared to move toward Tsang Le.
                      On the night of October 19-20, three regiments of Chinese
                      troops prepared and deployed for their assault on the (Indian)
                      Seventh Brigade in the Namka Chu River area (see Map Nine, page
                      59). The Indians had expected the Chinese to cross the Namka
                      Chu by one or more of the five bridges (marked Br 1, B2, etc.
                      on Map Nine), and hence were defending these crossings. But
                      the Namka Chu, running easterly 1 - 2 miles north of the McMahon
                      Line, was fordable; the Chinese generally forded rather than
                      use the bridges. the Chinese struck near Hathung La and at
                      Tsangdhar; but the weight of the Chinese attack was in the
                      center of the river line. Gurkhas on their way to Tsang Le
                      were victims of Chinese artillery. The Indian units fought
                      fiercely against overwhelming odds, but their positions were
                      overrun one by one. By 9 a.m. the Chinese had secured the
                      riverline. Not only had the Chinese readily taken Indian posi-
                      tions, but they also cut Indian telephone lines. The Seventh
                      Brigade quickly lost cohesion as a fighting force, and was
                      granted permission to withdraw.
                      The Chinese plan was to sieze Tsangdhar and Hathung La,
                      to cut off both escape and possible resupply. The plan had
                      worded perfectly, especially with the massive Chinese advantage
                      in both troops and firepower. The survivors and remnants of
                      Indian troops withdrew back to Tawang, and the Seventh Brigade
                      effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force by October 22nd.
                      And Tsang Le, so important to General Kaul, was ignored by the
                      Chinese, probably because the Chinese maps (like the Indians')
                      showed Tsang Le in Bhutan.
                      General L. P. Sen, Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Command,
                      flew to Tawang on October 22nd by helicopter. He ordered the
                      remnants of the Indian troops--two infantry battalions and
                      some artillery--to "hold Tawang at all costs." Sen flew back
                      to Tezpur on October 23rd.
                      Click here to view image
                      Immediately following the Thag La Ridge-Namka Chu River
                      victory, the Chinese developed a three-prong attack (see Map
                      Ten, page 61). On October 23rd, the three regiments which had
                      defeated the Seventh Brigade had come throug Shakti and were
                      poised ten miles north of Tawang. A second prong had come
                      through Khinezemane and joined with the first force. A third
                      line of advance came dwon through Bum La. Tawang was poorly
                      suited for the defense, and the Indians decided to withdraw.
                      Tawang was evacuated on October 23rd, and the Chinese occupied
                      it--essentially unopposed--on the next day. Indian forces had
                      now withdrawn to Se La, which they planned to reinforce and
                      defend in strength. There were attacks against Indian posts
                      elsewhere along the McMahon Line in the Tawang Tract; these
                      had fallen under varying degrees of pressure.
                      In the eastern end of NEFA, the Chinese made some probing
                      attacks against Walong on October 24th and 25th. But after
                      October 25th, NEFA fell into a lull, with the majority of Chi-
                      nese forces paused in Tawang, about ten miles south of the
                      McMahon Line.
                      Meanwhile, there had been significant fighting in the
                      western sector, in Aksai Chin. On October 20th, simultaneous
                      with the Thag La Ridge attack, the Chinese assaulted Indian
                      posts in Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake
                      (see Map Eleven, next page). The Galwn post had been sur-
                      rounded by the Chinese in August, and had thence been sup-
                      polied by air. Galwan post was finally attacked and overrun
                      on October 20th; after reporting that the Chinese had begun
                      to shell the post, it was not heard from again. Numerous
                      small posts were soon overwhelmed and the scant garrisons were
                      either captured or killed. The Western Command then recog-
                      nized the magnitude of the Chinese attack, and many of the
                      small, isolated posts withdrew to the southwest. On October
                      21st, after heavy fighting, the Chinese took the posts at the
                      north side of Pangong Lake. More posts, including Daulet Beg
                      Oldi, were evacuated; but the Chinese did not approach Daulet
                      Beg Oldi, for it laid south of their claim line. By pulling
                      troops back, General Daulat Singh of the Western Command had
                      methodically and rapidly built up strength to prepare for any
                      Click here to view image
                      further Chinese attacks. By the first week of November, three
                      brigades--each with four infantry battalions--were organizing
                      under Singh in Leh.
                      In late October, the Eastern Command made numerous chan-
                      ges--in both command and organization--in the Indian forces
                      after the October defeats. Much of the energies of the Eastern
                      Command were absorbed with these personnel moves; instead of
                      organizing forces, these changes only resulted in confusion
                      amongst the Indian troops on the eastern front.
                      After the Chinese victories in mid- to late-October, there
