Any Life Left!?

[Gun Grape]

Restoring an Iowa class Battleship to WW II configuration would cost more than it did to modernize one in the 1980's. Believe me, if anyone knows what was cut off and scrapped in way of new structures, it's me.

So, for a few thousand dollars (vs. a good percentage of a billion dollars) these ship museums can have models of their ships on display

I was hoping you would chime in here:). Would it be feasible to put the turrets back, rebuild the visible changes, remove the ABLS, make new gun tubs. ect.. but not rip the guts out of the ships by replacing below deck stuff for the turrets and other things the visitors would not see. You allow them to visit the 5/38 turrets and spaces that are still in place. The other ones are just for show. Same with below deck spaces.

I don't mean that she has to be put back to WW2 working order. Just a outward representation of her old self.

I can see a USS Mo outfitted as she was the day the surrender was signed by the Japanese. A fitting bookend to the Arizona. The start and Finish

If you want to build a model of one of these ships, contact my friend, former subordinate, former supervisor and fellow historian W.L. Upshaw of the Scale Shipyard that builds the fiberglass hulls for serious model builders. Most American ships (all classes of BB's from the Arizona on up, all classes of Cruisers, Destroyers and Aircraft Carriers) are in 1:96 scale. You should see the size of his Nimitz hull. Most submarines are 1:48 scale for the R/C equipment to fit. But some of his foreign ships (Yamato, Bismarck, Scharnhorst) are in 1:100 scale.

A friend of mine has one of Mr Upshaws Fletchers. Beautiful parts.

If I mention your name do I get a discount

[RustyBattleship]

The ships have brand new masts where the main stick is made of armor plate (the wave guides and coaxials run down through it). You would not be allowed to take that down.

By my calculations I added 400 tons of armor to each of the ships. Only about 50 tons was inside for the new communicaitons center. Almost all of it was outside for the Tomahawk deckhouses, armor over the new CEC, applique armor over existing armored structures, etc. Then there was about 400 tons of non-armored steel added for other structures including the ECM house up on 09 level.

Also we ripped out all of the old berthing spaces and sanitary spaces and put all new modular berths in and real toilets. Somewhere in my collection of photos I have one I took of a multi-holer on the Missouri. You really don't want to go back to those.

Though the four 5"/38 mounts we removed were 85 tons each (240 tons total) their armored upper handling rooms (2 1/2" thick STS) were converted into Tomahawk and Harpoon support equipment rooms.

No. It's just not worth it plus it would be in strict violation of the NAVY donation letter that specifically orders that the ship not be modified in any way that would prevent it from being reactivated "as is". Any other modifications required would be by the Navy after withdrawing the ship from donated status.

[RustyBattleship]

A friend of mine has one of Mr Upshaws Fletchers. Beautiful parts.

If I mention your name do I get a discount

If you upload the photos I posted on this site to him, he may do something like that. Unless you have a rare Winchester to trade.

[SteaminDemon]

Thanks SteaminDemon for your response. just to clarify, I do agree that the Iowa's have shown a remarkable ability to adapt to modern technology. I should have been more specific when I stated that they are gone for good. What I meant was that the Iowa's are not politically viable for today's fleet. The Navy has made clear that they do not want them, hence their stricken status. I've also heard that spare 16inch barrels were or are being destroyed, along with liners and the powder bags. Is this true?

It's good to know that if we ever get into a situation where their unique firepower is needed, they can be legally reclaimed by the USN. But I wonder how much of the logistics and schools needed to support Iowa reactivation are still being maintained.

Unfortunately, I just don't see Iowa reactivation happening in the near future, given the Navy's focus on ultra tech, gee - whizz ships like the DDG-1000 and LCS.

Thanks for answering my questions, especially about the Big J in Vietnam - I agree, she should have been used sooner and without restrictions. Imagine her blasting away north of the old DMZ!

Politics, that has played a major role in keeping the Iowa's out of commission. I am for a mixed fleet, one that includes Carriers and Battleships. The Carriers bring a lot to our fleet and I appreciate those that fought to keep the Nimitz carriers from being cut.

For the reactivation of the New Jersey in the 80's there were 3700 Volunteers that heeded the call of the New Jersey. And more followed for the Iowa, Mo and Whiskey. The crew would train while the ship is being reactivated, so they can learn their systems and aid in the reactivation of the ship. As far as the engineering dept goes,there are plenty of skilled MM's, MR's, HT's, EM's and EN's around. You wouldn't have to worry about training up like you would for the 16" guns and associated equipment. Even with the uniqueness of the 16" guns and the FC system, you would still get many volunteers who would know how to operate those systems, and then would be able to train the new comers.

The BM's job has remained pretty much the same since the rate was instituted. IC's, IT's, OS's have kept up with new technology which I am sure would be implemented on the Battleships if they were to be reactivated, as was done before.

