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The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province

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  • The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province

    The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province

    This book, written by Eric M. Bergerud, a professor of military and American history at Lincoln University in San Francisco, covers the path of the Vietnam War in a single province. Hau Nghia Province, just west of Saigon, played an important part of the war, with its western border along the “Parrot’s Beak” of Cambodia.

    The story covers mainly from 1963, when the province was created by Diem, through 1973, when the last Americans left the province. Professor Bergerud originally undertook the research for the book to find out how the United States could have taken a different road to have come up with victory, but instead, wound up becoming convinced that the war could not have been won since the South Vietnamese were not prepared to undertake the sacrifices needed to win. Essentially, the ruling elites that were supported by the United States wanted to win with the social structure of South Vietnam intact; however, without social change that would empower the rural population (while at the same time eroding the status of the elites), it was not possible to win the hearts and minds of the rural population.

    He chronicles the military successes of US forces in the province (manned by the 25th Infantry Division) and how the Tet Offensive and its aftermath severely weakened the National Liberation Front; however, despite low morale and numbers by the high tide of 1970, the “Front” continued to have its political apparatus spread out across the province and the fear imposed by its targeting of defectors and competent prevented stronger progress by those who might have decided to support the Thieu government. He shows that the Phoenix Program was a resounding failure in the province, with a Vietnamese structural deficiency due to either corruption or fear of retaliation by the Front. In the end, the combination of the government never being able establish legitimacy among the rural population combined with the psychological edge held by the Front created the conditions such that Vietnam was not winnable.

    In terms of the author’s thesis, he does a good job at looking at three main groups of arguments on where the US went wrong:

    1. The end of support in 1973 was the cause of failure, a la Nixon, Kissinger, Westmoreland
    2. The flexible (read: piecemeal) response that was further inhibited by the inability to target the Ho Chi Minh trail and sanctuaries along with North Vietnam a la Summers
    3. The focus on the “big war” instead of the “village war” a la Colby, Komer, Lewy, Krepinevich, Vann

    I think his arguments for the most part do a good job in addressing the fact that there was a structural issue with the Southern ruling elites such that fixing any of the above wasn’t a sufficient condition to have allowed the US to have found victory.

    I do think that there are deficiencies in his thesis such that he doesn’t address the success of Marine CAPs (he presents the argument that American soldiers simply couldn’t fight a village war and win hearts and minds, but the successes of some Marine CAPs put this thesis to question). While his single province approach allows for some great micro-level insights, his evidence of there being too large of a cultural barrier to overcome uses weak evidence that is endogenous (i.e., because a true village war wasn’t fought, the outcome of distrust was partly due to that fact). While I don’t know to whether the Marine CAP strategy was scalable enough (especially given the deterioration of the quality of soldiers post-1968) to allow for the same level of success seen in its smaller application, it is an issue avoided by Bergerud. Also, he doesn’t explore whether a hybrid strategy using combination of the above three could have found more success. Finally, because Hau Nghia province was such an active Front province, I worry about the bias created in readers by not exploring a counterexample, i.e., a province where Vietnamization found great success.

    Nonetheless, I think it is a great book to read. I especially enjoyed the discussion from the perspective of Front successes in building their political apparatus as well as looking at whether the Front saw the same action in a similar or different manner as the official 25th Infantry Division reports. It gave much more balance to the account than other books that often spend more time on the American perspective. Also, there were a few interesting insights that I gleaned as I was reading through the book (I can’t promise that you’ll find them interesting, though).

    For example, there was a quote from a high-level defector from the Front that addressed the question as to when the NLF should switch from political agitation to armed struggle, and he cites a saying from Mao: “A firefly can set a whole field ablaze” (page 21). I thought it to be a brilliant analogy to frame the decision. Also, as an economist, I like to look at incentive structures and found the NLF’s taxation and land policy to be brilliant. The Front “introduced a policy of progressive taxation that both lowered most peasants’ tax bills considerably and discouraged the ownership of surplus land. Land was distributed conditionally. Peasants were expected to support the Front with taxes, with member ship in mass organizations, or, if necessary, militarily. If a peasant refused to do so, his land could be lost. Obviously, all the advantages gained by Front reforms would be lost if the GVN prevailed. Thus, the land reform program [by the Front] was more than a strategy to gain popularity. Above all, it was aimed at gaining peasant commitment to the Front” (59). A second incentive structure was the use by the Front of female cadres to try and recruit members (61). I know that we’ve had discussions on the board about the importance of the fairer sex in influencing a war.

