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  • Russian Foreign Intelligence Service declassifies Munich Agreement papers

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti's Valery Yarmolenko) - The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR in Russian abbreviation) has declassified archive materials related to the 1938 Munich Agreement, which triggered the most dramatic events of the 20th century.

    Head of the SVR press office Sergei Ivanov allowed Yarmolenko to familiarize himself with the declassified documents.

    "The declassified intelligence documents reflect the political processes which took place before and after the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, which is also called the 'Munich conspiracy,'" Ivanov explained.

    These documents were kept in the archives as top secret for 70 years. They show that the Soviet political leadership was informed about the preparations for the meeting of Neville Chamberlain and Eduard Daladier, on the one hand, and Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, on the other, and predict its potential military and political consequences for Europe. The papers show what unprecedented pressure Britain and France brought to bear on Czechoslovakia, demanding that it ceded Sudeten to Germany.

    "Moscow was receiving secret reports to the effect that the British and French ambassadors in Prague were persuading the Czechoslovak president to give over the Sudeten region to the Germans. Moreover, Prague was offered to cancel mutual assistance pacts with other countries," Ivanov said.

    Memo #8604, which was sent to Moscow by Russian intelligence from Prague several days before the signing of the Munich Agreement reads: "On September 19, British Ambassador Newton and French Ambassador De Lacroix conveyed to Milan Hodza (Czechoslovak prime minister in 1935-1938) the following on behalf of Chamberlain and Daladier, respectfully:

    "Guided by the lofty principles of preserving peace in Europe, they consider it necessary for Germany to incorporate the Sudeten region. A system of mutual aid pacts with other countries should be cancelled. Instead, all of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, plus France and Britain will guarantee the inviolability of its frontiers."

    These actions destroyed the existing elements of the collective resistance system. The Western policymakers did this behind the back of the Soviet Union, which had mutual aid agreements with Czechoslovakia and France.

    The 1938 declassified documents also reveal the details of the correspondence between European embassies and their foreign policy departments.

    For example, the British ambassador in Warsaw warned the Foreign Office that if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, the Polish leadership would seize the Tesin region, and that is what exactly happened. Having enlisted Germany's support, Poland took part in dismembering Czechoslovakia. Later, Poland also fell victim to Germany.

    The Finnish ambassador in London reported that if Hitler moved his troops to Czechoslovakia, France would not be able to render it effective military aid.

    "The Soviet Union was ready to render such support to Czechoslovakia, but because of the heavy pressure from London and Paris, Prague did not dare address Moscow with such a request," Ivanov recalled.

    Soviet intelligence sources reported that many capitals closely watched the geopolitical situation in Europe after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement as well.

    "As early as November 1938, diplomatic missions of a number of countries reported to their departments that Britain and France would not prevent Germany's eastward expansion," Ivanov said.

    SVR veteran, Maj.-Gen. Lev Sotskov (Ret.), who sorted the archive documents, is confident that the Munich Agreement eventually destroyed the collective security system in Europe and led to the outbreak of WWII.

    Sotskov served in the Foreign Intelligence Service since 1956 both abroad and in the central office. Now he is studying the archives on the history of intelligence. He wrote "Operation Tarantella" and "Unknown Separatism," and took part in the compilation of a collection of documents, entitled "Baltic Countries and Geopolitics."

    Sotskov believes that the declassified documents make it possible to take a new and deeper look at the role the world leaders played in the late 1930s in Europe.

    "The documents received after the Munich conspiracy are particularly valuable. They analyze the post-Munich situation in Europe and clearly show that Britain was trying to draw Germany and the Soviet Union into active hostilities," Sotskov emphasized in an interview with RIA Novosti.

    In a memo on December 21, 1938, Lavrenty Beria reported to Stalin about the Soviet-seized documents, which included reports of Finnish envoys to London, Paris, and Warsaw on Germany's eastward expansion, and the position of the British, French, and Polish governments on this issue.

    Thus, Finnish Ambassador in London Grippenberg reported to his Foreign Ministry: "I heard the opinion that German propaganda of colonies is false. As Britons put it, it is a smokescreen to cover the preparations of a plan concerning Soviet Ukraine. Hitler himself told French Ambassador Francois-Poncet that he was not even thinking about any colonies," the document reads.

    Later, on November 25, Grippenberg reported his conversation with a British government member who assured him that Britain and France would not interfere in Germany's eastward expansion.

    "Britain's position is as follows: let's wait until Germany and the U.S.S.R. get involved in a big conflict," the document reads.