As for the Fire and engine room crew, those numbers can be reduced with the addition of EABC's (Electronic Automatic Boiler Controls) as well as other air pilot operated valves to control things like Gland seal for the Main Propulsion turbines and the SSTG's as well. They used weights to maintain Gland Seal which was real old school, but it was reliable. Other things to automate would be the main condenser recirc, DFT rundown valve, condenser make up valve, fuel oil control vlv, feed water control vlv, and instead of using a needle throttle valve in stick shift to control the speed of the forced draft blowers, you can incorporate as said above, the automatic boiler control console. It will take your fuel and air and ensure the proper mixture is introduced to ensure maximum efficiency over the entire load range.

The Boiler water level would be maintained by a 3 element feed water control system, that incorporates a steam flow transmitter, feed flow transmitter and a drum level transmitter along with the automatic feed water control valve to ensure the drum level is maintained at it's required level (normal) throughout the boilers load range (it does fluctuate..shrink and swell ). They should not however take away any of her stick ability's. If you loose control air (for the EABC system) you go into airlock, which is supposed to hold for 10 minutes and it holds what you had (no bell changes please!), then your controls go to their fail position (feed water control vlv fails open, fuel and air to a minimum, etc) I have seen air lock maintained for a half an hour, but we had a tight system. In those 10 minutes you better have the plant steamin in local manual control (local manual means you are controlling everything by manual manipulation of the controls...Stickin it) I did do a write up a while ago that incorporated the costs of adding EABC, but I have lost the paper. It would be worth it, because of the added efficiency. It would make up for it in the long run. There are those of us who can steam damn good and efficient, not everyone though;) .

You would be surprised as to some of the unique features the engineering plants on the Iowa's have. Some of them you wonder why they didn't incorporate in the newer ships like the White elephant. If the SSD salinity alarm goes off it actually has an eductor to get rid of that dastardly crap (as well as a ovbd vlv) That design is better than those of todays that are having their drain tank contaminated by faulty steam traps (damn A gangers), or leaks in the dragon. They are the most redundant propulsion plants in the Navy and can steam in the dark. Very essential if you are a warship.

If the Iowa's were reactivated today, they would be an asset to the fleet. I am not just talking about for the mission, but for the sailor as well. Rotations would be a hell of a lot better and can be incorporated in to either the Carrier rotations, or the LHD, LHA rotations. They would run as they did before as a BBBG (aka SAG) The reduced O&M costs for these ships is attractive as well. Their machine shops would be able to help out a battle group more than an LHA/D or carrier would. They both are heavily occupied by the air wing, so the BB can only add to that while saving money and time. Waiting on parts is a pain, but if you can make em, it's all the more better.

Extended range projectiles are feasible and better be incorporated in to the reactivation of the ships if they ever decide to bring them back. If they say scram jet is feasible, turn 2 damn it. If you can prevent the loss of a sailor in the air or a soldier on the ground out 50 to 1200 NM for a cheaper price , I am for it. Let us put aside this political bickering and get these ships together. As I have said before, I am a for a mix of systems, as one can not do it all. Carriers, Battleships, Straw bottom cruisers, tin cans, FFG's. Let's do it. New battleships? Why the hell not? There is no law that says you can not build new battleships. Our steel industry needs some fire under it's *****, instead of outsourcing.

The LCS and FFG can be replaced by a far more effective ship. The FFG's can go to the coast guard once replaced. A fleet of upward of 400 would be great for the Navy and our country, instead of the low # of 313 . Rotations would be better for the sailor and ship longevity would be improved as well. The ships would have more time in port and be able to receive better care. Maintaining that fleet would be cost effective in the long run, and result in a better prepared fleet that would be able to drop more ordinance than ever.

The 1000 ship Navy should only be considered as an added benefit to the US. However, we should in no way rely on other countries to make up for the shortfalls we currently face in our Navy. It is a sorry excuse.

Retention rates would probably increase above that in the 80's. You would maintain that skill base for a longer period of time, which would save money on training.

In order for any of the above to happen, the woes of contracting of the 90's and 2000's need to be addressed. Competition must be re instituted. Tough $h*^ NG, Litton, Electric boat, Raytheon. Enough of this sole sourcing. Ships will have to be thoroughly inspected prior to the ship being accepted. No more of this accepting ships that have so many discrepancies the Navy has to pay to get them fixed. That is an old trick to line the pockets of those that wish to rob the Navy....cough cough....LPD17...cough cough.

Have to run for now. Take it easy all.

Steamin Demon:)

[Bella]

As a reminder........."I'm not stating to resurrect the old WWII battleship with its' old 16" guns."
Maybe I need to ask a few more questions as a person who admires the battleship for future use.

Here we go!!

I know that the battleship was pretty much designed for anti-ship purposes at first. Then it evolved to attack ground targets. Then air targets!
Thru the history of Warfare and time, the battleship proved to be a great asset.
When the aircraft carrier came around, that increased striking distance and capability, and that the battleship was pretty much a obsolete piece of equipment to some people.

One of my questions....................."In today's warfare, can the old battleship, using the current hulls, be changed to accommodate today's' wars?"

