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A failure in generalship

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  • #46
    W,

    STAND FREAKING DOWN! Unless you show me an EXACT example of where these Officers LIE instead of speaking out if ignorance, I will NOT have you insulting Staff Officers who were doing their BEST.

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    • #47
      WECIV Reply

      You should provide the proof. The major has admitted nothing. Your claims are both serious and unsubstantiated. You need to step up or stand down. now.

      This condition can be corrected by you, 1.) providing the information (i.e. names might be a nice start) which corroborates your position or, 2.) apologizing for allowing matters to degenerate to this low with such an otherwise baseless claim.

      Your opinion of what constitutes a liar should become VERY interesting when we see the names of those who make your case for an endemic condition of dishonesty among our senior commissioned leadership.

      I look forward to your disclosures or apology. One or the other.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

      Comment


      • #48
        W,

        Poseurs can succeed.

        The incompetent can also succeed.

        But then, it depends on what you think is success.

        Even God has failed and yet he is God!

        So, easy does it!

        Everyone including God has feet of clay!

        Nothing to go ballistics for!

        I have apologised on this board many a time for misunderstanding. I have lost nothing. In fact,I have gained. I gained stature - even if it were in my own eyes! That is more important than what other think of me!

        One must be a Man!

        Go in Peace!
        Last edited by Ray; 03 May 07,, 08:53.


        "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

        I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

        HAKUNA MATATA

        Comment


        • #49
          Does the US Military offer officers any type of incentive pay for things like lanquage skills, graduate degrees, or advanced skills?

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by ChdNorm View Post
            Does the US Military offer officers any type of incentive pay for things like lanquage skills, graduate degrees, or advanced skills?
            Chad,

            Foreign Language Proficiency Pay is offered to any service member (upwards of $1000/month if you have 3 fluencies in "strategic" languages - this is the rare exception). There is no additional pay for graduate degrees, although if the Army paid for it, then that is an incentive there (along with the 1-2 years of good family time and stability that it affords). Additionally, if you make a graduate degree a wicket for promotion to future commands, then you incentivize the right people to pursue advanced education.
            "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

            Comment


            • #51
              Originally posted by Shek View Post
              Chad,

              Foreign Language Proficiency Pay is offered to any service member (upwards of $1000/month if you have 3 fluencies in "strategic" languages - this is the rare exception). There is no additional pay for graduate degrees, although if the Army paid for it, then that is an incentive there (along with the 1-2 years of good family time and stability that it affords). Additionally, if you make a graduate degree a wicket for promotion to future commands, then you incentivize the right people to pursue advanced education.
              Unless you are an idiot like me who gets is MA while on active duty, paying out of my own pocket, in a discipline the Army found no use for!!!!
              “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
              Mark Twain

              Comment


              • #52
                I am not apologizing for anything. If our staff officers were so good then we would be winning this thing. Shek has stated that they state things through rose colored glasses...they do and that is lying. Shek and I seem to agree on this subject then. I have nothing to apologize for and will not. Next.

                Any force that can keep telling the American ppl that the war is going well and have nothing concrete to show for it is lying. If you do not know the answer or how the war is just state so. If you want evidence of this sort of thing watch CSPAN.

                W
                Last edited by WECIV; 05 May 07,, 05:14.

                Comment


                • #53
                  Originally posted by WECIV View Post
                  I am not apologizing for anything. If our staff officers were so good then we would be winning this thing. Shek has stated that they state things through rose colored glasses...they do and that is lying. Shek and I seem to agree on this subject then. I have nothing to apologize for and will not. Next.
                  As much as I want to, I cannot ban you for not understanding English. There is a big difference between lying and incompetence. Looking through rose colour glasses is NOT lying. It is not understanding reality.

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    W Reply

                    You should consider your fitness for further participation at this board. I know that I sure have and concluded that you won't be missed one bit.
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Originally posted by WECIV View Post
                      I am not apologizing for anything. If our staff officers were so good then we would be winning this thing. Shek has stated that they state things through rose colored glasses...they do and that is lying. Shek and I seem to agree on this subject then. I have nothing to apologize for and will not. Next.

                      Any force that can keep telling the American ppl that the war is going well and have nothing concrete to show for it is lying. If you do not know the answer or how the war is just state so. If you want evidence of this sort of thing watch CSPAN.

                      W
                      No, we are not in agreeance. You question character while I question competence. One drives at professional expertise (competence), while the other drives straight at the profession (character) itself, and there is a huge difference, a difference that requires evidence to sustain.
                      Last edited by Shek; 05 May 07,, 11:38.
                      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Here's the first oped from "within" the military to hit the MSM on LTC Yingling's piece. I should be posting a rejoinder to the oped later.

