Here’s an unhappy fact for your reading enjoyment. Nuclear annihilation is just around the corner and we’re not doing nearly enough to address the threat, so say George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn in the following WSJ Op-ed:
Toward a Nuclear-Free World - WSJ.com
Hopes, dreams, and the best of good intentions can’t undo the nuclear revolution, but what if a great power condominium was to lead the way? The aforementioned authors—backed up by a host of our finest diplomatic, military, and academic minds—make the case that international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons have floundered upon US-Russian discord. In their view, the way “toward a nuclear-free world” is a two way street between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, close coordination and sustained cooperation between the two nuclear powers is key to a robust international control regime. So, how do we get back on track?
Whatever your view regarding the possibility of a “nuclear-free world,” prudence demands a more concerted effort on our part and many of their recommendations are sound. Nuclear arms reductions complemented by steps to increase the warning and decision times for launch are well worth pursuing. Small numbers on the order of 1,500 to 2,000 are probably adequate for deterrent purposes. Nor do we need existing operational plans for retaliation en masse, although I do have some qualms with the elimination of nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment. Nevertheless, the barriers to cooperation here are not insurmountable and positive movement along these lines could arguably improve our image and relations for little or no cost in security.
So, what’s the problem? “COOPERATIVE” multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems are deeply problematic among unequal partners, let alone former adversaries. Setting aside questions of technological feasibility for the moment, who would have their finger on the trigger and what of the practical mechanics? Decision by committee perhaps? Is Russia likely to be anything other than a junior partner in such an arrangement? Cooperative missile defense requires true interdependence, which is notoriously difficult to achieve in matters of high politics. Anything less and Russia is bound to have reservations about US intentions, which doesn’t bode well for the progressive advancement of arms control. Given the specter of missile defense—MINUS COOPERATION IN FULL—Russia would likely counter with new additions to its arsenal. But even if some sort of limited bargain could be hashed out, what of the attendant difficulties associated with free riding? Could the protection of a shield embolden Russia in other areas of interest to the US? The problems with implementation are varied and many, all of which undercut the possibility for sustained cooperation over the long-term. If a nuclear-free world rests upon Russia and the US, we’ll be waiting an awful long time for that eventuality.
Let’s assume, however, they can agree to lead. Will the rest of the world follow? Nuclear arms control is a luxury for the well armed. In contrast, second-tier states have to grapple with the superior striking power of their larger neighbors. To be sure, nuclear weapons offer the weak a way to neutralize the strong. As such, their measured and continued spread is all but certain, given power differentials among states operating in a self-help environment. Moreover, if new club members are going to become acclimated to nuclear reality, the "nuclear haves" will likely need the capability to retaliate in kind.
Try as we might, we can’t escape the unfortunate fact that nuclear weapons are here to stay.
Toward a Nuclear-Free World - WSJ.com
Hopes, dreams, and the best of good intentions can’t undo the nuclear revolution, but what if a great power condominium was to lead the way? The aforementioned authors—backed up by a host of our finest diplomatic, military, and academic minds—make the case that international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons have floundered upon US-Russian discord. In their view, the way “toward a nuclear-free world” is a two way street between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, close coordination and sustained cooperation between the two nuclear powers is key to a robust international control regime. So, how do we get back on track?
Whatever your view regarding the possibility of a “nuclear-free world,” prudence demands a more concerted effort on our part and many of their recommendations are sound. Nuclear arms reductions complemented by steps to increase the warning and decision times for launch are well worth pursuing. Small numbers on the order of 1,500 to 2,000 are probably adequate for deterrent purposes. Nor do we need existing operational plans for retaliation en masse, although I do have some qualms with the elimination of nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment. Nevertheless, the barriers to cooperation here are not insurmountable and positive movement along these lines could arguably improve our image and relations for little or no cost in security.
So, what’s the problem? “COOPERATIVE” multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems are deeply problematic among unequal partners, let alone former adversaries. Setting aside questions of technological feasibility for the moment, who would have their finger on the trigger and what of the practical mechanics? Decision by committee perhaps? Is Russia likely to be anything other than a junior partner in such an arrangement? Cooperative missile defense requires true interdependence, which is notoriously difficult to achieve in matters of high politics. Anything less and Russia is bound to have reservations about US intentions, which doesn’t bode well for the progressive advancement of arms control. Given the specter of missile defense—MINUS COOPERATION IN FULL—Russia would likely counter with new additions to its arsenal. But even if some sort of limited bargain could be hashed out, what of the attendant difficulties associated with free riding? Could the protection of a shield embolden Russia in other areas of interest to the US? The problems with implementation are varied and many, all of which undercut the possibility for sustained cooperation over the long-term. If a nuclear-free world rests upon Russia and the US, we’ll be waiting an awful long time for that eventuality.
Let’s assume, however, they can agree to lead. Will the rest of the world follow? Nuclear arms control is a luxury for the well armed. In contrast, second-tier states have to grapple with the superior striking power of their larger neighbors. To be sure, nuclear weapons offer the weak a way to neutralize the strong. As such, their measured and continued spread is all but certain, given power differentials among states operating in a self-help environment. Moreover, if new club members are going to become acclimated to nuclear reality, the "nuclear haves" will likely need the capability to retaliate in kind.
Try as we might, we can’t escape the unfortunate fact that nuclear weapons are here to stay.
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