                      was a two week lull in Chinese military activity. But it was
                      replaced by a flurry of diplomatic activity.
                      On October 24th, four days after the outbreak of heavy
                      fighting in NEFA and Aksai Chin, Chou sent a letter to Nehru,
                      proposing: 1) a negotiated settlement of the boundary, 2) that
                      both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from pre-
                      sent lines of actual control, 3) a Chinese withdrawal north
                      in NEFA, and 4) that China and India not cross lines of pre-
                      sent control in Aksai Chin.
                      Nehru's reply of October 27th appeared eager to restore
                      peace and friendly relations, but questioned a mutual twenty
                      kilometer withdrawl after "40 or 60 kilometers of blatant
                      military aggression." Nehru proposed, instead, a return to
                      the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962" before any Chinese
                      attacks; only then would India be interested in talks.
                      Chou's reply came on November 4th, and clarified his in-
                      tent of "line of actural control." Chou's "line"--the same
                      that he had repeatedly offered since 1959--was simply the
                      Indian-claimed McMahon Line in NEFA and the traditionally
                      claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin.
                      Simultaneously, external forces began to influence the
                      Border War situation. Russia, India's supporter through the
                      1950s, was endorsing the Chinese peace proposal. But in early
                      November, Russia was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis,
                      and paid little attention to the Border War. Without Soviet
                      support, India had courted support from both England and the
                      United States; military supplies from both countries began
                      arriving in early November. The Americans seemed eager to
                      help India against the perceived menace of Communism; Washing-
                      ton also made plans to send a carrier task force to the Bay of
                      Bengal.
                      The political activities continued. On November 8th, the
                      Indian Parliament proclaimed a state of national emergency
                      and adoped a resolution to "drive out the aggressors from the
                      sacred soil of India." Through the first two weeks of Novem-
                      ber, China had refrained from any further assaults; Peking
                      obviously wanted a diplomatic resolution. On November 14th,
                      Nehru wrote another letter to Chou, again rejecting Chou's
                      October 24th proposal, and again refuting any Chinese border
                      claims. But the exchanges between the two countries and the
                      external military support to India had produced no movement
                      toward settlement or compromise. On November 14th, the
                      fighting resumed again.
                      The Indians had withdrawn from Tawang on October 23rd.
                      The initial withdrawls plan was to draw back to Bomdi La (see
                      Map Ten, page 61), the northermost point which would allow
                      for a logistic buildup. But the withdrawl orders were almost
                      immediately modified to a withdrawal only to, and defense of,
                      Se La. Se La did appear to be a good defensible position:
                      the only road to Bomdi La ran through Se La, Se La Pass domi-
                      nated the road from Tawang, and there were dominating peaks
                      on both sides of the Pass. At 14,000+ feet altitude, Se La
                      was definitely "high ground." The problem, however, was the
                      altitude: the weather was harsh, Se La was far from supplies
                      in Bomdi La, and the altitude made air drop of supplies quite
                      difficult. Even if Se La was strongly defended, the Indians
                      knew that they must simultaneously prepare to defend Bomdi La,
                      for they now realized that the Chinese were not a road-bound
                      fighting force. The decision to hold Se La committed the In-
                      dians to an extended area, from Se La to Bomdi La, over sixty
                      miles of high-altitude, difficult road.
                      Over the next several days, the Se La-Bomdi La defense
                      began to form. Se La was sporadically supplied by air. The
                      Indian Government had considered tactical air operations
                      against Chinese positions, but ruled out air strikes because
                      of fear of Chinese retaliation. A supply and manpower buildup
                      began in NEFA. But there was no Chinese attack during the
                      first two weeks of November; and when the first new assault
                      came, it was far from Se La.
                      The Eleventh Brigade of the Second Division took over the
                      Walong sector on October 31st; the Eleventh was the third unit
                      in ten days to be assigned responsibility for Walong (because
                      of the numerous changes in command). The Walong detachment of
                      three infantry battalions was not, however, preparing for a
                      defense. Even though Chinese strength at Rima (see Map Seven
                      page 27) was estimated at a Division, the Walong force was
                      planning to attack the Chinese on November 14th, Nehru's birth-
                      day. General Kaul had planned a "first major success against
                      the enemy" as a birthday present to Nahru.
                      On November 14th, two companies of the Kumaon battalion,
                      supported by mortars and artillery, launched an assault against
                      a strategic hill held by company of Chinese fire, then stopped
                      fifty yards from the crest, exhausted. A Chinese night coun-
