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16-in Guns vs Hard Targets : A Reality Check

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  • #16
    USS New Jersey vs 8-inch guns at Guam (8 August 1945)

    Eight-inch gun at Peacock Point, Eneen-Kio Atoll, in the 1970s. Note the absence of the concrete revetment :



    More infos on the Japanese 8-inch coastal defense guns can be found here.

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    • #17
      Battleship guns vs Industrial Sites (1945)

      Though not necessarily *hard targets*, there is an interesting assessment of the naval gunfire missions conducted by Allied battleships against industrial sites in Japan towards the end of the Second World War in D.K. Brown's (RIP ) Nelson to Vanguard :

      Pages 199-200 : During the closing phase of the war with Japan, there were a number of bombardments with industrial sites as the prime target.

      Initial claims of severe damage were not generally supported by detailed photographic analysis or post-war inspection.

      The damage caused by a large HE shell was generally much less than by a large bomb, e.g. a 16-inch HE will damage 1,400 ft² of a steel framed building, a 2,000-lb bomb 8,800 ft². A similar shell will damage machine tools over 4,900 ft² whilst a 1,000-lb bomb damages 8,500 ft².

      Firing was generally at about 23,000 yards at which range 1 percent hits were obtained.

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      • #18
        Originally posted by Shipwreck View Post
        Regarding FC :

        Range and bearing were obtained by USS Massachusetts on El Hank lighthouse at 0704 and were maintained throughout the engagement (with the exception of 24 salvos fired against Jean Bart between 0748 and 0802, radars being inoperative at the time).

        The Iowas were the only fast BBs to receive Mark-48 shore bombardment computers in the mid-50s, so all fast BBs got their FC solutions for shore bombardment from their Mark-38 directors. The Mark-13 radar was arguably an improvement over the Mark-8 radar for surface engagements, but wouldn't have made much of a difference in the shooting against El Hank.

        Air spotting conditions were not ideal in Casablanca, but Allied forces enjoyed complete air superiority during the engagement and not much could be done against smoke and dust anyway.

        Regarding ammunitions :

        While the CO of USS Massachusetts blames AP shells for the modest results achieved against El Hank Battery (see post #4), the gunnery officer of USS Iowa blames HC shells for the modest results achieved against Japanese coastal batteries on Mili Islands.

        Mmmmmhhhhh....

        Which just goes to show that each situation is unique.

        Then there was Iwo Jima were the bombardment was nearly irrelevant.

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        • #19
          Crisbecq Battery vs USS Nevada et al., June 1944

          The Crisbecq Battery (also known as St. Marcouf Battery), located 1.5 miles inland from Utah Beach was one of the most important on the East Cotention Coast.

          With a garrison of 400 men under the command of Oberleutnant Zur See Walter Ohmsen, the Crisbecq Battery was comprised of three 210mm (8.25") Skoda K39/K41 guns, - two of which in casemates with pivot mounts and the third one in an open emplacement -, and six 88mm (3.45") dual purpose guns, all of which were in open emplacements.

          The Czech-made 210mm guns fired a 300-lb projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 yards. Casemates were made of reinforced concrete, with roof being 12.5 feet thick and walls ranging from 10 to 16 feet in thickness. External dimensions of the casemates were ~ 55 x 45 x 25 feet.

          Crisbecq Battery was also one of the main targets of Force U's Bombardment Group, under the command of Rear-Admiral Deyo, wich encompassed the battleship USS Nevada with 10 x 14"/45 guns, the monitor HMS Erebus with 2 x 15"/42 guns, five cruisers (USS Tuscaloosa, USS Quincy plus 3 cruisers from the Royal Navy) and ten destroyers.

          Between 6 June and 12 June 1944, the Crisbecq Battery received an estimated 1,500+ salvos of various calibers from the ships of Force U's Bombardment Group (the battery sank USS Corry, the only USN destroyer lost on D-Day).

          Prior to that, over 800 bombs were dropped on Crisbecq Battery between 19 April and 5 June 1944 (~ 600 tons dropped by 100 bombers on 5 June 1944 alone).

