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  • #61
    Originally posted by Albany Rifles View Post
    In fact, by AUG 64, the Union forces at Richmond/Petersburg outnumbered Lee by only 9,000 (50,000 ANV - 59,000 - AOP/AOJ)...hardly an overwhelming force.
    I just finished reading this, Amazon.com: The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (9780684845692): Edwin B. Coddington: Books, and was surprised to see his calculation of forces at Gettysburg at 75K for ANV and 85.5K for the AOP. The "overwhelming" Union advantage in numbers appears to be much exaggerated when you dig down into the eaches and is fleeting.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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    • #62
      I came across this passage today. The passage itself is genuine, although because it's a second hand account, I can't corroborate/verify it. Nonetheless, based on accounts of Lee and what he thought of the ANV, I find it a very plausible account.

      "When hearing Grant referred to as a "Military Accident," with no distinguishing merit, one who had achieved success through a combination of fortunate circumstances, Lee responded by saying, "Sir, your opinion is a very poor compliment to me. We all thought Richmond protected, as it was, by our splendid fortifications and defended by our army of veterans, and could not be taken. Yet Grant turned his face to our capital and never turned it away until we had surrendered. Now, I have carefully searched the military records of both ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant's superior as a general. I doubt his superior can be found in all history." -- General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia
      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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      • #63
        Originally posted by Shek View Post
        I just finished reading this, Amazon.com: The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (9780684845692): Edwin B. Coddington: Books, and was surprised to see his calculation of forces at Gettysburg at 75K for ANV and 85.5K for the AOP. The "overwhelming" Union advantage in numbers appears to be much exaggerated when you dig down into the eaches and is fleeting.
        I read somewhere that the ANV calculated every single man on the rolls in their strength reports. The Federals only counted those under arms and with their units. In other words, if you've been detailed off to the Provost Marshal or the Commissariat, the Rebs counted you, but the Yanks did not. May not make any more than a few thousands difference, but there is some of the imbalance, right there.

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        • #64
          Originally posted by Bluesman View Post
          I read somewhere that the ANV calculated every single man on the rolls in their strength reports. The Federals only counted those under arms and with their units. In other words, if you've been detailed off to the Provost Marshal or the Commissariat, the Rebs counted you, but the Yanks did not. May not make any more than a few thousands difference, but there is some of the imbalance, right there.
          I'll have to pull out Coddington's book again, but he goes into great length about why the reported numbers that show a much larger gap are wrong. I do remember that Federals that are detailed out are counted in the numbers that Coddington uses. I also know that slave labor doing details (e.g. teamster duties) are not counted in Confederate numbers.

          It's also not limited to Gettysburg. The numerical differences between North and South during the Overland Campaign is also smaller than historically reported because Confederate numbers don't account for units that reported (back) to the ANV during the course of the campaign. There's an article from North and South Magazine that I picked up over the fall that detailed this. I got about 50% of the way through entering the numbers by hand so I could plot the strength by battle over the course of the campaign, but unfortunately, I lost the battle with time :(
          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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          • #65
            Originally posted by Shek View Post
            I came across this passage today. The passage itself is genuine, although because it's a second hand account, I can't corroborate/verify it. Nonetheless, based on accounts of Lee and what he thought of the ANV, I find it a very plausible account.
            Well, what would YOU say about the man that whipped you? That he was second-rate, and beat you anyway, or that he was peerless, a master of the military art?

            Furthermore, the key is right there in the passage:
            Yet Grant turned his face to our capital and never turned it away until we had surrendered.
            And that's what I've been saying right along: Grant's most exceptional quality among all of the military virtues that he most definitely and without question possessed in abundance was his strength of will. He simply would not STAY defeated. Time after time, he suffered reverses, setbacks, frustrations and yes, even defeats. But he would not STAY beaten, and when he was ready to come at you again - usually much sooner than his counterpart thought he would - he would grab on and hang in there until he had you.

            Now, I ask you: what IS war, but a contest of WILL and MEANS? Grant had limitless reserves of each, and that's what decided it.

