Power, and Its Limits
Richard Weitz | Bio | 15 Oct 2008
World Politics Review
The Russian government may not yet describe itself as a superpower, but its latest military exercise, "Stability 2008," clearly aims to affirm Russia's global military reach. The exercise's hypothetical scenario posited a local conflict (e.g., over Georgia) that escalates into a world war, pitting Russia and its ally, Belarus, in a conflict with the West in which both sides employ land, air, maritime, and eventually nuclear forces. All three components of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent (bombers, submarines, and land forces) participated in the maneuvers, which were the largest conducted on Russian territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. One Russian commentary on the month-long exercise, which began on Sept. 21, described it as an opportunity for Russia to "prove its Major League status."
Although the Georgia War has brought the issue to the forefront, Russia's military activities expanded well before this summer's conflict. For several years, Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) have engaged in an enlarged testing program of the country's land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The launches aim both to confirm existing missiles' reliability, and to develop new missile and warhead technologies. In August, for instance, the SMF test-launched Russia's main intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-12M Topol ICBM (NATO codenamed SS-25 Sickle), with a new warhead designed to overcome U.S. missile defenses. Spokesperson Alexander Vovk declared, "An experimental warhead hit a target at a testing range on the Kamchatka peninsula with high precision, demonstrating its capability to deliver pinpoint strikes on well-defended targets."
In addition to its ICBM deterrent, Russia has been reinvigorating its air-based deterrent recently as well. Since last year, Russian strategic bombers have resumed global patrols, simulating nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies.
During the Stability 2008 exercises, Russian strategic bombers conducted their first live-fire exercises since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In northern Russia, the Tu-160 White Swan (NATO codename Blackjack) and Tu-95MS Bear-H strategic bombers deployed and launched their maximum combat payload of cruise missiles. Additional Russian combat and support warplanes also participated in the exercise.
And on Sept. 10, two Russian Tu-160 Blackjack supersonic strategic bombers flew to Venezuela, where they conducted a week of highly publicized exercises before returning to their home base of Engels in central Russia on Sept. 19. Their 16-hour flights were the longest in the history of Russian strategic aviation. The planes carried only dummy warheads on this deployment, as Russian warplanes usually do on exercises.
Perhaps the most interesting component of Russia's military resurgence, though, is the return of the Russian Navy, which in recent months has conducted exercises in maritime regions unvisited by Russian sailors since Soviet times. During the Georgia War, warships from Russia's Black Sea fleet, based at the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol, deployed along the coast of Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia to support Russian ground and air operations. After NATO warships entered the Black Sea to provide humanitarian assistance to the Georgian government, Russian Adm. Eduard Baltin boasted that the Russian Navy could destroy the NATO naval contingent within 20 minutes. President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and other Russian leaders expressed concerns that the NATO ships were actually delivering weapons to Georgia under the guise of providing humanitarian assistance.
Following Ukrainian protests and a reaffirmation of Ukraine's intent to end Russia's lease on its Sevastopol naval base in 2017, a Russian Navy commander expressed interest in acquiring new bases in the Mediterranean Sea. Those would more than compensate for the loss of the Sevastopol base by providing the Russian fleet with a new presence in an important region of the world. The Soviet Navy had a limited flotilla in the Mediterranean, but Russian Federation warships have rarely deployed there. In addition to the Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Navy comprises the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, Naval Aviation, Naval Infantry (marines), and coastal artillery.
On Sept. 22, meanwhile, two of the Russian Navy's newest warships -- the Pyotr Veliky ("Peter the Great"), a nuclear-powered guided missile heavy cruiser, and the Admiral Chabanenko, an anti-submarine warfare ship -- ostentatiously left their base in northern Russia, along with several escort ships. The task force is spending several weeks in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean before engaging in joint military exercises with the Venezuelan Navy from Nov. 10-14. In describing the deployment, spokesman Igor Dygalo affirmed that, "The Navy remains a serious deterrent prepared to thwart any threat to Russia's national security, and if necessary provide an adequate response to any act of aggression." Capt. Dygalo added that, "The return of the Russian Navy to global oceans is an accomplished fact, whether you accept it or not."