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          • #20
            Crisbecq Battery vs USS Nevada et al., June 1944

            In his report dated 21 June 1944, Rear-Admiral Don P. Moon, who directed the landings on "Utah" Beach, wrote :

            (emphasis added)

            (3) It was significant that at least through the first week of the operation, no battery could be considered destroyed unless captured. There were several instances of positions which were believed, on the basis of air and sea observation, to have been destroyed yet guns in these positions subsequently opened fire. In some of these cases, there is evidence that casements protected the guns against lethal damage although they were rendered inoperative during the bombardment and for many hours thereafter.

            (4) The latter was probably the case at Crisbecq, which battery was one of the most important on the east coast of the Cherbourg Penisula. The position contained two 210mm guns in casements, one 210mm in an open emplacement, and six 88mm dual purpose in open revetted emplacements. The casements had roofs of reinforced concrete 12 1/2 feet thick and walls ranging from 10 to 16 feet. This position had been subjected, both before and after D-day, to especially heavy air and naval bombardment. The guns in casemates were undamaged except for minor fragmentation scars, the casemates themselves were also entirely unscratched even by close misses. On the other hand, all communication leading to them from the observation post and rangefinders were disrupted which probably rendered accurate fire extremely difficult. All the other guns in the battery which were not enclosed were destroyed or nearly so. There were ample bomb-proof personnel shelters in the area which afforded complete protection to the gun crews.
            Attached Files
            Last edited by Shipwreck; 19 May 08,, 22:39.

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            • #21
              Shipwreck,

              Thank you for the wonderful research.

              Is, your hypothosis that Heavy gun bombbardment without H.E. is ineffective? or, is this a critic of battleships in total?

              My reply might take a few days.

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              • #22
                Operation Neptune (6-30 June 1944)

                During Operation Neptune (6-30 June 1944), ships comprising the Western Task Force were :

                FORCE U - Utah Beach :

                USS Nevada : 10 x 14"/45 guns, 16 x 5"/38 guns
                USS Tuscaloosa : 8 x 8"/55 guns, 8 x 5"/25 guns
                USS Quincy : 8 x 8"/55 guns, 8 x 5"/25 guns
                HMS Erebus : 2 x 15"/42 guns, 8 x 4"/45 guns
                HMS Hawkins : 7 x 7.5"/45 guns
                HMS Black Prince : 8 x 5.25"/50 guns
                HMS Entreprise : 5 x 6"/45 guns
                HNLMS Soemba : 3 x 5.9"/50 guns

                FORCE O - Omaha Beach :

                USS Texas : 10 x 14"/45 guns, 6 x 5"/51 guns
                USS Arkansas : 12 x 12"/50 guns, 6 x 5"/51 guns
                HMS Glasgow : 12 x 6"/50 guns, 8 x 4"/45 guns
                Georges Leygues : 9 x 6"/55 guns, 8 x 3.5"/50 guns
                Montcalm : 9 x 6"/55 guns, 8 x 3.5"/50 guns


                In the Western Task Force, bombarding ships exclusive of craft standing off the beaches delivered the following quantity of naval fire :

                15-in. : 101 HC,
                14-in. : 508 A.P. 1490 H.C.,
                12-in. : 163 A.P.,
                7.5-in. : 1,200 H.C.,
                5.25 in. : 65 A.P. 1,473 H.C.,
                5/38-in. : 25,707,
                5/25-in. : 118,
                5/51-in. : 376,
                4-in. : 3000, 656 H.C.
                8-in. : 168 A.P. 2,862 H.C.
                6-in. : 1,064 A.P. 5,414 H.C.

                source : Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946, vol. 5., "The Invasion of Normandy : Operation Neptune", Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe (London, 1946), page 474, footnote #1.
                Last edited by Shipwreck; 20 May 08,, 14:08.

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                • #23
                  Operation Neptune (6-30 June 1944)

                  A couple of quotes from the Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946, vol. 5., "The Invasion of Normandy : Operation Neptune", Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe (London, 1946), page 474 :

                  (emphasis added)

                  E. Results of Naval Bombardment

                  28. A generalized tabulating of the results of Naval bombardment is hard to give. Prisoners reports indicated that the terror of the gun fire from ships at sea was a major factor in driving the Germans from their positions. Subsequent to the assault, considerable trouble was experienced on both flanks from enemy guns which shelled the beaches and anchorages. Although doubtless new guns were rushed up by the enemy to replace those made unserviceable, there is no evidence that naval gun fire caused great destruction to enemy guns.