    Commenting on it, Sotskov explained that despite the circumstances, the Soviet Union was still trying to set up some system for resisting the Nazi aggression. As a result, Britain and France had to send their military missions to Moscow for negotiations.

    "Moscow presented very detailed information about the resources which it could use against Hitler's Germany. In the event of an anti-Hitler agreement with Britain and France, the U.S.S.R. was ready to employ 120 infantry divisions, 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 tanks and as many aircraft," Sotskov said.

    However, despite this, the talks with Britain and France failed. It became obvious that they were working toward their super goal, he noted.

    The documents make it abundantly clear that both Britain and France realized that their position was driving the U.S.S.R. into a corner and that Moscow would have to come to terms with the Germans.

    As a result, the U.S.S.R. signed the Nonaggression Pact with Germany, which allowed it to move its border to the West and gain some time for the preparations to repel the aggression, Sotskov explained.

    "It became obvious that a policy of appeasing Hitler did not work, and that concessions only encouraged him further. This compelled the Soviet leadership to look for ways of ensuring national security in this foreign policy environment," he pointed out.

    "The Western model of appeasing the aggressor (the Munich Agreement) failed to achieve the desired effect, and the war broke out in the West. France surrendered to Hitler, and the cabinet of ministers changed in Britain. The anti-Hitler coalition took shape later under the pattern suggested by the Soviet Union in 1935: the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and later de Gaulle's France," Sotskov said.

    He believes that Europe should draw conclusions from the events around the Munich Agreement, as well as from the events in the Balkans and the recent crisis in the Caucasus (South Ossetia).

    "First of all, appeasing any aggressor, whether big or small, is a flawed policy. The United States wants to dominate the world, and it does not matter whose model, Hitler's or Bush's, it is using to achieve this goal," he said.

    Unless aggressive actions are nipped in the bud, the region and probably the entire continent will be in for big trouble, Sotskov believes.

    He is convinced that Europe needs a system of collective security, and this is the second lesson. "The bloc system no longer works. However, it transpires that the lesson has not been learned. Instead of curbing Georgia, the aggressor, the United States suggests encircling Russia," he summed up.

    RIA Novosti - Opinion & analysis - Russian Foreign Intelligence Service declassifies Munich Agreement papers
    " THe SiLEnt KNighT.

  • #2
    Munich's platinum jubilee

    MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - Attempts to review World War II results and point a finger at new culprits for unleashing it have become "good form" in the past few years in many East European countries.

    In trying to include the Soviet Union among the aggressors, revisionists usually start the countdown from the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, saying the Soviet leadership gave the aggressor the green light. But amid frequent references to the summer and fall of 1939, they often forget the events of the previous year, 1938, which has gone down in history as the year of the Munich Agreement.

    Currently, Russia is declassifying many documents relating to the history of World War II and preceding events. Munich is no exception - on September 29, 2008 Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service announced the lifting of secrecy classification from some diplomatic and intelligence documents dating from that time.

    The Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, inhabited mainly by Germans, became the source of a conflict soon after World War I when, with the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the Sudeten Germans tried to unite either with the newly formed Austria or Germany. But all their protests were crushed by Czechoslovak troops. By 1938, Nazi Germany, which had already annexed Austria by proclaiming the Anschluss, had been making preparations for annexing the Sudetenland. Although the rights of the Sudeten Germans were never violated by the Czechoslovak government, which was taking steps to provide school instruction in the German language and gave the Germans parliamentary representation and local government, the tensions continued. Konrad Heinlein's pro-German party made the demand that the Sudetenland be joined to Germany.

    On September 15, 1938, during a meeting with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Hitler said he was willing to preserve peace but was ready to fight over the Sudeten issue. As a result, Chamberlain agreed to hand over the Sudetenland to Germany by observing the right of nations to self-determination.

    By that time, Czechoslovakia had two agreements on friendship and mutual assistance - one with France and one with the Soviet Union. Both provided for assisting Czechoslovakia in case it were subjected to an act of aggression. But the agreement with the Soviet Union had a proviso: Moscow was to render help to Czechoslovakia only if Paris did the same.

    In that way, France, which at the time had Europe's largest army, exercised the decisive say. In the course of British-French consultations on September 18 in London, the parties agreed that areas where more than half the population was German must become part of Germany, while Britain and France would guarantee Czechoslovakia's new borders.