                      ter-attack cleared the Indians off the hill. The survivors--
                      less than half the attacking force--returned to Walong. The
                      Chinese followed the retreating Indians and penetrated the
                      main Indian defenses. Indian artillery could not assist the
                      defense; all rounds had been used in the attack on the Chinese
                      hill. Key defensive points were overrun, and a withdrawal was
                      ordered at 10 a.m. on November 16th. But many of the Indian
                      troops did not receive the order, and fought to the death at
                      their positions. The remnants of the Walong brigade withdrew
                      down Lohit Valley; even in withdrawl, many died either from
                      amushes or from privation. The Chinese did not pursue the
                      retreating troops further. The withdrawing General Kaul sent
                      a rather frantic message to New Delhi:
                      The enemy strength is now so great and his
                      overall strength so superior that you should
                      ask the highest authorities to get such
                      foreign armed forces to come to our aid as are
                      willing to do so. . . . it seems beyond the
                      capability of our armed forces to stem the
                      tide of the superior Chinese forces which he
                      has and will continue to concentrate against
                      us to our disadvantage. This is not a coun-
                      sel of fear, but facing stark realities.2
                      Only hours after the Walong defeat, fighting would resume in
                      both Aksai Chin and Se La.
                      In Ladakh, the Western Command continued a steady build-
                      up of forces. By mid-November, a brigade was in place at
                      Chushul (Chusul). Some of the forces were at Chushul village
                      and airport, west of the Chinese claim line (see Map Twelve,
                      next page). Some of the Indian defenses were to the east of
                      the claim line; in fact, the forces east of Chushul were the
                      only Indian forces left in Chinese-clamed territory in Aksai
                      Chin; all other Indian posts in Chinese-claimed territory had
                      been either withdrawn or wiped out. Western Command had made
                      Chushul key terrain as a blocking point between the Chinese
                      and the city of Leh. It is notable that the positions around
                      Chushul were at 14,000-16,000 feet altitude: there was no wood
                      for fires or for constructing bunkers, frozen ground had to be
                      blasted for entrenchments, and even acclimatized troops could
                      work only for short periods. Yet, some strong Indian posi-
                      tions were in place by November 17th.
                      Chinese reconnaissance patrols were visible east of Chu-
                      shul in mid-November, but no fire was exchanged. On November
                      17th, a strong Chinese force moved westward toward Chushul.
                      And in the early hours of November 18th, Chinese artillery
                      Click here to view image
                      opened fire on Indian outposts. Mortars and rockets also
                      softened the Indian entrenchments. The Chinese attempted a
                      frontal infantry attack, but it was repelled. Soon, though,
                      the Chinese moved to envelop the Indian positions. In heavy
                      fighting, the Chinese rear and flank attacks were successful.
                      The casualties were heavy for the Indians; one company had
                      only three survivors--the remainder was found fronzen as they
                      died weapons in hand. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties,
                      too. Five hours into the attack, the Chinese had overrun, or
                      forced the evacuation of, every Indian position east of the
                      claim line. The withdrawing Indians regrouped as best they
                      could in the village (and heights behind) Chushul. But the
                      Chinese attack on Chushul village never came; the Chinese
                      stopped at their claim line and did not assault Chushul it-
                      self. The War in the western sector was over. Not a single
                      Indian force remained within the Chinese-claimed territory.
                      By the end of November 18th, all of Aksai Chin was in Chinese
                      hands.
                      In the Se La-Bomdi La sector of NEFA, a steady Indian
                      buildup continued. By November 17th, Fouth Division had ten
                      infantry battalions and some supporting arms--mortars, artil-
                      lery, and twelve tanks. Concentrated, it could have been a
                      formidable defense; but the force was spread out over the 60
                      twisty miles of road between Se La and Bomdi La, with the com-
                      mander and main defenses at Se La. Five battalions were
                      at Se La; three, at Bomdi La; and two were at Dirange Dzong*,
                      halfway between. The commander, Brigadier Hosair Singh, soon
                      established his headquarters at the Dzong. Dirang Dzong was
                      poorly suited for defenses; but the Indians intended strong
                      defenses at Se la and Bomdi La, both of which were well sur-
                      rounded by hill masses. The defense might have been more suc-
                      cessful--if the Chinese had been limited to the road. But
                      * A Dzong is a Tibetan monastery-fortress.
                      there were trails--most notably the Bailey Trail (see Map
                      Thirteen, below).
                      Click here to view image
                      Captain F. M. Bailey had explored into Tibet in 1913;
                      his work helped McMahon to draw his boundary line. Bailey had
                      made his way from Tulung La to Lap, and thence through Tse La