Example,........use the current hulls, or modify them at minimal cost, then equip them with today's long range missile systems and technology?
Strip the current gun turrets and radars, and put in new long, medium, or short range surface to surface, or surface to air missile systems?

I don't mean to sound rude, or uneducated, but I'm curious about this! The aircraft carrier has been around for a long time too, but it has endured upgrades and modifications in design thru the years.

I also know that the U.S. has many destroyers, and cruisers that preform surface to air, and surface to surface threats.
However, these ships are small and only have enough firepower, from what I know, to defend against a large or massive attack.

My last and confusing question..................If the U.S. can keep many military weapons in service by modifying them, B-52, aircraft carriers, destroyers, etc..., why can't they do it with the battleship?
Like the B-52, which is a old airframe, and was used as a carpet bomber, be fitted with current technology also be used as a nuclear, or precision guided bomber, why can't the battleship be used as a modern day surface to air, or surface to surface platform?

Last question, I know money is involved with this, but how much? What would it take? What would be more feasible?

Please...........!!!!!! Once again, I'm not no navy expert, so to those that think my questions are ridiculous...............be professional!!
I'm simple asking a few questions!!

Thanks!!

[RustyBattleship]

One of my questions....................."In today's warfare, can the old battleship, using the current hulls, be changed to accommodate today's' wars?"

!!

In my 39+ years service with the US Navy as a shipfitter "changing ships to accomodate" the latest war technology with a sledge hammer or as a draftsman (with a pencil and an artistic eye for 3 dimensional drawings) or as an Engineering Technician (with a Marchant electro-mechanical calculator) or as a Project Manager (with a Texas Instrument TI35II-that I still have and use), ANY ship can be altered to take the latest technology.

We did have a big, big problem with early electronics that were so dependent on ONLY a 50 foot waveguide they had to be moved topside into crews' quarters which then changed the center of gravity of the ship so high we couldn't add more protection to it.

But today's micro-electronics reduces that weight problem considerably.

Plus the Navy was trying to make its Destroyers all purpose fighting ships for anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, anti-missile AND shore fire support that it was like putting 12 pounds of potatos into a 10 pound sack.

Because of the redundancy of survival systems aboard Navy ships (fuel feed, feed water, potable water, steam distribution, waste disposal and electrical distribution) you can change almost any ship to do anything you want it to do.

Even submarines. Any American or British submarine can fire a Tomahawk missile out of one of its torpedo tubes. When it came to doomsday missiles, we just built our subs bigger and longer to accomodate Polaris, Poseidon and Trident missiles (the Trident C-4 was the same size as a Poseidon C-3 that was launched from a tube that originally had a smaller tube for the Polaris A1 and A2 missiles. Of course, the Trident D-5 called for a really big sub.).

I have spent countless hours with ship imagineers (even after retirement) trying to reconfigure ships to be more up to date in weapons and other rolls of warfare, including installing a type of secondary gun that only two were ever made and Senator Proxmire made sure no others would ever be made.

I've grown a bit tired of it and would rather see a whole new class of "Battleship" come out and put up our Iowas as proper museums and memorials to the wars they fought in and the ingenuity of their designers (a slide rule was the closest thing to a computer then) and their builders from the shops that put together (in my mind) the greatest 3 dimensional jigsaw puzzle I have ever seen or have been priviledged to work on.

[Dreadnought]

Congressmen do not lobby Congress, they are Congress. The individuals who did lobby for their return were not, to my knowledge, ex-Marines. In fact, the 1980's reactivations were done specifically to bring the ships back as TLAM platforms. Right up to the last minute it was seriously considered to leave the guns mothballed to save costs!

It's all there in the Congressional record if you care to take a look.

As for why 2 of the Iowa's were put back in Cat B reserve in 1996, that was also the result of the lobbying of Congress by private battleship enthusiasts and was not instigated by the Navy. The Navy looks after them because there is a law that says they have to.

So Im guessing that you have the final piece to the NGFS support triad hiding in your pocket?


The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:

Subject: Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Land-, air-, and sea-based components form the "fires triad" that is
used to support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The sea-
based part of the fires triad is referred to as Naval Surface Fire
Support (NSFS). From World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991,
NSFS resided mainly in the capability of the 16-inch guns on the Navy's
Iowa class battleships. The thick armor of these battleships and the
24-nautical-mile range of their 16-inch guns gave the battleships
increased survivability in high-threat scenarios. The last Iowa class
battleship was decommissioned in 1992.

Their retirement left a void in the NSFS part of the fires triad. To
field a replacement NSFS capability, the Navy developed a two-phased
plan in 1994. In the near-term to midterm, it would modify the
capability of 5-inch guns on existing destroyers and cruisers, and
develop extended-range guided munitions for the modified 5-inch gun. In
the far term, it would field a sufficient number of new destroyers
fitted with an even-longer-range advanced gun system and ultimately a
very-long-range electromagnetic gun or "Rail Gun."