    On September 20-21, the Czechoslovak government was told that if the British-French proposals were rejected France would ditch its obligations under the treaty of mutual assistance. At the same time, the Western envoys warned against the Czechoslovak leadership seeking an alliance with the U.S.S.R., saying that "if the Czechs joined forces with the Russians, the war might become a crusade against the Bolsheviks. The British and French governments would find it hard to stay aloof."

    At the same time, the Soviet Union offered military help to Czechoslovakia disregarding France's position, provided Poland let Soviet troops pass through its territory (at the time, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia did not have a common border). Still, as declassified documents show, the Czechoslovak government decided to opt for the French and British guarantees and waived Soviet assistance.

    On September 22, Germany issued an ultimatum, demanding that the Sudetenland be joined to it. Czechoslovakia and France declared a mobilization. On September 27, Hitler wrote to Chamberlain to say that he was ready to guarantee the borders of the remaining part of Czechoslovakia and discuss details of an agreement.

    On September 29-30, 1938 the government leaders of Germany, Italy, France and Britain met in Munich. No Czechoslovak representatives were invited to attend. By 1 a.m. on September 30, the sides signed an agreement which in effect accepted Germany's demands. Only then was the Czechoslovak delegation admitted into the conference hall to hear the verdict passed by others.

    At that point Czechoslovakia had two choices: it could accept the ultimatum on the Sudetenland and give it up, or go to war against Germany. Despite a well-developed munitions industry, an army little short of the German army in size and armaments of superb quality, the Czechoslovak National Assembly accepted the Munich decisions for implementation.

    Germany took possession of the Sudetenland complete with three million people - one-quarter of the population - and 20% of Czechoslovak territory, which concentrated half of the country's heavy industry.

    Naturally, history did not end there. Poland stepped forward, claiming its piece of the pie - the return of the Tesin (Cieszyn) Region, long a controversial territory. Left out in the cold, Czechoslovakia complied again. Poland, however, did not enjoy the new ownership long - in September 1939, Germany occupied Poland, and after 1945 Tesin was returned to Czechoslovakia.

    On October 7, under German pressure, Prague decided to give autonomy to Slovakia, while on November 2, by decision of the Vienna Arbitration Court, Hungary was given the southern regions of Slovakia and Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian Rus) with the towns of Beregszasz (Beregovo), Munkacz (Mukachevo) and Uzhgorod.

    In March 1939, Germany overran what remained of Czechoslovakia, and made it part of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The autonomous Slovakia became the Reich's satellite state. The arms industry of former Czechoslovakia spent the war years working for the Wehrmacht and producing hundreds of thousands of small arms, tens of thousands of artillery guns, and thousands of aircraft, tanks and self-propelled gun mounts.

    Czechoslovakia was the last to be freed from the Nazi occupation - it was not until May 9, 1945 that the Red Army captured Prague. Sporadic fighting with separate German units continued until May 12.

    The Munich Agreement triggered the largest massacre in human history. As for French and British politicians, they showed an astonishing lack of foresight: they failed either to pacify Germany, or turn it against the U.S.S.R. In the context of today, only one lesson can be drawn from the 1938 events: the best remedy for reining in the real aggressor is not a treaty of guarantees or a ceasefire agreement, but a peace enforcement operation.

    RIA Novosti - Opinion & analysis - Munich's platinum jubilee

    Comment


    • #3
      ...Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or been so well preserved as in Britain.

      In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward. As if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view:

      (1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center,
      (2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close to the center,
      (3) the supporters of "appeasement," and
      (4) the "peace at any price" group in a peripheral position.

      The "anti-Bolsheviks," who were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real policy of the government in 1939. In the earlier period the chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French militarism."

      This point of view was supported by the second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor. It included Lord Milner, Leopold Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian, Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand (brother-in-law of Lady Astor and managing director of Lazard Brothers, the international bankers), Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates.

      This group wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table (founded in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes Trust, and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal Institute of International Affairs, called "Chatham House" (of which Sir Abe Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters, while Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford.

      This Round Table Group formed the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from the anti-Bolsheviks like D'Abernon in that they sought to contain the Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an English-speaking bloc rather than to destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Relationships between the two groups were very close and friendly, and some people, like Smuts, were in both.

      The anti-Bolsheviks, including D'Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany.


      Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in a letter of August 11, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, a protege of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922) to Lausanne (1932).

      D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain "with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet." As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D'Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission).