                  29. Naval gunfire neutralized rather than destroyed enemy batteries. The long periods of silence of flanking batteries, which often followed bombardment, was considered to be the result of the moral effect of H.E. on the defenders rather than of its destructive effect. In the rapid advance along the Cotentin Peninsula, hostile batteries which could fire on the Western Beaches were captured at an early date. On the Eastern static flank, an enemy battery east of the River Orne and another at Le Havre made it necessary to discontinue unloading on Sword Beach. All Navy and Army reports covering the subject are agreed that the close supporting fire delivered by small ships, immediately preceding H-hour, was of the greatest assistance in enabling the Infantry to make the first break across the open beaches.
                  Last edited by Shipwreck; 20 May 08,, 14:14.

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                  • #24
                    IMO I dont think comparing the Iowas nor the other fast battleships classes (South Dakotas and North Carolinia classes)for shore bombardment during WWII against the older heavies would reveal much about the 16"/50 accuracy. The newer classes major role wasnt shore bombardment and therefore it would not be surprising to see the old heavies (Nevada,Pa etc etc) do it much better since they had much more practice while the faster battleships stayed at sea with the carriers and other jobs.

                    The older heavies were much better suited for that particular job and certainly due to their speed (not capable of staying with the fleet at speed) had the time to do it accurately and methodically time and time again.
                    Fortitude.....The strength to persist...The courage to endure.

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                    • #25
                      Originally posted by vannor View Post
                      Is, your hypothosis that Heavy gun bombbardment without H.E. is ineffective?
                      My hypothesis is that if they had used HC instead of AP against El Hank (and AP instead of HC at Mili Island), the results would have been the same as historically.
                      Last edited by Shipwreck; 21 May 08,, 19:02.

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                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Dreadnought View Post
                        The newer classes major role wasnt shore bombardment and therefore it would not be surprising to see the old heavies (Nevada,Pa etc etc) do it much better since they had much more practice while the faster battleships stayed at sea with the carriers and other jobs.

                        The older heavies were much better suited for that particular job and certainly due to their speed (not capable of staying with the fleet at speed) had the time to do it accurately and methodically time and time again.
                        BBs assigned to the Bombardment Force during Operation Neptune were :

                        US Navy :

                        USS Arkansas (commissioned in 1912) [WTF]
                        USS Texas (commissioned in 1914) [WTF]
                        USS Nevada (commissioned in 1916) [WTF]

                        Royal Navy :

                        HMS Warspite (commissioned in 1915) [ETF]
                        HMS Ramillies (commissioned in 1917) [ETF]
                        HMS Rodney (commissioned in 1927) [ETF Reserve]
                        HMS Nelson (commissioned in 1927) [spare battleship]

                        Other big gun shooters assigned to the Bombardment Force were the British monitors HMS Erebus (commissioned in 1916) [WTF] and HMS Roberts (commissioned in 1941) [ETF].

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                        • #27
                          how did the Iowa's do in Desert Storm, when they had accurate feedback from their drones?

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                          • #28
                            ODS vs Vietnam vs Korea : 16"/50 Missions Success Rates

                            Korea : (March 1951 - March 1952)

                            * Average range : 22,700 yards
                            * Number of missions / rounds : 391 / 4,411
                            * Spotted / Unspotted (% of missions) : 75% / 25%

                            Success Rates (basis = spotted missions) :
                            * No success / unknown results : 6%
                            * Limited results : 24%
                            * Successful : 70%

                            Vietnam : (September 1968 - January 1969)

                            * Average range : 28,400 yards
                            * Number of missions / rounds : 200 / 2,709
                            * Spotted / Unspotted (% of missions) : 100% / 0%

                            Success Rates (basis = spotted missions) :
                            * No success / unknown results : 22%
                            * Limited results : 32%
                            * Successful : 46%

                            Desert Storm :

                            * Average range : 38,700 yards
                            * Number of missions / rounds : 83 / 1,102
                            * Spotted / Unspotted (% of missions) : 63% / 37%

                            Success Rates (basis = spotted missions) :
                            * No success / unknown results : 29%
                            * Limited results : 40%
                            * Successful : 31%
                            Last edited by Shipwreck; 21 May 08,, 13:00.

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                            • #29
                              Naval Bombardments on D-Day

                              Mapping between the Allied ships of the Bombardment Force and the German batteries :

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                              • #30
                                All of which proves you have to get Infantrymen in there to finally take them out.
                                “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                                Mark Twain

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