The Baltic Fleet subsequently dispatched the Neustrashimy (Fearless) frigate from the port of Kaliningrad to confront Somali pirates who had seized a Ukrainian-owned ship whose captured crew included several Russians. The UN Security Council enacted a resolution authorizing countries to use force in Somalia's territorial waters against the pirates. Russian policy makers see the ship's deployment as both a means to reaffirm Russia's commitment to uphold international security and an opportunity to underscore their capacity for independent military action. "We are planning to participate in international efforts to fight piracy off the Somalia coast," observed Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, "but the Russian warships will conduct operations on their own."
Russia's fleet of strategic missile submarines has also shown renewed activity. On Oct. 12, the Russian armed forces fired three long-range ballistic missiles nearly simultaneously from separate launch platforms located thousands of miles apart -- a truck-mounted Topol missile from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northwest Russia and ballistic missiles from submarines deployed in both the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in the Pacific Ocean. The day before, a Russian submarine had launched a Sineva ballistic missile from the Barents Sea. The missile traveled a record distance of more than 11,500 kilometers to a target in the equatorial region of the Pacific Ocean. President Dmitry Medvedev, who observed the submarine launch on Saturday and the ground launch on Sunday, said that the exercise "shows that our deterrent is in order."
Until recently, the priority placed on reviving Russia's ground and air forces has meant that the Russian fleet has been declining in size due to the need to decommission ships that have reached the end of their operational lifespan. The current Russian rearmament program, which will provide the Russian military with 4.9 trillion rubles ($192.16 billion) until 2015, allocates 25% to constructing new warships.
Medvedev has stated that the government would give priority to "nuclear submarines with cruise missiles, and multi-purpose attack submarines." Russia's existing non-strategic submarines will soon reach the end of their designated lifespan since they were constructed during the 1980s and 1990s.
In July, Adm. Vysotsky, stated that Russia intended to eventually deploy five or six aircraft carrier task forces, which would be more useful than submarines for reestablishing Russia's global maritime presence. The current plan is to start building the carriers in 2012. Observers question, however, whether the Russian defense industry still has the capacity to construct such a large and complex weapons system as a modern aircraft carrier and its associated warplanes. Russia's only remaining aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has repeatedly gone out of service since its commissioning in the early 1990s to undergo essential repairs. Russia does not now have a shipyard designed to construct aircraft carriers; the Kuznetsov was built in Ukraine during the 1980s, when Ukraine's defense industries were part of the integrated Soviet military-industrial complex.
Perhaps the most serious concern of the Russian Navy, though, is whether it can fulfill its important role in Russia's nuclear strategy. The critical uncertainties relate to Russia's new Bulava Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which is designed to carry ten nuclear warheads a maximum range of 8,000 kilometers. A variety of developmental problems, including an unprecedented three successive failed launches, have delayed the Bulava's entry into service until at least 2009, which is already three years behind schedule.
On Sept. 18, the Dmitry Donskoi launched a Bulava from a submerged position in the White Sea at a target in the Kura testing grounds on the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to a Russian Navy spokesman, "It can be said that the launch and flight proceeded without a hitch." Nevertheless, some Russian sources subsequently claimed that the missile's multiple warheads failed to separate properly from the carrier bus and missed their targets. The Russian Navy is counting on the Bulava to equip its next generation Borey-class nuclear-power submarines, which is the only strategic submarine still under production in Russia.
The problems with the Bulava underscore the fragility of Russia's military revival. Despite the unprecedented scale of the recent military maneuvers, the Russian armed forces, especially the non-nuclear branches, have yet to acquire the robust range of military platforms and technologies required of a military superpower.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Reviewcontributing editor. His weekly WPR column appears every Tuesday.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2777
Richard Weitz | Bio | 15 Oct 2008
World Politics Review
The Russian government may not yet describe itself as a superpower, but its latest military exercise, "Stability 2008," clearly aims to affirm Russia's global military reach. The exercise's hypothetical scenario posited a local conflict (e.g., over Georgia) that escalates into a world war, pitting Russia and its ally, Belarus, in a conflict with the West in which both sides employ land, air, maritime, and eventually nuclear forces. All three components of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent (bombers, submarines, and land forces) participated in the maneuvers, which were the largest conducted on Russian territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. One Russian commentary on the month-long exercise, which began on Sept. 21, described it as an opportunity for Russia to "prove its Major League status."