      The point of view of this group was presented by General Smuts in a speech of October 23, 1923 (made after luncheon with H. A. L. Fisher). From these two groups came the Dawes Plan and the Locarno pacts. It was Smuts, according to Stresemann, who first suggested the Locarno policy, and it was D'Abernon who became its chief supporter. H. A. L. Fisher and John Simon in the House of Commons, and Lothian, Dawson, and their friends on The Round Table and on The Times prepared the ground among the British governing class for both the Dawes Plan and Locarno as early as 1923 (The Round Table for March 1923; the speeches of Fisher and Simon in the House of Commons on February 19, 1923, Fisher's speech of March 6th and Simon's speech of March 13th in the same place, The Round Table for June 1923; and Smuts's speech of October 23rd).

      The more moderate Round Table group, including Lionel Curtis, Leopold Amery (who was the shadow of Lord Milner), Lord Lothian, Lord Brand, and Lord Astor, sought to weaken the League of Nations and destroy all possibility of collective security in order to strengthen Germany in respect to both France and the Soviet Union, and above all to free Britain from Europe in order to build up an "Atlantic bloc" of Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the United States.

      They prepared the way for this "Union" through the Rhodes Scholarship organization (of which Lord Milner was the head in 1905-1925 and Lord Lothian was secretary in 1925-1940), through the Round Table groups (which had been set up in the United States, India, and the British Dominions in T 910- 1917), through the Chatham House organization, which set up Royal Institutes of International Affairs in all the dominions and a Council on Foreign Relations in New York, as well as through "Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences" held irregularly, and the Institutes of Pacific Relations set up in various countries as autonomous branches of the Royal Institutes of International Affairs.

      This influential group sought to change the League of Nations from an instrument of collective security to an international conference center for "nonpolitical" matters like drug control or international postal services, to rebuild Germany as a buffer against the Soviet Union and a counterpoise to France, and to build up an Atlantic bloc of Britain, the Dominions, the United States, and, if possible, the Scandinavian countries.

      One of the effusions of this group was the project called Union Now, and later Union Now with Great Britain, propagated in the United States in 1938-1945 by Clarence Streit on behalf of Lord Lothian and the Rhodes Trust. Ultimately, the inner circle of this group arrived at the idea of the "three-bloc world."

      It was believed that this system could force Germany to keep the peace (after it absorbed Europe) because it would be squeezed between the Atlantic bloc and the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union could be forced to keep the peace because it would be squeezed between Japan and Germany. This plan would work only if Germany and the Soviet Union could be brought into contact with each other by abandoning to Germany Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Polish Corridor.

      This became the aim of both the anti-Bolsheviks and the three-bloc people from the early part of 1937 to the end of 1939 (or even early 1940). These two cooperated and dominated the government in that period. They split in the period 1939-1940, with the "three-bloc" people, like Amery, Lord Halifax, and Lord Lothian, becoming increasingly anti-German, while the anti-Bolshevik crowd, like Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, and John Simon, tried to adopt a policy based on a declared but unfought war against Germany combined with an undeclared fighting war against the Soviet Union.

      The split between these two groups appeared openly in public and led to Chamberlain's fall from office when Amery cried to Chamberlain, across the floor of the House of Commons, on May 10, 1940, "In the name of God, go!"

      Outside these two groups, and much more numerous (but much more remote from the real instruments of government), were the appeasers and the "peace at any price" people. These were both used by the two inner groups to command public support for their quite different policies. Of the two the appeasers were much more important than the "peace at any price" people. The appeasers swallowed the steady propaganda (much of it emanating from Chatman House, The Times, the Round Table groups, or Rhodes circles) that the Germans had been deceived and brutally treated in 1919.

      For example, it was under pressure from seven persons, including General Smuts and H. A. L. Fisher, as well as Lord Milner himself, that Lloyd George made his belated demand on June 2, 1919, that the German reparations be reduced and the Rhineland occupation be cut from fifteen years to two. The memorandum from which Lloyd George read these demands was apparently drawn up by Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), while the minutes of the Council of Four, from which we get the record of those demands, were taken down by Sir Maurice Hankey (as secretary to the Supreme Council, a position obtained through Lord Esher).

      It was Kerr (Lothian) who served as British member of the Committee of Five which drew up the answer to the Germans' protest of May, 1 919. General Smuts was still refusing to sign the treaty because it was too severe as late as June 2 3, 1919.

      As a result of these attacks and a barrage of similar attacks on the treaty which continued year after year, British public opinion acquired a guilty conscience about the Treaty of Versailles, and was quite unprepared to take any steps to enforce it by 1930. On this feeling, which owed so much to the British idea of sportsmanlike conduct toward a beaten opponent, was built the movement for appeasement. This movement had two basic assumptions: (a) that reparation must be made for Britain's treatment of Germany in 1919 and (b) that if Germany's most obvious demands, such as arms equality, remilitarization of the Rhineland, and perhaps union with Austria, were met, Germany would become satisfied and peaceful.

