Hi
came across this a few months ago and wondered what you guys on WAB thought of it..
full article is here
Military History Online
Introduction
This work endeavors to explore the historiography surrounding a controversial and emotionally charged subject, namely the comparative combat performance of the United States and German armies in the European Theatre in World War II. While the subject has been of interest to soldiers and military historians for over fifty years, and hence would seem to be a likely candidate for reasoned debate, nevertheless it continues to incite strong interest among partisans on both sides. Indeed, in recent years the topic has generated some rather heated work, particularly from those who advocate the view that the United States Army was more than a match for the Wehrmacht in that elusive quality known as "fighting power". One reading the literature on the subject published within the last ten years or so is in fact struck by the aggressively adversarial tone adopted by the authors. One might reasonably inquire why such a stridently partisan tenor has asserted itself in this area of military history.
The answer to this question lies, it may be reasonably argued, not with the performance of the U.S. Army in World War II, but with its experience in the Vietnam War. Anyone who experienced firsthand the passage of the United States through the long period during which that conflict progressed cannot fail to be aware of its profound effect upon nearly every aspect of American life and culture. Although it obviously was not the only historical force at work in the period, nonetheless it can be said to have contributed mightily to a number of significant negative phenomena with which Americans continue to struggle. These include such things as the diminution in value of higher education through grade inflation; the more or less permanent distortion of the American economy resulting from the consistent policies of succeeding presidential administrations in following a "guns and butter" economic policy throughout the course of the conflict; the degradation of moral authority in sexual and social relationships; and, not least of all, disrespect for and suspicion of all things governmental.
Perhaps nowhere were the pernicious effects of the Vietnam War felt more profoundly than in the U.S. military establishment. This can be observed not only in personal memory and the literature devoted to the subject, but also in the experiences of those who served. Delve into the subject with any officer or enlisted man who went through this crucible. You will find not only the horrific recollections common to those who have experienced combat, but also a litany of other horrors not previously associated with military service in the American experience. The examples are many and diverse. In perhaps the ultimate form of military disrespect, American soldiers "fragged" their officers in the combat zone. American soldiers perceived themselves as being pilloried by the American news media. Returning soldiers in uniform were humiliated by their fellow citizens. In the aftermath of the war, indeed even to the time of this writing, so-called "veterans" have debased the experiences of those who actually served by bogus claims not only to veteran status itself, but also to battle honors.
For the American military, however, the most significant fact about the Vietnam War was and is that, by any objective standard, from the American perspective it was not successfully concluded. It is true, of course, that the United States did not emerge from the war a defeated nation, in the manner of those countries on the losing side in the First and Second World Wars. In relative terms, the number of Americans who perished in the cause was small. American territory and industry were not ravaged. With few exceptions, American soldiers and politicians have never been charged with war crimes. The United States has not been compelled to pay reparations. On the other hand, unlike even in the case of the Korean War, there has been not even a pretext that the United States was the victor in Vietnam. The last Americans fled ignominiously from Saigon. And South Vietnam, the nation on whose behalf so much American blood and treasure were expended, has ceased to exist, having been absorbed into the body politic of its former foe.
The irony of this situation can only have been exacerbated for the American military by subsequent events. By 1990, the Cold War, the historical backdrop against which the Vietnam War had taken place, had ended, rendering the United States the sole great power in the world. Far from curing the ills engendered for the U.S. military by the Vietnam conflict, this event seemed only to magnify them. Not only did the successful conclusion of the Cold War fail to eradicate the negative public image of the Vietnam War and the military which had fought it, it also brought about a drastic reduction in military force. With the exception of those whose lives would be directly affected by base closings and the like, the American public greeted this reduction in force with indifference. Not even the hugely popular Gulf War could rectify this situation.
The increasingly fractious debate over the relative quality of the U.S. and German armies during the Second World War has its roots in this decline in the fortunes of the U.S. military establishment. It is a truism that human frustration in one area often expresses itself in another. As will be seen, this work focuses on four works published within the last fifteen years, each of which seeks, in strident tones, to lay to rest once and for all what they characterize as "the myth of German superiority". All four were written by (at the time of their writing) serving officers in the United States Army. Each officer was at least a Lieutenant Colonel in rank, and thus likely to have served at the time of the Vietnam War. What is certain is that each of them served in the U.S. Army in the aftermath of that war. Each of them thus matriculated through the Army's staff college and advanced schools at a time when those institutions attempted to come to terms with the "lessons learned" from that conflict. In that time and place rising officers were educated, at least in part, with a body of work written during the 1950's and 1960's by historians whom one prominent military historian of more recent vintage is pleased to call "German lovers".