                      Pass and southward. The 1962 Indian forces soon came to rea-
                      lize that the Chinese could use the Trail that Bailey had used
                      half a century before. If the Chinese did come down Bailey
                      Trail, they would emerge at Thembang, between Dirang Dzong and
                      Bomdi La. Such a Chinese move would cut off Dirang Dzong and
                      Se La. Yet, despite this, there remained the underlying In-
                      dian faith that the Chinese would not attack.
                      A few blocking forces were sent out in early November: a
                      company to Phutang and a platoon sent up the Bailey Trail to
                      Poshing La. As November advanced, more attention was given to
                      Bailey Trail. Three more platoos--now making a company--were
                      dispatched to Poshing La.
                      On November 15th, the Chinese--probably a battalion--at-
                      tacked the company at Poshing La. Radio reports indicated
                      that the Chinese had wiped out the Indian force. But Headquar-
                      ters could not believe that the Chinese could bring a full bat-
                      talion down the mountain trail, and a second company from Bomdi
                      La was sent up Bailey Trail. A third company was brought from
                      Bomdi La to Dirang Dzong. By November 16th, the three batta-
                      lions stationed at Bomdi La was cut to half strenght.
                      The second company sent to Bailey Trail dug in at Tembang
                      (Thembang) on the morning of November 17th. A Chinese force
                      of about 1500 attacked the company soon after midday. The In-
                      dians resisted for three hours, inflicting heavy Chinese casu-
                      alties. But logistics problems struck again: the Indians began
                      to run out of ammunition. With darkness falling, the Indian
                      company began to withdraw. But in the darkness and in thick
                      vegetation, and orderly withdrawal soon turned into chaotic
                      flight. None of the company returned to Bomdi La; weeks later,
                      stragglers began appearing on the plains to the south. Again
                      the superior strength of the Chinese and the logistic problems
                      of the Indians had lead to another Indian defeat. But now,
                      the Chinese had cut the road between Bomdi La and Dirang
                      Dzong; about 10,000 Indian troops were northwest of the Chi-
                      nese road block (see Map Thirteen, page 71).
                      There was a brief (and almost the only) bright moment for
                      the Indians on November 17th. Simultaneous with the Bailey
                      Trail action, the Chinese had launched an attack on Se La.
                      But Se La was well defended; between dawn and midafternoon,
                      the Chinese launched five assaults on Se La, and five times
                      they were repulsed. With five battalions plus artillery, the
                      Se La force was strong--until its main supply route was cut
                      off when the Chinese took Thembang.
                      Were the Indians at Se La to hold and continue defending,
                      supplied by air? Or should the force withdraw, and if so
                      could it break through the Chinese roadblock? Meanwhile, the
                      Headquarters position at Dirang Dzong, pooly defended, was in
                      jeapordy. Brigadier Singh, commander at Se La, requested
                      guidance from General Kaul.
                      But General Kaul was still flying around the lost battle
                      at Walong. General P. N. Thapar, Chief of Army Staff, and
                      General Sen, Commander in Chief of Eastern Command, were both
                      at Kaul's headquarters. They both declined to give orders or
                      guidance, deferring instead to General Kaul. An urgent opera-
                      tional decision was needed, but it waited until 7:30 p.m.
                      when Kaul returned.
                      By the time General Kaul returned that evening (November
                      17th), there were reports that the Chinese had begun an en-
                      veloping movement at Se La and threatened to cut the road be-
                      tween Se La and Dirang Dzong. After a half hour meeting of
                      the three highest ranking officers of the Indian Army, General
                      Kaul issued his order: all units were to pull back from Se La
                      and Dirang Dzong to Bomdi La.
                      But immediate further discussions amongst the generals
                      resulted in a modification to Kaul's order. The highlights
                      of the new order were as follows:
                      You will hold on to your present posi-
                      tions to the best of your ability. When
                      the position becomes untenable I delegate
                      the authority to you to withdraw to any
                      alternative position you can hold. . . .
                      You may be cut off by the enemy. . . .
                      Your only course is to fight it out as best
                      you can.3
                      The wording of this order hardly constituted clear guidance.
                      General A. S. Pathania, commander of 65 Brigade at Dirang
                      Dzong, ordered a withdrawl to the plains to the south. Going
                      through Phutang, he himself withdrew. He had hurriedly ordered
                      his tanks to try to fight through to Bomdi La; if the crews
                      could not, they were to abandon their tanks and head for the
                      plains. But no one took command of the force--two infantry
                      battalions, some tanks, some artillery, and headquarters per-
                      sonnel--left at Dirang Dzong. A few field grade officers (who
                      did not know that withdrawal was ordered) attempted to orga-
                      nize the forces and fight toward Bomdi La. But Chinese forces