      The trouble with this argument was that once Germany reached this point, it would be very difficult to prevent Germany from going further (such as taking the Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor).

      Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or "three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into the "peace at any price" group. It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to anti-Bolshevism.

      At any rate, few influential people were still in the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized, it seemed to many that the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even collision with, the Soviet Union.

      The "peace at any price" people were both few and lacking in influence in Britain, while the contrary, as we shall see, was true in France. However, in the period August 1935 to March 1939 and especially in September 1938, the government built upon the fears of this group by steadily exaggerating Germany's armed might and belittling their own, by calculated indiscretions (like the statement in September 1938 that there were no real antiaircraft defenses in London), by constant hammering at the danger of an overwhelming air attack without warning, by building ostentatious and quite useless air-raid trenches in the streets and parks of London, and by insisting through daily warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask immediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil).

      In this way, the government put London into a panic in 1938 for the first time since 1804 or even 1678. And by this panic, Chamberlain was able to get the British people to accept the destruction of Czechoslovakia, wrapping it up in a piece of paper, marked "peace in our time," which he obtained from Hitler, as he confided to that ruthless dictator, "for British public opinion." Once this panic passed, Chamberlain found it impossible to get the British public to follow his program, although he himself never wavered, even in 1940.

      He worked on the appeasement and the "peace at any price" groups throughout 1939, but their numbers dwindled rapidly, and since he could not openly appeal for support on either the anti-Bolshevik or the "three-bloc" basis, he had to adopt the dangerous expedient of pretending to resist (in order to satisfy the British public) while really continuing to make every possible concession to Hitler which would bring Germany to a common frontier with the Soviet Union, all the while putting every pressure on Poland to negotiate and on Germany to refrain from using force in order to gain time to wear Poland down and in order to avoid the necessity of backing up by action his pretense of resistance to Germany. This policy went completely astray in the period from August 1939 to April 1940.

      Chamberlain’s motives were not bad ones; he wanted peace so that he could devote Britain’s “limited resources” to social welfare; but he was narrow and totally ignorant of the realities of power, convinced that international politics could be conducted in terms of secret deals, as business was, and he was quite ruthless in carrying out his aims, especially in his readiness to sacrifice non-English persons, who, in his eyes, did not count.

      In the meantime, both the people and the government were more demoralized in France than in England. The policy of the Right which would have used force against Germany even in the face of British disapproval ended in 1924. When Barthou, who had been one of the chief figures in the 1924 effort, tried to revive it in 1934, it was quite a different thing, and he had constantly to give at least verbal support to Britain's efforts to modify his encirclement of Germany into a Four-Power Pact (of Britain, France, Italy, Germany).

      This Four-Power Pact, which was the ultimate goal of the anti-Bolshevik group in England, was really an effort to form a united front of Europe against the Soviet Union and, in the eyes of this group, would have been a capstone to unite in one system the encirclement of France (which was the British answer to Barthou's encirclement of Germany) and the Anti-Comintern Pact (which was the German response to the same project).

      The Four-Power Pact reached its fruition at the Munich Conference of September 1938, where these four Powers destroyed Czechoslovakia without consulting Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union. But the scorn the dictators had for Britain and France as decadent democracies had by this time reached such a pass that the dictators no longer had even that minimum of respect without which the Four-Power Pact could not function.

      As a consequence, Hitler in 1939 spurned all Chamberlain's frantic efforts to restore the Four-Power Pact along with his equally frantic and even more secret efforts to win Hitler's attention by offers of colonies in Africa and economic support in eastern Europe...

      Tragedy & Hope - Carroll Quigley (Part 12: The Policy of Appeasement, 1931-1936)
      Last edited by Alssey; 04 Oct 08,, 07:09.

      Comment


      • #4
        "First of all, appeasing any aggressor, whether big or small, is a flawed policy. Russia wants to dominate the world, and it does not matter whose model, Hitler's or Bush's, it is using to achieve this goal," he said.
        fixed

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by zraver View Post
          fixed
          "First of all, appeasing any aggressor, whether big or small, is a flawed policy. All countries with the means want to dominate the world because they believe their point of view superior and want it to carry the day over other countries' points of view, and it does not matter whose model, Hitler's or Bush's, it is using to achieve this goal." This is what is called geopolitics."
          fixed
          Last edited by rj1; 08 Oct 08,, 18:05.

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