            But I stand by this: Lee was demonstrably better, and if the two had exchanged situations, Lee could've whipped Grant faster and cheaper. I really don't even think it's a close call, but oh BOY, ain't it fun to take that as a hypothetical and argue against what is accepted as conventional wisdom by all us herd animals, proving thereby that independence of mind so valued in today's academic class?

            Hmph. I simply don't buy it.

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            • #66
              Keith,

              Unfortunately, Google Books only has a snippet view, so you can't look at the pages where he lays out the net assessment, but if you can get your hands on a copy of the book, look at pages 242-250. The book was published in 1968, so newer research could point out flaws in his calculations.

              The Gettysburg campaign: a study in ... - Google Books
              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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              • #67
                Gracious To A Fault

                Lee was quite a gentleman and would have been an excellent example for us all here at WAB.

                Keith's point about reversing matters would be an interesting scenario. Nonetheless, it seems that Grant was a thinking and learning soldier who assimilated lessons learned in military innovation and distilled them to a very useful elixir. He found the formula and had the determination to prosecute the war with all his available implements.

                He showed great operational acumen at Vicksburg. He showed immense strategic patience throughout the summer of 1864. He was victimized by battlefield foibles in a war replete with them on all sides. I'm uncertain what more he could have done under the circumstances as presented to him.

                I'm glad Lincoln and him were of accord.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                • #68
                  Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                  Lee was quite a gentleman and would have been an excellent example for us all here at WAB.

                  Keith's point about reversing matters would be an interesting scenario. Nonetheless, it seems that Grant was a thinking and learning soldier who assimilated lessons learned in military innovation and distilled them to a very useful elixir. He found the formula and had the determination to prosecute the war with all his available implements.

                  He showed great operational acumen at Vicksburg. He showed immense strategic patience throughout the summer of 1864. He was victimized by battlefield foibles in a war replete with them on all sides. I'm uncertain what more he could have done under the circumstances as presented to him.

                  I'm glad Lincoln and him were of accord.
                  All true. The man and the moment collided with calamitous results for the Confederacy. And it should never be forgotten that his right hand and his naval counterpart out west were also immense parts of his success. Having a Sherman and immense naval power led with such brilliance were key, and I'm not taking anything away from Grant by pointing that out: he still had to use it all properly, and he dam' sure did.

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                  • #69
                    Originally posted by Bluesman View Post
                    Well, what would YOU say about the man that whipped you? That he was second-rate, and beat you anyway, or that he was peerless, a master of the military art?
                    Keith,

                    If you look to our Vietnam history, you can see the denial that the North Vietnamese won. Instead, the hypotheses are almost always focused to why we lost. You could also look to the Lost Cause tradition, which rates Grant as simply who simply had to apply more resources without generalship to win. So, maybe Lee meant what he said, or maybe he was being respectful in the tradition that S-2 raised.

                    Originally posted by Bluesman
                    Furthermore, the key is right there in the passage:

                    And that's what I've been saying right along: Grant's most exceptional quality among all of the military virtues that he most definitely and without question possessed in abundance was his strength of will. He simply would not STAY defeated. Time after time, he suffered reverses, setbacks, frustrations and yes, even defeats. But he would not STAY beaten, and when he was ready to come at you again - usually much sooner than his counterpart thought he would - he would grab on and hang in there until he had you.
                    This may be tautological, but you're not defeated until you're defeated. Shiloh is a great example (and what a great quote, eh?). Having the presence of mind to know that you've got reinforcements on the way and to maintain that psychological advantage and spread it to subordinates, while an intangible, is signs of part of the genius of his generalship.

                    Originally posted by Bluesman
                    Now, I ask you: what IS war, but a contest of WILL and MEANS? Grant had limitless reserves of each, and that's what decided it.
                    But he didn't have limitless reserves of means. He certainly had plenty of logistics (and the genius to know how and where to bring them to bear), but he had scraped the bottom of the manpower barrel, bringing the heavies down from the DC defenses and taking risk in the right places to mass combat power in the places where it would reap the greatest rewards. He had an advantage (and once again, not as great as "conventional wisdom" makes it out to be), but it was an advantage that he created and brought to bear.