                      and ambushes quickly ended the attempt. The survivors straggled
                      southward to the plains. General Pathania would resign soon
                      after the ceasefire.
                      Good control was maintained over the initial withdrawal
                      from Se La; the Indians cleared the first Chinese found behind
                      Se La. But ahead, the Indian column came under heavy machine
                      gun fire. Attempts to knock out Chinese gun positions failed;
                      the road was impassable. Under heavy Chinese fire, the re-
                      treating troops headed chaotically south for the plains. In
                      their retreat, many were killed or captured.
                      By mid-morning of November 18th, the 48 Brigade--six rifle
                      companies at Bomdi La--was the only Indian Army force left in
                      NEFA. The six companies were dug into defensive positions
                      that had been designed for three battalions. They had artil-
                      lery and mortars, and were expecting reinforcements.
                      But poor command/control/communications again struck the
                      Indians. At 11 a.m., General Kaul--not knowing that Dirang
                      Dzong was now abandoned--ordered a mobile column (at Bomdi La)
                      to move out to reinforce Dirang Dzong. Brigadier Singh pro-
                      tested that such a move would weaken Bomdi La. But Kaul an-
                      grily ordered tow infantry companies, with tanks and artil-
                      lery, to move out onto the winding road to Dirang Dzong. Sup-
                      port personnel--cooks and clerks--were ordered to aid in the
                      defense of Bomdi La.
                      The Chinese attacked about ten minutes after the column
                      left. The first attack was beaten off. The infantry in the
                      column was quickly ordered back to their defensive positions;
                      but these were already occupied by the Chinese, and the Indians
                      were caught in the open. A second, stronger Chinese assault
                      followed. Many Indian positions were overrun, and the Chinese
                      brought fire onto the Brigade headquarters; attempts to counter-
                      attack failed. By 4 p.m., Singh ordered a withdrawal to Rupa,
                      eight miles to the south.
                      The Brigade began to organize a defense around Rupa on
                      the night of Novemeber 18th. Then, Singh received orders from
                      IV Corps to withdraw to Foothills, just above the plains. As
                      he began his withdrawal, he received orders from General Kaul
                      to defend Rupa! Turning back, he found that the Chinese were
                      already taking up positions around Rupa; thus, defense of Rupa
                      was impossible. His 48 Brigade was then ordered to Chaku, the
                      next defensible position down the road. The Chinese harrassed
                      the withdrawing troops, and then broke contact. The Brigade,
                      now only one battalion in size, reached Chaku on the evening
                      of November 19th. The Chinese struck at midnight, on three
                      sides. The Chinese had attacked an ammunition supply train,
                      and burning vehicles illuminated the Indian defensive posi-
                      tions. The Brigade broken, scattered groups made their way
                      southward to the plains. Remaining Indian command elements
                      were headed far to the south.
                      With the disintegration of 48 Brigade at 3 a.m. on Novem-
                      ber 20th, no organized Indian military force was left in NEFA
                      (nor in Aksai Chin). Militarily, the Chinese victory was
                      complete, and the Indian defeat absolute.
                      Late on the evening of November 20th, prime Minister Nehru
                      made an urgent and open appeal to the United States for armed
                      intervention against the Chinese; he asked for bomber and
                      fighter squadrons to begin air strikes on Chinese troops in
                      Indian territory "if they continued to advance" and cover for
                      Indian cities "in case the Chinese air force tried to raid
                      them." An American carrier was dispatched toward the Bay of
                      Bengal; but the aircraft carrier was ordered back on November
                      21st. The victorious Chinese had ordered a ceasefire effec-
                      tive midnight, November 21, 1962.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        hehehehheheheheheheh hahahahahah

                        That orbat you googled is from 1998 and not 1962.
                        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          ROTFLMAO!!!!

                          *** wiping a tear from my eye ***

                          Son, if you are going to quote a site to a person, make sure you're not quoting from a site from which that person is a moderator. Both Xinhui and I are moderators at China-Defense.com and I know you didn't get that article nor your info from us.

                          Now, where in the article did it mention specific PLA regiments?

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                            ROTFLMAO!!!!

                            *** wiping a tear from my eye ***

                            Son, if you are going to quote a site to a person, make sure you're not quoting from a site from which that person is a moderator. Both Xinhui and I are moderators at China-Defense.com and I know you didn't get that article nor your info from us.

                            Now, where in the article did it mention specific PLA regiments?
                            honestly asking you?? wht do you mean by calling me son

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Because I am the Old Man and you're acting like one of my know-it-all 2nd LTs (I either can't remember or don't want to remember if I was like that).

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