Although the Georgia War has brought the issue to the forefront, Russia's military activities expanded well before this summer's conflict. For several years, Russia's Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) have engaged in an enlarged testing program of the country's land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The launches aim both to confirm existing missiles' reliability, and to develop new missile and warhead technologies. In August, for instance, the SMF test-launched Russia's main intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-12M Topol ICBM (NATO codenamed SS-25 Sickle), with a new warhead designed to overcome U.S. missile defenses. Spokesperson Alexander Vovk declared, "An experimental warhead hit a target at a testing range on the Kamchatka peninsula with high precision, demonstrating its capability to deliver pinpoint strikes on well-defended targets."
In addition to its ICBM deterrent, Russia has been reinvigorating its air-based deterrent recently as well. Since last year, Russian strategic bombers have resumed global patrols, simulating nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies.
During the Stability 2008 exercises, Russian strategic bombers conducted their first live-fire exercises since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In northern Russia, the Tu-160 White Swan (NATO codename Blackjack) and Tu-95MS Bear-H strategic bombers deployed and launched their maximum combat payload of cruise missiles. Additional Russian combat and support warplanes also participated in the exercise.
And on Sept. 10, two Russian Tu-160 Blackjack supersonic strategic bombers flew to Venezuela, where they conducted a week of highly publicized exercises before returning to their home base of Engels in central Russia on Sept. 19. Their 16-hour flights were the longest in the history of Russian strategic aviation. The planes carried only dummy warheads on this deployment, as Russian warplanes usually do on exercises.
Perhaps the most interesting component of Russia's military resurgence, though, is the return of the Russian Navy, which in recent months has conducted exercises in maritime regions unvisited by Russian sailors since Soviet times. During the Georgia War, warships from Russia's Black Sea fleet, based at the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol, deployed along the coast of Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia to support Russian ground and air operations. After NATO warships entered the Black Sea to provide humanitarian assistance to the Georgian government, Russian Adm. Eduard Baltin boasted that the Russian Navy could destroy the NATO naval contingent within 20 minutes. President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and other Russian leaders expressed concerns that the NATO ships were actually delivering weapons to Georgia under the guise of providing humanitarian assistance.
Following Ukrainian protests and a reaffirmation of Ukraine's intent to end Russia's lease on its Sevastopol naval base in 2017, a Russian Navy commander expressed interest in acquiring new bases in the Mediterranean Sea. Those would more than compensate for the loss of the Sevastopol base by providing the Russian fleet with a new presence in an important region of the world. The Soviet Navy had a limited flotilla in the Mediterranean, but Russian Federation warships have rarely deployed there. In addition to the Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Navy comprises the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, Naval Aviation, Naval Infantry (marines), and coastal artillery.
On Sept. 22, meanwhile, two of the Russian Navy's newest warships -- the Pyotr Veliky ("Peter the Great"), a nuclear-powered guided missile heavy cruiser, and the Admiral Chabanenko, an anti-submarine warfare ship -- ostentatiously left their base in northern Russia, along with several escort ships. The task force is spending several weeks in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean before engaging in joint military exercises with the Venezuelan Navy from Nov. 10-14. In describing the deployment, spokesman Igor Dygalo affirmed that, "The Navy remains a serious deterrent prepared to thwart any threat to Russia's national security, and if necessary provide an adequate response to any act of aggression." Capt. Dygalo added that, "The return of the Russian Navy to global oceans is an accomplished fact, whether you accept it or not."
The Baltic Fleet subsequently dispatched the Neustrashimy (Fearless) frigate from the port of Kaliningrad to confront Somali pirates who had seized a Ukrainian-owned ship whose captured crew included several Russians. The UN Security Council enacted a resolution authorizing countries to use force in Somalia's territorial waters against the pirates. Russian policy makers see the ship's deployment as both a means to reaffirm Russia's commitment to uphold international security and an opportunity to underscore their capacity for independent military action. "We are planning to participate in international efforts to fight piracy off the Somalia coast," observed Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, "but the Russian warships will conduct operations on their own."