                    Originally posted by Bluesman
                    But I stand by this: Lee was demonstrably better, and if the two had exchanged situations, Lee could've whipped Grant faster and cheaper. I really don't even think it's a close call, but oh BOY, ain't it fun to take that as a hypothetical and argue against what is accepted as conventional wisdom by all us herd animals, proving thereby that independence of mind so valued in today's academic class?

                    Hmph. I simply don't buy it.
                    Grant played at a different level. He accepted and wanted to manage the strategic fight. He orchestrated the fight across theaters and within theaters. He had a vision and the genius to bring discordant pieces together in harmony.

                    Lee shunned it consistently, wanting only to be a theater commander. He finally accepted a general-in-chief role only because it was forced upon him. I'm not sure that he was as capable as Grant in managing war. He failings on day 3 at Gettysburg (a logistics failure, a reconnaissance failure, and a coordination failure) are very telling towards this end. His inability to mold his command team (the three corps from the reorganization prior to Gettysburg) into a synergistic element by 1864 is telling in my mind (contrast that to Grant's challenge, which was to impose a completely foreign style of fighting to the AOP - coping vs. set piece - within weeks).

                    As to "conventional wisdom," it often fails us. That's not to say that we should ignore it, but we shouldn't treat it as infallible.

                    I would be interested to hear how you see the 1864 Overland Campaign progressing under Lee and fighting against Grant.
                    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                    • #70
                      On a tangentially related topic. I have an amateur question that requires more informed insight: Why is it that the Confederacy routed Union forces in Chancellorsville, where Lee lost 25% of his army to casualties and inflicted barely more than 10% on Hooker, but failed to do so in the Wilderness, when AoV both inflicted more and suffered less punishment at 20% each, proportionally?

                      I understand that Hooker and his divisions turned tail; what I don't understand is the physical mechanism that caused Grant's army to stand firm whereas Hooker's disintegrated. Was Lee's victory achieved psychologically, in the sense that he put the AoP in a position wherein continuing resistance meant being wiped out, even though its losses up to the point of defeat was comparatively light?

                      Additionally, would any of you gents consider Fuller's study on Lee and Grant worth reading?
                      Last edited by Triple C; 17 Apr 10,, 09:31.
                      All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                      -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

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                      • #71
                        triple C,

                        Was Lee's victory achieved psychologically, in the sense that he put the AoP in a position wherein continuing resistance meant being wiped out, even though its losses up to the point of defeat was comparatively light?
                        it was psychological in nature-- the feeling that one side had the momentum. honestly, i think if hooker hadn't lost confidence in himself, he could have at minimum forced the ANV to withdraw on may 3. if he was aggressive, he could have destroyed the ANV in detail.

                        but lee read his man right, and drove hooker away. still, it was a Pyrrhic victory.
                        There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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                        • #72
                          4 words

                          Hooker instead of Grant

                          And one could also have said Meade instead of Grant.

                          That Joe Hooker was a courageous individual is indisputable. That he was an able administrator is also true. That he was an excellent division commander and pretty good corps commander is also true (see Lookout Mountain in NOV 63).

                          His problem was he read and believed his press, so to speak. As an Army commander, he actually stole the march on Lee to open the campaign. However, he lost his nerve in the face of Lee's aggressiveness....and when he was wounded he took counsel of his fears.


                          He should have listened to Darius Couch.


                          Grant, on the other hand, in the Overland Campaign, was trying to force a battle with Lee. the Wilderness was not of his choosing but it would suffice. Grant believed it was time to provide an inexorable pressure on the ANV and destroy it (along with a coordinated effort in the west) to knock out the Confederacy's means to continue to wage war.


                          Hooker had his eyes on the White House; Grant had his eyes on victory.
                          “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                          Mark Twain

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                          • #73
                            A few observations and questions.