However, in 1996, congressional authorizers became concerned that the
Navy would not be able to produce a replacement NSFS capability
comparable to the battleships until well into the twenty-first century.
In that year's Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 1] the Congress
directed the Secretary of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa class
battleships to the naval vessel registry until a capability was
developed equal to or greater than that provided by the battleships. By
1999 the Navy had placed the Iowa and Wisconsin battleships back on the
naval vessel registry and has been maintaining them in an inactive
state since then.

In recent years, the Navy's efforts to develop a NSFS replacement
capability have not progressed as quickly as planned. Given concerns
about the gap in NSFS capability, you requested that we review (1) the
validated requirements for NSFS, (2) the estimated cost and schedule
for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class battleships to provide
NSFS, and (3) the status of Navy efforts to develop a replacement NSFS
capability. This letter summarizes our findings and transmits the
detailed briefing that we prepared for your staff. (See encl. I.)

To address our engagement objectives, we interviewed responsible
officials and reviewed official documents, including internal memos,
operational requirements documents, and related studies, from the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Navy's Inactive Ships
Program Office, the Navy's Surface Warfare Directorate, the Navy's
Guided Projectile Office, the Joint Staff (J-8) Force Application
Assessment Division, and the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association. We
also toured the Battleship Wisconsin (BB-64) and the USS Winston
Churchill (DDG-81). We conducted our work from April through September
2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Results in Brief:

The Navy and Marine Corps have only recently begun the process to
establish validated NSFS requirements that address the overall
capabilities needed and the balance between different systems that will
be required to provide effective, continuous, and sustaining support
fire for forces operating ashore. Validated requirements for some
specific systems have been established, however.

The cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class
battleships have not been fully developed. However, the Navy believes
that reactivation of the battleships should not be pursued for a number
of reasons. These include, among other things, manpower requirements
and modernization needed to integrate the battleships into today's
modern Navy. Therefore, the Navy has no plans to conduct the detailed
studies needed to identify the full extent of needs and costs.

The Navy's fielding of a replacement NSFS capability has been delayed.
The near-term and midterm efforts to extend the range of munitions
fired from the 5-inch guns on its cruisers and destroyers have been
delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011, but other program
options have been discussed including the option of canceling or
reducing the extended-range munitions program to fund development of
another gun system. Far-term plans to help fill the NSFS gap by 2015
using a new destroyer with advanced gun systems were revised in 2001 to
employ a different destroyer concept--the DD (X). The Navy currently
expects sufficient numbers of DD (X) destroyers to be ready to help
fill the NSFS gap by 2018 at the earliest.
Validated Requirements for NSFS Overall Have Not Been Established:

The role of naval surface fire support has been evolving in tandem with
the Navy's amphibious assault doctrine, and for well over a decade,
since the decommissioning of the last of the Iowa class battleships,
both the Navy and Marine Corps have strived to address the specifics of
how to fulfill NSFS requirements. Until recently, these services have
had difficulty with reconciling their respective positions. Operational
requirements documents for several systems, such as the new destroyer,
that will contribute to the NSFS mission have been developed. On
several occasions, the Marine Corps has specified to the Navy what they
believe the replacement NSFS capability should be and the timing of the
capability. However, no single document has ever addressed the overall
capabilities and the balance between different systems that will be
required to provide effective, continuous, and sustainable supporting
fire for increasingly capable expeditionary forces operating ashore.

Although no formal NSFS requirement currently exists, in August 2004,
the Navy and Marine Corps agreed on an approach to correct the problem
by formally agreeing to develop an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)
that would address the overall capabilities needed for naval fire
support. The goal of this ICD is to document and address the overall
capabilities required of naval fire support. This will assist in
determining the most effective and efficient balance of capabilities
and in determining the cumulative offensive power that naval forces
must be capable of generating. An integrated product team chaired by
the Marine Corps' Deputy Commandant for Combat Development office, in
coordination with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, will
conduct the required analyses, develop the ICD, and endeavor to gain
the Department of Defense's approval for the ICD.

Full Cost and Schedule for Reactivating and Modernizing Battleships
Have Not Been Analyzed:

To reactivate two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned
capability, the Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million. This
does not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish
gunpowder for the 16-inch guns because a recent survey found that it is
unsafe. In terms of schedule, the Navy's program management office
estimates that reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss
of corporate memory and the shipyard industrial base.

Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship
modernization improvements, according to the Navy's program management
office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements include command
and control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment;
environmental protection (including ozone-depleting substances); a
plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and wastewater alterations;
firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea alterations; a modernized
sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and new combat and self-
defense systems. Although detailed studies would be needed to identify
the full extent of modernization needs and costs, the Navy has no plans
to conduct these studies.

The Navy's program management office also identified other issues that
would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing
the battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the
battleships would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be
available or easily reconstituted. Other issues include the age and
unreliability of the battleships' propulsion systems and the fact that
the Navy no longer maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-
inch gun system components and ordnance.