A defeated army cannot hope to gain much capital by dwelling on the military deficiencies of its former foe, particularly when, in spite of its "lost victories", that army has subsequently emerged as THE dominant military force in the world. Unseemly though it might be to criticize the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, however, there is no likelihood of opprobrium attaching to one who criticizes the Wehrmacht, particularly when the fall of the Evil Empire has reduced to nil the likelihood that the U.S. Army might have to fight side by side with Germans to defend western Europe against the Red hordes. The Wehrmacht, indeed, is an easy target. The Nazi regime for which it fought ranks among the most vicious in the twentieth century. Some of the Wehrmacht's soldiers committed, or had complicity in, heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finally, two generations of publicity, including written works, television shows and films, has succeeded in creating an image of the German soldier as a Nazi automaton, an image fostered and encouraged by such eminent historians as Gerhard Weinberg and Omer Bartov, as well as successful non-historians such as Daniel Goldhagen. [1]
There is more to the partisanship of the American officer corps and its adherents in this debate than mere opportunistic frustration. While the outcome of the Vietnam War deeply wounded the self-image of the American military, more recent events have had the opposite effect. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a credible military threat, and the overwhelming victory of the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War have engendered in the U.S. military a tremendous sense of hubris. As against their contemporaries, whether friend or potential foe, this arrogance on the part of the American officer corps is somewhat understandable. The armed forces of many other countries contain elite elements, some of which may even be the equal in skill and bravery to members of the U.S. Marines, Navy Seals and Army Rangers. No other armed force in the world, however, has the resources to utterly crush an enemy. More difficult to understand is the intellectual process by which this pride of place has found its way into the historical literature dealing with America's enemies of the past. The motivating logic seems to be, however, that since no existing armed force can be considered a match for the American military, it must have always been so. A corollary to this principle is that the historical record needs must be "corrected" to reflect this elemental truth.
It is the purpose of this work to examine the literature of the apologists for the U.S. Army in World War II, and determine whether the authors of that literature have met their burden of proof.
came across this a few months ago and wondered what you guys on WAB thought of it..
full article is here
Military History Online
Introduction
This work endeavors to explore the historiography surrounding a controversial and emotionally charged subject, namely the comparative combat performance of the United States and German armies in the European Theatre in World War II. While the subject has been of interest to soldiers and military historians for over fifty years, and hence would seem to be a likely candidate for reasoned debate, nevertheless it continues to incite strong interest among partisans on both sides. Indeed, in recent years the topic has generated some rather heated work, particularly from those who advocate the view that the United States Army was more than a match for the Wehrmacht in that elusive quality known as "fighting power". One reading the literature on the subject published within the last ten years or so is in fact struck by the aggressively adversarial tone adopted by the authors. One might reasonably inquire why such a stridently partisan tenor has asserted itself in this area of military history.
The answer to this question lies, it may be reasonably argued, not with the performance of the U.S. Army in World War II, but with its experience in the Vietnam War. Anyone who experienced firsthand the passage of the United States through the long period during which that conflict progressed cannot fail to be aware of its profound effect upon nearly every aspect of American life and culture. Although it obviously was not the only historical force at work in the period, nonetheless it can be said to have contributed mightily to a number of significant negative phenomena with which Americans continue to struggle. These include such things as the diminution in value of higher education through grade inflation; the more or less permanent distortion of the American economy resulting from the consistent policies of succeeding presidential administrations in following a "guns and butter" economic policy throughout the course of the conflict; the degradation of moral authority in sexual and social relationships; and, not least of all, disrespect for and suspicion of all things governmental.
Perhaps nowhere were the pernicious effects of the Vietnam War felt more profoundly than in the U.S. military establishment. This can be observed not only in personal memory and the literature devoted to the subject, but also in the experiences of those who served. Delve into the subject with any officer or enlisted man who went through this crucible. You will find not only the horrific recollections common to those who have experienced combat, but also a litany of other horrors not previously associated with military service in the American experience. The examples are many and diverse. In perhaps the ultimate form of military disrespect, American soldiers "fragged" their officers in the combat zone. American soldiers perceived themselves as being pilloried by the American news media. Returning soldiers in uniform were humiliated by their fellow citizens. In the aftermath of the war, indeed even to the time of this writing, so-called "veterans" have debased the experiences of those who actually served by bogus claims not only to veteran status itself, but also to battle honors.