                            It appears to my amateur eyes that finding the right pace of battle was a big challenge to ACW generals. Many commanders took weeks to organize and shadow-box without actually engaging in combat. Even when victorious much time was spent on reorganizing scattered forces before generals were confident to seek battle again. Grant did not seem to operate according to this pattern. The the Overland Campaign was not ten battles but a massive, 50 day engagement of virtually continuous combat and movement. To me, both Overland and Petersburg Campaigns have the appearance of modern war that would be fought in the twentieth century.

                            Would it be fair to say that the Grant put his stamp on a truly modern tempo of operations in ACW? A related phenomena is Grant's ability to put more corps into the fight than most friends and foes alike. Do you think the tempo of his operations and this ability to have more units engage the enemy at the same time a reflection of successful staff work?
                            All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                            -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

                            Comment


                            • #74
                              Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                              A few observations and questions.

                              It appears to my amateur eyes that finding the right pace of battle was a big challenge to ACW generals. Many commanders took weeks to organize and shadow-box without actually engaging in combat. Even when victorious much time was spent on reorganizing scattered forces before generals were confident to seek battle again. Grant did not seem to operate according to this pattern. The the Overland Campaign was not ten battles but a massive, 50 day engagement of virtually continuous combat and movement. To me, both Overland and Petersburg Campaigns have the appearance of modern war that would be fought in the twentieth century.
                              TC,
                              I think this is great analysis. As I'm reading through Rhea's multi-volume work on the Overland Campaign, I'm amazed at Grant's constant attempts to steal a march to either force Lee to fight on ground of his choosing (and less ground of his choosing vs. time of his choosing, i.e., trying to catch him on the move while Lee is trying to react) or to turn his flank. I'm halfway through the North Anna book and while he was quite unsuccessful at Spotsylvania following the typical ending of the narrative on Spotsylvania (due to weather, sending Sheridan south and thus depriving himself of his eyes, and a personal failure to appreciate the revolution in earthworks spawned by the continuous grind of the Overland Campaign), his efforts to turn Lee's flank are quite amazing.

                              Originally posted by Triple C
                              Would it be fair to say that the Grant put his stamp on a truly modern tempo of operations in ACW? A related phenomena is Grant's ability to put more corps into the fight than most friends and foes alike. Do you think the tempo of his operations and this ability to have more units engage the enemy at the same time a reflection of successful staff work?
                              On this point, Grant's failure to capitalize on his schemes are a result of a lack of staff work - he often hatched these ideas spontaneously and so there wasn't the time for the details to be attended to (e.g. clearing routes of march of the supply trains and ambulances, route reconnaissance of "short cuts"); taking tactical command of the AoP, an army that wasn't used to his spontaneous, coping style of warfare that saw a good offense as the best defense; and maintaining an awkward command relationship with Meade, almost relegating him at times to the role of a third wheel.
                              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                              • #75
                                One of the quotes in the current book I'm reading (Google Books - To the North Anna River: Grant and ... - Google Books, Amazon - Amazon.com: To the North Anna River: Grant And Lee, May 13-25, 1864 (Jules and Frances Landry Award Series)…) is from a Confederate soldier to talks about Grant "refusing to admit defeat." In thinking about this quote, it struck me that the quote is to a large extent, figuratively speaking, beneath Grant.

                                In thinking about this, Grant clearly was an operational/strategic level thinker. He understood the concept of a center of gravity (even though he wouldn't have recognized the term since Clausewitz, while published at the time, probably wasn't available in English, and even if so, wouldn't have been part of Grant's curriculum at any point), and that while it'd be nice to defeat the CoG at once (the ANV), it wasn't part of his expectation. Thus, tactical setbacks, while not preferred, simply meant that it was time to devise another means to attack the CoG. In looking at Grant's continual effort to devise a way to maintain the initiative and bring battle to the ANV on his terms, it becomes clear that an argument about "refusing to admit defeat" in large part misses the genius of Grant's generalship (although it does speak volumes to his character).
                                "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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