Delays in Fielding Replacement NSFS Systems After Retiring Battleships
Extend Gap in NSFS Capability:

Following the retirement of the last Iowa class battleship in 1992, the
Navy laid out a two-phase plan to provide a replacement NSFS
capability:

* The near-term and midterm phases called for modifying the 5-inch guns
on the current class of destroyers and cruisers planned for production
and developing extended-range guided munitions (ERGM) to be used in the
upgraded guns for improved range.

* The far-term phase called for developing a longer-range advanced gun
system to be fitted on a new destroyer and eventually a Rail Gun with
even greater range.

In the near-term and midterm, expected fielding of the ERGM system for
use in upgraded 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers has been
delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011. Technical and design
problems on the ERGM, which has been under development since 1996, have
led to test failures and delays.[Footnote 2] The Navy has awarded a
contract to a different company for developing an alternative
technology. The Navy now intends to issue a solicitation in 2005 to
hold full and open competition for development and low-rate production
for the extended-range munitions for the 5-inch gun. Other program
options have also been discussed to include canceling or reducing the
extended-range munitions program to fund the development of another gun
under consideration for the future destroyer called the "hypersonic
naval rail gun." Also, the Navy is considering the benefits of
installing modified 5-inch guns on the current cruisers to fire the
extended-range guided munitions. However, if undertaken, the Navy does
not intend to use these platforms in an NSFS role. This decision will
reduce the number of ships able to provide NSFS by 41 percent in those
scenarios where a 25-nautical-mile standoff range of the ships from the
shore is needed to protect them from shore-based threats. Without the
5-inch gun modification to handle the extended-range guided munitions,
the range of the cruisers' guns is only 13 nautical miles.

In the far term, the fielding of an advanced gun system has been
delayed. Initial plans called for fielding 32 new destroyers,
designated the DD 21, with advanced gun systems between 2008 and 2020
to fill the NSFS gap. In 2001, the Navy announced that it would replace
the DD 21 with another destroyer concept called the DD(X). The Navy now
expects to field 24 DD(X) destroyers between 2011 and 2023. A
sufficient number of DD(X) destroyers to help close the NSFS gap will
not be available until 2018. We reported that the ship's construction
plan was risky because some technologies are unproven and the design is
not yet stable.

Agency Comments:

DOD provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in our
letter where appropriate.

As agreed with your staff, we plan no further distribution of this
letter until 14 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send
copies of this letter to other congressional committees; the Secretary
of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
interested parties. Copies are available to others upon request. The
letter will also be available on the GAO Web site at http://
U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO).

Should you or your staff have questions on the matters discussed in
this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Jim Morrison,
Assistant Director, at (202) 512-7078. Contributors to this report
include Jerry Clark, Robert Swierczek, and Martha Dey.

Signed by:

Robert E. Levin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:

Enclosure:

Enclosure I:


Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Briefing to the Staff of the Subcommittee on Projection Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support

Naval Surface Fire Support

Questions

1.What are the validated requirements for naval surface fire support
(NSFS)?

2.What are the estimated cost and schedule for reactivating and
modernizing two of the Iowa Class battleships to conduct naval surface
fire support?

3.What is the status of the Navy's efforts to develop a replacement
NSFS capability?

Naval Surface Fire Support

BACKGROUND

* "Fires TRIAD" supports Marine Corps amphibious assault operations.

* Fires TRIAD composed of complementary land (artillery/rockets), air
(aircraft), and sea (surface ship) components.

* Iowa Class battleships with their 16-inch guns were used for NSFS
between WWII and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

* 1992 --Navy decommissioned last Iowa class battleship.

* FY92-93 --National Defense Authorization Act directs Secretary of
Navy to establish naval surface fire support R&D program
- Navy states that shift away from large caliber guns, the retirement
of the last battleships, and the current emphasis on amphibious assault
from over the horizon eroded capability to provide fire support for
forces ashore;
* - According to Navy this trend resulted in the congressional
direction that the Navy establish an NSFS R&D program.

* 1994 --Navy develops near-/mid-and far-term phased approach to
address current shortfalls in NSFS capability.

* 1995 --Navy removes the Navy's four inactive Iowa class battleships
from the naval vessel registry (NVR)
- NVR is the official inventory of ships and service craft in custody
or titled to the U.S. Navy.

* Ships remain on the NVR until they are disposed of.

* 1996 --Congressional authorizers were concerned that Navy's future
years defense program could not produce a replacement fire support
capability comparable to the battleships until well into the next
century. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996
directed the Secretary of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa class
battleships to the NVR

* Two battleships must be retained until the Secretary of the Navy
certifies that the Navy has within the fleet an operational surface
fire support capability that equals or exceeds the capability that the
battleships could provide if returned to active service.
* 1998/1999 --Navy placed the battleships Iowa and Wisconsin back on
the NVR

* According to Navy program management officials, maintenance costs for
the Iowa and Wisconsin totaled over $7 million for fiscal years 2000-
2004.

* Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements

* Question #1 - What are the validated requirements for naval surface
fire support (NSFS)?

* Past efforts to address NSFS requirements

* May 1992 --Navy's NSFS Mission Need Statement identified NSFS
shortfalls and listed several alternatives to address them.

* February 1993 --Navy begins development of Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) for NSFS

* Navy plans called for COEA to be followed by an Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) to provide detailed NSFS characteristics.

* October 1994 --Navy concludes that the assumed NSFS requirements
needed to be reevaluated and updated to guide NSFS plans.

* December 1994 - Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approves revised NSFS
plan and in January 1995 directs that Navy initiate upgrades to the 5-
inch gun and develop precision-guided munitions for use in the modified
5-inch gun

* Initial operational capability before 2001.

* December 1994 - Navy signs memo transmitting COEA stating that
retirement of the battleships with their large caliber guns had eroded
Navy's capability to provide NSFS for forces ashore

* COEA proposed a variety of gun and missile weapon systems as
solutions to the NSFS requirement.

* November 1995 - Operational Requirements Document for an extended
range guided munitions for use in existing 5-inch guns signed.

* October 1996 --The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory published NSFS Road Map Study Phase1report

* Report concludes that there was a need for a new vision to convey the
evolving role of NSFS--recommends that the Navy with the Marine Corps
and Army establish requirements for Navy fire support for the joint
land battle.

* December 1996 --Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) memo
to CNO outlining NSFS requirements and their milestones
- NSFS is essential to augment organic fire support during the critical
early phases of an amphibious operation.
- NSFS initial operational capability by 2010 and a fully operational
capability by 2014.
- December 1996 MCCDC memo was followed by June 1999 and March 2002
memos to the CNO. The March 2002 memo
** reemphasized the Marine Corps requirements for NSFS stated in the
December 1996 and June 1999 memos.

* recommended establishment of a Capstone Requirements Document to
address NSFS requirements.

* November 1997 --DD 21 ORD signed
- One of the primary missions identified for the DD 21 was to conduct
NSFS.
- The first of 32 DD 21s to be procured in 2005 and entered into
service in 2010.
- In 2001 the DD 21 was replaced by the DD(X) destroyer
** Delivery of the first DD(X) has slipped to 2011.

* Marine Corps believes DD(X) with its Advance Gun Systems will help
meet their NSFS performance requirements.

* April 2002 --Navy informed Senate Armed Services Committee that they
concur with the Marine Corps position on NSFS requirements stated in
the March 2002 MCCDC memo.

* August 2002 --CNO reports to Congress that a dramatic improvement in
sea-based fires capability is required to align NSFS with Marine Corps
doctrine
- Report updates Navy's two-phased approach to provide NSFS support
** Near/mid term phase is projected to deliver the initial operational
capability of the ERGM for the 5-inch gun in 2005.

* Far-term approach is to develop a more robust set of NSFS weapon
systems for installation in the DD(X).

* Current efforts to address NSFS requirements

* February 2004 --ORD for Extended Range Munitions (ERM) signed.

* February 2004 - ORD for DD(X) destroyer signed.

* August 2004 --Marine Corps issues charter for an integrated process
team for development of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) -
"Joint Fires In Support Of Expeditionary Operations In The Littorals."
Charter states that
- A significant gap exists in Joint and Service capabilities associated
with naval fires and expeditionary warfare.
- No single document has ever addressed the overall capabilities - nor
the balance between different systems - that will be required to
provide effective, continuous, and sustainable supporting fires for
increasingly capable expeditionary forces operating ashore.
- Formally stating the overall capabilities required of naval fires
will assist not only in determining the most effective and efficient
balance of capabilities but ultimately in determining the cumulative
offensive fire power that naval forces must be capable of generating.
- Navy and Marine Corps agree that the ICD will be the basis for
resolving NSFS requirements issues.

* Marine Corps representatives believe that validated requirements will
help them compete with other programs for funding.

* Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation

* Question #2 - What are the estimated cost and schedule for
reactivating and modernizing two of the Iowa Class battleships to
conduct naval surface fire support?

* Full reactivation and modernization costs have not been analyzed

* Navy's 1999 estimate for reactivation cost was $430 million for both
ships.

* Reactivation would return the ships to their decommissioned
capability.

* Current cost to reactivate estimated to be in excess of $500 million
for both ships
- Cost assumption based on 1999 estimate with a 4% annual inflation
rate.

* Cost assumption does not consider availability of shipyard space to
complete the reactivation.

* $500 million reactivation cost does not include estimated $110
million needed to replenish gun powder for battleships' 16-inch guns.

* Recent survey found powder to be unsafe.

* The Navy has not conducted and does not plan to conduct studies to
define battleship modernization needs and costs.