For the American military, however, the most significant fact about the Vietnam War was and is that, by any objective standard, from the American perspective it was not successfully concluded. It is true, of course, that the United States did not emerge from the war a defeated nation, in the manner of those countries on the losing side in the First and Second World Wars. In relative terms, the number of Americans who perished in the cause was small. American territory and industry were not ravaged. With few exceptions, American soldiers and politicians have never been charged with war crimes. The United States has not been compelled to pay reparations. On the other hand, unlike even in the case of the Korean War, there has been not even a pretext that the United States was the victor in Vietnam. The last Americans fled ignominiously from Saigon. And South Vietnam, the nation on whose behalf so much American blood and treasure were expended, has ceased to exist, having been absorbed into the body politic of its former foe.
The irony of this situation can only have been exacerbated for the American military by subsequent events. By 1990, the Cold War, the historical backdrop against which the Vietnam War had taken place, had ended, rendering the United States the sole great power in the world. Far from curing the ills engendered for the U.S. military by the Vietnam conflict, this event seemed only to magnify them. Not only did the successful conclusion of the Cold War fail to eradicate the negative public image of the Vietnam War and the military which had fought it, it also brought about a drastic reduction in military force. With the exception of those whose lives would be directly affected by base closings and the like, the American public greeted this reduction in force with indifference. Not even the hugely popular Gulf War could rectify this situation.
The increasingly fractious debate over the relative quality of the U.S. and German armies during the Second World War has its roots in this decline in the fortunes of the U.S. military establishment. It is a truism that human frustration in one area often expresses itself in another. As will be seen, this work focuses on four works published within the last fifteen years, each of which seeks, in strident tones, to lay to rest once and for all what they characterize as "the myth of German superiority". All four were written by (at the time of their writing) serving officers in the United States Army. Each officer was at least a Lieutenant Colonel in rank, and thus likely to have served at the time of the Vietnam War. What is certain is that each of them served in the U.S. Army in the aftermath of that war. Each of them thus matriculated through the Army's staff college and advanced schools at a time when those institutions attempted to come to terms with the "lessons learned" from that conflict. In that time and place rising officers were educated, at least in part, with a body of work written during the 1950's and 1960's by historians whom one prominent military historian of more recent vintage is pleased to call "German lovers".
A defeated army cannot hope to gain much capital by dwelling on the military deficiencies of its former foe, particularly when, in spite of its "lost victories", that army has subsequently emerged as THE dominant military force in the world. Unseemly though it might be to criticize the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, however, there is no likelihood of opprobrium attaching to one who criticizes the Wehrmacht, particularly when the fall of the Evil Empire has reduced to nil the likelihood that the U.S. Army might have to fight side by side with Germans to defend western Europe against the Red hordes. The Wehrmacht, indeed, is an easy target. The Nazi regime for which it fought ranks among the most vicious in the twentieth century. Some of the Wehrmacht's soldiers committed, or had complicity in, heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finally, two generations of publicity, including written works, television shows and films, has succeeded in creating an image of the German soldier as a Nazi automaton, an image fostered and encouraged by such eminent historians as Gerhard Weinberg and Omer Bartov, as well as successful non-historians such as Daniel Goldhagen. [1]
There is more to the partisanship of the American officer corps and its adherents in this debate than mere opportunistic frustration. While the outcome of the Vietnam War deeply wounded the self-image of the American military, more recent events have had the opposite effect. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a credible military threat, and the overwhelming victory of the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War have engendered in the U.S. military a tremendous sense of hubris. As against their contemporaries, whether friend or potential foe, this arrogance on the part of the American officer corps is somewhat understandable. The armed forces of many other countries contain elite elements, some of which may even be the equal in skill and bravery to members of the U.S. Marines, Navy Seals and Army Rangers. No other armed force in the world, however, has the resources to utterly crush an enemy. More difficult to understand is the intellectual process by which this pride of place has found its way into the historical literature dealing with America's enemies of the past. The motivating logic seems to be, however, that since no existing armed force can be considered a match for the American military, it must have always been so. A corollary to this principle is that the historical record needs must be "corrected" to reflect this elemental truth.
It is the purpose of this work to examine the literature of the apologists for the U.S. Army in World War II, and determine whether the authors of that literature have met their burden of proof.
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