    Here are two maps that will help orient folks to the location of Hau Nghia. The first map shows Operation Cedar Falls in the Iron Triangle, located immediately to the northof the province. The second map (I left a link because it skews the width of the post due to its size) shows the Cambodian incursion along with the location of Hau Nghia in relation to both Saigon and Cambodia (there was a major sanctuary inside the Parrot’s Beak). Cu Chi is one of the cities in the northern portion of the province.



    http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web...20map%2031.htm
    Last edited by Shek; 09 Jan 08,, 18:18.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  • #2
    Originally posted by Shek View Post
    Professor Bergerud originally undertook the research for the book to find out how the United States could have taken a different road to have come up with victory, but instead, wound up becoming convinced that the war could not have been won since the South Vietnamese were not prepared to undertake the sacrifices needed to win. Essentially, the ruling elites that were supported by the United States wanted to win with the social structure of South Vietnam intact; however, without social change that would empower the rural population (while at the same time eroding the status of the elites), it was not possible to win the hearts and minds of the rural population.
    Is there a historic instance where a great progressive force successfully managed to persuade/coerce a reactionary ally in a revolutionary war into adapting to the common radical threat?

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by Cactus View Post
      Is there a historic instance where a great progressive force successfully managed to persuade/coerce a reactionary ally in a revolutionary war into adapting to the common radical threat?
      Cactus,

      World history is not my strength, so I'm selecting from a very small database

      The defeat of the Huk Rebellion in the PI fits your question.

      Depending on how you specifically define or delineate your terms, El Salvador may be an example.

      Also, in the context of Vietnam, the Land to the Tiller program was an adaptation, albeit late in the game (and it wasn't popular amongst the ruling elite). The question is whether Thieu was truly genuine with the reform and would have been willing to have gone further vs. it was simply a self-defence/bare minimum reaction move. This would have mattered if the US had continued aid beyond essentially 1973.
      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

      Comment


      • #4
        Shek Reply

        Great book review. A lot of effort to the analysis. "endogenous"? Very nice.;)

        I thought about wading through to identify likely targets for selective sniping but was repeatedly struck by this-

        "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."
        George Santayana

        Specifically, the application to the present.

        "Professor Bergerud... wound up becoming convinced that the war could not have been won ...Essentially, the ruling elites that were supported by the United States wanted to win with the social structure ...intact; however, without social change that would empower the rural population (while at the same time eroding the status of the elites), it was not possible to win the hearts and minds of the rural population."

        Removing context shifts the regretable conclusions to the present. If Bergerud was correct about the impediments to victory then, do not those same conditions now exist? Immediately in Iraq (and separately, perhaps, Kurdistan) and Afghanistan?

        Further afield, Saudi Arabia?

        Furthest afield ourselves? We refuse to confront these ruling elites harshly and unequivocably. We cede the ground of the "peoples' defender" to those able to manipulate these continuing tensions. Our policies abet, support and give tangible aid and comfort to those who fundamentally oppose our aspirations. Why? Our own near-term and expedient comfort. We call it realpolitik and it's ambitionless and status quo defined. It seems as though Prof. Bergerud would agree that, once again, our willingness to tolerate an ignominious condition perpetuates and feeds our defeat.

        That is, if Prof. Bergerud is correct. We know he is.

        "1. The end of support in 1973 was the cause of failure, a la Nixon, Kissinger, Westmoreland"

        I don't agree here. My understanding is that hundreds of millions of budgeted dollars were unspent as of March 1975 per Wheeler.

        "2. The flexible (read: piecemeal) response that was further inhibited by the inability to target the Ho Chi Minh trail and sanctuaries along with North Vietnam a la Summers"

        Our history possesses instances of synergized battle-plans. We've often failed to display an equally comprehensive and SUSTAINED diplomatic/military approach while too often pursuing a flawed, incremental approach to force-planning and budget allocation. We don't presently synergize well at the national policy-making level.

        3. "The focus on the “big war” instead of the “village war” a la Colby, Komer, Lewy, Krepinevich, Vann"

        That's changing, I think. Nobody would know better than you.