* Navy program management office has identified the following as the
minimum battleship modernization improvements they believe would be
needed
- C4I (Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence)
equipment,
- environmental protection (including ozone depleting substances),
- plastic waste processor,
- pulper/shredder and gray (waste) water alterations,
- normal firefighting/safety and women-at-sea alterations,
- sensor suite (air and surface search radar),
- combat systems,

* self defense systems.

According to the Navy program management office, reactivation time has
increased

* 1999 estimate to reactivate battleships was 14 months.

* Current estimate of 20 to 40 months to reactivate the battleships.

* Increased reactivation time due in part to
- Loss of corporate memory.

* Shipyard industrial base.

* Time to modernize has not been estimated.

* Navy program management office lists reasons that would discourage
the Navy from battleship reactivation and modernization;
- Personnel - reactivation would require additional personnel that the
Navy does not have as well as significant training costs.
- Self Defense/C4SI - operation within modern battle group structure
would require significant upgrades.
- Propulsion - System is old, unreliable, potentially unsafe and
lacking skilled personnel.
- Ordnance - Navy no longer maintains capability to manufacture 16-inch
gun system components and ordnance.
- Cost - Estimate to reactivate both ships to their decommissioned
capability would increase to address modernization needs.

* Schedule - Loss of corporate memory and shipyard industry base
expected to increase reactivation time.

* Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two
battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act
of 1996 and supports the Navy's modernization efforts to deliver a
sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class
battleships

* Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability

* Question #3 - What is the status of the Navy's efforts to develop a
replacement NSFS capability?

* In 1994 Navy developed plan to field replacement NSFS capability

* Near-/mid-term plan
- Modify capability of 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers.
- Develop extended range guided munitions to fire in upgraded 5-inch
guns.

* Develop a long range land attack missile

* Far-term plan
- Develop and produce a new destroyer fitted with an advanced gun
system.

* Pursue electromagnetic technology (Rail Gun) with an even greater
range for the new destroyer

* Near-/mid-term plans to field replacement NSFS capability have
changed

* 1994 --Navy proposed a near-/mid-term NSFS plan that would upgrade
their 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers and fit it with
extended range guided munitions

* 1996 - Navy awards contract to develop extended range guided
munitions (ERGM) system.

* Initial plans to field near/mid term replacement NSFS capability by
2001 were not realized on expected timeline because of technical and
design problems with the ERGM system.

* 1998 - Navy pursues development of a Land Attack Standard Missile
(LASM) to provide a long range missile capability by FY04 but the
program was terminated during FY03 budget development.

* October 2003 - Navy issues solicitation for alternative precision
guided munitions concept.

* May 2004 --Navy awarded a contract to a different company to develop
an alternative extended range munitions technology.

* June 2004 - Navy discusses options for accelerating Rail Gun
development to meet DD(X) schedule.
- According to Navy officials funding for Rail Gun research is
deficient.

* Options discussed to address funding deficiency included canceling or
descoping the extended range munitions program

* August 2004 - Navy again modifies plans for extended range munitions
for 5-inch gun
- Navy notifies industry of intent to issue a solicitation in 2005 for
System Development and Demonstration with a low rate initial production
option of precision-guided, extended range munitions to be fired in the
Navy's 5-inch gun.

* According to program official, depending on which system is selected,
initial operational capability could be as late as 2011.

* October 2004 - Navy is currently reconsidering decision to not put 5-
in guns on cruisers
- Even if cruisers receive new gun, the Navy does not intend to use
them in the NSFS role.

* Will reduce available NSFS capable platforms by 41 percent if 25
nautical mile stand-off range is adhered to.

* Concerns have been raised about sufficiency of far-term plans to
field replacement NSFS capability

* 1994 --Navy identified the need for a far term NSFS plan
- Plan evolved from the DD 21 to the proposal to develop the DD(X)
destroyer with advance gun systems.
** Current production plans call for sufficient DD(X) destroyers in
combination with DDG destroyers outfitted with extended range munitions
to fill NSFS gap by 2018.
** September 2004 GAO reported (GAO-04-973) that there is risk to the
DD(X) construction plan.

* Program plans to award the contract for detail design and
construction of the lead ship before the technologies are proven and
the design is stable

* Current NSFS gun range capability falls short of Marine Corps stated
range requirement

* Marine Corps 2002 memo to CNO lists the following near term NSFS gun
range requirement
- Desired/Objective - 63 nautical miles from ship to shore.

* Minimal Acceptable/Threshold - 41 nautical miles from ship to shore

* Current NSFS guns are not able to achieve Marine Corps stated NSFS
gun range requirements when ships are positioned 25 nautical miles from
shore due to increased land based threats
- The 5-inch guns with a range of 13 nautical miles currently in use on
destroyers and cruisers unable to meet range objective.
** Desired/Objective range could be met with anticipated increase in
range using ERGM currently in development.

* The 16-inch guns with a range of 24 nautical miles used on
battleships unable to meet range objective when 25-nautical-mile
standoff range is required
- Minimal Acceptable/Threshold range to target could be achieved if
battleships operated closer to shore.

* Desired/Objective range to target could be achieved with previously
tested but not fielded advanced projectiles.