                        A skewed perspective - Editorials/Op-Ed - The Washington Times, America's Newspaper

                        A skewed perspective
                        TODAY'S COLUMNIST
                        By Gian P. Gentile
                        May 30, 2007

                        A recent article by active Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling published in a reputable military magazine argues that general officers in today's American military have failed miserably at their job. If the job of the general is to see accurately the nature of current and future wars, determine and construct military resources to deal with the nature of war and make truthful -- if often unpleasant -- recommendations to civilian authorities to conduct those wars, then America's generals receive an "F" grade from Col. Yingling.

                        In concluding his article, the most egregious criticism that Col. Yingling makes toward today's American generals is that they have lacked the moral courage to stand up to their higher leaders and tell them the truth about the reality of war and what is needed to fight it.

                        Making such a sweeping generalization of the failure of American generals (Col. Yingling does not mention the names of any specific generals whom he has in mind) demands a perspective -- or a view to the subject matter. Unfortunately, Col. Yingling does not, and never did, have that perspective yet he uses his position as an active army officer to suggest to his readers that he does.

                        Other current serving active Army officers with a perspective have offered fair and balanced criticisms of American generals and their performance. The best example is that of Col. H.R. McMaster's book, "Dereliction of Duty," in which he cites a failure in American generals during the Vietnam War to state truthfully what they saw as the war's actual needs and how to fight it. Because they were unwilling to do so, Col. McMaster, the historian with a perspective through historical research, faults them for lacking moral courage. The American Vietnam generals were therefore derelict at their duties; this is a reasonable interpretation to make from the perspective of the historian Col. McMaster sifting through the multitude of the past.

                        Since the publication of Col. Yingling's article, the American press and punditry have made him out to appear as an insider who knows the inner workings and activities of America's highest ranking generals. Col. Yingling has served two tours in Iraq. The first go-around was actually in a non-counterinsurgency unit responsible for the movement and disposition of captured Iraqi Army munitions. His second tour in Iraq was as a counterinsurgency operator with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment under Col. McMaster in the city of Tal Afar. In the latter, Col. Yingling certainly had a perspective of the tactical side of a very successful, if not discrete, counterinsurgency operation. But he was not privy to the conversations, the thinking, the decisions of high American generals like George Casey and John Abizaid concerning Iraq.

                        For Col. Yingling to condemn American generals for lacking the moral courage to stand up against their civilian leaders for what they knew was right but were afraid to tell would require him to have a perspective about those generals. To make such an argument one would first have to determine through proof that senior American generals believed that they were on the wrong tack in Iraq but were afraid to state such things to their civilian leadership, therefore lacking moral courage. Col. Yingling never had that perspective, and his claim of a failure of American generalship for lacking moral courage is specious.

                        I commanded an armored reconnaissance squadron in West Baghdad in 2006. I saw firsthand the Iraq civil war. I also had the opportunity from August to November 2006 to take a number of very high-ranking general officers out on patrol with me and show them my areas of operations. I took out at the time the CENTCOM commander, Gen. John Abizaid, the commander of coalition forces in Iraq; Gen. George Casey, the commander of daily operations of coalition forces; and Gen. Pete Chiarelli, to name a few of the most senior generals. They rode in the front seat of my armored humvee while I road in the back seat; we talked each time for about two to three hours. So in a limited sense I gained a perspective on these senior American generals.

                        In taking these generals out on patrol and getting to know them, I never sensed that they new something that I and the rest of the world didn't and were afraid to tell us and their superiors. Instead, what I saw was deeply committed leaders to their duty, and to accomplishing the mission given to them by their country. In my eyes they were not derelict.

                        I think I know what moral courage is. I lost soldiers in my squadron. I spoke to their families shortly after they were killed and gave them an honest rendering of the death of their loved ones. In this sense, I have a perspective on moral courage. That perspective on moral courage combined with my perspective of senior American generals in Iraq in 2006 causes me to conclude that Col. Yingling is hugely off the mark in his condemnation of American generalship.

                        Others probably don't think so. Many in the American press and punditry laud him along with his condemnations as speaking truth to power. They assume that Col. Yingling must be right in his proclamations of failure by American generals because he as a serving, active army officer had a perspective on their actions and could reasonably draw conclusions on their performance.

                        Yet Col. Yingling had no informed perspective on these Generals and so those who quickly and happily embraced his conclusions should now reconsider. At least in the American Army today it is my impression that the majority of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers do not view their generals in the same sweeping and condemning light as does Col. Yingling.

                        Lt. Col. Gian P. Gentile is commander of the 8-10 Cavalry 4ID in Fort Hood.
                        "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                        • #57
                          Max Boot chimes in.

