Arleigh Burke DDG Program

[rickusn]

Ive recently been reviewing the history of this program.

Its interesting to note that it appears all 63 ships originally envisioned will be built.

The program was delayed and first ship of the first 29 was commissioned two years later than originally planned. And the last ship of sixty-three 2 to 5 years later depending on using an average approximately of 3 or 4 ships average per year build rate or the last 34 ships.

Not bad at all considering the need for surface combatants(Escorts) was reduced with the drawdown from 15 to 12 carriers and the decommissioning of the BBs. Also the integration of the OHPs into the battlegroup lessened somewhat the need in #s but more importantly the affected the capability of the Burkes(ie ASW).

Already the first 19(flight I and II) were vastly inferior to the CG 47 originally DDG 47 because of cost. Which really was acceptable given the capabilities of the ships they were replacing and it only amounted to 1 escort per battlegroup(15 CVBGs and 4 SAGs). Also the fact that not enough LAMPS III helos were programmed to be built to fill existing ships mitigated this somewhat. The flight III ships (the next 10) were to rectify the ASW shortcoming with the addition of two LAMPS III helos along with other upgrades. This didnt happen because of three factors cost again, reduced Soviet threat and the integration of the OHP frigates into the battlegroup.

So 28 ships were completed to the Flight I and II configuration all but seven flight I(originally only 9 were to be completed as flight I ships). Then (and continuing now) Flight IIA ships are being built which while having the LAMPS III helos are not as capable overall as the Flight III version originally forseen. Again cost and the reduced Soviet threat(at least at the beginning) being the issue.

The 63 Burkes were nominally replacing the 23 CF Adams DDGs, 10 Farragut/Coontz DDGs, 9 Belknap CG , 9 Leahy CG plus 12 extra to fill out the SAGs. However they have now also nominally replaced the 9 CGN, 4 Kidd DDGs and are in the process of replacing the 31 Spruance DDs and the first 5 CG 47s. Not to mention the gradual phasing out of the OHPs from battlegroup duties. This is possible only because fo the reduced CVBGs and the demise of the SAGs, URGs and Convoys. Which reduce the needed escorts from 137 Cruisers and Destroyers to 87. Along with the reduced threat. Although the advent of the ESG and emerging threats may change this somewhat. Right now we have 27 CG 47s, 40 Burkes and 10 Spruances. And why about a dozen OHPs will remain in the strike groups(new name for battlegroups and ARGs) at least for the short term.

[Bill]

Good info Rick, thanx.

[rickusn]

Thx sniper. But I need to expand on the force structure a little.

The nominal/notional war time plan for Combatant formations is as follows:

12 CSG: 1 CV/CVN, 6(CG,DDG,DD,FFG), 2 SSN

12 ESG : 1 LHA/LHD, 1 LPD, 1LSD, 2(DDG,FFG, DDX), 1 SSN

also 7 SAGs rotate to the 5th fleet varying in composition and coming from various squadrons to be relplaced by 9 new BMD SAGs made up apparently in the same ad hoc manner.

Although a CG has been taken from the CVSG and added to the ESG. And because we lack the right type of escorts some units will operate shorthanded in the short-term. Which in time of relative peace may be an acceptable risk.

So we need 96 escorts but as stated above we are making do with 89 or actually 87(86)(of which 14 are FFGs as 2 Spruances are also engaged in other duties) as two(three until a FY 2004 deployment)CGs are engaged in other duties.

So 21(20 FY 2004) ships are engaged in Counter-Narcotics Patrol, Homeland Defense and STANNAVFORLANT(NATO). 3(2 FY 2004) CGs, 2 Spruances and 16 FFGs of which 10 are or will be in FY 2004 NRF ships.

Also note that URGs, SAGs and Convoy needs are not accounted for. Although the USN states that 9(* see below) SAGs for BMD are envisioned(which requires a minimium IMHO that 102 (CG,DDG) and 12 DDX). Which will make the CSG and ESG shorthanded even further. Although in case of all out war those three elements will have to come together and provide mutual support. Providing they are not deployed to far apart!!!

This will only be partially rectified when all 63 Burkes and at least 12 DDX(the nominal replacement for the 12 CORT FFGs).

By 2015 I envision only 22 CGs, 63 Burkes and 12 DDX(by no means certain). Plus whatever LCS are built and FFGs(if any) that are retained.