Russia's fleet of strategic missile submarines has also shown renewed activity. On Oct. 12, the Russian armed forces fired three long-range ballistic missiles nearly simultaneously from separate launch platforms located thousands of miles apart -- a truck-mounted Topol missile from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in northwest Russia and ballistic missiles from submarines deployed in both the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in the Pacific Ocean. The day before, a Russian submarine had launched a Sineva ballistic missile from the Barents Sea. The missile traveled a record distance of more than 11,500 kilometers to a target in the equatorial region of the Pacific Ocean. President Dmitry Medvedev, who observed the submarine launch on Saturday and the ground launch on Sunday, said that the exercise "shows that our deterrent is in order."
Until recently, the priority placed on reviving Russia's ground and air forces has meant that the Russian fleet has been declining in size due to the need to decommission ships that have reached the end of their operational lifespan. The current Russian rearmament program, which will provide the Russian military with 4.9 trillion rubles ($192.16 billion) until 2015, allocates 25% to constructing new warships.
Medvedev has stated that the government would give priority to "nuclear submarines with cruise missiles, and multi-purpose attack submarines." Russia's existing non-strategic submarines will soon reach the end of their designated lifespan since they were constructed during the 1980s and 1990s.
In July, Adm. Vysotsky, stated that Russia intended to eventually deploy five or six aircraft carrier task forces, which would be more useful than submarines for reestablishing Russia's global maritime presence. The current plan is to start building the carriers in 2012. Observers question, however, whether the Russian defense industry still has the capacity to construct such a large and complex weapons system as a modern aircraft carrier and its associated warplanes. Russia's only remaining aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has repeatedly gone out of service since its commissioning in the early 1990s to undergo essential repairs. Russia does not now have a shipyard designed to construct aircraft carriers; the Kuznetsov was built in Ukraine during the 1980s, when Ukraine's defense industries were part of the integrated Soviet military-industrial complex.
Perhaps the most serious concern of the Russian Navy, though, is whether it can fulfill its important role in Russia's nuclear strategy. The critical uncertainties relate to Russia's new Bulava Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), which is designed to carry ten nuclear warheads a maximum range of 8,000 kilometers. A variety of developmental problems, including an unprecedented three successive failed launches, have delayed the Bulava's entry into service until at least 2009, which is already three years behind schedule.
On Sept. 18, the Dmitry Donskoi launched a Bulava from a submerged position in the White Sea at a target in the Kura testing grounds on the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to a Russian Navy spokesman, "It can be said that the launch and flight proceeded without a hitch." Nevertheless, some Russian sources subsequently claimed that the missile's multiple warheads failed to separate properly from the carrier bus and missed their targets. The Russian Navy is counting on the Bulava to equip its next generation Borey-class nuclear-power submarines, which is the only strategic submarine still under production in Russia.
The problems with the Bulava underscore the fragility of Russia's military revival. Despite the unprecedented scale of the recent military maneuvers, the Russian armed forces, especially the non-nuclear branches, have yet to acquire the robust range of military platforms and technologies required of a military superpower.
Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Reviewcontributing editor. His weekly WPR column appears every Tuesday.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2777
It appears that Russia is not only refurbishing her armed forces, but is also attempting to enforce a physical presence globally. This article does indicate that there is a very potent adversary in the making. However, while it appears formidable, what is the quality of the war machine Russia is trying to engineer?
One wonders what Mediterranean bases Russia is thinking about since no Mediterranean nation is pro Russia, unless of course, it means Syria. There was such a report earlier too.
The Georgian conflict indicates a growing confidence of Russia and it has seriously indicated that a rethink and a reappraisal of Russia's strength and intent is done.
There is also the issue that the West has many an unsolved conflicts in hand and hence distracted in applying itself to the Russian intent.
What should be done in the manner of policy, redeployment and action by the West wherein Russia is contained without losing momentum in Afghanistan and Iraq and at the same time keeping Iran and North Korea in check?
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