                          Sign Up

                          Fire the incompetents, find the Pattons
                          Our armed forces need to do a better job of punishing failure while rewarding those who succeed on the battlefield.
                          May 31, 2007

                          THE NAVY IS ON a tear. Last week, for the sixth time in six weeks, a skipper was relieved of command. The latest to get the sack was Cmdr. E.J. McClure of the guided missile destroyer Arleigh Burke, which had a "soft grounding" while heading back to port in the well-charted waters off Norfolk, Va.

                          These firings have sparked debate in military circles, with some critics from the other services charging that the Navy is guilty of a "zero defect" mentality that would have robbed it of such distinguished leaders as Adm. Chester Nimitz, the World War II hero who grounded his first command in 1908. But even if the Navy is going, so to speak, overboard, there is a good case to be made that the ground-combat arms go too far in the other direction by not holding their commanders responsible for a lack of results.

                          This was the essence of a complaint made recently by Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, who wrote in the Armed Forces Journal that "a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

                          Yingling was complaining about, as the title of his article had it, "A Failure in Generalship," and he was right to do so. But the same complaint could be lodged with equal justice about some of the lieutenant colonels and colonels who have commanded battalions and brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those are positions roughly equivalent to a ship commander in the Navy, and in a decentralized war like the one in Iraq, they are the key combat leaders.

                          There are precious few examples of an Army or Marine tactical commander being fired for ineffectiveness. One of the few exceptions occurred during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 when Marine Maj. Gen. James Mattis replaced a regimental commander he felt was not advancing fast enough. More commonly, it takes extreme misconduct, often of a sexual nature, to get a ground-forces commander fired.

                          For instance, there is Army Lt. Col. William H. Steele, a reservist who used to command Camp Cropper, the main U.S. detention facility in Baghdad. He faces possible prosecution for offenses including fraternizing "with the daughter of a detainee" and "possessing pornographic videos."

                          Another Steele (no relation to William H.) — Col. Michael Steele of the 101st Airborne Division — had his career ended in 2006 when he was reprimanded for not doing more to investigate and expose an incident in which four of his soldiers were accused of murdering three Iraqi detainees. Then there is the case of Janis Karpinski, who was busted from brigadier general to colonel because of dereliction of duty in the command of Abu Ghraib prison, as well as for a prior charge of shoplifting.

                          All these disciplinary actions seem justified. But many military observers wonder about holding to account those who aren't caught in public scandals but simply aren't effective leaders or who consistently fail to achieve results. No one should get cashiered for honest mistakes, especially if the errors are the result of calculated risk-taking in the volatile caldron of conflict. But if officers show themselves unable to perform effectively, they need to be sent packing.

                          Conversely, promising young leaders who prove their worth in the line of fire need to be promoted more rapidly than they are today under a ponderous peacetime personnel system. James Gavin, the celebrated commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II, became a brigadier general at 36. Curtis LeMay, one of the most successful airmen in history, was a major general at 37. Why is it that today such senior ranks are only held by graybeards with more than 30 years of service?

                          War imposes far different demands on soldiers than does the routine life of the garrison. Some who are perfectly adequate peacetime soldiers fail the audit of conflict and have to be shunted aside (as happened to hundreds of generals in the Civil War and World War II), while others who were malcontents in peacetime (think of Ulysses S. Grant or George S. Patton) excel on the battlefield and rocket to the top.

                          That winnowing-out process, which has been a hallmark of all of our previous major conflicts (at least the ones we won), has not occurred since 9/11. A good deal of the blame rests with President Bush, who has refused to punish incompetence until it's far too late, and sometimes not even then. Senior generals who have failed to get results in Iraq have received medals and promotions, not pink slips. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld was kept around long after his miscalculations had become plain. But accountability can't stop at the top. It has to extend down the chain of command. Otherwise our soldiers will pay a terrible price for a failure of leadership.

                          There is no better guidance in these matters than the words of British Field Marshal William Slim, the commander of Allied forces in Burma in World War II. He wrote: "The only test of generalship is success…. The soldier may comfort himself with the thought that, whatever the result, he has done his duty faithfully and steadfastly, but the commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory — for that is his duty."
                          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                          • #58
                            Fire the incompetents, find the Pattons

                            Amen brother, Amen!

                            My career survived the Viet Nam war, and well into the Cold War. But, I never saw a time when we needed warriors in command more than today. I look back on too many good sticks moved on to the airlines rather than take a PCO course. Today, the same thing is happening. And the threat is worse. We had a proven strategy to deal with the USSR. Right now we don't have a strategy to deal with violent Islam.

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