        "While I don’t know to whether the Marine CAP strategy was scalable enough..."

        What do you think? Is it scalable now? To some degree, isn't this close to what we're trying to accomplish? As we draw down, I wonder that our remaining troops won't go further into the Iraqi Army and, following, the communities. Hope so.

        Provocative. Thanks.:)
        Last edited by S2; 11 Jan 08,, 01:43.
        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by S-2 View Post
          Great book review. A lot of effort to the analysis. "endogenous"? Very nice.;)
          Sorry, I'm ramping up on a paper/research that I'm working on for an econ conference next week. ;) However, it is the most succinct way of getting at the fact that there is bias in that particular conclusion.

          Originally posted by S-2
          I thought about wading through to identify likely targets for selective sniping but was repeatedly struck by this-

          "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."
          George Santayana

          Specifically, the application to the present.

          "Professor Bergerud... wound up becoming convinced that the war could not have been won ...Essentially, the ruling elites that were supported by the United States wanted to win with the social structure ...intact; however, without social change that would empower the rural population (while at the same time eroding the status of the elites), it was not possible to win the hearts and minds of the rural population."

          Removing context shifts the regretable conclusions to the present. If Bergerud was correct about the impediments to victory then, do not those same conditions now exist? Immediately in Iraq (and separately, perhaps, Kurdistan) and Afghanistan?

          Further afield, Saudi Arabia?

          Furthest afield ourselves? We refuse to confront these ruling elites harshly and unequivocably. We cede the ground of the "peoples' defender" to those able to manipulate these continuing tensions. Our policies abet, support and give tangible aid and comfort to those who fundamentally oppose our aspirations. Why? Our own near-term and expedient comfort. We call it realpolitik and it's ambitionless and status quo defined. It seems as though Prof. Bergerud would agree that, once again, our willingness to tolerate an ignominious condition perpetuates and feeds our defeat.

          That is, if Prof. Bergerud is correct. We know he is.
          The problem here is that in Iraq we designed a system that enshrined religious militia politics and failed to build parties tied to the people through local elections first. We failed Galula 101.

          Originally posted by S-2
          "1. The end of support in 1973 was the cause of failure, a la Nixon, Kissinger, Westmoreland"

          I don't agree here. My understanding is that hundreds of millions of budgeted dollars were unspent as of March 1975 per Wheeler.
          I think we're probably in agreement, it's just my phrasing here was too loose. We started slashing funding in 1973, partly because the Paris Accords(violated by NVN, so really an invalid restriction) and also due to the Congressional revolt against an imperial presidency. So, while there was still funding, it provided a constraint on SVN and ARVN. Sorley's "A Better War" gets at this really well in one of the closing chapters.

          Originally posted by S-2
          "2. The flexible (read: piecemeal) response that was further inhibited by the inability to target the Ho Chi Minh trail and sanctuaries along with North Vietnam a la Summers"

          Our history possesses instances of synergized battle-plans. We've often failed to display an equally comprehensive and SUSTAINED diplomatic/military approach while too often pursuing a flawed, incremental approach to force-planning and budget allocation. We don't presently synergize well at the national policy-making level.
          diMe instead of DIME. Happening today in Iraq (and I'm sure the stats don't differ much in Afghanistan, either.

          http://www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.m...Galula’s 80/20 rule

          Galula stated COIN is 20% military, 80% political. US spending in Iraq is 1.4% civilian, 98.6% military.
          Originally posted by S-2
          3. "The focus on the “big war” instead of the “village war” a la Colby, Komer, Lewy, Krepinevich, Vann"

          That's changing, I think. Nobody would know better than you.

          "While I don’t know to whether the Marine CAP strategy was scalable enough..."

          What do you think? Is it scalable now? To some degree, isn't this close to what we're trying to accomplish? As we draw down, I wonder that our remaining troops won't go further into the Iraqi Army and, following, the communities. Hope so.