* Recent Navy analysis found that the need for replacement NSFS
capability continues to exist

* Navy officials stated that their analysis confirms a capabilities gap
exists during the early stages of a conflict.

* Analysis confirms that ships are best gap filler based on
- Immature theater;
- Lack of air superiority;
- Capacity;
- Number of people placed in danger;
- All weather;
- Capability (24 hours/7 days per week);

* Cost.

* Summary

* Marine Corps and Navy have had difficulty reconciling their positions
for formalizing NSFS requirements.

* Recent agreement to have a Navy/Marine Corps developed Initial
Capabilities Document expected to eventually result in validated NSFS
requirements.

* Full battleship reactivation and modernization costs have not been
analyzed.

* Gap in NSFS capability since retirement of the battleships expected
to continue until end of next decade or later- NSFS replacement capability has not progressed as quickly as planned.
** Plans for improved 5-inch gun near/mid term NSFS replacement
capability delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011.
** Marine Corps states that DD(X) with advance gun systems will help
meet their NSFS needs.
** Plans for DD(X) far-term NSFS replacement capability will not be
achieved until 2018 or possibly later.
[End of slide presentation]

[End of section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-106, Sec. 1011.

[2] For more details on these problems, see our report, Defense
Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs (GAO-04-248, Mar.
31, 2004), pp. 57 and 58.

Until the Zumwalts are built, Which we all know wont happen too soon after the expense of the LCS programs gets swallowed. The Triad remains open. Wonder just how happy the Marines are with that.;)

[SteaminDemon]

"Propulsion - System is old, unreliable, potentially unsafe and
lacking skilled personnel." That is a complete lie.

[Dreadnought]

"Propulsion - System is old, unreliable, potentially unsafe and
lacking skilled personnel." That is a complete lie.

Not my opinion Steamin. I operated Babcox Willcox 600lb boilers for years and have a very good understanding of them. Thought they were very good power plants in my judgement. Most of this is only assesed from behind a desk and closed doors. Being in the field would certainly have changed some of this assesment.;)

[RustyBattleship]

Not my opinion Steamin. I operated Babcox Willcox 600lb boilers for years and have a very good understanding of them. Thought they were very good power plants in my judgement. Most of this is only assesed from behind a desk and closed doors. Being in the field would certainly have changed some of this assesment.;)

Those are the kinds of comments I like. From people who literally had a "hands on" experience in operating those systems.

That doesn't mean I hate bookworms, but only if they use their reading experiences ONLY for argument. When the New Jersey was assigned to us in 1981 for reactivation, not all the plans in plan files had been filed yet. So anyone in my section that had any books on Iowa class Battleships brought them in which gave us our preperatory visions of the ships.

Oh. My new avatar. That's me standing on the strut fairing of shaft number 4 of the New Jersey inspecting corrosion repair.

Sure kept my weight down climbing around those babies.

[Dreadnought]

One little edit to above. Outside of the sootblowers,poppet valves and the occasional troubled safety valves (Anderson Greenwoods on some):)) . But these have zip to do with the actual design of the boiler. Merely aftermarket add ons based upon price and availability.

Safety when operating any boiler is always a concern and should not be written off due to model nor ships class.

[Dreadnought]

Those are the kinds of comments I like. From people who literally had a "hands on" experience in operating those systems.

That doesn't mean I hate bookworms, but only if they use their reading experiences ONLY for argument. When the New Jersey was assigned to us in 1981 for reactivation, not all the plans in plan files had been filed yet. So anyone in my section that had any books on Iowa class Battleships brought them in which gave us our preperatory visions of the ships.

Oh. My new avatar. That's me standing on the strut fairing of shaft number 4 of the New Jersey inspecting corrosion repair.

Sure kept my weight down climbing around those babies.

Mr. L. a quick question. I know Philadelphia still has their blade shops. When they refiited the Iowas in the 1980's do you know where the props went for trueing and inspection? Im not sure how many of the major yards left still have the capabilities for them.

[Dreadnought]

By the way I would like to point out to the mods that the double post safety works quite well. Good job guys.

[Dreadnought]

The only system I see out there that could for all intensive purposes solve the Tri-ad problem and retire them to history permanently would be getting the rail gun system operational (interesting tests conducted lately) and into the fleet long before they state they will. And then again they will need the Zumwalts (DDX) in the fleet before then as well. With the cost overuns of the LCS programs it doesn't look very reassuring that they will meet at the same point in time to solve the Tri-ad equasion. I bet the ships stick around for along time in case all else were to fail.

[Dreadnought]

"Propulsion - System is old, unreliable, potentially unsafe and
lacking skilled personnel." That is a complete lie.

The Firing Locks for the 16"/50's (BB62) were made by Hudson Motorcar Company 1942. Hows that for old and unreliable. Seem to work just fine. Just because you may have aged certainly dont mean you are unreliable. Be that the case we would have alot of unreliables here running around the WAB.:))