Many experiments are being undertaken to mitigate the potential short-falls. SSGNs and SSNs(already heavily tasked) can pick-up some of the slack**. The BBs if they had been retained and modernised as originally planned could have also.

The myth that surface warfare has been short-changed during the 1980s, even the 1990s and continuing in this decade compared to aviation and submarines is unfounded though. While Aviation had ongoing procurement of aircraft and carriers ongoing and the new A-12(but failed) and the LA and Trident submarine ongoing constrution. The surface community had the reactivation of the BBs, NTU of existing ships, the new AEGIS CG, ongoing construction of FFGs and the new DDG(Burke) program.

Aviation had to bite the bullet and settle for the F/A 18 E/F as its only new aircraft program. The Submarine Community had to settle for 3 new Seawolfs. Although the new technology for the Virginia class of the 21st century was quietly brought into being Thank GOD(where the surface community really failed). And they convinced those who hold the power and purse strings of the need and mission for the SSGNs and the refueling of LAs. The surface community while getting the DDGs # wise, it had to settle for ships that arent as capable as originally envisioned. But they foolishly IMHO didnt fight for the BBs. Lost out on the Arsenal ship and had the DD21, DD(X) or whatever you want to call it pushed way back because they couldnt properly define the need, mission and the technology required. The submarine Community was on the verge of total annhilation(cancellation of 26 of 29 units, Premature decom of the Sturgeon class and 20 of 31(some of those now being refueled) of the non-vls LA class with threats of more to follow with the end of the Cold War, 1990s draw down and QDR but battled tenaciously for and bided their time for their plans to bear fruit. The Aviation Community and Surface Community( in particular) havent faired as well mainly beacuse their advocates lacked IMHO vision. And also because they didnt battle internally and externally as well, it turns out, as the Submarine Community(which was by no means assured for the Submarine Community, so this is from hindsight) did.









* 15 May 2003

Sea change for the US Navy

By Scott C Truver



"The US Navy (USN), buoyed by its new 'Sea Power 21' strategic concept released in October 2002, was a critical element in assuring the military victory in Iraq. Numerous aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) made ready for combat, in some cases significantly compressing inter-deployment workups to arrive on-scene on time. In the background, the USN was also engaged in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), with operational and personnel tempos at post-Cold War highs. The gathering storms of war and the reality of worldwide crisis dramatically underscored the need for on-scene, responsive, and combat-effective military forces to protect US interests.

In his 'Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities' white paper, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vernon E Clark articulated the USN's vision for 21st-century operations based on three fundamental concepts – Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing – linked together in a seamless 'FORCEnet' web of secure communications and information. Important for today's and tomorrow's fleet, 'Sea Power 21' outlined a new 'Global Concept of Operations' that posited innovative force mixes – carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, and expeditionary strike forces – which would enable the USN to reach friends and adversaries in ways not previously possible.

Nagging issues, some clearly beyond the control of the USN, and still-constrained resources, despite record defense budget increases, may yet combine to cloud that vision.

As in numerous crises since the end of the Second World War, CVBGs and ARGs built around large-deck amphibious assault warships figure prominently in the USN's order of battle, providing highly mobile sea 'bases' from which offensive and defensive power can be projected well over land and serving as vital 'nodes' in net-centric operations. But, there is little doubt that today's fleet is being spread too thin, which has generated some creative thinking.

Indeed, as Lenin understood, quantity has a quality all its own - numbers matter. While the capabilities of tomorrow's netted sensors and weapons will doubtless increase the potency of each warship and aircraft, numbers will always be of concern: a ship or an aircraft cannot be in two places at once.

'Sea Power 21' explains that the Global Concept of Operations will "disperse combat striking power by creating additional independent operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world. This increase of combat power is possible because technological advancements are dramatically transforming the capability of our ships, submarines, and aircraft to act as power projection forces, netted together for expanded warfighting effect." Instead of today's 12 CVBGs, a total of 37 independent strike groups will carry out worldwide operations, including 12 Carrier Strike Groups, 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups, nine Strike and Missile Defense Surface Action Groups and 4 modified Trident guided-missile submarines providing covert striking power from cruise missiles and the insertion of Special Operations Forces.

And, should warfighting requirements demand, the various carrier, expeditionary, and surface action strike groups can be combined with guided-missile submarines to form Expeditionary Strike Forces: what Adm Clark has called the 'gold standard' of naval power. "

** also with the advent of the JDAM long-range bombers can take up some slack for strike warfare.