          Provocative. Thanks.:)
          The human capital in the Army today is much greater than what you saw towards the end of our ground involvement, and so our ability to embed and conduct culturally sensitive operations is greater. However, the question begged here is if we pursued the village war circa 1965, a CAP program would have been more scalable than say if that strategy was pursued starting in 1969 or 1970. However, I don't have the knowledge, whether through research or discussion with vets to know the answer, to give a definitive position then.
          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

          Comment


          • #6
            Shek,

            Thanks, I am looking into the Huk Rebellion now. The end of US support to right-wing groups in El Salvador since 1988 is a better shape-fit to the ideological and political constraints I had placed, but it is a weaker grip-fit than the Huk Rebellion from what little I have read since.

            S-2,

            "To learn from history..." in this context, I think, means something far more straightforward: You need to find a template that worked, plug in your local values, chug out a custom solution, and move out. Remember, you are trying to stop a revolutionary/radical movement there... not bring one about here!!! (Removing context shifts the regretable conclusions to the present.... Furthest afield ourselves?) ;)

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Cactus View Post
              Shek,

              Thanks, I am looking into the Huk Rebellion now. The end of US support to right-wing groups in El Salvador since 1988 is a better shape-fit to the ideological and political constraints I had placed, but it is a weaker grip-fit than the Huk Rebellion from what little I have read since.
              A special circumstance with the PI is the fact that it had been a US colony, and there was a fair amount of support or at least sympathy for the US based on some of the development done there. In contrast, France milked Vietnam for what it was worth, and so NLF propaganda about the US just being the next colonial power to install a puppet government held much traction.

              The one area of interest that I haven't delved into is how would have a change in US policy during the 1950-1960 time period have impacted and changed things. I don't have anything in mind to even play "what if" with, but it would be an interesting "what if" exercise.
              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

              Comment


              • #8
                Cactus Reply

                "You need to find a template that worked, plug in your local values, chug out a custom solution..."

                Your brevity is commendable, but it's abruptness belies the difficulties of getting those former three points correct.

                I'm confused how my comments hasten a radical/revolutionary movement in America, unless you mean honest, forthright, transparent, value-based foreign policy would make untenable our SUVs:)) . The perturbations would ripple like a boulder tossed in a calm lake.

                I'm not looking for more of the same-ol', same-ol'. I don't OWN an SUV.

                Shek says-

                "The problem here is that in Iraq we designed a system that enshrined religious militia politics and failed to build parties tied to the people through local elections first. We failed Galula 101."

                Prof. Bergerud discusses the perfumed princes of the S. Vietnamese power-elite. Shek alludes to our creation, first- of a power-vacumn and, second our inept vision of Iraqi democracy which we permitted to devolve upon the base-line existing power apparatus- SCIRI and Jaish-I-Mahdi.

                Perfumed or otherwise, it was an illegitimately lifted ruling power-clique not substantively democratic to be worthy of the name. In the absence of a better idea, we "enshrined" not just their legitimacy, but primacy. We did so from expedience born of desperation.

                We pay for that inept vision now.

                The neo-con vision of democratic transformation remains the ONLY concept that offers hope for uplifting individual aspirations while promoting the common good. What's debunked is the continued sloppy, near and short-sighted implementation which fails to fully mobilize our nat'l power behind worthy causes supported by thoughtful analysis, preparation, and sustainment.

                That requires an approach not unlike Iraq NOW (w/ caveats abounding, mind you). Like the al-Anbar awakening by the tribes, we, too, are awakening. Greater security has translated to closer coalition/tribal contact on the streets. Going "bottom-up" politically from the villages through the districts to the provinces was compelled upon us by the inability of the Iraqi nat'l gov't to achieve accord and reach a reconciliation.

                In retrospect, perhaps, thank GOD. It's conceivable that this particular local construct will ultimately by-pass the worthless SOBs that populate the parliament and government ministries. Sadly, it also runs the risk of promoting a de facto partition.

                Separate issue, I suppose.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                Comment


                • #9
                  From the summary it appears that Eric M. Bergerud ignores the fact that North Vietnam took over the South through a full scale military invasion rather than overthrowing the government from within. The invasion succeeded because of an unwillingness of the U.S. to provide military supplies and the fact that too many South Vietnamese generals held their positions due to political influence instead of their ability to lead troops in battle.

                  The National Liberation Front played at most only a limited role and only one member of the Front was given a government position. He later went into exile in France. I have a copy of his autobiography somewhere, but cannot find it at the moment.
                  There must be no barriers for freedom of inquiry. R. Oppenheimer

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